

## **State Legislative Decision-Making in the Face of Direct Democracy**

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Political scientists have long debated how legislative institutions *should* reflect the will of the people (Pitkin 1967), as well as how much they *do* reflect the will of the people (Rosenthal 1998). While a variety of means have been used to measure “the will of the people,” initiatives and referenda mark one intuitively appealing means of examining how the public expresses their views on a variety of issues. Initially, initiatives were enacted to make the government more responsive to the people (Magelby 1984). Recently, however, Gerber (1996; 1999) and others (Alexander 2002) suggest that the initiative process is susceptible to being co-opted by the very interest groups that it was meant to de-emphasize. Nonetheless, we suggest that initiative results mark a unique opportunity to understand the expressed will of the people. The reasons why will be outlined in turn.

State constitutions vary considerably in how the referendum process works and whether the state legislature has a role in either setting up the proposal on the ballot or overturning the results. Further, the states also offer a wide variety of legislative institutions to examine in the context of direct legislation. For example, several states have single-member districts for the upper chamber and multiple members representing the same geographic districts in the lower chamber. Idaho and Arizona are two such states that also allow legislative interaction with ballot issues.

On several occasions throughout the 1990s, Idaho voters overwhelmingly supported ballot initiatives to impose term limits on the state legislature. In 2001, the Idaho state legislature passed legislation that repealed these term limits. In 2000, Governor Hull of Arizona proposed a major education reform package to increase funding for both K-12 schools and state institutions of higher education through higher taxes. The state legislature adopted the reform package in a special session after a series of amendments seeking to reduce the size of the

package, weaken its support or replace it entirely. The reform package was placed on the ballot for the November 2000 election, and Proposition 301 passed.

In this paper we examine the votes of the Idaho legislature in repealing term limits imposed by a popular vote and the Arizona legislature in passing the reforms to be placed on the ballot. A number of issues can be assessed in this examination. First, are there differences across the two states considering that one was voting to place an issue on the ballot whereas the other was seeking to overturn a popular vote? Second, are there differences in legislative behavior between the single-member district system of the upper chambers and the multi-member system of the lower chambers? Third, do the legislators hew closely to the preferences of the district constituency as expressed in these ballot measures, and under what circumstances? Fourth, what impact do personal ideology and other legislator characteristics have on legislative votes as opposed to constituency characteristics and constituency preferences as expressed in these ballot issues? Finally, does legislative behavior vary on amendment votes as opposed to final roll calls on bills? To answer these questions, we analyze a series of votes in Idaho and Arizona that relate to ballot issues.

### **What Do We Know About Initiatives and State Legislators?**

Initiatives and referenda, means by which citizens vote directly on the issues rather than on candidates, were implemented in many states during the Progressive Era as a means to increase direct democracy (Magleby 1994). Direct legislation<sup>1</sup> is most common in Western States, and is found less often in the South and Northeast (Magleby 1984). In those states that allow for initiatives and referenda, the frequency of use has increased over the last few decades for a number of important policy issues.

Because the explicit purpose of initiatives and referenda is to make government more responsive to the people, it makes sense to briefly address the literature that asks whether this explicit goal has been reached, or whether the initiative process has been co-opted by moneyed interests. The literature is split fairly evenly on this issue. Gerber's research on initiatives (1996; 1999) suggests that direct democracy generally makes legislatures more responsive to popular opinion. Matsusaka's work supports the notion that initiatives tend to produce more responsive and representative legislatures (2001; Matsusaka and McCarty 2001). Nonetheless, this sanguine view of the initiative process is not universal.

A considerable amount of research suggests that direct democracy does not produce government policies that are more responsive to the will of the people. Using Erikson, Wright and McIver's (1996) data on public opinion in the states, Lascher, Hagen and Rochlin (1991) and Camobreco (1998) suggest that states with initiatives are no more responsive to public opinion than states without initiatives. Smith (2001) takes a slightly different look at this issue. While the other studies use the state legislature as the unit of analysis, Smith examines the issue from the perspective of the individual legislator and her constituents. Smith finds that on two issues (homosexual rights and late term abortions) legislative votes are predicted by the vote of each individual legislator's constituents. In other words, on these issues a legislator is most likely to respond to the opinion of her constituents, rather than the opinion of the state as a whole. Smith's findings are confounded slightly by his finding on a third issue (campaign finance reform), legislators seem to shirk their constituents' opinions.

In sum, the literature is divided. As it stands, we can make no definitive conclusions as to whether direct democracy produces more representative state policies. At the least, we must agree with Hagan, Lasher and Camobreco (2001) who note, "There remains good reason to

believe that in many policy domains, at least, initiatives do not make state governments more responsive to citizens” (2001: 1262).

In this study, we weigh in on this issue once again. We believe that our research design can help inform this question for two reasons. First, we examine two very different kinds of issues. Much of the work that has been done in this area examines only one type of issue or examines issues that are highly similar (Gerber 1996; 1999). We look at education policy and legislative term limits—two very different policy issues. Second, we look at Idaho and Arizona, two very different states<sup>2</sup>. More details on the nature of the states and the issues are discussed below, but suffice it to say, the variation in state context and in the type of policies addressed allow us to make broad generalizations about the responsiveness of state legislators to constituent opinion as measured through initiatives.

### **Legislative Representation and Decision-Making in the States**

While we specifically examine the nature of representation and decision-making in the face of direct democracy, certainly some work has been done in the general area of legislative decision-making and representation that informs our work. For instance, Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) have shown convincingly that there is rather tight congruence between the overall opinion of constituents (as measured through CBS/*New York Times* polls) and state policy. Unfortunately, we do not know why this is so or under what circumstances the representative/constituency linkage might weaken.

In addition to constituency characteristics, scholars have also found that party (Wright and Schaffner 2002), ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), fellow legislators (Arnold, Deen and Patterson 2000), media (Herbst 1998), and interest groups (Nownes 1999) all play a role in state

legislative decision-making. These studies give us a good place to begin, but we know little else about how state legislators make decisions (Moncrief, Thompson and Cassie 1996). In particular, we do not know much about how state legislators represent their constituents in the face of direct democracy.

### **Idaho and Arizona: The Nature of the States and the Issues**

In order to examine how state legislators respond to initiatives, we examine specific referenda and their corresponding legislative votes in two states: Arizona and Idaho. We choose these states and issues for several reasons. First and most importantly, each of these states has initiatives that were successful. Further, each state had a vote or series of votes that was directly related to the initiative. In Idaho, this vote came after the initiative vote and essentially nullified it. In Arizona, the vote came five months prior to the initiative vote and was consistent with the subsequent vote of the people.

Each initiative was also a highly salient issue in the state. Although Bowler and Donovan (1994) point out that most of the time voters do not know anything about the issues surrounding the initiative, we do not believe this was the case in either Arizona or Idaho. In Arizona, Proposition 301 was a major aspect of Governor Hull's agenda, it raised taxes substantially, and it received considerable media attention in the state. The Idaho legislature's decision to repeal term limits was salient enough to garner attention even from national media, such as the New York Times.

The final reason we examine these states is that each state employs a single-member district system in the lower house and a multi-member district system in the upper house, and the district boundaries are identical for both chambers. This unique structure (only four other states

have this system) enables us to test theories about the nature of representation of multi-member systems (Adams 1996; Cox 1990; Richardson and Russell 2001), as well as traditional questions of representation in the face of direct democracy. Next, we discuss in more detail the nature of the specific issues and votes we examine in each state.

### **Idaho - Term Limits**

In fall 2001, the Idaho legislature voted (50-20 in the House, and 26-8 in the Senate) to repeal term limits for state legislators. This vote was subsequently covered in a number of news media across the country, including the *New York Times*. Normally, a state legislative vote in Idaho would not have entered the radar screen of the national media, but this vote was different in one respect. It marked a clear and unequivocal case where a state legislature voted in direct opposition to citizen opinion. In 1994, the people of Idaho had voted overwhelmingly (59.3%) to enact term limit legislation in their state. The voters reasserted their support of term limits in follow-up votes in 1996, 1998, and 2000 (Janofsky 2002). When the Idaho state legislature voted to overturn term limits, it marked a time when the legislature was aware of the “will of the people” but decided to ignore this expressed will and vote as they pleased. Certainly, this vote runs counter to much of what we know about decision-making and representation in the states.

### **Arizona - Education Policy**

In Arizona, we examine the vote on Proposition 301 and the related legislative votes that implemented the major features of 301. Proposition 301 (passed in November, 2000) authorized a .6% increase in sales tax in order to support education. Although a portion of the tax revenues (20%) were authorized for higher education expenditures, the vast majority of the money was set aside for teacher salaries, repair of school buildings, and a variety of other expenditures intended for K-12 schools.

The legislative vote we examine to gauge legislator behavior on this subject was proposed in June 2000. SB 1007 was a particularly protracted and conflict-ridden battle. Seven amendments were proposed in the Senate and ten were proposed in the House. While the final vote in both houses was fairly one-sided (44-13 in the House and 23-5 in the Senate), we do not feel this is characteristic of the battle that ensued over this bill. As a result, in addition to using the legislators' final vote on SB 1007 to measure legislative behavior, we investigate the votes on a series of floor amendments that sought to reduce the size of the Governor's package and especially floor amendment #5, which was the House Speaker's alternative reform package. The vote on this amendment was particularly close (27-32), and it was the last major effort of those who opposed Governor Hull's education plan (which was later manifested in Prop. 301). In sum, this motion to amend was more important and more divisive than the final vote. All signs suggest that it was the key vote on this bill, and thus, it is the best gauge of legislative behavior on this issue.

### **Data and Hypotheses**

The purpose of this study is to find out how various institutional arrangements in two states change the nature of legislative representation. The institutional arrangements include 1) the presence of direct legislation immediately prior, or immediately following the legislative vote and 2) the presence of multi-member and single-member districts.

To answer these questions, we employ seven regression models. The first model examines the vote to overturn term limits in the Idaho House (multi-member districts). The second examines the vote to overturn term limits in the Idaho Senate (single-member districts). Models three through seven examine education reform in Arizona. The third model looks at the



third (and final) reading in the Arizona Senate. The fourth examines a summative scale of the Committee of the Whole (COW) votes in the Senate, including all the floor amendments seeking to weaken the Governor's education plan<sup>3</sup>. The fifth predicts a legislator's vote on the third (and final) reading in the Arizona House. The sixth looks at the total of the COW votes in the House, and the final model look at COW 5 in the House. We include independent variables for constituency characteristics and legislator characteristics. Each independent variable, along with its predicted relationship to the dependent variable is discussed below.

### **Legislator Characteristics**

*Personal Ideology.* We could employ any number of indicators to measure the personal characteristics of legislators. Indeed, most studies examining legislative representation and voting behavior utilize party (Smith 2002) and gender (Smith 2001), along with a number of other possible variables to measure legislator characteristics. These measures are chosen primarily because there is no extant consistent measure of state legislative ideology (Adams and Fastnow 1998; Wright and Schaffner 2002). In this study, however, we apply a measure of personal ideology, based on Bishin's FILTER scores of members of Congress (2002), to state legislators. Instead of measuring "action based ideology" in a manner similar to Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) nominate scores, FILTER uses the literature in social psychology to identify factors that "...reflect an individual's private beliefs or personal values" (Bishin 2002: 4). The supposition of the FILTER scores is that "background experiences influence ideology in a systematic way" (Bishin 2002: 16-17).

Bishin (2002) argues that FILTER scores are advantageous for a number of reasons. First, action-based measures of ideology can only express a legislator's preferences as evidenced through issues that are brought up for vote - "a small subset of the universe of issues with which

public officials deal” (Bishin 2002:5). Second, while specifically designed for measuring the ideology of members of Congress, FILTER can be applied to any elite group—including state legislators. In this paper we apply FILTER scores to state legislators for the first time. Next, we discuss how we created the FILTER score for state legislators. Third, the information needed to develop FILTER scores is available prior to the start of a legislative session. Fourth, the FILTER scores allow comparisons of elites across different institutions and jurisdictions. Finally, because neither ADA scores or NOMINATE scores are available for state legislators, the FILTER scores allow us to provide a proxy measure of ideology into the analysis.

FILTER, as initially created by Bishin (2002), is a scale created by collecting information about characteristics traditionally associated with ideology. Bishin then validates this scale against a survey of elites. He finds that his FILTER scores perform quite well in predicting ideology. Although Bishin presents a number of competing models in his work, he suggests that all perform similarly in predicting ideology. Due to data collection problems in the state legislature, as well as questions about operationalization, we opt for the FILTER scores presented in Table 2 of Bishin’s (2002) study. The factors that make up FILTER in this table include education, gender, south, north, farmer, black and party ID<sup>4</sup>. By combining these factors into one variable, we can account for a tremendous amount of the variation in legislator’s personal ideology (Bishin 2002). Our scores range from a low of 2.12 to a high of 4.05. In the end, we believe that FILTER can provide us with an opportunity to explain more variation in legislator ideology than any traditional demographic variable presented alone<sup>5</sup>.

*Electoral Support.* Although FILTER may adequately capture legislator ideology, other legislator characteristics can affect voting behavior. As Mayhew stated 30 years ago, legislators are primarily motivated by reelection (1972). We expect that legislators in Arizona and Idaho

who were elected by smaller margins in the previous election will be more likely to vote with the majority opinion. Previous electoral support was obtained from each state's board of elections and is measured 0-100%<sup>6</sup>.

*Tenure.* Remembering once again Mayhew's sage advice that reelection is the ultimate motivation of legislators, we hypothesize that legislators who have been in the chamber longer are less likely to be enthusiastic about term limits. After all, if a legislator with a long career in the chamber is facing involuntary expulsion from the legislature, it stands to reason that she will vote for a measure repealing term limits. We measure this variable as the number of years the legislator has served in either chamber of the state legislature.

### **Constituency Characteristics**

A number of studies of Congress have found that constituency influence weighs heavily in congressional decision-making (Overby 1991; Richardson and Munger 1990; Shapiro, Brady, Brody and Ferejohn 1990). Indeed, constituency influence is the variable we are most interested in for this study. Our most important measure of constituency influence is different than most, however. We measure constituency influence as the percent of the legislator's district that voted for the initiative of interest (Prop. 301 in AZ and Prop. 2 in ID). The variable ranges from 45-62% in the Arizona state legislative districts and 46-73% in Idaho state legislative districts. We gathered information for these votes from each state's board of elections.

In addition, we have included several more standard measures of constituency influence: district vote for president in the past election (Bush vote), percent of the district with a college education, and whether the district is rural. The district's support for Bush in the 2000 election is used as a proxy measure for the partisan preferences of the constituents (Kau, Keenan and Rubin 1982). Partisan preferences are difficult to assess in both cases because Republicans controlled

all legislative chambers and both governorships, but we hypothesize that Republican preferences are likely to oppose higher taxes (in the Arizona case) and favor term limits (in Idaho).

The percent of the district with a college education is expected to have an impact on the preferences for the education taxes in Arizona but not the term limits bill in Idaho. We expect that a more educated citizenry is more likely to support funding for education so Arizona legislators representing districts with more college graduates will support the votes allowing the education proposition. The data were taken from Lilley et al. (1994)<sup>7</sup>.

A rural legislator may experience a relationship with the constituency that shapes representation in a manner distinct from urban and suburban legislators, and rural/urban cleavages have long characterized many state legislatures (Key 1949; Jewell 1982). For example, rural legislators tend to place more emphasis on constituency service and spend more time on casework (Freeman and Richardson 1996), and distinct rural/urban differences exist in popular support for public policies (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). The rural distinction may be even more important for term limits because of the seniority and power held by many rural legislators (Rosenthal 1998), and we would expect rural legislators to be more likely to oppose term limits. We used the Lilley et al. (1994) data to create a dichotomous rural variable<sup>8</sup>.

## **Results**

To test the hypotheses developed above, we conducted separate analyses of the votes to repeal term limits in the Idaho House and Senate and several models of votes determining the educational package that was put before Arizona voters in proposition 301. Because there is little nuance or complexity available in the term limit repeal votes, we used the final vote in each

chamber on the repeal bills. Because it was a single vote with a dichotomous distribution, logistic regression analysis was employed.

The education proposition in Arizona allowed more complexity and nuance, and the legislative votes offered an opportunity to explore this variation. For both the House and the Senate, we conducted logistic regression analysis of the final reading of each bill. Of more interest, however, both chambers considered a series of Committee of the Whole (COW) amendments that were almost all designed to reduce the size of the Governor's reform package or weaken its support in the legislature. Because there was a series of amendments in both chambers, we created a summative scale of amendment support in both chambers and analyzed these variables with OLS regression. Positive support of these amendments was contrary to support for the proposition. In addition, one key COW vote in the House was analyzed separately because it was the amendment that would replace the Governor's reform package with the Speaker's smaller package. Because the vote was dichotomous, we used logistic regression.

### **Idaho Results**

The results of the logistic regression analysis for the term limits repeal votes in Idaho suggest little impact for the preferences of the district as expressed through votes on propositions. As the results in table 1 indicate, the district vote is not significant in either chamber, and the relationship is positive so legislators from districts with high support for term limits were more likely to vote to repeal. Clearly, this result is counter-majoritarian in nature.

An assessment of the results for the two chambers in Idaho suggests that the ideology of the legislator as measured by the FILTER score and the partisan preferences of the district as expressed in support for Bush in the 2000 election had consistently positive coefficients in both chambers. Conservative legislators and legislators representing districts exhibiting stronger

Republican support were much more likely to favor the repeal of term limits. The FILTER and Bush Vote variables were significant in the House, but possibly due to the small sample size they were not significant in the Senate. Clearly, given the overwhelming Republican control of Idaho politics, this result is not a surprise. Republicans and conservatives had the incentive to protect this dominance, and they had the luxury of being able to counter the popular will with little chance of losing partisan control of the legislature with a 62-8 advantage in the House and a 32-3 difference in the Senate.

The other two variables did not behave as expected. The tenure of the legislator was positive but insignificant in the House and negative in the Senate. Legislators with more time in service may have much at stake by staying in office, but younger legislators with career aspirations may be just as motivated to remove term limits from the equation.

The rural variable was inconsistent with expectations by displaying a negative coefficient. Rural legislators were less likely to support repeal of term limits in both chambers, and the variable was significant in the House. This result runs counter to what Smith (2002) found for the Idaho term limits repeal, and it suggests that the personal ideology of the legislator as measured by FILTER may capture much of the explanatory power offered by rural/urban differences.

Finally, it is difficult to argue that major differences exist between the two chambers in Idaho despite the contrasting electoral systems of the two chambers. The significant personal ideology and district partisanship effects in the House are not significant in the Senate, but they are in the same direction and the sample size is much smaller. The only variable to behave differently between the two chambers was tenure, but it was not significant in either case.

## Arizona Results

As one can see in Table 2, the model for the Senate final reading of the bill displays no significant coefficients. Given the small sample size of 28, this is not surprising. Overall, only two variables are in the expected direction: conservative personal ideology (FILTER) makes one less likely to support the bill and legislators with a high number of college graduates supported the bill. On the other hand, senators with greater electoral support were more likely to support the final bill, and legislators with more Republican-leaning districts were more likely to support the final bill. Most importantly, the senators from districts with more support for the proposition were more likely to vote against the bill. Similar to Idaho, the senators voted against their own district majorities on a policy issue.

Because much of the battle over the education package took place in the series of COW amendments, the final bill may not be the best measure of senate behavior. The second column of table 2 shows the regression analysis for the scale of amendment support. The dependent variable is coded so that a positive value indicates opposition to the reform package that was adopted in the proposition. Consistent with the results for the final bill (but with an opposite coefficient), conservative legislators opposed the Governor's reform package, and the personal ideology variable was the only significant coefficient in the model. Further, those senators from districts with greater support for the proposition were more likely to vote to weaken the reform package. Again, the senators voted against the majority preference of their own constituencies. The margin and college coefficients were consistent in meaning with the final bill results, but interestingly legislators from districts with greater support for Bush were more likely to vote for the amendments weakening the bill even though they were also more likely to vote for the final bill that did not include those amendments.

Turning to the results for the Arizona house (in columns 3, 4, and 5), one can see a pattern of one significant variable for the final bill model and several significant variables for the amendment scale and the key amendment (COW 5) models. Considering that much of the legislative action took place in the amendment process, it is valuable to see the political dynamics reveal themselves more at that legislative stage. The coefficients for the final bill reading have only one significant variable: Bush vote. Legislators who had more Bush support in the district were more likely to try to kill the bill that set up the proposition election. Further, conservative personal ideology led House members to oppose the final bill. Similar to the findings for the Senate, legislators from districts with greater support for the proposition were more likely to try to kill the bill that allowed the proposition. Although the variable is not significant, it still indicates a vote against the majority preferences in the legislator's district.

The results for the amendment votes are particularly telling for the district support of the proposition. In both cases, legislators voted against the district preferences as revealed in the proposition vote, and on the key amendment determining the fate of the Governor's reform package the counter-majority variable was significant at the .01 level. It is notable that in all the cases examined the legislators voted against the district preference as expressed in propositions, but the only time the variable was significant was on a crucial amendment that most constituents would never see or probably understand.

The analysis of the amendments shows that personal ideology was again a strong factor in that conservatives were significantly more likely to vote for the amendments weakening the reform package. Further, though not significant, the Bush vote was also positively associated with these efforts to limit the Governor's package. Considering that the Governor and the Speaker offering the key amendment trying to kill the reform package were of the same party



(Republican), the combination of strong conservative personal ideology and district Republican support with the significant counter-majority vote may offer some support of the notion that House members in a multi-member district system are more extreme in their preferences and actions (Adams 1996).

The only real impact of constituency influence in the Arizona House was the college variable. Legislators from districts with more college graduates were more likely to vote against the amendments or in favor of the bill (and therefore the proposition). Although it is not a direct measure of preferences, this argument relies on the notion that college graduates would be more likely to support funding and taxes for K-12 education and higher education so a positive relationship between the percent of college graduates and support for the reform package at least indirectly suggests constituency influence.

### **Conclusion**

Our study has provided four major insights that should aid in the future study of state legislative representation. First, we find that state legislators do not always follow the opinions of their constituents. This is particularly surprising because in our study we explicitly examine an issue (in Idaho) where legislators knew the opinions of their constituents prior to the legislative vote, thereby eliminating the possibility that legislators do not represent their constituents' interests merely because they have no way of knowing what their constituents want and believe.

Initially, our findings seem to disagree with the findings of Smith (2001), but upon further examination the two are not entirely inconsistent. Smith finds that on two issues (homosexual rights and late term abortion), legislators' opinions are not inconsistent with the

opinions of their constituents, while on a third (campaign finance reform) legislators appear to shirk the opinions of their constituents. We find that on both issues we examine (term limits in Idaho and education reform in Arizona) legislators respond much more acutely to their own personal ideology than to the constituents' expressed will. It appears then that legislators respond to their constituents much more readily on issues dealing with morality (Haider-Markel 1999), which may relate to the salience of the issue as well as the more simple symbolic meaning of such votes. It may be that legislators have more wiggle room when the issue is perceived to be a process issue (such as term limits or campaign finance reform) or a complex issue with subtle variations in degrees of support (such as funding for education).

Second, we apply a measure of personal ideology to the study of state legislators. Because the study of state legislatures is notably absent any competing measures of ideology, FILTER scores provide a new way to capture personal ideology in the state legislature. Future studies should continue to examine the applicability of FILTER scores to a variety of issues, and compare it to measures of ideological behavior that may be developed.

Third, our data provide mixed evidence about whether multi-member districts produce more ideologically extreme legislators as Adams (1996) suggests. We find that the multi-member Idaho House produces somewhat more ideologically extreme legislators to the degree that personal ideology was significant in the House but not the Senate, but it is not glaringly strong evidence. Similarly, our findings for Arizona suggest that House members were more likely to vote against district preferences and in accord with partisan preferences. In the end, we are unable to discern conclusively whether the unique representational structure of Idaho and Arizona produces a different sort of legislator in the two electoral systems.

Finally, in this study we make use of legislative amendments (most of which failed) in order to measure legislative voting behavior. Traditional models of legislative behavior often ignore analysis of amendments, instead focusing on the final vote as the preferred dependent variable. We believe that this is somewhat shortsighted. By examining votes on legislative amendments, we can examine a form of legislative behavior oft-ignored in the literature. Unfortunately, many states (including Arizona) do not generally keep failed amendments, relegating them to the waste-basket. State legislative scholars need to make a concerted effort to ensure that these valuable records of state government in action are not lost.

In sum, we have examined how legislators represent the interests of their constituents in a unique context—when confronted with the expressed will of the people. Using a new method of legislator ideology, we find that legislators often shirk the opinions of their constituents in favor of their own preferences. This effect seems to be attenuated some by the type of issue that is examined.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> For an excellent discussion of the various types of direct legislation, see Magleby (1994: 219-222)

<sup>2</sup> These states vary as to professionalism (King 2000), policy liberalism (Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993), and interest group influence (Thomas and Hrebener 1996).

<sup>3</sup> The fifth Senate floor amendment was dropped because it was not clearly opposed to the Governor's plan, and the legislators' behavior on this amendment was inconsistent with the other amendments.

<sup>4</sup> Education is coded as 1=HS degree, or less; 2=some college; 3=college degree; 4=Masters degree; 5=JD, MBA, LLB, Bachelor in Law; 6=MD, PhD, EdD. The others are a series of dichotomous variables: 1=female; 0=male, 1=south; 0=other, 1=north; 0=other, 1=farmer; 0=not farmer, 1=black; 0=not black, 1=Republican; 0=Democrat. Because of the extremely small number of African-Americans in either state, we included all Hispanic and Native American legislators in a minority variable rather than just blacks. Whereas measures of the ideology of Hispanics nationwide can be complex due to the conservative and Republican nature of Cuban-American voters, Hispanics in Arizona have been more consistently supportive of liberal candidates. Also, the north and south variables fell out of the equation for both states because of the way Bishin codes the variables and our sample of states.

<sup>5</sup> We tested each of our models with the FILTER variable taken out of the model and various legislator characteristics included. This change in model specification had only one consistent impact on the models. Because the FILTER scores and the districts percent vote for Bush in the 2000 election were highly correlated at .790, the Bush vote variable was typically insignificant in the presence of the FILTER scores and significant when FILTER scores were removed.

<sup>6</sup> Because of the multi-member district system in the lower chamber of both states, marginality is more complex than in single-member district systems. In a single-member district system a legislator can closely watch the 50% vote level, and many scholars have argued that legislators winning less than 55% of the vote are marginal. In multi-member elections, some legislators win with as little as 25% of the vote depending on the number of candidates and how support is divided among the candidates so marginality is more difficult to assess. Therefore, we used the total percent of electoral support for each member. Therefore, higher numbers indicate that a legislator is less marginal.

<sup>7</sup> The education variable was also tested for the Idaho votes, but it was not significant. Given the small sample size, we decided for the sake of parsimony to leave it out of the models for Idaho.

<sup>8</sup> We tested rural for both Arizona and Idaho, but it was not significant in Arizona so we dropped it from the results listed in the tables. Although rural/urban differences exist in the quality of education, there is no strong theoretical justification for the rural variable having an impact on the education proposition votes beyond the preferences expressed by voters in the district proposition vote. It is also true that many of the other variables are highly collinear with rural, such as support for Bush, percent of college graduates, and FILTER.

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**Table 1:** Logistic Regression Results for Idaho Votes on Term Limits

Variables	House	Senate
FILTER	1.687* (.762)	4.129 (2.766)
District Vote on Proposition	1.090 (5.737)	12.056 (10.606)
Bush Vote	6.026* (2.849)	1.171 (3.994)
Tenure	0.131 (.083)	-0.144 (.113)
Rural	-1.684* (.832)	-1.579 (1.354)
Constant	-10.143* (4.316)	-20.101 (11.902)
Model Chi Square (Probability)	25.418 .000	13.628 .018
Nagelkerke R-square	.436	.490
Sample Size	70	35
% Correctly Predicted	81.4	88.6

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors

\* indicates significance at the .05 level

\*\* indicates significance at the .01 level



**Table 2:** Regression Results for Arizona Votes on Education Reform

Variables	Senate Final Read	Senate Total COW Votes	House Final Read	House Total COW Votes	House COW 5
Vote relative to proposition	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Con
FILTER	-17.769 (11.228)	2.593* (1.039)	-3.020 (3.287)	7.096** (2.203)	4.595* (2.168)
District Vote on Proposition	-44.654 (30.442)	12.390 (10.970)	-12.489 (14.410)	38.780 (22.092)	36.783** (13.836)
Bush Vote	41.708 (35.122)	2.541 (6.810)	-31.004* (13.684)	22.601 (14.164)	8.719 (8.386)
Previous Electoral Support	7.3140 (4.769)	-1.326 (2.157)	11.329 (6.763)	-8.528 (9.140)	-0.649 (4.965)
% College	27.253 (21.134)	-2.550 (5.268)	10.845 (8.278)	-34.062** (11.199)	-21.425** (8.120)
Constant	52.964 (33.161)	-11.488 (6.769)	27.971 (16.226)	-34.873** (13.404)	-33.598** (11.119)
Model X <sup>2</sup> / F Test	13.842	4.122	25.936	10.168	38.035
Probability	.017	.009	.000	.000	.000
R Square	.641 <sup>+</sup>	.366 <sup>&amp;</sup>	.574 <sup>+</sup>	.441 <sup>&amp;</sup>	.635 <sup>+</sup>
Sample Size	28	28	56	59	59
% Correctly Predicted	89.3	-	87.5	-	83.1

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors

\* indicates significance at the .05 level

\*\* indicates significance at the .01 level

Note: <sup>+</sup> = Nagelkerke R Square for logistic regression

<sup>&</sup> = Adjusted R Square