Bryan Dettrey
Electoral System Change - Bibliography

Cheng, Tun-Jen and Stephan Haggard. 2001. "Democracy and Deficits in Taiwan."  In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy eds. Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Oxford University Press.

Taiwan had a history of disciplined fiscal policy.  From 1980 to 1988, fiscal policy produced near balanced budget results with only small deficits or small surpluses.  Only twice in that time did the deficit reach more than 1% of GDP.  This is very different from the fiscal policy results after 1988.  From 1989 to 1995 deficits average 4.5% of GDP.  This dramatic change in fiscal policy is linked to electoral system change.

Increased electoral competitiveness due to increased parties contesting elections, the presence of a SNTV, and the division of purpose between the executive and legislative branches contributed to the increased deficits. The competitiveness in the electoral system increased as more legitimate parties entered electoral contests.  The rules of SNTV created an incentive for legislators to cultivate a personal vote through patronage and pork.  This incentive for increased pork had a direct impact on increased deficits.  Lastly, institutional reform in legislative-executive relations placed more power in budgeting and finance in the legislative branch, where legislators procured even more pork for their reelection efforts.  This paper demonstrates the impact electoral rules can have on policy outcomes.

Cox, Gary W., Frances McCall Rosenbluth, and Michael F. Thies. 1999. "Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party."  British Journal of Political Science 29: 33-56.

This paper focused on the effect of the SNTV on the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan. The single, non-transferable vote used in the Japanese electoral system was eliminated in 1994.  Elections under the SNTV had a large degree of intra-party competition and factionalism.  With the SNTV, voters could express preference for individual legislators, rather than voting for the whole party. Under these conditions, legislators often found their strongest competition was from candidates in the same party (as the Liberal Democratic Party was the dominant party during the time period).  This increased the amount of intra-party factionalism and competition for resources.  This is very similar to the idea of cultivating a "personal vote" rather than a "party vote."

After the electoral reform from SNTV to closed party lists, the degree of intra-party factionalism and competition decreased.  Specifically, the competition for individual endorsements and pork projects has decreased, although competition for cabinet positions is still present. In short, the SNTV, encouraged legislators to pursue personal votes at the cost of increase intra-party competition.  The elimination of the SNTV in favor of closed party lists decreased the incentives to pursue personal votes.
　　　
Bawn, Kathleen. 1993.  "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome."  American Journal of Political Science 37(4): 965-989.

This paper studies the choice of electoral systems in the post war period in Germany.  More specifically, it looks at the incentives parties use to choose electoral systems that will provide the most advantage in future elections.  Bawn develops a model where parties will value policy incentives over seat share incentives.  For example, a party will sacrifice number of seats held for more influence on policy.

Many of the smaller parties preferred a PR system to a FPTP electoral system.  This approach is expected, as smaller parties would be virtually eliminated in a FPTP system.  However, what was not expected was the behavior of the German Social Democrat Party (SPD).  The SPD would have increased their seat share by about 7% under FPTP rules compared to PR rules.  Despite the seat advantage of the FPTP system, the SPD voted in favor of the PR rules.  They did this because the Christian Democrat Party would have been dominant under a FPTP system and the SPD would have been a permanent minority party with no influence.  However, by supporting the PR rules, though it reduced seat share, it made the SPD a potential coalition partner and more relevant to the policy process.

Remington, Thomas F. and Steven S. Smith.  1996.  "Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the Choices of an Electoral System:  The Russian Parliamentary Election Law." American Journal of Political Science 40(4): 1253-1279.

Remington and Smith follow up on Bawn (1993).  They argue using the Russian example that parties do not only evaluate overall seat and policy incentives, but also specific electoral outcomes.  For example, powerful deputies in the Duma voted for the electoral system that maximized their chances of retaining the seat in the next election.  Personal power was also influential in selecting electoral systems.  Larger parties voted to include a PR element to Russian electoral laws, despite the advantage of SMD systems, so party leaders could retain power in their control over nominations on party lists.  The Agrarian Party, overall a very small party in Russia, was in favor of a SMD system.  This is counterintuitive for a small party.  However, the Agrarian party leaders were very strong in the areas they were from and wanted to use SMD as a way to eliminate competition. Overall, the paper suggests policy and electoral interests of individual legislators and parties are influential in the reform of electoral systems. Remington and Smith summarize, "The Russian experience suggests that extreme caution must be exercised in applying simple policy-outcome models to electoral systems."
　　　
Benoit, Kenneth and John W. Schiemann. 2001. "Institutional Choice in New Democracies: Bargaining over Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law."  Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(2): 153-182.

Benoit and Schiemann use a seat share model to predict the behavior of parties in the reform of the electoral system in Hungary.  This is in contrast to Bawn (1993) who used a policy model and Remington and Smith (1996) who used an electoral interest model of legislators to predict party behavior.   Benoit and Schiemann emphasize the role of information and uncertainty in changing electoral systems.

In the debate of Hungary's election law, the small parties campaigned for PR from the beginning.  The consultation with electoral experts indicated to small parties they would benefit from PR and severally impaired by SMD.  Conversely, the largest party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP), campaigned for SMD throughout the negotiations over the new electoral law.  It was only after a poll was conducted with the assistance of electoral experts that the MSZMP realized they might not have enough electoral support to remain in the majority under a SMD system.  A quote from a leader of the MSZMP makes the point: "We went from wanting an individual precinct system...to the point where we didn't know. But we had the feeling as time went by that it wouldn't be very favorable to us."  In the end, the parties in Hungary agreed upon a mixed-member system, but this paper emphasizes the importance of information in the choice of electoral systems and the desire for parties to prefer electoral systems that provide the most seats.

Nagel, Jack H.  1994.  "What Political Scientists Can Learn from the 1993 Electoral Reform in New Zealand." PS: Political Science and Politics September 1994: 525-529.

Nagel writes that despite much belief that electoral systems are entrenched and little can be done to reform these systems the New Zealand example is instructive in disabusing political scientists of this belief.  Entrenched electoral systems can be reformed via principled leadership, competitive dynamics, and persuasive analysis. The change in the New Zealand system (from FPTP to MMP) came as a result of minority dissatisfaction with the current electoral rules.  The Maori (indigenous Australian minority) were frustrated by a fixed quota of 4 seats despite the rising population in Maori communities.  Pakeha (European) New Zealanders were also frustrated by the Maori quota-they contended the Maori were given 4 "free" seats regardless of votes.  These disputes resulted in momentum for change that was originally defeated by incumbent politicians but after a referendum the call for change became too great to be ignored.  Political scientists also played a role in the reform process. The commission charged with studying electoral reform options was comprised of 3 political scientists who did an excellent job of exploring and explaining the electoral reform options to the Australian public.