

The Diminished Citizenship of Felons and the Determinants of their
Invisible Punishment among the American States*

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The convicted offender returns to the community sans a full status and sans his respectability. . . . The law preserves his prison stripes despite the myth of "having paid one's debt to society." (Reed and Nance 1972, 27-30)

Felons are diminished citizens of the United States. Even when pardoned for their crimes, or just having their basic civil and political rights restored, the majority of felons remain, according to public policy and personal experiences, less than full citizens. Social class and social capital afford some felons like George Steinbrenner and Martha Stewart opportunities to overcome their diminished citizenship. Nonetheless, criminal convictions for felonies – crimes punishable by at least one year in state or federal prison – normally yield and sustain a reduced citizenship. It is comprised of a bundle of rights, benefits, obligations, and standing that is smaller for those judged guilty of offending the community and the state than for those charged but not convicted of crimes and those who have never been charged with them. In short, a *felonious citizenship* exists in America. It exists as public policy despite its contradiction of public opinion regarding the treatment of felons as citizens, at least when they are not incarcerated (Zogby International 2007; Manza, Brooks, and Uggen 2004; Heumann, Pinaire, and Clark 2005; Pinaire, Heumann, and Bilotta 2004; Immerwahr and Johnson 2002). It exists according to and is enforced by the laws of the states, as well as the nation. But, in some states felons are more equal to nonfelons (i.e., people not convicted of felonies) in their status as citizens.

The degree of diminished citizenship for felons depends on where they reside, not just the types of crimes that resulted in their convictions (Love 2005). Vermont and Maine, for example, allow all felons to possess the franchise just like nonfelons, albeit incarcerated felons must vote via absentee ballot. Yet other states (e.g., Kentucky and Maryland) ban felons from the ballot box for life. Felons elsewhere are less equal than nonfelons. Drug-related felons in Alabama, California, and twenty other states, for instance, are banned for life from receiving welfare, regardless of their need for public benefits, even if their need is greater than that of nonfelons. Six states (Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Carolina) prohibit felons from being employed by the public sector, inclusive of county, state, and federal government jobs (Petersilia 2003, 115). Thus, there is a continuum of citizenship for people convicted of felonies, ranging from extremely diminished citizenship to almost full citizenship. *Given that all states in some way treat felons as deviant citizens, what explains the variation in the citizenship of felons among the states? Why do some states require felons to carry smaller bundles of rights, obligations, benefits, and standing than other states?*

State variation in the degree of citizenship possessed by people following felony convictions is the focus of our study. We attempt to determine why the citizenship of felons is more diminished in some states than other states. We employ multivariate analyses to examine the effects of a set of political factors on the variation in felonious citizenship among the states. In studying the citizenship of felons we concentrate on their “invisible punishment,” the administrative sanctions associated with criminal convictions that are determined by states, that reduce the citizenship of felons, and whose full sweep is often unknown to policymakers, judges, attorneys, and felons (Mele and Miller 2005; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002).

Unlike previous research on felons as citizens, we look both at and beyond voting as a measure of citizenship. Political science research on felons as citizens tends to focus on a single dependent variable, namely disenfranchisement (Hull 2006; Brown-Dean 2003; Middlemass 2006; Preuhs 2001). Its emphasis on the franchise is understandable. Voting is a key characteristic of American citizenship. It is also a fundamental right of members of the polity. Yet the possession and retention of the franchise is not the only or perhaps the most pivotal characteristic of contemporary American citizenship (Shklar 1991).

Another distinction between our research and the existing scholarship is that we focus on the effects of interest groups on the citizenship of felons. Much of the current political analysis of post-felony citizenship emphasizes the import of political institutions, partisan competition, and group threat (i.e., competition and conflict). It does so to the exclusion of the presence, mobilization, and influence of interests groups. We contend that the diminished citizenship of felons is the political manifestation of organized interests contesting the place of felons in the polity.

Our findings, based on an original dataset, demonstrate that aspects of interest group politics, political institutions, and race affect the diminished citizenship for felons across the states. Thus, we extend the work of scholars studying the politics of punishment among the states and how the politics of punishment affects crime, public safety, race, and governance (Weaver 2007; Gottschalk 2007; Yates and Fording 2005; Zimring et al. 2001; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). In particular, we build upon studies that specifically consider the citizenship of felons in terms of disenfranchisement (Manza and Uggen 2006; Hull 2006; Preuhs 2001).

FELONIOUS CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES

Felons are among the fastest growing population in the United States. From 1988 through 2004 state court convictions for felonies rose by 61 percent, increasing from 667,366 adults to 1,078,920 (Langan & Brown 1997; Durose & Langan 2007).¹ That number only counts new felony convictions.² A portion of them were recidivists. But most people living in the United States who already possessed felony convictions were not accounted for in those numbers. Furthermore, while a majority of state felony convictions are accompanied by prison sentences (e.g., 70 percent in 2004) most felons at any given time dwell among us, not behind prison walls, razor wire, or cell bars. This is because of an iron law of corrections, “they all come back” (Travis 2005). Save for the few who die in prison at the hands of the state, other inmates, or God, most felons not already “serving time on the outside” ultimately gain release from their confinement. Returning from what some felons call “state-paid vacations,” they seek to pick up where they left off as citizens.³

Interestingly, when most people talk about felons it is almost never in relation to their status as citizens. “When criminologists,” for instance, “talk about ‘citizens,’ they generally use the term in opposition to convicted offenders, placing criminals on one side of the ledger and the law-abiding community residents on the other” (Uggen and Manza 2005, 67). This seems to be true when policymakers, including state representatives, correctional, parole, and probation administrators, talk about felons, even after their incarceration, as offenders. The assumption is that felons and citizens are mutually exclusive terms. They are not.

People convicted of felonies are and remain citizens of the United States, albeit discredited ones. They retain obligations (e.g., paying governmental taxes, charges, and fees), fulfill duties (e.g., serving in the military), and contribute to the polity (e.g., volunteering with community-based programs). Many are “good citizens,” in the language of Judith Shklar (1991, 6); “whether in private or in public, the good citizen does something to support democratic habits and the constitutional order.” Amid the cautionary tales and horror stories of recidivism are lives of redeemed citizenship, whereby offenders offend no more

¹ A way to put the growth of felons in perspective is to compare their growth to the population demographers frequently attend to, namely Latinos. Although comparable data is difficult to identify, we know that the growth rate for Latinos from 1990 to 2000 was 58 percent. So, the felon population is growing as fast if not faster than the Latinos.

² The U.S Bureau of Justice Statistics (Durose & Langan 2007, 2) reports that a plurality of the state felony convictions (34 percent) were for nonviolent drug offenses, followed by property offenses (29 percent), violent offenses (18 percent), “other offenses” (17 percent), and weapon offenses without the use of violence (3 percent).

³ Anonymous, Georgia STANDUP Alliance Meeting on Ex-Prisoner Reentry, Atlanta, Georgia, April 18, 2008.

and make life better for themselves and others. Regardless of their goodness of citizenship, however, felons in the United States generally tend to be diminished citizens.

Statutes, primarily state ones determine the degree of diminished citizenship for most people convicted of felonies. Accordingly, reductions in citizenship for criminal convictions vary across the 50 states. The diminished citizenship of felons is manifested by “collateral consequences” that accompany criminal convictions. Specific consequences differ state by state, but routinely relate to voting, employment, firearms, public benefits, parental rights, civil forfeitures, and residential registration (see Table 1). Depending upon their number and type, the consequences greatly or minimally reduce the fullness of citizenship possessed by felons as members of the polity.

For policymakers, collateral consequences are not punishments. They are restrictions. In the view of most scholars and in the minds of felons, the administrative sanctions associated with criminal convictions constitute punishment. It is punishment “accomplished through the diminution of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal residency in the United States” (Travis 2002, 15-16). Even prosecutors acknowledge that “collateral consequences are simply a new form of mandated sentences” (Johnson 2008). Collectively and individually, they are sentences and punishments that influence the size and shape of the bundles of citizenship felons carry with them, be they inside or outside prison. They constitute perpetual punishment that may produce and retain an infrastructure of impediments to the positive reintegration of felons as full citizens. As one felon remarked recently, “We’re dealing with a system that won’t ever let you forget your offense.”⁴

States are able to never forget the offenses of felons and may impose perpetual punishment, particularly in opaque ways, because they are “deviant” citizens; their negative social constructions as undeserving and their weakness in terms of political power foster an inability to routinely and consistently claim with authority and receive greater allocations of benefits and lesser burdens (Schneider and Ingram 1993). It is true that the social constructions of groups are not necessarily fixed in the United States (Lieberman 1995, 439). Yet those of felons are perhaps the least malleable of all social constructions. “Once a criminal,” as the adage goes, “always a criminal.” Therefore, the typical felon, as Groffman (1963, 3) reminds us regarding stigmatized persons generally, “is thus reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.” As such, the bundles of rights, obligations, and benefits of felons are smaller and different than those carried by other recognized members of the polity. Consequently, the degree of civil respect and societal esteem, the “standing,” granted to felons as members of the polity is reduced (Shklar 1991).

Social scientists observe that felons “gradually become more accustomed to the wide range of restrictions, deprivations, and indignities that institutional life imposes” (Haney 2004, 39). They accept their diminished citizenship, even if they abhor it. This possibly explains the ease with which policymakers maintain reductions in the citizenship of felons. As for the political effects of felonious citizenship, the reduced standing of felons may negatively affect their perceptions of individual and collective efficacy as political actors, especially their rights to participate, fulfill obligations, and receive benefits (Cardinale 2004; Fairchild 1977). The stigmatized citizenship of felons as deviants also influences their political behavior, particularly in ways that further reduce their legitimacy as citizens (Burch 2007; Uggen and Manza 2004). These findings parallel the research on “dependent” citizens such as welfare recipients and public mental health consumers, groups that are legally deserving of full citizenship and have legitimate claims for assistance but that are often perceived to truly be “deviant” citizens in the mind of the body politic (Soss 2000; Gilliom 2001; Faller 2002; Hancock 2004; also see Mettler and Soss 2004).

⁴ Anonymous, “Legislative and Legal Strategies to Address the Collateral Impacts of Incarceration and Reentry,” Community Voices Freedom’s Voice Conference, Atlanta, GA, April 10, 2008.

The diminished citizenship of felons due to their deviance fits within the two dominant perspectives on citizenship. As Olson (2008, 40) observes:

The predominant conception of citizenship in contemporary democracies is a liberal-democratic one. In this view, citizenship is a society's legal recognition of the democratic equality of its members. A citizen, correspondingly, is an autonomous subject entitled to exercise certain rights and expected to fulfill certain obligations. In recent years, however, this picture has grown increasingly complex. "Governmental" approaches . . . claim that citizenship is not simply a legal status conferring political rights and obligations, but one that additionally shapes identities and forms of subjectivity. Here citizenship not only certifies political membership, but more profoundly serves as a means of social differentiation and of fabricating interests, opinions, and preferences.

The perspectives are not mutually exclusive in relation to understanding felonious citizenship. The act of states reducing the rights and obligations of felons fits with the first view of citizenship. States grant its residents degrees of citizenship based on their entitlement. In the case of felons, based on their offending of laws and standards, states judge their entitlement to be weaker than nonfelons and therefore diminish, but do not deny entirely, their citizenship in the polity. Subsequently, the status of felons as diminished citizens via civil sanctions creates and sustains degrees of differentiation between felons and nonfelons as equal citizens, as well as among felons. Regardless, the differentiation between felons and nonfelons is marked by an inequitable distribution of the three sets of rights normally afforded citizens within a polity, namely social, political, and civil rights (Marshall 1950).

Taken together, when considering citizenship in relation to people convicted of crimes it is best to think of a continuum. On one end of the continuum is full citizenship. Full citizens possess all rights, benefits, obligations, and standing afforded them by nature of their birth or naturalization in the United States. Convictions for felonies reduce citizenship. Again, the reduction in rights, benefits, obligations, and standing of felons as citizens varies from state to state, and it often varies by type of felony conviction. The restoration of civil and political rights, as well as pardons, for felons may recapture much of the former citizenship of felons when they were nonfelons. However, the complete restoration of felons as full citizens is often unlikely. First, felons are not necessarily guaranteed the restoration of all of their rights. For example, persons convicted of weapons-related felonies may not have their right to bear arms returned to them. Second, pardons, which are rare rather than routine, do not mean that criminal convictions are vacated. In other words, a pardon does expunge a criminal record. Third, the "felon" (or offender) label is one that stigmatizes its subject and influences the opportunity for positive reintegration.

HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE DIMINISHED CITIZENSHIP OF FELONS

In recent years the citizenship of people convicted of felonies in the United States has emerged as a domestic issue worthy of public examination and scholarly analysis. One catalyst for the movement of the treatment of felons *qua* citizens onto the governmental agenda and into academic venues was the media coverage of the Presidential Elections of 2000. It raised awareness about citizens being prevented from voting due to felony convictions and voter roll purges of felons, factual and fictive. It also highlighted the political consequences of the differential treatment of felons as citizens in relation to their political behavior as voters (Burch 2007; Uggen and Manza 2004), the potential effects on the political influence of minority communities (Ochs 2006), and partisan competition and election outcomes (Manza and Uggen 2006).

Another catalyst for the recent political inquiry and academic analysis of felons as citizens is the domestic challenge posed by decarceration and ex-prisoner reentry. Annually, federal and state prisons release approximately 700,000 people, and the number is predicted to increase over the next decade (Travis

2005). The scale of ex-prisoner reentry raises questions about the ability of felons to transition into society as responsible citizens, as well as how public policies constructing and circumscribing their citizenship influence their likelihood of desisting from crime (Braithewaite 1989; Petersilia 2003; Pager 2007).

The explosive rates of incarceration over the last four decades has also prompted examinations of felons, including inmates, as citizens and raised the issue of the broader meaning of mass incarceration for a democratic nation, especially in terms of the politics of punishment and punishment as politics (Gottschalk 2007; Simon 2007; Yates and Fording 2005; Smith 2004; Garland 2001; Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001; Katzenstein 2005).

Finally, the increase in the “discovery of innocence” and felony exonerations elevates the subject of the citizenship of felons, particularly with regard to the unfair loss of full citizenship by people wrongfully convicted of crimes (Baumgartner, de Boef, and Boydston 2008).

Academics and activists have identified the characters and consequences of the citizenship of felons in the United States. Key works in this area, which we label “felonious citizenship studies,” have been done by scholars with an activist bent and by attorneys affiliated with nongovernmental organizations and interest groups such as the Sentencing Project, the Legal Action Center, and the American Civil Liberties Union. In particular, the Legal Action Center (2004) has done yeoman work in ranking and grading the states in terms of their “roadblocks to reentry” (i.e., state policies that may hinder the positive reintegration of felons into society following their convictions and/or imprisonment). Its activities build upon the earlier work of criminologists to discern differences among the states in their treatment of felons as citizens (Mele and Miller 2005; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002; Buckler and Travis 2003; Olivares, Burton, Cullen 1996; Burton, Cullen, and Travis 1987).

Nonetheless, the extant work in felonious citizenship studies remains more descriptive, philosophical, juridical, and normative than theoretical and empirical (e.g., Reiman 2005; LaFollette 2005; Demleitner 1999; Hull 2006; Mele and Miller 2005; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002). The exception is research related to an important element of post-felony citizenship, namely felon disenfranchisement, which one would readily associate with the domain and questions of political science (Burch 2007; Brown-Dean 2003; Manza and Uggen 2006; Middlemass 2006; Preuhs 2001; Campbell 2007). Yet, even that research is limited because it only focuses on a single aspect of citizenship, ballot access. Overall, the result is an odd dearth of rigorous research discerning causal explanations for the variation in citizenship status for felons across the states.

A review of the literature on the politics of punishment in the United States yields a set of hypotheses for explaining the variation in felonious citizenship among the states. They correspond to traditional foci within political science research: (1) interest groups, (2) political institutions, and (3) partisan competition.

Interest Group Influence

Numerous studies empirically examine the rising incarceration rates among the states. Among the more intriguing research is the work of Gottschalk (2006, 9), which hypothesizes that interest articulation and demand, especially on the part of groups that are “not the usual suspects in [criminal] policy and yet have played pivotal roles in making public policy more punitive,” account for much of the increase in the “carceral state” since the 1960s. Specifically, Gottschalk contends that expanded use of incarceration as punishment of felons resulted from the unintentional alignment of normally conflicting interests. In particular, she posits that the political activities of the feminist movement, the emergence of a prisoner’s rights movement centered on using the courts to improve conditions for felons, and the rise of the victims

rights lobby permitted the expansion of the carceral state without public deliberations about the goals and consequences of it.

In the area of crime policymaking, the feminist (women's liberation) movement, at least over the last forty years, has tended to favor policies that impose punishment over rehabilitation. It has forthrightly pursued the enactment of state laws to punish perpetrators of domestic abuse and sexual violence. Among its rewards are that we no longer equate or rationalize the battery of women in their homes by male partners as a private action without public consequences and we now find it unthinkable for anyone to adopt the view of battery as something that should be and is less than criminal. At the same time, however, according to dominant arguments, the benefits for women and families derived from the mobilization of the feminist movement to affect crime policies came with costs to the women's liberation movement, the broader polity, and particular communities, especially African American communities. In particular, the appropriation of the domestic and sexual violence frame by conservative policymakers, backed by the law and order wing of the victim's rights movement rather than its restorative justice faction, catalyzed the explosive growth in prison building to warehouse rather than reform sexual offenders, batterers, and others convicted of crimes (Gottschalk 2006). Furthermore, according to one perspective, "feminists, whose original program was to vindicate women's autonomy, have begun to adopt the essentialist discourse of objectifying battered women by characterizing abused women as helpless, scared, irrational, and sick," which undermines women's liberation and gender equality (Gruber 2007).

Extracting energy and direction from the feminist movement, while coupling much of its policy preferences to conservative policymaking, whether it truly aided its interests or not, the victim's rights movement became one of the strongest voices in the choir of law and order. In the eyes of Janet Reno, former U.S. Attorney General in the Clinton administration, its members were "but little lower than the angels" (quoted in Simon 2007, 89). It was and is a movement that relies on valence issues that draw stark, almost Biblical, contrasts between good and evil, lightness and darkness, victim and criminal to affect policy alternatives, deliberations, and choices. As Karmen (2001, xvi) observes, "no set of ideas has had a more profound impact on the criminal justice system the last 30 years than has the institutionalized public concern about the victim of crime." A measure of its influence, for instance, is the universal agreement among social scientists that it was pivotal to the expansion of mandatory sentencing laws and the dissolution of the discretionary parole regime in the United States, which further fueled the engine of incarceration and prison growth (Petersilia 2003).

Of course, felons themselves, influence the degree to which the polity grants them full citizenship, but not just felons as criminals. Felons as political claimants have affected how the states view them as citizens. The prisoners' rights movement assisted in the expansion of punitive policymaking towards felons. Aided by the civil rights and Black Power movements and the activism of incarcerated Black Muslims, the citizenship of felons, particularly in terms of the constitutional rights of prison inmates, became an issue on the governmental agenda. Prisoners pursued just treatment through the courts. "By the 1980s," according to Katzenstein (2005, 244), "prisoner rights claims making had become institutionalized" within the courts. Furthermore, the prisoner's rights movement continued to leverage the memory of famous riots in American prisons (e.g., Attica in 1971 and the Penitentiary of New Mexico in 1980) as political capital in policymaking venues (Useem and Kimball 1989). However, the initial effectiveness of the movement during the 1960s through 1980s to position felons as legitimate claimants despite their status as deviant citizens resulted in a political backlash, particularly from the victim's rights and feminist movements, against "coddling criminals" and favoring hard time for crime (Gottschalk 2006; Simon 2007). Moreover, the elevation of prison rights rhetoric and the willingness of courts to improve the living conditions in prison ultimately undermined the pursuit of broader citizenship, especially the absolute restoration of the franchise, for all felons (Katzenstein 2005).

The logic of interest group effects should hold for the general treatment of felons, be they in or outside prison. That is, interest group should influence not only incarceration rates but also the overall punitiveness of states towards felons, inclusive of the diminished citizenship of felons via invisible punishment. Based on this argument, we hypothesize that the citizenship of felons will be narrower in states where women's interest groups are more numerous, victim's rights advocates are strongest, and felons are active in the courts.

If we take the interest group argument seriously then we must consider two other lobbies, namely the corrections lobby and the civil rights/liberties lobby. The former, which is reminiscent of the iron triangles of past decades, is comprised primarily of law enforcement interests (e.g., corrections, parole, and police officer unions), for-profit firms generating revenue from incarceration, and rural politicians whose districts contain the bulk of correctional facilities (Blakely 2005; Tabarrok 2003). It constitutes the usual suspects that ally in the cause of protecting the public. The latter, which includes groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, is an extension of the earlier prisoner's rights movement but its attention today is focused more on expanding the citizenship of felons outside of prison rather than those on the inside.

We should expect post-felony citizenship to be narrower (i.e., the citizenship of felons to be more reduced) in states where the commercialization of incarceration is greater and where there are more law enforcement officers. The argument is that members of the corrections lobby derive material benefits – contracts, bonuses, employment, intergovernmental assistance, and votes – from punitive policymaking that diminishes the citizenship of all felons. The invisible punishment of felons make their ability to function well or “do straight time” more challenging, as well as increases the likelihood of felons violating parole or probation, committing new crimes, and ultimately returning to or being sentenced to incarceration. In short, the broadened citizenship of felons conflicts with the interests of the corrections lobby. Conversely, we anticipate that the citizenship of felons will be broader in states where civil rights/liberties groups are more numerous. The prediction is that the presence of civil liberties organizations attenuates the influence of the corrections lobby, ultimately broadening the citizenship of felons.

Political Institutions

Political institutions should influence post-felony citizenship. In particular, where political institutions reduce deliberation and hinder discretion in sentencing and sanctioning, post-felony citizenship should be narrower. Specifically, it should be narrower where states have less professional legislatures and in states that have Truth-in-Sentencing laws. Concerning the former proposition, the level of professionalism within a state legislature affects the policymaking environment (Squire 2007). More professional legislatures have more resources available for policy development and deliberation. In terms of punitive policymaking then, such legislatures should be more likely to base policy choices governing the citizenship of felons on rational considerations. That is, they should produce policies that work to advance the interests of public safety through lawmaking for the positive reintegration of people convicted of crimes rather than just punishment and detention.

We also expect the composition of the state legislature, especially in terms of race, gender, and partisanship to affect the degree of felonious citizenship. First, the proportion of African Americans in state legislatures should influence the treatment of felons as citizens. However, it is debatable whether a higher proportion of African-Americans, particularly within state legislatures, will broaden or narrow the citizenship of felons. As legislators, African Americans may be conflicted about their positions (Haynie 2001).

On the one hand, crime is one the greatest challenges in majority-black communities. Crime victimization surveys consistently demonstrate it, particularly in terms of violent crimes: African Americans account for 13 percent of the population but they comprise 49 percent of all homicides, with African Americans accounting for 52 percent of male homicides (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 2007). Perhaps not surprisingly, there is evidence that finds that African Americans, especially in terms of gun-related crimes, are more punitive than Whites (Payne et al. 2004). Since the pursuit of law and order in black communities is real and necessary, African American legislators may determine that the best representation of black interests in relation to crime requires a tough stance towards felons, inclusive of reducing their citizenship.

On the other hand, despite their victimization rates, African Americans have generally been found to hold less punitive attitudes than Whites when it comes to sanctioning criminals (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Unnever and Cullen 2007). One explanation for the racial gap is that historic and contemporary racial inequities in arrests, convictions, and sentencing have jaded African Americans towards the criminal justice system. Moreover, African Americans favor structural explanations for crime rather than individual explanations. On both accounts then one would expect African Americans to be less supportive of diminishing the citizenship of felons. Also, African Americans should show more support for a fuller citizenship for felons given that the diminished citizenship of felons, of which a large proportion are African American, may result in lower political and socioeconomic wellbeing of black communities (e.g., depressed political participation and limited employment opportunities). Overall, however, the evidence is mixed on whether more blacks as state legislators influences the punitiveness of states, at least in terms of incarceration and disenfranchisement (Yates and Fording 2005; Brown-Dean 2003).

Second, the proportion of state legislators that are female should affect the degree of post-felony citizenship. Like the proportion of African American legislators, the prediction can go in either direction. That is, as the percentage of women in state legislatures increases the citizenship of felons may broaden or narrow. One view is that the gender gap in public opinion will affect public policy. Generally, women express less support than men for punitive criminal policymaking (Unnever and Cullen 2007; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). Hence, legislatures with more women should be less punitive overall. Another view is that the presence of more female legislators should increase the likelihood of the institution being punitive. This is because female legislators are descriptive and substantive representatives of women's interests, especially the interests of women as victims of crime. Studies suggest that women are less punitive than men when it comes to "seemingly victimless crimes" but that crimes with victims elicit greater punitiveness from women (Payne et al. 2004). As representatives of women, female legislators may be more acutely sensitive to lenient treatment of felons, especially batterers and sexual offenders, than male legislators. Thus, female legislators as women and representatives of women's interests may press for more punitive policies against felons, both when they are imprisoned and free, when there are clear victims.

Third, given that "law and order" appeals and policymaking are normally associated with the GOP we would expect the citizenship of felons to be narrower in states where Republicans control their legislatures. Extant support for this partisanship hypothesis is confirmed in analyses of incarceration rates that show that incarceration rates increase as Republican control of state legislatures increase (Yates and Fording 2005; Smith 2004; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang 2005; Yoshinaka and Grose 2003).

Partisan Competition

The dominant political parties "govern through crime" (Simon 2007). In particular, crime and issues related to it serve as wedge issues that politicians and parties employ for electoral and partisan advantage. Accordingly, we should view state punishment as an inherently political process. In particular, partisan politics should reside at the center of state criminal justice policymaking. Smith provides the clearest

considerations of how partisan competition matters to crime and vice versa. Being tough on crime benefits elected officials, regardless of partisanship. Republicans and Democrats alike may gain votes by pursuing tough-on-crime policies. For Republicans, in particular, it is a means to connect with voting blocs that may not support nor benefit from GOP economic policies but want greater security and safety (e.g., inner city African Americans). Officeholders, especially executives, need to provide evidence of their stance on crime during election years, which creates a political imprisonment cycle. If true, post-felony citizenship will be narrower in states where partisan competition is greater. Specifically, it should be narrower in states where competition between the dominant parties is tighter (Bassi, Morton, and Trounstein 2006; Yates and Fording 2005; Smith 2004; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang 2005).

DATA AND METHODS

The data for our paper come from an original dataset developed to analyze multiple multivariate models of the degree to which interest group pressure, partisan competition, political ideology, and political institutions influence felonious citizenship across the states. In particular, it permits one to determine the effects of the aforementioned factors on a set of invisible punishments including but not limited to disenfranchisement. Punishments besides disenfranchisement include, for example, broad public access to criminal records and barriers hampering the employability of ex-felons among the states. The dataset is cross-sectional and the unit of analysis is a state. The sources of our data include the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Legal Action Center, the Sentencing Project, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, the National Conference of State Legislatures, among others.

We measure the citizenship of felons in relation to invisible punishment, which “is accomplished through the diminution of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal residency in the United States” (Travis 2002, 15-16). Our measures of invisible punishment come from the Legal Action Center (LAC), a nonprofit policy organization that works in the area of discrimination against people with histories of addiction, HIV/AIDS, or criminal records. The LAC conducted a two-year study of the 50 states. Advised by a diverse set of criminal justice stakeholders (e.g., policymakers, attorneys, victims’ advocates, and felons), the LAC evaluated each state in terms of public policies (i.e., laws and regulations) that establish “roadblocks to reentry – unfair or counterproductive barriers” that diminish the rights and privileges of felons as equal citizens. Such diminution may affect the ability of people convicted of crimes to positively reintegrate back into society following their convictions and possible incarcerations. The invisible punishments covered by the LAC study relate to employment, public assistance, criminal records, voting, parenting, and drivers’ license policies. Each state was awarded an overall score, from zero to 50, covering all of the policy areas. States with higher scores have set more and higher roadblocks to reentry before people convicted of felonies. The states were also given scores on each of the individual policy areas, on scales from zero to ten. Below are the ratings from the LAC that we use as dependent variables in our analyses of invisible punishment among the states:

- Overall “roadblocks to reentry” rank, 2004 (based on a set of ten measures of the degree to which states have policies that serve as impediments to the positive transition of felons back into society as citizens, inclusive of voting, employment, parenting, and public assistance)
- Employment “roadblocks to reentry” rank, 2004 (based on two measures of the degree to which states permit employers open access to the criminal records of prospective employees)
- Enfranchisement “roadblocks to reentry” rank, 2004 (based on one measure of the degree to which states restrict access to the ballot box by felons)

In addition to the 2004 enfranchisement rankings by the LAC, we have another measure of post-felony citizenship – *votedis07* – that identifies the severity of felon disenfranchisement as of June 2007.⁵ Table 2 lists the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses, along with descriptive statistics.

It is important to note that our measures go beyond conventional empirical analyses of felons as citizens. Generally, scholars seeking to explain the citizenship of felons have limited themselves to disenfranchisement. They seem to equate the franchise with full citizenship. Although barriers to voting affect the citizenship of felons, the opportunity to cast a ballot is not the only or even the most important element of the citizenship of felons, or any other recognized group in the polity. “To be a recognized and active citizen at all he must be an equal member of the polity, a voter, but he must also be independent, which has all along meant that he must be an ‘earner’ (Shklar 1991, 64). In other words, citizenship has two cornerstones, voting and earning. Thus, possessing the ability to cast a ballot and to work for licit wages are the dominant characteristics that distinguish citizens from noncitizens in the United States. That suggests that our measures of the status of felons as citizens must at least include both ballot access and access to employment opportunities.

Turning to our independent variables, the first set measures the presence of several organized interests in the American states. *Womigs* and *civrigs* are Gray and Lowery’s (1997) count of the number of women’s and civil rights interest organizations, respectively, in each state in 1997. To measure the presence and effectiveness of victims’ rights groups as an organized interest, the variable *conbill* is coded “1” if the state has a constitutional bill of rights to protect victims of crime as of 2005 and “0” otherwise (Hammond 2005). Likewise, to proxy the strength of correctional and police officers as an interest group, we use *offpercap*, which is the number of full-time law enforcement officers per 100,000 state residents in 2005 (U.S. Department of Justice 2005c, table 77). The variable *lawsuits* is a count of the number of inmate lawsuits against correctional officials per 1,000 inmates in 1991, and is used to indicate the extent to which prisoners’ interests are actualized in the states. To our knowledge, this analysis is the first attempt to operationalize the concept of prisoners’ interests in the relevant literature. Finally, *private3* is the percentage of all state and federal inmates who are held in private facilities in the state as of June 2004 (Harrison and Beck 2004). It measures whether the owners, employees, and associates of commercial prisons are a potent interest group in the state.

The second set of variables considers the extent to which political institutions might affect the degree of felonious citizenship among the states. *Legprof03* is the conventional index of state legislative professionalism, which is updated as of 2003 (Squire 2007). Higher scores on this measure signify more professional legislatures and we expect such states to have a felonious citizenship that is closer to the citizenship of nonfelons. Also, we include a dummy variable that identifies states with truth-in-sentencing laws that require convicted felons to serve a minimum of 85 percent of their sentence before being released from prison (*tinsl*). It signifies the presence or absence of such laws; states that have such laws are assumed to be states where post-felony citizenship is narrower. Furthermore, *femleg04* is the percentage of female state legislators in 2004, as tabulated by the Center for American Women and Politics. Similarly, *perblkleg* is the percentage of African American state representatives and senators in 2001, taken from Bositis (2003). Again, the expectations are undetermined for the effects of the presence of women and African Americans in state legislatures.

The third set of independent variables measures the level and nature of partisan competition in the states. *Ranney* is the political party competition index for 1989 through 1994. This variable ranges from no competition between the two parties to a very high level of partisan competition (Bibby and Holbrook 1996; Preuhs 2001). Greater partisan competition should yield a narrower citizenship for felons. *Gopleg* is

⁵ The severity of felon disenfranchisement is based on an ordinal measure with four categories: (1) no restriction on voting rights, (2) loss of voting rights during the period of incarceration, (3) loss of voting rights during the period of sentence, and (4) pardon necessary for the reinstatement of voting rights.

coded 1 for a state legislature controlled by Republicans and 0 if it is not (National Conference of State Legislatures annuals). The expectation is that post-felony citizenship is narrower in states where the GOP controls the legislature.

The fourth set of independent variables indicates the ideological disposition of each state, including the state's proclivity for punitive policymaking. *Polclib* is a ranking of the states based on their policy liberalism. The ranking comes from a composite policy-based, rather than expenditure-based, index comprised of state scores on five issues that typically divide liberals and conservatives (Gray et al. 204). The index ranks each state according to its laws and policies with regard to these issues. Higher rankings (i.e., closer to the rank of #1) indicate greater liberalism in state policymaking, and we expect that post-felony citizenship will be broader in states with values closer to the top ranking. *Strikeout* is a dichotomous variable that assesses the state's relative punitiveness. It is coded 1 for states that have a "three strikes" law in place as of 2002 and 0 otherwise (Lotke et al. 2004). Post-felony citizenship is expected to be greater in states with such laws.

Finally, a longstanding focus in political science generally is the effect of group competition and conflict on political behavior (Key 1949; Giles 1977; Giles & Evans 1985). Scholars looking at criminal justice policy often posit that punitive criminal justice policies are intended primarily to reduce competition for scarce resources and privilege among different groups. As the share of an out-group grows within a polity, in-groups increase the use of punitive justice policies (e.g., mass incarceration) to protect their dominant position. There is strong evidence of group threat affecting state punitiveness (Yates and Fording 2005; Smith 2004) and felonious citizenship (Manza and Uggen 2006; Brown-Dean 2003; Preuhs 2001). Therefore, we control for group threat in our models.

One measure of group threat we employ is the general level of diversity within the populations of the states. *Mindiv* is an additive index that measures the size of the minority population (i.e., Blacks, Latinos, and Asians) relative to the size of the White population in a state (Hero 1998). We expect a direct relationship between minority diversity and the degree of diminished citizenship of felons. Also, we include a measure that controls for the effects of inequality among groups. *Perpov00* is the percentage of the population with income in 1999 below the poverty level. As poverty increases, the citizenship of felons should narrow.

Additionally, given consistent findings that race, especially the presence of African Americans in a state, is correlated with state punitiveness, the citizenship of felons should be narrower in states where more blacks are incarcerated. Increased proportions of incarcerated individuals should lead to increasingly punitive policies targeted at felons. Moreover, the degree of perceived racial threat should vary according to the racial composition of the incarcerated population. We measure the incarceration rates of Whites (*whincarate01*) and African Americans (*blkincarate01*), respectively, per 100,000 state residents in 2001 (Sentencing Project 2004).

We use Ordinary Least Squares regression to evaluate the impact of the sets of independent variables on our first three dependent variables: (1) the overall "roadblocks to reentry" rankings, (2) the employment "roadblocks to reentry" rankings, and (3) enfranchisement "roadblocks to reentry" rankings. Since our fourth dependent variable, the severity of felon disenfranchisement in 2007, is ordinal with four categories, we use Ordered Logistic regression. The results of the analyses appear in Tables 3 and 4.⁶ For

⁶ The models are robust to a series of diagnostic tests. Specifically, pairwise correlations between the independent variables and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) calculated after the regressions indicate that collinearity between the independent variables is not of concern here. The models were also tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity, using the Breusch-Pagan test, revealing that the models are homoskedastic. Finally, among other diagnostic tests run, component-plus-residual graphs of individual independent variables indicated that no nonlinearities are present. All four of the models meet the minimum standard of adequacy for fit to the population as assessed with the F-test for the regressions and a likelihood ratio test for the ordered logistic regression.

illustrative purposes, we graph the predicted values from the OLS regressions and the predicted probabilities from the Ordered Logistic regression analysis.

RESULTS

The regression results for Models 1 through 3 (i.e., the rankings for overall “roadblocks to reentry,” employment “roadblocks to reentry,” and enfranchisement “roadblocks to reentry”) are presented in Table 3, while Table 4 shows the results from Model 4 (severity of felon disenfranchisement).

Model 1 estimates the effects of interest group pressure, partisan competition, ideology and punitiveness, and political institutions on the overall “roadblocks to reentry” rank. The results suggest that interest groups matter in explaining the variation in post-felony citizenship among the states. Two interests are of particular importance, namely women’s interest organizations and civil rights organizations. The variable *womigs* is positive and significant, while *civrigs* is negative and significant. Ceteris paribus, while states with more women’s interest organizations afford felons narrower degrees of citizenship, states with more civil rights organizations afford them broader degrees of post-felony citizenship. Graph 1 depicts the predicted reintegration score, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for varying numbers of women’s interest organizations, keeping all other continuous independent variables at their means and other dichotomous independent variables at their medians. Likewise, Graph 2 shows the predicted reintegration score, with confidence intervals, for varying numbers of civil rights organizations, keeping the other independent variables constant.

Models 2 through 4 provide additional support for the finding from Model 1 that interest groups are important determinants of the degree of felonious citizenship across the states. They show that greater numbers of civil rights groups yield larger bundles of rights, benefits, obligations, and standing to people convicted of felonies. Additionally, as the number of women’s interests groups increases, the bundles of citizenship carried by felons gets smaller, especially regarding ballot access. Furthermore, neither the percentage of women nor African Americans inside state legislatures affects the degree of felonious citizenship across the states. This counters our expectations. The finding suggests that the demands of articulated interests outside of formal political institutions may have more of an impact on the politics of punitiveness than the descriptive representation of these interests within state legislature.

As hypothesized, post-felony citizenship is narrower when prisoners’ interests are actualized. The mobilization of prisoners as an interest is particularly relevant when considering the disenfranchisement of ex-prisoners. Models 3 and 4 demonstrate that as the number of inmate lawsuits filed against correctional officers increases, states narrow the citizenship of felons in terms of ballot access and voting. In short, there is a backlash against felons when they participate politically. Graph 3 illustrates this relationship. Varying the number of inmate lawsuits filed while holding continuous explanatory variables at their mean values and dichotomous variables at their medians reveals that as the number of inmate lawsuits filed against correctional officials per 1,000 inmates increases from 10 to 110, the predicted enfranchisement score moves from 4.78 to 6.81 (i.e., ballot access becomes more restrictive).

Surprisingly, our models yielded null findings in terms of the other interests that we expected to have an effect on the citizenship of felons. Although the relationship between groups organized on behalf of victims and the alternative specifications of invisible punishment matched our prediction, it is puzzling that the effect failed to reach statistical significance. Likewise our results for the influence of the corrections lobby, both in terms of commercial prison interests and correctional officer interests, failed to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. Still, while the direction of the relationship between law enforcement officer per capita and invisible punishment are in an unexpected direction, the relation between commercial prison interests and such punishment turned out as we anticipated. Regardless, we suspect that there are better measures of the corrections lobby to be considered.

Returning to Model 1, we find support for the hypothesis that post-felony citizenship is narrower in states where Republicans control the legislature. *Gopleg* is positive and significant. Nonetheless, the results of the model also suggest that post-felony citizenship is broader in states where competition between the dominant parties is greater. Somewhat surprisingly, Model 3 demonstrates that as political party composition becomes more acute, the barriers to the voting rights of ex-prisoners decrease.

Consistent with our hypothesis, the analysis reveals that post-felony citizenship is narrower in states with less professional legislatures. In Models 1 and 2 *legprof03* has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant. This finding reveals that the level of legislative professionalism is particularly relevant in determining the overall level of barriers that states put up to the reintegration of ex-prisoners, as well as those barriers that pertain particularly to the employability of ex-prisoners. The punitiveness of state-level policies regarding prisoners' sentencing does not prove to have a statistically significant effect on the roadblocks to reentry. The variable *tinsl* is insignificant across the four models. This finding leads us to believe that the decision processes underlying a state's decision to adopt a Truth-in-Sentencing law diverge from those decisions that lead to punitive policies against ex-prisoners.

None of the ideological measures seem to affect state-level variation in felonious citizenship. This finding is curious but not unexpected given that extant research tends to not yield statistically significant findings regarding the effect of public ideology at the state-level on criminal justice policymaking among the states, at least not in terms of state punitiveness (see, e.g., Yates and Fording 2005; Smith 2004). The lack of significant findings may reflect the weak validity of the measures used to account for public ideology.

In terms of the control variables in this analysis, minority diversity has a statistically significant effect on the states' overall reintegration score as well as the level of voting reintegration. More diverse states erect higher barriers to the reintegration of ex-prisoners generally, and are more likely to restrict the voting rights of former prisoners in particular. Consistent with group threat theory, we find that the black incarceration rate has a statistically significant positive impact on the severity of felon disenfranchisement. Graph 4 shows that as the black incarceration rate per 100,000 population increases, the predicted probability that the state will require a pardon for the reinstatement of ex-felons' voting rights (i.e., the fourth category of the *votedis07* variable) rises. Interestingly, the white incarceration rate has the opposite effect. Graph 5 demonstrates that as the white incarceration rate increases, the predicted probability that the state requires a pardon decreases. These results suggest that there is a significant racial dimension to the politics of post-prison punitiveness. When more Caucasians are incarcerated, the severity of disenfranchisement policies decreases, but when more African Americans are incarcerated, the severity of post-felony disenfranchisement increases.

CONCLUSION

Upon completing their sentences, formerly incarcerated individuals are confronted with a wide array of barriers to their reincorporation into society, from the right to apply for and receive public assistance to requirements that they report their criminal histories on job applications. Furthermore, there is considerable state to state variation in the extent to which former prisoners face "invisible punishments" following their sentences.

To better understand the why some states treat felons less or more than full citizens, political scientists must attend to interest group activity. It is a key component of the politics of felonious citizenship, one political scientists have neglected and one worthy of further study. At the state level, interests play a central role in articulating the cases both for and against diminishing the citizenship of felons. While the activities of some interest organizations, especially civil rights organizations, may broaden the citizenship of felons, other interests may press to diminish post-felony citizenship. Furthermore, while women in general tend to have less punitive attitudes than men in relation to crime and sentencing, the results of our

analysis suggest that the gender gap in public opinion does not trend in the same direction for all issue areas. For some issues, such as matters relating to crime and punishment, women as an interest group may be more likely to take stances that tend towards the conservative end of the political spectrum. This appears to be the case in terms of exacting “invisible punishments” on felons. Also, as we show in this paper, political scientists should attend to the incorporation of the interests of felons as an important determinant of the politics of punitiveness among the states. To this point, political scientists have ignored how the articulation of the interests of felons may affect their status and treatment as citizens. Also, as our findings suggest, the citizenship of felons may be affected by another neglected group, the corrections lobby.

Additionally, our paper has reasoned that political scientists interested in felonious citizenship studies need to look beyond disenfranchisement. It is but one type of sanction that diminishes felons as citizens, but it arguably is not the most important one. As our empirical analyses in this paper show, politics affects a broader set of sanctions against felons than previous studies suggest.

Finally, like previous studies, we find that there is a significant racial dimension to post-felony citizenship and state punitiveness. More heterogeneous states grant felons a narrower citizenship than more homogenous states. Plus, while increased white incarceration is correlated with a broader citizenship for felons, increased black incarceration has the opposite effect. This extends the empirical evidence that group threat, particularly racial group threat, is an important determinant of punitive policymaking in among states.

Future research in felonious citizenship studies should seek to refine and improve our models of the diminished citizenship of felons in the United States, as well as specify and test new ones that account for undetermined factors (e.g., the influence of rural legislators, religious values, and recidivism). This makes sense given that our past policy choices and current public expenditures ensure that felons as a class of citizens will grow, not shrink, as a proportion of the American polity in the 21st Century.

TABLES AND GRAPHS

Table 1. Felonious Citizenship across the States: Rights, Benefits, Obligations, and Standing Commonly Diminished by Felony Convictions

Area	State Restrictions or Actions Adverse to People Convicted of Felonies
<i>Rights</i>	
Firearm ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All felons barred from owning a firearm (pistols and rifles), unless right is explicitly restored via administrative decision.
Voting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Felons barred from registering to vote and casting a ballot, unless right is explicitly restored via administrative decision or pardon.
Privacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Felons, especially people convicted of sex-related felonies, required to register their residence with state and/or local law enforcement agencies. Employers may ask and consider arrests not leading to convictions in determining employment. Internet postings of felony conviction data on parolees, probationers, and inmates and arrest data for persons not convicted of felonies.
<i>Benefits</i>	
Public assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Felons (certain classes and offenders) banned permanently, partially, or temporarily from receiving public assistance such as Food Stamps, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Public Housing (residence or vouchers), and Medicaid.
Financial aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Drug-related felons barred from receiving government-subsidized loans and grants for higher education.
Drivers license	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Automatic suspension or revocation of licenses due to drug-related felony convictions, regardless of drug use/possession during the commission of crime and/or ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. Restrictive licenses given to drug-related felons.
<i>Obligations</i>	
Jury service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Felons permanently barred from sitting in judgment of their neighbors, unless obligation is restored through administrative decision or pardon.
<i>Standing</i>	
Employment & Entrepreneurship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Felons may be barred from certain types of public employment and holding licenses for specific occupations. Felons are restricted as entrepreneurs in terms of the types of businesses they establish or joint-partnerships available to them.
Marital dissolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spouses of persons with felon convictions may use such convictions as grounds for divorce.
Parental “rights”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Felony convictions resulting in incarceration are grounds for termination of parental responsibilities and permanent separation from children.
Resource parenting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Felony convictions bar adults from serving as resource (i.e., foster and/or adoptive) parents.
Public office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Felony convictions bar adults from holding public – elected and/or appointed – office.

Sources: Uggen, Manza, and Thompson (2006); Buckler and Travis (2003); Petersilia (2003)

TABLE 2. List of Variables

Concept	Variable Name and Explanation (with expected direction of effect)	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent Variables	<i>reintegration</i> : Overall "roadblocks to reentry" rank, 2004	29.5	9.5	10	48
	<i>rein_employ</i> : Employment "roadblocks to reentry" rank, 2004	7.0	3.6	-5	10
	<i>rein_voting</i> : Enfranchisement "roadblocks to reentry" rank, 2004	4.6	1.7	1	9
	<i>votedis07</i> : Severity of felon disenfranchisement, 2007	2.9	0.9	1	4
Interests	<i>womigs</i> : Number of women's interests organizations, 1997(+/-)	6.1	3.7	0	20
	<i>civrigs</i> : Number of civil rights interests organizations, 1997(-)	4.4	4.0	0	17
	<i>conbill</i> : Constitutional victim's bill of rights, 2005 (+)	0.6	0.5	0	1
	<i>offpercap</i> : Law enforcement officers per capita, 2005 (+)	226.5	50.4	158	377
	<i>lawsuits</i> : Inmate lawsuits against correctional officials per 1k inmates, 1991 (+)	40.3	28.2	4.3	129.1
Partisan Competition	<i>ranney</i> : Party competition, 1989-1994 (+)	0.9	0.1	0.67	0.99
	<i>gopleg</i> : Republican legislative control, 2002 (+)	0.5	0.5	0	1
Ideology	<i>polclib</i> : Policy liberalism ranking, 2004 (-)	24.5	14.0	1	48
	<i>strikeout</i> : "Three Strikes-Out" statute, 2002 (+)	0.5	0.5	0	1
Political Institutions	<i>legprof03</i> : Legislative professionalism, 2003 (-)	0.2	0.1	0	0.6
	<i>tinsl</i> : "Truth-in-Sentencing" statute, 2002 (+)	0.6	0.5	0	1
	<i>perblkleg</i> : % black state legislators, 2001 (+/-)	7.3	7.3	0	25.9
	<i>femleg</i> : % female state legislators, 2004 (+/-)	22.4	6.6	9	35.40
Controls	<i>whtincarate01</i> : White incarceration rate, 2001 (-)	363.7	127.9	139	646
	<i>blkincarate01</i> : Black incarceration rate, 2001 (+)	2189.6	609.1	609	4058
	<i>mindiv</i> : Minority diversity score, 1998 (+)	0.3	0.2	0	0.73
	<i>perpov00</i> : % below poverty, 2000 (+)	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2

Table 3: Modeling Post-Felony Citizenship (Ordinary Least Squares Regression)

Concept	Explanatory Variable	Model 1: Overall Reintegration Score	Model 2: Employment Reintegration	Model 3: Voting Reintegration
Interests	womigs	0.96 (0.42)**	0.11 (0.14)	0.15 (0.08)*
	civrigs	-1.35 (0.62)**	-0.50 (0.21)**	-0.13 (0.12)
	conbill	0.43 (3.02)	1.00 (1.00)	0.70 (0.59)
	offpercap	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
	lawsuits	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)*
	private3	0.02 (0.17)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.03)
Partisan Competition	ranney	16.87 (16.90)	-1.27 (5.60)	-5.97 (3.28)*
	gopleg	5.01 (2.58)*	-0.63 (0.85)	-0.62 (0.50)
Ideology	polclib	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)
	strikeout	2.38 (2.51)	0.20 (0.05)	-0.40 (0.49)
Political Institutions	legprof03	-38.50 (14.43)**	-14.89 (4.78)**	-0.23 (2.80)
	tinsl	-2.42 (2.70)	0.75 (0.89)	0.18 (0.52)
	femleg04	-0.19 (0.28)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.05)
	perblkleg	0.09 (0.27)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.01 (0.05)
Controls	whtincarate01	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.003)
	blkincarate01	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)
	mindiv	32.16 (12.58)**	-1.07 (4.17)	5.09 (2.44)**
	perpov00	-13.91 (75.04)	2.66 (24.87)	-13.60 (14.58)
Constant		21.83 (22.94)	15.57 (7.60)**	10.72 (4.46)**
N		48	48	48
F-statistic (18, 29)		2.32	3.43	2.03
P-value		0.0211	0.0016	0.0433
Adjusted R²		0.59	0.48	0.28



Source: Prisoners of Democracy state-level dataset

*Denotes significance at 0.1 level (two-tailed)


**Denotes significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed)



Table 4: Modeling Post-Felony Citizenship (Ordered Logistic Regression)

Concept	Explanatory Variable	Model 4: Severity of Felon Disenfranchisement
Interests	femleg04	-0.03 (0.08)
	womigs	0.24 (0.12)*
	perblkleg	0.01 (0.08)
	civrigs	-0.09 (0.17)
	conbill	1.17 (0.85)
	offpercap	-0.02 (0.01)
	lawsuits	0.03 (0.02)**
	private3	0.05 (0.05)
Partisan Competition	ranney	-5.18 (4.89)
	gopleg	-0.28 (0.71)
Ideology	polclib	0.01 (0.04)
	strikeout	-0.62 (0.73)
Political Institutions	legprof03	-5.08 (4.52)
	tinsl	-0.75 (0.80)
Controls	whtincarate01	-0.01 (0.01)*
	blkincarate01	0.002 (0.001)**
	mindiv	14.51 (4.96)**
	perpov00	-5.41 (22.33)
N		48
LR Chi-square (18)		37.98
P-value		0.0039
Pseudo-R²		0.32
<i>Source: Prisoners of Democracy state-level dataset</i>		
*Denotes significance at 0.1 level (two-tailed)		
**Denotes significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed)		



Graph 3: Predicted Voting Reintegration Score by Number of Inmate Lawsuits (Based on Model 3)





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