Zach Baumann
POL 638 Dr. Gang Guo
April 19, 2006
Consequences of Electoral Systems

Monroe, Burt L. and Amanda G. Rose.  2002.  "Electoral Systems and Unimagined Consequences: Partisan Effects of Districted Proportional Representation."  American Journal of Political Science 46(1): 67-89.

While previous researchers have highlighted the importance of district magnitude in determining the number of parties present within a given electoral district, hardly any have analyzed the type of parties that exist.  District magnitude can be considered in two moments, the first determining the number of players in the system and the second determining the type.  Monroe and Rose explore the variation within district magnitude, which they term the variance effect, through twenty-four house elections in sixteen countries.

District magnitude is a function of the drawing of district lines throughout the nation.  These lines encompass voters with rural and urban interests leading representatives to be elected from each district that reflect these preferences.  To understand the variation effect it is important to describe the interests that are being represented in the legislature.  Using a modified version of King's JudgeIt program they determine that rural interests are represented more than urban and that there is also lower parliamentary fragmentation of rural parties.  The results also indicate that other demographic factors may be overrepresented based on district lines.  This paper describes the consequences of electoral rules in determining who is represented and at what rate.

Ishiyama, John T.  1997.  "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe." Political Science Quarterly 112(1): 95-115.

The ability of electoral rules to determine the rules of the game takes on new meaning when considering nations that have gone through a democratizing process.  As these newly emerging democracies move forward the electoral rules they have created will determine who has the upper hand in transitional elections.  The outcome of transitional elections will promote or detract form the legitimacy of a new regime and may hold consequences for their ability to act in office.  Electoral rules that promote majoritarian rule in a heterogeneous society may also excessively fragment society, creating further rifts among the public.

Ishiyama states that electoral system are chosen based on the self-interested vote and seat maximizing nature of political parties, the role of actors, not parties, whose goals are at odds with the party, and the type of transition which creates important actors.  While Ishiyama does not utilize quantitative data in his paper, applying the theories to relevant Eastern European states yields some support for his findings.  Ultimately the newly emerging electoral systems of Eastern Europe will reflect the will of the dominate actors in society who wish to maximize their utility by creating the best possible outcome for themselves.  Electoral systems in these newly emerging democracies may not represent 'the public good,' but the will of the dominate actors within society who have the ability to make rules.

Mainwaring, Scott.  1991.  "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective."  Comparative Politics 24(1): 21-43.

Electoral systems have the ability to shape the party system and determine the strategy of politicians and voters.  These two tenets are exemplified in Mainwaring's discussion of Brazil.  While employing majoritarian, plural, and proportional electoral systems, party systems within Brazil remain weak and ineffective.  Presidential, legislative, and mayoral (in cities with greater than 200,000 voters) elections are conduced by majority rule, with a runoffs being called when no candidate achieves greater than fifty percent of the total vote.  Mayoral elections in cities with fewer than 200,000 voters are conducted by plurality, with lower-level elections such as federal deputies and town council members being filled based on proportional method.  The proportional ballot, however, operates based on open list rules where the voter decides which members within the party list they would like to see elected.

Brazil's electoral rules prohibit the party from gaining strength and disciplining its existing candidates or members.  The electoral system encourages candidate-centered campaigns with self-financed races and individual, rather than collective, promises.  There also does not appear to be a strong desire to create strong party systems as governmental actions constantly mitigate any incentive put forth by parties to become unified.  Fundamentally, this paper describes the ability of the electoral system to make political parties ineffective, while it certainly has the ability to make them become viable and required in other circumstances.

Gabel, Matthew J.  1995.  "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in the 1990 Hungarian Elections."  Comparative Politics 27(2): 205-214.

Electoral laws, more specifically, the manner of electing representatives impacts the type of individuals that will hold office.  Duverger's Law states that in a plural or majoritarian system the optimal number of parties is two.  Proportional systems can allow for more viable parties, opening the door to greater equity in representation.  Gabel analyzes this issue, concerned with the equitability of legislative seats during the 1990 Hungarian national elections.  The Hungarian system allows for 176 seats to be awarded from single-member districts with majority rules.  152 seats are then awarded based on regional party-list systems and an additional fifty-eight are awarded on the national-level based also on party-lists.  Wanting to control for ethnic fragmentation, Gabel determined that the degree of multipartism within the state is related to the number of salient political cleavages.  Gabel's findings also support the notion that medium to large sized national and regional parties have the best chance of gaining support as they are favorable not only across one district but many.  The 1990 national legislature elected four parties controlling eighty-six percent of the total seats and the effective number of parties within the nation is 3.07.  These results indicate that while the proportional system allows for a more equitable distribution of legislative seats, the electoral formula favors medium and large parties that enjoy cross-district support.

Myerson, Roger B.  1993.  "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems."  American Political Science Review 87(4): 856-869.

Myerson, an economist, applies advanced modeling and game-theoretical techniques to electoral systems to further explore the strategic options available to political parties.  This research, while pursing out the intricacies of both majority/pluralistic and proportional systems, establishes the Cox threshold, or the upper bound of voters that may be ignored.  Myerson's work is similar to that of Downs (1957) in that candidates are offering income in the form of policies that voters will choose based on the marginal income they will receive from all possible choices.  The ability of the parties to ignore much of the population and still achieve their goal to become elected creates incentives for them to ignore the majority of voters (in a plural system).  Electoral rules determine the strategy in which both voters and candidates participate.  These rules can also determine the equality afforded to all citizens within the state.

Boix, Carles.  1999.  "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies."  American Political Science Review 93(3): 609-624.

Boix shows through empirical analysis of developed countries from 1875 to 1990 that the threat of party instability is a fundamental factor in determining the choice of electoral thresholds.  Dominate parties, when they feel safe about holding office, have no incentive to modify the electoral rules.  When there is uncertainty about the future, however, the party will seek to shore up their electoral stability by creating favorable laws.  This was demonstrated in the movement from majority/plural forms of government in the late nineteenth century to proportional systems in the early twentieth.  Because all voters are considered to be strategic in that they will rarely 'waste' their vote on a candidate they know will loose, a two-party system is not optimal for the dominate party facing electoral uncertainty.  In this situation the dominate party would rather be competing in a proportional system where they may loose some support, but overall they should be expected to hold their ground.  The consequence of electoral systems, as illustrated by this article, is that dominate powers should remain control of the government, ceteris paribus.