WHY PARTIES?

THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA

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To Herbert and Ruth Aldrich

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
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Printed in the United States of America

04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95 1 2 3 4 5

ISBN: 0-226-01271-9 (cloth)
0-226-01272-7 (paper)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Aldrich, John Herbert, 1947-
--- Why parties?: the origin and transformation of political parties in America / John H. Aldrich.
   p. cm. -- (American politics and political economy)
   Includes bibliographical references and index.
JK2261.A46 1995
324.273'09—dc20 94-36879
CIP

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Acknowledgments

Research, and the publications it produces, is a collective enterprise. This fact is especially true for this book, which represents the combination, and culmination, of several different projects. Therefore these acknowledgments run long, and I am certain I have forgotten to note the help and advice of several people. To them, please accept my apologies.

A large number of institutions provided substantial assistance. The research reported in this book has no clear starting point, but one strong candidate for beginnings is the research I did with the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-8108548). Both the University of Minnesota and Duke University provided grants and generous leaves, and both added supportive and congenial working environments, as well as the advice and assistance of many of their members and staffs. Many of the data used in this project were made available through the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research and the National Elections Studies. A great many university departments (mostly, but happily not always, political science departments) suffered through presentations of various parts of this project. Among them are Carnegie Mellon, the University of California (Davis, Los Angeles, and San Diego), California Institute of Technology, the University of Florida, the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Stanford, the University of Rochester, Wisconsin, Yale, and of course Minnesota and Duke. Two institutions deserve special notes of appreciation. The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (with, in my case, support from NSF, BNS87-00864) provided its usual stimulating intellectual and collegial environment, making it the most enjoyable and rewarding year of my professional life. Phil Converse, Bob Scott, and entire staff, and of course an amazing collection of fellows made it so. The Department
of Government at Harvard offered me a rare and special week to discuss this book. Special thanks to Jim Alt and Ken Shepsle for that opportunity and to the Harvard community for helping to make me spend a few more years completing this book, and making the result much better.

I have had the good fortune to learn about politics and political parties from some of the masters of the subject, whether as formal teachers or as colleagues. John Kessel trained me uncommonly well early on, and he has remained a constant source of wisdom and, I am pleased to say, friendship throughout my professional career. Each department where I have worked has provided a major figure on party politics whose influence should be evident throughout this book. My appreciation therefore to Joe Schlesinger and Frank Sorauf. Allan Kornberg not only served that role at Duke but made Duke attractive and welcoming to me and a wonderful place to live and work. Bill Riker's impact is, perhaps, most evident of all, but even that greatly understates his importance to me, as to so many others.

Many people have offered substantial comments on parts of the work in progress. These include Lance Banning, David Baron, Bob Bates, Ira Berlin, Bill Blanco, David Brady, Dean Burnham, David Canon, Gary Cox, John Ferejohn, Mo Fiorina, Ruth Grant, Gary Jacobson, Cal Jillson, Bill Keech, Morgan Kousser, Keithe Krehbiel, Peter Lange, Matt McCubbins, Terry Moe, Mike Munger, Dick Niemi, Sam Popkin, Wendy Rahn, Tom Schwartz, Lloyd Shapley, Theda Skocpol, John Sullivan, Jack Walker (whose untimely passing left too much unsaid), Tom Weko, Rick Wilson—and the list goes on. Michael Gillespie listened to my often breathless meanderings as we ran, as well as in more usual venues, and he always had sound advice and insightful facts and opinions to offer, as well as detailed comments. Barry Weingast is quite remarkable. While he has, of course, a lot to offer, what makes him special is both seeing to the heart of the matter quickly and, when he has criticisms, making them be seen positively rather than as the devastating critiques they could be. Two stand out for their genuine friendship and professionalism. Dave Rohde and Ken Shepsle were not just willing to read and comment as often as asked, they also listened, supported, and discussed for many hours over many years.

Another long list of people provided more direct assistance in this project—rather embarrassing because some did so as graduate students and are now senior faculty. Mike McGinnis and John Williams fit that bill most directly. Wendy Rahn soon will. Mike Alvarez, Jacquie Pfeffer, Pat Sellers, and Mat Schousen provided more than “merely” their fine assistance at Duke. A special note of thanks, as well, to Jim Granato, Michael Layton, and Regina Smyth, as well as to students who read drafts of chapters in a course. Ben Page and Charles Stewart read the manuscript with care and strengthened it considerably.

None of these institutions and none of these people, mentioned and unmentioned, have any responsibility for the content of this book. At the University of Chicago Press John Tryneski, Alice Bennett, and the rest of the staff are, however, responsible. They are responsible for bringing this book to reality, making it as attractive as it is, and making it, clearly, a better book.

My family is the reason I have achieved whatever I have accomplished. Cindy is the love of my life and my best friend. She has made my entire adult life joyful. It is hard to believe that David is about to leave us as an adult, although he is in many ways already mature. My appreciation for the love, caring, and wisdom my parents have always given me grows every year. Mom and Dad, it is my honor and privilege to dedicate this book, with love, to you.
2 

Why Parties Form

Ratification of the Constitution launched America’s “great experiment,” testing the viability of democracy. This experiment began before national political parties were invented. The founders held deep sentiments against parties, yet many of them were instrumental in creating them, justifying them as temporary necessities to make the great experiment succeed, as we will see in chapter 3. In the 1820s what effectively had become a one-party system led to a revival of concerns that the viability of the republic was threatened (see chap. 4). Martin Van Buren and others sought to revive the old party principles of Jefferson and Madison through a new form that historians have come to call the “modern mass party,” and with formation of the Whigs this led to the first full flowering of a two-party system. Even with collapse of the Whigs, as we will see in chapter 5, incentives for party formation were sufficiently strong that politicians turned immediately to the creation of the Republican party, thereby maintaining a two-party system.

In these crucial moments, ambitious politicians sought durable solutions to what they perceived as critical problems. New partisan institutions were their chosen means. In each case not only were these problems seen as threatening the union, but it was the politicians’ seeking to achieve their goals—seeking to win—that led them to create parties.

In this chapter I will develop a theoretical account of the origins of political parties by demonstrating that there exists a set of incentives for ambitious politicians to “turn to parties.” In particular, a series of problems that necessarily arise in elections and in governance make it possible for politicians to win more of what they seek to win, more often, and over a longer period by creating political parties. The historical context determines when, and in what form, these theoretical possibilities actually arise. This theoretical inquiry produces “possibility” results that imply political parties may be a solution. It is not necessary or inevitable that politicians will turn to parties. These theoretical circumstances are, however, regular and recurring rather than rare and occasional, so the possibility that politicians will seek to achieve their goals through political parties will also recur.

The situations that give rise to incentives for turning to parties are problems endemic to republican government. That is, each of the three problems is deeply interwoven into the choices a society might make and thus into our theoretical understanding of social decision making. All are so significant that there are theories about each: the theory of public goods and collective action, the theory of social choice and voting, and the theory of political ambition. A second purpose of this chapter is to develop the technical tools, language, and logics that their theoretical study has produced. These tools and logics need to be understood on their own terms if we are to comprehend the role of each in the theory of political parties. I have simplified presentation as much as possible, and I hope to provide readers unfamiliar with the technical literature enough of the insights and results already achieved to make them useful for understanding.

I also hope to show that each is indeed relevant to the question of why ambitious politicians might choose to create and use political parties. Of course politicians confront such circumstances not as theoretical insights, but as practical, substantive problems affecting their ability to achieve their goals. The task therefore is to demonstrate that they perceive political parties as a possible institutional means to solve the particular (theoretical) problem that has arisen.

COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT

The Problem of Collective Policymaking

Parties-in-government consist of officeholders who have preferences. It could be that parties are no more than a convenient coalition of those who share preferences most closely: shared preferences are important bases of political parties. Parties-in-government are also institutions with rules and procedures for selecting leaders, providing them with powers and resources, and structuring Congress and government more generally. The goal here is to see what the incentives are for cre-
Table 2.1 A Collective Action Problem and Incentives for Party Formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislator</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent voting: Outcome: All bills pass. Payoff \((-2, -2, -2)\)

Pareto optimal result: Defeat all bills. Payoff \((0, 0, 0)\)

Party of A and B: Outcome: Pass only X. Payoff \((4, 3, -9)\)

*Denotes payoff to legislator if bill is passed.
*Denotes typical payoffs to legislators A, B, and C, respectively.

payoffs from Z of 0 each, if one or both joins A in voting no, or with payoffs of 4 and 3 if neither does. Acting independently, B and C vote for that legislation. So too A and C would rationally defect from any agreement to vote for Y, or would not agree to do so in the first place. In similar fashion, A and B independently conclude that they should vote for X. The equilibrium in behavior for independent legislators, therefore, is to pass each bill, even though all three might know full well that doing so makes them worse off.

This is the problem of collective action, and it arises when rational behavior, in equilibrium, leads to results that are Pareto inferior to at least one other possible outcome. A, B, and C are led by their individual, rational decisions to a behavioral equilibrium that passes all three bills. They unanimously prefer defeat of all bills to their adoption, however, and yet that Pareto superior outcome cannot be attained by rational, independent action.

The Nature of the Collective Action Problem

Collective action arises in a large variety of political contexts, owing to the nature of the goods governments deal with. These are "public goods" rather than the "private goods" of economic theory. Pure public goods exhibit "jointness of supply," meaning that one person's use or consumption of the good does not reduce the amount available for others, and "nonexcludability," meaning that it is very difficult to keep those many from consuming the good (see, for example, Barry and Hardin 1982). Indeed it is often impossible to avoid consuming a public good provided by the government even for those who do not want it. A lighthouse illustrates jointness of supply, since one ship's use of the light does not affect others' ability to see and use that light. National defense is nonexcludable, since if it protects one family, it is effectively impossible to keep from protecting their neighbors as well. And the president is everyone's president, so citizens cannot avoid "consuming" this public good whether they like it or not.

Collective action is needed to secure nearly all public goods, and this is especially true in democracies, where governments all but invariably act collectively, such as in voting to select representatives or to pass legislation. Political parties, moreover, are collections of individuals, so that virtually everything they do involves collective action, and they provide public goods for their members, since much of what they do affects many, if not all, partisans. To be sure real, rather than theoretically pure, public goods typically have private goods dimensions—some firm receives the contract to build a bridge or jet
There are two ways to achieve cooperation. One way is to agree to cooperate during play. For example, legislators interact repeatedly over a relatively long period. Axelrod (1984), Hardin (1982), and Taylor (1976) studied repeated play, and they show roughly that as long as interaction is ongoing and as long as the players place enough value on payoffs in the future, it can be individually rational to cooperate. A very closely related idea is that politicians might find it valuable to develop a reputation for being cooperative; if they do, they can achieve more by obtaining cooperative outcomes in the face of incentives to defect. This is one interpretation of Sam Rayburn’s famous dictum that representatives can “get along by going along.”

The problem with these ideas is a result known as the “folk theorem” (so called because the originator is unknown; see Bianco and Bates 1990; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). The folk theorem says, in effect, that though the cooperative outcome is a behavioral equilibrium to the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game, so too is every set of outcomes that yields the players at least what they get from defecting. Instead of the defection outcome’s being the single behavioral equilibrium, as in the single play game, therefore, essentially everything is a possible equilibrium in the repeated version of this game. The Axelrod-Hardin-Taylor results are thus only one set out of the many possible equilibria, but always defecting is also an equilibrium outcome. In this case institutional arrangements can help specify which of the equilibrium outcomes is actually chosen.

The other way to achieve the cooperative outcome is to agree in advance to do so. Saying so is insufficient, however, for both players have every reason to defect from that agreement, and even if they intend to honor it, they would recognize that the other player might take advantage of the situation and defect, making them the “sucker.” To be effective any a priori agreement requires a binding commitment. One possibility is some form of institutional arrangement that provides a basis for commitment. In either single or repeated play, then, institutions can be important in resolving collective action problems.

Incentives for Party Formation

With legislators acting independently, each bill in table 2.1 passed with a minimal winning coalition. One alternative is to form what Schwartz calls a “broad” coalition, one larger than required for minimal winning. To do so the legislators would have to have some means of binding each other ex ante, but suppose they can solve this problem. Presumably they would agree to vote for a bill only if it made each one
of them better off (or no one worse off), thus defeating each bill. This would solve the collective action problem, for only Pareto superior bills could pass under unanimity.

Another alternative is to form what Schwartz calls a "long" but narrow coalition. Two legislators could agree to form an enduring coalition to pass any bill that made both of them better off and to defeat all others. Schwartz, indeed, defines a political party as a long coalition. As in the first case, there would have to be some means of ensuring commitment, one primary purpose of institutionalizing the party. Suppose A and B enter into a long coalition. They would agree to pass bill X and defeat bills Y and Z. Each would get positive payoffs, 4 and 3 respectively (and C would lose −9). Society would not be better off, but both members of the majority coalition are better off than by acting independently or in a unanimous coalition. To be sure, A prefers the A-B coalition, B prefers the B-C coalition, and C prefers A-C. The central point, however, is that members win more in this "party" than in the unanimous coalition or by acting independently. It is not necessarily the case that a party will form, but it is possible, and it is possible because partisans win more in a party than by other arrangements.

Table 2.3 provides a second example. Here, with independent voting, all bills fail, and each legislator nets 0. It is Pareto superior for each bill to pass, yielding each legislator 1. Thus a broad coalition will pass all three. A two-person party will yield each of its members 2 and the excluded member −2. Again, the central point is that forming a party is possible, and the incentive is that partisans in the majority win more than they would win in any other way. This example illustrates "universalism," that is, passing substantive legislation unanimously, or nearly so, within this pork barrel setting. The basic idea is that in a universal coalition, each legislator gets a "pet project" to take back to the district. This particular case illustrates the conditions of Weingast's universalism theorem (1979).

Central to his theorem is his assumption that, a priori, each member expects a minimal winning coalition to form but no member has any idea which one, so that (Weingast assumes) every minimal winning coalition is equally likely. In this case there is a two-thirds chance of each legislator being in a minimal winning coalition, with an ex ante expected payoff of 2/3. This expected payoff is, indeed, less than the payoff of universalism, in which all bills pass and each receives a payoff of 1. Again, some form of a priori commitment is necessary, and universalism theorems show that it is possible, but not necessary, for a "norm" of universalism to develop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>x</th>
<th>y</th>
<th>z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent voting: Outcome: All bills fail. Payoff (0, 0, 0)
Pareto optimal result: Pass all bills. Payoff (1, 1, 1)
Universalism norm: Outcome: Pass all bills. Payoff (1, 1, 1)
Part of A and B: Outcome: Pass bills X and Y. Payoff (2, 2, -2)
Universalism theorem (Weingast, 1979)
Outcome: Pass all bills. Ex ante payoff (2/3, 2/3, 2/3)

Forming a party yields the winners a payoff of 2 each. This is not a counterexample to Weingast's theorem, because the formation of a party means there is ex ante certainty, not the equal probability of his theorem. That, of course, is the point. The reason to enter a party is to win more, and here that means reducing uncertainty over future outcomes. The majority party can pass any bill, so it can yield each more than acting alone, more than forming majority coalitions piecemeal, and more than under a universalism norm. Again, this shows it is possible that rational legislators would choose to form a party, because they would win more than otherwise.

We have seen that pork barrel legislation gives an incentive for a political party to form. That incentive exists whether or not there is a collective action problem. Consider table 2.3 again, but suppose that the winner receives 2. This is not a collective action problem, for each receives the same payoff if all bills pass or if none do, but there is still an incentive for a long, narrow coalition. The two, say A and B, would agree to pass the two bills that give each one a payoff of 2, and each would receive a payoff of +1, better than they could get playing individually or in a universal coalition.

Is this set of examples at all general? Schwartz proves that as long as the bills are distributive policies, there will be incentives for a majority to form a minimal winning party. Suppose there are n legislators and m denotes (minimal) majority size. Passing any bill yields benefits to a winner of, say, b. If costs, c, are divided equally, each pays \( c = \frac{C}{n} \). Each legislator, if choosing independently, will vote for any bill for which \( b - c > 0 \). If a simple majority forms, they will pass pork
barrel legislation such that \( b - mc > 0 \) for all members of the coalition. The rest lose an amount \(-mc\). What Schwarz shows is that it is better for winners to be in a permanent coalition a priori, that is, in the majority party. Whatever the situation, each member can calculate that there is an a priori probability, \( p \), of being in the winning coalition. If only minimal winning coalitions will form, each expects to receive an amount equal to \( pb - mc \). Weingast's theorem assumes that \( p \) is based on every minimal winning coalition's being equally likely and thus assumes its lowest value. The larger \( p \) is, the higher each winner's payoff. When \( p \) equals 1, each of the \( m \) winners expects to receive a full \( b - mc \). Thus members of the majority each prefer to know with certainty that they are the winning coalition. These \( m \) individuals will be worse off with any degree of uncertainty. That is the incentive for forming a binding coalition—for forming a political party.

One might argue that there are transactions costs that must be paid for forming and maintaining a party coalition. Although this is true, there are also transactions costs for forming each winning coalition. No one knows how large either set of costs is, but it is likely that transactions costs for parties are far less, at least over the long haul, than those for forming new majorities for each piece of legislation. Thus an additional incentive for intralegislative party formation is to reduce costs of legislative coalition formation over the long haul.

We can also exploit the structure of bicameralism to extend Schwarz's argument. Suppose there are two chambers and the two have to agree for a bill to become law. An example similar to the United States House and Senate is displayed in table 2.4. Here, the seven-member House faces proposals like those in table 2.3. The Senate comprises three members whose states are composed of House districts. Thus, Q's state consists of the House districts, A, B, and C, and so on. Senators’ payoffs are assumed to be the sum of those in the component House district. Here, if a party of D, E, F, and G forms in the House, it will pass bills W, X, Y, and Z, with each partisan receiving +4 and the rest receiving −4. R and S have an incentive to join the House’s majority party, since they would like to pass the same bills and reject the rest. R and S would then receive +8, while Q receives a payoff of −12. With geographic definitions of districts and of the distribution of legislative benefits, we would expect parties to form along regional lines, and bicameralism would accentuate the value of partisan regional bases.\(^7\)

| Table 2.4 An Example of Bicameralism with Districts Defined Geographically and with Incentives for Regional Party Bases |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **House** | **Bill** |
| | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| A | 7 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 |
| B | −1 | 7 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 |
| C | −1 | −1 | 7 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 |
| D | −1 | −1 | −1 | 7 | −1 | −1 | −1 |
| E | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | 7 | −1 | −1 |
| F | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | 7 | −1 |
| G | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | −1 | 7 |
| **Senate** | **Q (= A + B + C)** | 5 | 5 | 5 | −3 | −3 | −3 | −3 |
| | **R (= D + E)** | −2 | −2 | −2 | 6 | 6 | −2 | −2 |
| | **S (= F + G)** | −2 | −2 | −2 | −2 | −2 | −2 | 6 |

Independent Voting  Outcome: All bills fail with a payoff of 0 to all.

Pareto-optimal result  All bills pass with a payoff of 1 to all.

"Natural" geographic basis for parties  Suppose D-E-F-G and R-S formed a party, passing (W, X, Y, Z). Then:

- A, B, and C receive −4; D, E, F, and G receive +4 each
- Q receives −12; R and S receive +8 each

This is the highest these parties could have obtained, and it is higher than either independent voting or the Pareto optimal (universality) outcome.

Other parties are possible, but only those with a geographic basis are of much value. For example, suppose the House majority party was A-B-D-F. By passing (T, U, W, Y), each of them would receive +4, while the others in the House would receive −4. Q would be a winner in the Senate (+4), while R and S would receive 0. Alternatively, the majority A-B-C-D could form a party and pass (T, U, V, W) in the House. Q would win 12, R would receive 0, and S would get −8. Thus the nongeographic coalition in the House could succeed there but would get support in the Senate only from Q. The last, which is also a geographic coalition, shows that not all are advantaged. Rather, the small state coalition in the House is, when interchamber majorities are necessary. Although both of these examples could yield interchamber parties, only the first is truly advantageous for all members.

\(^7\) Senate payoffs are the sum of the payoffs to that state's House districts.

### SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT

#### The Social Choice Problem in Policymaking

Social choice theory in political science concerns Arrow's general possibility theorem and its implications for the theory of majority voting.
Table 2.5  A Social Choice Problem and Incentives for Party Formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Round-robin tournament, voting independently and sincerely*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X beats Y (A, B)</th>
<th>Y beats Z (A, C)</th>
<th>Z beats X (B, C):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sequential agenda: sincere voting*

1st vote             Final vote outcome  Payoff to (A, B, C)

a. (X, Y) = X         (X, Z) = Z     (-9, 4, 3)

b. (X, Z) = Z         (Z, Y) = Y     (3, -9, 4)

c. (Y, Z) = Y         (Y, X) = X     (4, 3, -9)

*Sequential agenda: sophisticated voting*

a. (X, Y) = Y         (Y, Z) = Y     (3, -9, 4)

b. (X, Z) = X         (X, Y) = X     (4, 3, -9)

c. (Y, Z) = Z         (Z, X) = Z     (-9, 4, 3)

*Equitriable order of voting*  Expected outcome: (2/3, 2/3, 2/3)

Temporary coalitions A and B coalesce, yielding X;
C offers to coalesce with B, yielding Z;
A offers to coalesce with C, yielding Y;
B offers to coalesce with A again.
Thus, there is a cycle in coalitions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party of A and B</th>
<th>Outcome: Pass X</th>
<th>Payoff (4, 3, -9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*(X, Y) = X, for example, denotes that alternative X is voted against Y with X winning. Boldface denotes the final, winning outcome.*

(1951; see also, Riker 1982a). Its typical example, the “paradox of voting,” is illustrated in table 2.5. Here there are three alternatives—say, a bill, an amendment, and the status quo (or reversion outcome). The three legislators have preferences over these outcomes. Suppose that voting is by round-robin, majority rule and that each legislator votes for the preferred alternative at each vote. Then X beats Y by a 2–1 vote, and Y defeats Z 2–1. We might expect transitivity to hold, so that if X beats Y and Y beats Z, then X should defeat Z. In fact, Z defeats X 2–1. This is called a majority “cycle,” since voting can cycle the social choice from Z to Y to X and back to Z.

Payoff values are assigned to the alternatives in table 2.5, with 4 for the most preferred alternative, 3 for the second most preferred, and -9 for the least-liked alternative. Note that these reproduce the payoffs from table 2.1, except over competing versions of the same bill rather than three different bills. Thus, at least in this case, the same

preferences that led to a collective action problem also lead to a social choice problem. Table 2.5 does not look like pork barrel preferences, and indeed it has many interpretations in addition to preferences for pork. In other words, preferences that could lead to a collective action problem need not be of distributive policies, so that the previous section is actually more general than it appears.

The Nature of the Social Choice Problem

Arrow’s general possibility theorem is essentially that cycles are always possible—not that they must exist, but that they can never be ruled out. His theorem is about preferences. All legislators have noncyclical preferences. Is there a sense in which we could say that this three-person society also has noncyclical preferences? Is there a socially preferred outcome? Round-robin majority voting (or the method of majority voting generally; see Sen 1970; Riker 1982a), if that is used to define “social preference,” says no. Arrows’ theorem says no method of choosing can guarantee that noncyclical social “preferences” can be obtained from noncyclical individual preferences.

Voting theory is about how preferences lead to choices, that is, about behavior, as well as about the normative questions Arrow considered. In the example, legislators always choose to vote for the preferred alternative in any pair, illustrating how Arrow’s theorem can be translated into a form for studying behavior. This has been done mostly in terms of majority voting procedures, either in large electorates or in “committees,” that is, smaller bodies such as legislatures. The central problem in this literature is a search for equilibria in behavior, and the literature divides into two streams of research.

One stream consists of what may be referred to as the “positive” results. It seeks conditions that yield a behavioral equilibrium, which would tell us what society would choose. The most famous result is Duncan Black’s “median voter” theorem (1958). This theorem says that if it is possible to arrange alternatives so that every voter’s preferences are “single peaked” in one dimension, then there is a behavioral equilibrium. Calling each voter’s most preferred alternative an “ideal point,” the result is that the ideal point of the median voter is the equilibrium. Black proved this result for the case of committees, and Anthony Downs (1957) provided the comparable result for large electorates. Two candidates competing along a single dimension (e.g., a left/right ideological dimension) and seeking only to win the election would be led to “converge” to the ideal point of the median voter (see chap. 6 for further development). Some generalization is possible, but
these results are marginal emendations of Black's theorem (see Sen 1970). Black's theorem has been employed in a variety of forms. For example, Shepsle (1979) used the median voter theorem in its institutional model of a legislature with a committee system, and there are a number of other results that involve voting on one dimension at a time or in some other way constrain multidimensional choice settings to single dimensions.

Black also searched for equilibrium in multidimensional spaces.10 Stated more generally by Plott (1967), this attempt to generalize the median voter theorem effectively requires the existence of a multivariate median.11 A multivariate median, however, exists only in symmetric distributions (e.g., of ideal points). Davis and Hinich (e.g., 1966; see also Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970) extended the Downsian spatial model to multiple dimensions, and they also needed symmetry conditions to yield a behavioral equilibrium.12

This apparent necessity for symmetry underlies the second, "negative" stream of research. Unidimensionality typically cannot be assumed. Most certainly, symmetry of preferences can be dismissed as wildly implausible. Thus the failure to find a multidimensional generalization of Black's theorem in anything like a useful set of conditions means that cycling in social choices holds almost invariably. One must begin with the premise that there is no behavioral equilibrium. Thus Plott's basic argument was that disequilibrium was ordinarily the case, and the two-candidate spatial model also foundered on such impossibility results.

More "impossibility" results followed. It was shown, for example, that Arrow's theorem was coincident with the nonexistence of the game theoretic solution concept of the core, thus providing a formal tie between Arrow's preference cycling and behavior.13 Kramer (1973) added the "knife-edged" result—that the slightest possible divergence from an equilibrium totally destroys it. The ultimate in negative results are the series of "chaos" theorems (e.g., McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1978). These showed that if there was no behavioral equilibrium, majority voting could lead from any one outcome to any other, no matter how far apart, even to alternatives that were unanimously disfavored. Pairwise majority voting, they showed, could result in "anything happening."14 This stream of research was effectively summarized by Riker's calling politics "truly the dismal science" (1980).15

Give the implausibility of a single dimension of choice and the extreme implausibility of symmetry, the presumed perverseness of disequilibrium has led to two newer directions in research. One is the new institutionalism, such as the work of Shepsle and Weingast. This is in part the search for equilibria due to the combination of preferences and institutional arrangements (called "structure-induced equilibria" or SIEs), knowing that equilibrium under majority rule based on preferences alone ("preference-induced equilibria," or PIEs) are virtually nonexistent. This will be explored in the party setting in chapter 7. The second has examined choice without imposing (much in the way of) institutional arrangements. The search, instead, is for alternative solution concepts. Most notable here are such concepts as the "uncovered set" (e.g., McKelvey 1986) or the "minmax set" (e.g., Kramer 1977). The general thrust of this literature is that though there may be no equilibrium akin to Black's median voter theorem, all of these concepts tend to lead to voting outcomes near the center. Perhaps, then, there may be some weaker form of generalization of the median voter revealing a tendency toward choice at, or convergence to, the policy center.

Incentives for Party Formation in the Presence of a Social Choice Problem

Table 2.5 was used to illustrate the paradox of voting with round-robin voting. Legislatures, of course, adopt rules for determining the agenda, such as that the first vote is on the amendment, equivalent to voting for the unamended versus the amended bill. The winner then faces the status quo, determining the final outcome.

Cyclical preferences would not be revealed with such an agenda, since not all pairs are matched. This does not mean the paradoxical arrangements of preferences is inconsequential. To examine this, we need a behavioral rule to guide us in understanding how rational legislators would choose. There are two commonly used choice rules, called "sincere" and "sophisticated" voting. Voting is sincere if legislators always vote for whichever alternative they prefer. Voting is sophisticated if legislators look ahead to see the consequences of their current votes for future choices. One might vote against a preferred alternative to avoid ending up with an even worse outcome. Obviously sophisticated voting requires, in addition to anything else, information about the preferences of the other votes. Thus sincere voting is plausible when legislators or voters know little about each other, whereas sophisticated voting is more likely when legislators or voters know each other well.16

Under sincere voting as shown in table 2.5, the status quo always
wins. For example, if X is an amended form of bill Y, X wins in the first vote but loses to the status quo (Z) in the second vote. Any of these three alternatives can win, depending only on the order in which they are voted on. The same is true under sophisticated voting, although in this case the status quo always loses. Thus, with the same preferences, the outcome depends on the order of voting, sometimes called “path dependence,” since the outcome depends on the “path” or agenda order followed. The outcome also depends on whether voters are sincere or sophisticated and thus presumably on the availability and costs of information.

In table 2.6 there is a behavioral equilibrium in preferences. In this case X defeats Y and Y defeats Z, as before, but X also defeats Z. That is, X defeats both alternatives in pairwise voting and is called a “Condorcet winner.” X is also the median voter result, with A the median voter. X is chosen under any of the three methods of voting: the round-robin tournament, the sequential agenda with sincere voting, or the agenda with sophisticated voting. The choice no longer depends on the path or on the decision rules followed by the actors.

What, then, of parties? Here “length” is not meaningful, since these are three alternatives under simultaneous consideration. Think first of a party as a coalition, say of A and B. In the situation depicted in table 2.5, A and B could agree to support X over the other two, and as a majority they could ensure that X passes, yielding payoffs to A of 4, B of 3, and C of −9. If this were a mere coalition, however, it would be vulnerable: C could offer to join with B, agreeing on passage of Z. This would make them both better off, giving B 4 and C 3. Now A could offer to join with C, making both better off, giving C the 4 payoff and A the 3. But then B could reoffer the A-B coalition. In short, if a party were a mere coalition formed around a single issue, there would be a cycle among coalitions, mirroring the cycle in preferences. A party, then, must be more than a coalition of temporary interests. It could be a long coalition, in which A and B would agree to commit to a coalition over a series of bills, and anytime such a case of cycling arose, they would determine a joint course of action. In this particular case B could do better, but by entering the A-B party, B could ensure never being in C’s circumstance of being the worst off. Again, the value of the party would be to institutionalize for the long haul (and over issues) and reduce uncertainty, ensuring each member some benefits for being in this party, such as here in avoiding the worst outcome.

In table 2.6, any two-legislator coalition will agree on X. That is,
wins, forming a coalition would involve paying needless transactions costs, and it might be that the median would not win, thus making C worse off in either case.

Consider, then, coalitions that exclude C. Any majority coalition that excludes C has to include legislators on both “sides” of C. Suppose A, B, and D form a coalition. Anything that A and B find more attractive than C’s ideal point, D likes less, and vice versa. As Axelrod pointed out (1970), the coalition that has the least internal conflict of interest (or in other words the most in common) is “connected,” having adjacent ideal point locations. Any such connected coalition must therefore include C. Skipping over C, such as forming, A-B-D, involves greater conflict of interest than, say, forming A-B-C or B-C-D, and A-B-D may be able to agree to no more than selecting C’s ideal point, which they could get without coalescing. 10

Thus there is no incentive to form a coalition when there is an equilibrium. Social choice theory tells us that most of the time we should expect there to be no voting equilibrium based solely on preferences, which returns us to the previous case where there were incentives to form a long coalition—a party—precisely because of the disequilibrium. One might argue that if a coalition such as A-B-D has formed for other reasons, it might face the possibility of figure 2.1 sometime in the future. Even so, the coalition of A-B-D can always agree on C’s ideal point—or equivalently, agree not to act in coalition on this policy—and the members will receive no worse than they would have without forming (or employing) the party. They will have won at least as much as they would have without the party, and in the presumably common cases where there is a paradoxical arrangement of preferences, they can win more.

If the lesson of voting theory in committee settings is that PIEs are rare, then there are always incentives to form a party. Indeed, were equilibrium the ordinary circumstance, there would be no incentive to form a party based on the social choice problem. But even when an equilibrium exists, the political party need not make its members worse off than without the party; they can always choose to take no “partisan” actions. With PIEs generally considered impossible, there is a strong incentive for parties to form, precisely because of the likelihood of disequilibrium. Riker’s dismal conclusion turns out to provide a strong case for the formation of political parties.

The new institutionalism (e.g., Shepsle 1979) emerged in response to the ordinary absence of (pure) voting equilibria. Two points discussed below and in later chapters are also relevant here. First, many different institutional arrangements can be sufficient to yield (structure-induced) equilibria, such as committee systems, agenda designs, and even separate powers. None of these are necessary—like parties, all yield possibility results. Second, partisan institutions are one of those sets of sufficient institutions.

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ELECTORAL MOBILIZATION

The Problem of Collective Action in Elections

The Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican parties began with the government as a means of solving a social choice problem (see chap. 3). Such parties-in-government may also become electoral parties. The most obvious motivation lies with the minority. The examples above demonstrated incentives for some majority to form a party. If this happens, some or all of those excluded might form a party in reaction, seeking to become the legislative majority. Failing to reach majority size, the minority would naturally turn to the public, seeking to elect more of its members. That is essentially what the Jeffersonians did when facing a Hamiltonian majority. Later parties, notably the Jacksonian Democratic party, formed more directly for electoral purposes (see chap. 4). The question for this section and the next, then, is what set of incentives candidates for elective office might have that would lead them to form or join a political party. In this section we examine incentives that arise from attempting to mobilize the electorate. Mobilizing the electorate by definition is getting the public to turn out to vote for, or otherwise support, a candidate. Examining the logic of voting among citizens introduces the second form in which prob-
lems of collective action are studied, and in this case turnout is the quintessential example.

The Nature of Problem of Collective Action and Mobilization

Turnout is ordinarily seen as a problem in individual decision making, unlike the prisoners’ dilemma. Both can be put in game theoretic terms, but in the latter case, the strategic interaction between the players is central. Both players have an immediate and direct impact on the outcome, and each player would be wise to at least consider the strategic possibilities of the other player. In large electorates the outcome depends on the actions taken by all, but strategic interaction is so remote that it can be effectively ignored: how one citizen decides to act has very little effect on the decisions of any others. Sheer size all but eliminates strategic interaction, reducing the problem to one of individual decision making.

The standard theory, called the “calculus of voting,” employs expected utility maximization (see Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968, 1973). If there are two candidates, the calculus, like all rational choice models, predicts voting for the more preferred one. The question is whether to vote at all. The calculus for choosing whether one votes or abstains is

\[ R = PB + D - C. \]

(2.1)

R denotes the reward (expected utility) for casting a vote, and one votes if R is positive and abstains if not. P represents the probability that the vote will affect the outcome, roughly the probability of casting the vote that makes or breaks a tie. B represents the differential benefit the citizen receives from the election of the more preferred candidate. The D, for duty, term measures any positive rewards received from the act of voting itself, which may include the satisfaction of having done one’s duty as a citizen, the value of expressing support for the preferred candidate or party, and so on. Finally, C stands for the costs of voting, including the time and effort needed to register and go to the polls and the costs of decision making. C and D, therefore, come with the act of voting itself and do not depend on the outcome. Only B depends on the outcome, and it is discounted by the impact of P, the effect this one vote would have on determining that outcome.

This calculus is a typical example of expected utility maximizing. It thus serves as a template for a large number of other expected utility maximization problems. One example is the “calculus of candidacy” that will be examined in the next section. It also serves as a calculus for political participation more generally. Olson (1965) analyzed the problem of collective action for participating in interest groups, for example, and his logic is effectively equivalent to this calculus.

The calculus is a model of individual decision making, but the outcome sought is a public good. The winning candidate is “jointly supplied,” no one can be excluded from “consuming” the good, and indeed no one can avoid consuming it, no matter whether they voted for or against the winner or did not vote at all. The question, then, is under what conditions it is rational for the individual to contribute to (or “cooperate in”) the provision of this public good.

The collective action problem follows immediately from the calculus and the observation that, in any large group, the P term is almost invariably very small. A near zero P makes the PB term tiny unless B is immense. Thus all those who share an interest in seeing a candidate elected nonetheless are motivated to act primarily on the D and C terms, that is, the intrinsic costs and benefits to voting, and very little in terms of their collectively shared interest in the candidate. If we set aside the D term for the moment (as Barry 1970 and others argue should be done), then one votes if PB > C. If P is effectively zero, then no one should vote. As in the prisoners’ dilemma, the rational citizen should “defect” by abstaining.21

The calculus of voting includes a second, prior “collective action” problem: becoming informed. A citizen concerned about the electoral outcome needs to determine what outcome is desired. Which candidate, in other words, does the citizen want to see elected, and how important is the outcome—that is, how large is the B term? The citizen must expend decision-making costs to gather and process information to determine this, but if a vote has a negligible impact on the outcome, why should anyone pay these costs? Downs (1957) explained why it is rational for citizens to be ill informed except as they “accidentally” acquire information or obtain it for other reasons.

Incentives for Candidates in Electoral Mobilization

Candidates want to win elections. To do so, they need to convince more citizens to prefer them than prefer their opponent(s), and they need to convince these supporters to vote in greater numbers than their opposition. Citizens may not have incentives to turn out or even to ascertain their preferences over candidates. Candidates, however, do have strong personal incentives to solae these collective action problems for citizens, if only for their supporters. Campaigns therefore can
be understood as attempts to create supporters and get them to turn out in the face of these two collective action problems.

There are a number of ways candidates can generate supporters and get them to vote, and these can be seen as attempts to manipulate terms in the calculus of voting. Most important are the common efforts to lower the costs of voting, such as exhortations to register and vote and formally organized mobilization drives. Candidates also can lower decision-making costs for voters by providing as much information as possible in a readily available form, seeking to "instruct" voters that the candidate values what they do, thus also seeking to generate a favorable B term as well as lowering C. At the same time, "allocating emphasis," to use Page's term (1976), or even outright exaggeration, may make the B differential appear large.

Exhortations that all citizens should do their duty by voting seek to increase the intrinsic rewards of voting, while claims that "everyone's vote counts" seek to make the P term seem high. These claims strike everyone, however, opponents and supporters alike, so candidates typically leave them to editorial writers and the League of Women Voters. But candidates do manipulate the P, B, C, and D terms more selectively. Thus candidates and parties focus their campaign appeals and mobilization drives on those they believe already are, or are most likely to become, their supporters.

Although candidates employ many particular tactics to make it seem in their supporters' personal interests to turn out and vote, the general points are that candidates have private incentives to seek to overcome these collective action problems, and that these tactics, to be successful, must be chosen in light of the collective action problems facing the electorate. Implementing these tactics takes resources. It is probably not very expensive to generate the largely private benefits sufficient for overcoming the free riding incentives an individual citizen faces, but these small per capita costs become substantial in a large electorate. Yet as a great deal of empirical work has demonstrated (e.g., Patterson and Calidera 1983), wise expenditures of resources pays off in increased turnout.

Incentives for Party Affiliation for Candidates

That candidates have private incentives to reduce collective action problems among their supporters does not necessarily mean they have incentives to form a party. Today's elections are typically described as "candidate centered," and a large part of that claim is that it has become feasible for individual candidates to raise and expend resources on their own (see chaps. 6 and 8). So part of the answer must be historically contingent, but part must continue to apply, since candidates with any serious hopes are almost invariably partisan.

Affiliation with a party provides a candidate with, among other things, a "brand name." In advertising, successful brand names convey a great deal of information cheaply: they cue an established reputation (see Downs 1957). Travelers, for example, know little about a local hamburger stand but know that McDonald's provides a certain type of product with standards for cleanliness, service, and so on. A party label can convey a great deal of information as well. The American Voter popularized the view that political parties provide cues and partisan images (Campbell et al. 1960). Key (1966) referred to party identification as a "standing decision": parties vote for their preferred party's candidates until and unless given good reasons not to. The candidate's party affiliation therefore provides a very inexpensive way to infer a great deal: what a typical Democrat or Republican is like. To be sure, other sources of reputation could serve much the same as party affiliation. A reputation as a liberal or conservative, for example, is a similar cost-saving device for voters. The empirical dominance of party cues (and their not coincidental relation to what is popularly understood by "liberal" and "conservative") in the public suggests, of course, that the affiliation of a candidate with a party has proved useful. Thus the collective action problem for voters of becoming sufficiently informed to make a (possibly preliminary) determination of whom they favor is greatly attenuated, given party affiliation and perhaps other reputational cues. This effect is exaggerated to the extent that voters' choices are correlated among candidates of the same party. The correlation is, of course, partially endogenous to the actions and the stances of a party's candidates (as well as to institutional features such as ballot forms that ease or hinder split-ticket voting). Even today, however, many vote straight tickets, or close to it, and as Cox and McCubbins (1993) have shown, there is a substantial impact of party identification on even the highly candidate (especially incumbent) centered voting for Congress.

Affiliation with a party not only brings the candidate a "natural" reputation, it also provides economies of scale. This is especially important for turnout. Campaigns may reduce free riding incentives in the public, but they are costly for the candidates. The campaign budget imposes real constraints, especially at lower levels of office and for nonincumbents. A turnout drive by the party's presidential nominee reduces or eliminates the costs of getting partisans to the polls for
other candidates of that party, for example. Once the voter is there, the additional costs of voting for remaining offices are very small, especially if party-line votes are possible. Thus the tide of partisans turning out to vote for president lifts the boats for all of the rest of that party's nominees.

The combination of office-seeking ambition and the very nature of electoral institutions generate incentives for candidates to solve the two collective action problems affecting voters: becoming informed and turning out to vote. Candidates have two kinds of incentives to affiliate with a political party, ameliorating both of the public's collective action problems. Party affiliation provides an initial reputation that reduces decision-making costs and provides a core of likely supporters. Party campaign efforts, whether conducted by the party organization itself or by its various candidates, provide economies of scale for all of the party's candidates as they seek to reduce the costs and increase the benefits for supporters to come to the polls. As before, these incentives create the possibility that candidates might want to affiliate with a party. There are other means of reaching the same ends. Moreover, affiliation is not costless. The reputational effects of being a Democrat or Republican need not be entirely positive and at times can be quite negative. Until recently being a Republican in the South provided a reputation, but one that made winning all but impossible.Any partisan image undoubtedly mixes positives and negatives for any candidate. Yet the ambitious politician seeking a long and successful career almost invariably affiliates with one or the other major party, in part owing to reputational effects and economies of scale.

One of the tensions facing partisan candidates is the need to solve another collective action problem, that of generating the many activists needed to secure the labor and financial (and other) resources needed to achieve mobilization. This may yield tension, because the best appeal to activists may differ from what would best mobilize voters. Resolution of such competing pressures depends in part on the activists' incentives. For example, political machines generated selective incentives for securing activists' support that were largely independent of policy appeals to the public. The reduction of such private incentives is a substantial part of the forces that reduced or eliminated partisan machines. In place of the private benefit seekers of the machine era are today's more policy-motivated activists. The consequences of such activists for inducing more divergence between candidates of opposing parties is developed and tested in chapter 6.

AMBITION AND INCENTIVES FOR PARTY AFFILIATION

The Problem of Ambition Theory

Joseph A. Schlesinger began his theory of political ambition by asserting, "Ambition lies at the heart of politics. Politics thrives on the hope of preferment and the drive for office" (1966, p. 1). Schlesinger's ambition is the ordinary drive for a long and successful career, in this case a career in elective office. This ambition constrains office seekers and holders to promise what the public wants and to deliver what the public finds at least minimally satisfactory. It also provides incentives for ambitious politicians to affiliate with a major party.

Black (1972) and Rohde (1979) modified ambition theory, casting it in expected utility maximizing form, the "calculus of candidacy." It can be illustrated using Rohde's example of an incumbent member of the House considering whether to run for reelection, run for the Senate, or retire. There are three outcomes, \{O_a, O_b, O_c\}, denoting holding no office, keeping the current House seat, and gaining a Senate seat. Ambition theory assumes that all prefer holding a higher office to a lower office and prefer that to holding no office, or \(U(O_a) > U(O_b) > U(O_c)\). It will be convenient to set \(U(O_a) = 0\). The candidate chooses an action, \(\{a_a, a_b, a_c\}\), to run for no office, run for reelection, or run for the Senate. It is very costly to run for office, and presumably more so for the Senate than the House, so costs may be written \(C_a > C_b > C_c = 0\). Expected utility maximization requires calculating the probability of each possible outcome, given each possible action. Many are zero, of course. The two critical probabilities are \(P_a\) and \(P_b\), the probability of election to the Senate (House) if the candidate runs for that office, with \((1 - P_a)\) and \((1 - P_b)\), the respective probabilities of defeat, being the remaining nonzero probabilities. The \(P\), \(B\), and \(C\) terms discussed so far mirror those in the calculus of voting. The voting calculus also includes a \(D\) term. Here, though there may be intrinsic benefits for running for office, they are likely to be so small for ambitious politicians that they can be ignored.

The calculus can be simplified to: \[\text{or, with } U(O_a) = 0, \text{ to:}\]

\[2.2a \quad EU(a_a) = 0 \]
\[2.2b \quad EU(a_a) = P_a U(O_a) - (1 - P_a) U(O_b) - C_b = P_a U(O_a) - C_b; \]
\[2.2c \quad EU(a_a) = P_a U(O_a) - (1 - P_a) U(O_b) - C_b = P_a U(O_a) - C_b. \]
The expected utility maximizing candidate chooses whichever yields the highest expected return. Thus the candidate retires if the costs of running for each office exceed its expected benefits. If not, the candidate runs for whichever office yields the larger expected net benefits. For incumbent members of the House, the probability of reelection (barring indictment) is so high that $EU(a)$ is almost always positive, so retirement is rare. The probability of winning a Senate race is usually much lower than for the House, and the costs of running are much higher. Candidates therefore must either have very strong ambition or pick the timing of a Senate race very carefully, looking for circumstances that make $P$, unusually high. Of course all terms, $P$, $B$, and $C$, may vary across contests, for example, in large compared with small states. Finally, although there are strong parallels to the form of the calculus of voting, there is no collective action problem, since the outcome of holding office is a private good for the candidate.

Incentives for Party Affiliation among Ambitious Politicians

In most applications, as above, the question is which office a candidate seeks. Party affiliation is taken for granted and not even considered a matter of choice. Although recognizing their importance, Schlesinger deferred consideration of parties until the end of his study, because ambition and its theoretical consequences are features of the actors and government, independent of party. This point reflects, of course, my claim that parties are the consequences of the actions of political elites in a republican democracy. It is also true that in ordinary circumstances very few political careerists change their party affiliation.

Yet as Schlesinger recognized, affiliation with a major party is close to a necessary condition for access to elective office, and even closer to a necessary condition for a long, successful career in politics. At base, party affiliation is a choice made by ambitious politicians, even if often made before entering politics. At critical times, such as during national realignments (e.g., in the 1850s; see chap. 5) or with the rise of the Republicans to competitive status in the South, significant numbers do change their party affiliation, and more consider doing so. Moreover, Schlesinger noted the irony that in this age of party decline and candidate-centered elections, politicians’ affiliation with a major party had increased (to over 99 percent since World War II; see Schlesinger 1984). Why then are politicians affiliating with major parties more today, if they need them less? Presumably they do not need them less, regardless of party decline and candidate-centered elections.

Party affiliation therefore should be derived from the theory rather than be assumed by the theory a priori. In the terms used in this chapter, what incentives are there for political careerists to form ties with a major political party?

To begin to analyze the incentives that may have produced these results, consider what the calculus of candidacy looks like when party affiliation, rather than level of office, is the variable of choice. In chapter 5 we will examine the demise of the Whigs and the rise of the Republican party, so I will use that notation for illustration, although the form is general (for formal development, see Aldrich and Bianco 1992). Consider a candidate deciding whether to run for office as a Whig or a Republican and therefore facing three outcomes, $O_w$, $O_R$, $O_J$, where $O_w$ denotes serving as a Whig, $O_R$ serving as a Republican, and $O_J$ as not serving at all. Let $U(O)$ denote the utility for outcome $O$. There are three actions, $a_w$, $a_R$, $a_J$, and each has a cost, $C_w$, $C_R$, $C_J$. Finally, there will be a set of probabilities, $P_{wO}$, denoting the probability of outcome $O$ given that action $a$ has been taken. This is generally written

$$EU(a) = \sum P_{iO} U(O) - C_i,$$

and expected utility maximizing candidates choose action $i$, such that

$$\max_i EU(a).$$

This calculus can be simplified by three assumptions (see Aldrich and Bianco 1992 for details). First, pure office-seeking ambition implies in its strongest and simplest form that no politicians care which party they join based on policy concerns. Second, we can easily assume that the candidate will not win election as a $W(R)$ if he or she runs as an $R(W)$. Finally, we can also assume that net costs of running are positive and constant across parties. Differing costs across parties are likely to be negatively correlated with probabilities of success (that is, extra effort will make up for lower probabilities), so that variable costs are likely to accentuate any findings reached. Aldrich and Bianco show that the full expression of this model (1992, p. 105), combined with the simplifications above, leads to (p. 106):

$$EU(a_w) = 0;$$

$$EU(a_w) = P_{wO} U(O) - C_i;$$

$$EU(a_w) = P_{wO} U(O) - C_i.$$
Rational (pure) office seekers will run if at least one party offers a positive expected return, and they will then choose to run in whichever party offers the higher (highest) probability of victory. Note that, with simplifying assumptions, the calculus of candidacy and the calculus of party choice are identical in form. In either case it is the consequence of ambition that the candidate desires as great a certainty of holding office as possible and acts so as to minimize the risk of defeat.

What about running as a candidate independent of any party? For a single election to a single office for one who cares only about holding office and not at all about using it, the calculus could be written as $EU(a) = P_I(0) - C_0$, where I denotes independence. In this case it is thus an empirical question whether $P_I$ is less than $P_{\text{ republican}}$ or $P_{\text{ democrat}}$ or if $C_0$ is less than $C_0$, or both. The empirical answer is almost certainly yes in both cases, probably decisively so. Still, it is an empirical question. The value of independence compared with party affiliation will, however, be quite different if the candidate values the potential for repeated election to office, or the use of office, or both.

Ambition is for a career. To that end, victory in the immediate election is crucial, for any defeat greatly reduces the prospects for a long career. So too, however, are the prospects for continued election critical. This is true for the selection of what office to seek, but the advantages of incumbency mean that victory in the current election will yield (for most offices, at least) a relatively high probability of reelection later. Choice of party, however, depends even more on future as well as current prospects. Thus, for example, Whigs in the 1850s differed in their assessments of the future. Some apparently believed it was more likely that the Republican party would join the Democrats as the two major parties than that the Whigs would remain a major party. Senator William Seward (N.Y.), even though antislavery himself, believed the prospects of the Whig party were better and remained a Whig longer than others for that reason.

Consider, then, calculations over a career. Even maintaining the pure office-seeking model, future party switching opens up a huge array of possible strategies. The two most important to consider are choosing to affiliate with one party or the other and expecting to continue that affiliation for the foreseeable future. Aldrich and Bianco (1992) demonstrate that future choices of this simple sort do not change the fundamentals: the ambitious candidate affiliates with the party that offers the higher probability of a continuing career.

This narrowly career-oriented form of ambition has been developed on the grounds that if we can find incentives for affiliating with a party with this self-interested motivation, explaining why ambitious politicians who also have policy goals affiliate with a party will be even easier. The model so far, however, explains which party ambitious politicians join, but it does not explain why they join any party, or why they might have formed a party in the first place.

The answer to these more fundamental questions focuses on the same central variable, the probability of election. The argument proceeds in three steps. The first is to assume—and to justify the assumption—that the probability of election for any candidate is higher with a party than without. The second step is to show that the probability is higher by affiliating with a major party than with a minor party. The final step is to show that there will be two such major parties—Duverger’s law.

The probability of election is a summary measure of expected choices of the electorate. As I argued earlier, the electorate faces two collective action problems, and candidates who affiliate with a party receive (at least potentially) two resources for ameliorating those problems. They receive, that is, an initial reputation (and hence a bloc of potential supporters) and a set of resources for identifying and helping to bring out those supporters. The purely ambitious candidate is assumed to place no particular value on the reputation itself, although candidates with policy motivations might be attracted to (or repelled by) one or another party by its reputation. The advantage of assuming a reputation by affiliating with a party is efficiency in attracting support. Economies of scale simply make it more attractive to participate in a political party than to go it alone. This of course was especially consequential in earlier periods, when political parties were the nearly exclusive source of the funding and labor needed to compete effectively, reinforced when voting was not secret and was cast by party-strip ballots. Even without such an effective monopoly, however, it follows that it is possible that there are incentives for affiliating with a political party. Indeed, Aldrich and Bianco (1992) provide a simple, game theoretic model that combines choice of party with the Black-Rohde model of office seeking from which they derive such incentives.

Combined with the electoral credibility that comes with having achieved a party's nomination for office, reputation and resources more easily explain why candidates affiliate with existing parties than why they form them in the first place. In particular, the formation of a party, even if the potential advantages are fully appreciated, raises a collective action problem of its own. Chapters 4 and 5 will provide detailed accounts of the ways the (Jacksonian) Democratic and Re-
publican parties were able to surmount these collective action problems and form in the first place. In the latter chapter I will use the calculus of party affiliation, but we will also see that it needs to be understood as a problem in strategic interaction, requiring a game theoretic explanation, rather than as a problem in individual decision making. We will also see not only that it took ambitious politicians to create the two American mass political parties, but that it also took a conjunction of particular conditions to make collective action possible.

What was especially important in the Jacksonian case was that office seekers were also benefit seekers—seeking, that is, the benefits that come from other partisans' holding office. In this case it was to be a new party, forged primarily by incumbent representatives and senators (along with other high-level benefit seekers) seeking, through the popular presidential candidacy of Jackson, the dual benefits of spurred mobilization for all Democrats and an incumbency that could provide selective benefits for these Jacksonian Democratic congressmen. Thus the spoils of office, whether in controlling jobs or in distributing the benefits of legislation, could become a full spoils system only by means of an organized party controlling a majority in Congress and, above all, capturing the presidency. Even if Jacksonian Democrats were merely ambitious office seekers, control over the spoils of victory would make holding office more valuable and more certain over the long term.

The reason for affiliating with a major instead of a minor party is relatively simple to explain. A major party is by definition one that provides a high probability of access to office for many of its candidates, and it provides a high likelihood of continued success as a party and hence continued access to office in the future. It was in this case Van Buren's genius to recognize the value of forming a party system that made it possible for career ambitions to be realized. It was also his genius to develop a partisan rather than governmental career path, and one that exploited the advantages of the spoils system. The remaining problem, then, is to explain why there are, have been, and are likely to be exactly two major parties in America.

Duverger's law, that elections decided by plurality or majority rule yield a two-party system, is an empirical observation. As Riker has pointed out (1982b), it becomes a scientific law only when given theoretical underpinnings. He pointed to two possible sources of a rational basis for the law. One resides in the electorate and is manifested in the "wasted vote" logic, that is, the decisions of voters to choose between only the two leading candidates or parties. Recently Palfrey (1989) and Feddersen (1992) have provided formal demonstrations of this account. Abramson et al. (1992) provide evidence that voters avoided "wasting" votes on other than the two major contenders in presidential primaries, and Black (1978) and Cain (1978) provide comparable evidence for the "wasted vote" logic in Canada and in Britain. Still, the formal demonstration rests on the problematic assumption that voters base their decisions on the probability of making or breaking ties (but see Aldrich 1993b). Nonetheless, even weak tendency of voters to act in this "sophisticated" fashion will encourage two-partyism.

The stronger force, Riker believes, lies with the political elites. Certainly it is in the party's interests—in the collective interests of its key members—to be one of the two major parties. Thus any party will seek to recruit, train, and support the strongest candidates it can. Just as surely, it is in the interests of the two strongest candidates to ensure, as far as possible, that the choice reduces to just those two. The advantage for the possible or actual candidates lies, however, not (or not just) in the advantages major party affiliation afford them for the immediate election. The advantage lies in the long-term career prospects of relatively high likelihood of continued access to office over the course of a political career and of the heightened ability to use that office for whatever goals are desired. It is the reduction of uncertainty in repeated electoral contests, just as in repeated policymaking contests, that yields the great advantage of affiliation with, and even the creation of, a major party.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

The last few sections have demonstrated that the nature of forming electoral and legislative majorities in a republican democracy induces incentives for the possible formation of political parties. The nature of these incentives invariably entails that politicians stand to win more—achieve more of their goals or be more likely to achieve their goals—through a party than otherwise. Rational choice theory since Riker's classic argument (1962) has moved away from this emphasis on winning per se to become more concerned with the problems of social choice and collective action—that is, to search for conditions that generate equilibrium outcomes or that yield equilibrium outcomes with desirable properties, especially Pareto optimality. I have argued in this chapter that winning, that is, achieving one's goals, and establishing
(desirable) equilibria are closely related in republican democracies. To achieve an equilibrium at all or to attain a desirable outcome is often precisely the same thing as winning, whether that means securing office, using office for other purposes, or both.

Saying that politicians might find it in their interests to create or to use a political party is not the same thing as saying they will choose to do so. A political party is a collective enterprise, subject to significant collective action problems in forming and maintaining it. Moreover, there may be other means of achieving the politicians' goals, and parties may not always be a means to desirable outcomes. In chapter 8 I will argue that contemporary, candidate-centered elections have become more desirable to ambitious candidates than the traditional "party-centered" elections. Since forming or even affiliating with a political party is a voluntary choice of a politician, it is critical to examine the particular setting to see if (1) there is an incentive for politicians to turn to parties, (2) it is feasible (not, for example, a potential solution that founders on a collective action problem), and (3) there are no superior solutions—or at minimum that politicians actually did act on the incentives by creating or employing the agency of a party.

Political parties are "solutions" of a particular kind. They must be institutions that are enduring, or at least that politicians expect to endure, if they are to be successful in achieving their goals. Although long a part of the rational choice tradition, the "new institutionalism" became a self-consciously identified entity only with publication of Shepsle's famous paper (1979). Shepsle's work examined one of the two great problems that structure the analysis of how institutions affect outcomes by developing his notion of structure-induced equilibrium, or SIEs. The problem is to investigate the equilibrium in outcomes, given the preferences of the actors and the institutional rules. There are two major streams to the study of SIEs.

The first, illustrated by Shepsle, is motivated by Arrow's theorem and searches for the existence of equilibrium, virtually any equilibrium, when it is generally expected that there would be none. The second stream of research concerns public goods and collective action. Thus, for example, Olson (1965) not only developed the problem of collective action but also considered institutional solutions to that problem. The goal here is not to find just any equilibrium, but to develop means to achieve a desirable equilibrium when an undesirable one (notably a Pareto inferior one) would otherwise be expected. Although differing in these ways, these two streams investigate the combination of actors' goals and institutional arrangements in achieving political outcomes. This problem may be referred to as investigation of institutional equilibrium.

The second great problem Shepsle (1986) called that of equilibrium institutions. Instead of asking what equilibrium it is that institutional arrangements and preferences produce, the question is what institutional arrangements are chosen in the first place. This is the question that motivated this chapter: Why or under what conditions would rational actors choose to turn to parties? What was shown here was that, if rational politicians did turn to parties, those parties might have beneficial effects—that is, might help politicians achieve their goals. The equilibrium institutions question, then, is whether rational politicians would indeed choose that institutional arrangement. It rests, of course, on the presumption that politicians can choose such institutional arrangements (i.e., they are endogenous institutions). Parties meet this criterion, perhaps more commonly than most institutions studied. Thus politicians can choose to create or modify partisan institutions, and this chapter has demonstrated that they might want create or modify them. The problem of equilibrium institutions, then, asks whether politicians do so choose, given that they can and might want to.

As with institutional equilibrium, there are two streams to the equilibrium institutions literature, one concerning social choice problems and the other addressing public goods and collective action problems. Analysis of equilibrium institutions proceeds by assuming that at least one important reason actors may choose an equilibrium institution is its desirable consequences, for example, in solving social choice or collective action problems. It may well be that adopting any new or altered rules will have unanticipated consequences and that their institutional equilibrium consequences may be only one of many reasons that rules were adopted or changed. Still, the presumption is that their anticipated equilibrium consequences are important motivations for adoption.

The first stream, social choice, faces the "inheritability problem" (first posed by Riker 1980). If it is true that rules are adopted to yield SIEs, because there is no equilibrium in preferences alone, then the choice of rules may be affected by, or inherit, the disequilibrium of choices over outcomes. We saw in the paradox of voting example above that forming temporary coalitions was unsatisfactory precisely because those temporary coalitions cycled themselves. There is as yet no general answer to this problem. It may be that Arrow's theorem extends back, so that the "answer" to the inheritability problem is an-
other impossibility result. Just as Arrow's theorem can be proved using an infinite regress approach (see MacKay 1980), so may the choice of rules yield an infinite regress. There may be ways around this problem. For example, the Constitution may end the infinite regress. Legislation is enacted by simple majorities, whereas the Constitution may be changed only by extraordinary majorities—and by extraordinary majorities fashioned in states as well as the nation. Therefore disequilibrium over legislation would not be expected to reflect back into disequilibrium over constitutional amendments, owing to the differing rules of selection and the larger set of actors involved in amending (see Aldrich 1993a).

Party rules, however, are often changed by the same procedures and the same actors that determine outcomes. A simple majority of national convention delegates is needed to nominate candidates, but the same people use the same procedure at virtually the same time to choose the party's rules. So too does a party's congressional caucus decide on rules governing itself and on policy outcomes it seeks.

Constitutional rules and party rules share another characteristic: they define institutions. The idea of institutionalizing something is to give its rules and procedures some permanence. If disequilibrium were a problem in choosing some political outcome, it does not follow immediately, if at all, that the choice of rules to specify how this and other outcomes are to be chosen would also cycle. Different decision criteria are involved: choice of the specific outcome at hand, and choice of rules to affect choices of outcomes over some time horizon. That does not mean there will be equilibrium in the choice of rules where there is none in the choice of particular outcomes. It does mean that the choice of rules will not, in general, inherit the disequilibrium associated with the choice of these particular outcomes. Moreover, the argument made here is not that actors turned to parties for the mere purpose of resolving cyclicity. Rather, it is that the actors had the purpose of winning, and that happens to include buttressing their side from the threat of losing owing to manipulation of cycling by opponents. They seek not just to end the threat of cycling, but to yield particular resolutions that further their particular goals. The choice of rules, whether constitutional or partisan, is typically justified on ethical or moral grounds, in addition to any practical considerations. Whether or not the advocate believes in those normative arguments, their regularity suggests that advocates consider them useful in convincing others. To that extent, normative grounds invoke alternative goals and values, also breaking the immediate inheritability of outcome cycling.

The problems posed by public goods and collective action provide the second stream of research into equilibrium institutions. Here the vast literature that Axelrod's (1984) and Taylor's (1976) research has spawned often deals with institutional or normative arrangements that promote more optimal outcomes than would be expected in their absence. This literature faces the problem of the folk theorem, in which differing institutional arrangements are capable of supporting virtually any set of outcomes in equilibrium. In general, however, the problem is how to sustain any outcome superior to what would happen "naturally," in the absence of institutional arrangements. Thus the problem is that there are shared preferences that go unrealized, and the equilibrium institutions problem is to aid the realization of unanimously desired outcomes that are not otherwise sustainable.

The next three chapters are empirical examinations of times in which politicians did turn to parties. Their first purpose is to show that the theoretical possibilities developed in this chapter appeared to hold in the particular historical contexts studied. Their second purpose is to demonstrate that the relevant political actors realized the theoretical problems in the form generally realized by politicians, the opportunity to win or lose on important issues. The purpose of these chapters, in other words, is to put the possibility claims made in this chapter to the test. Parties were chosen institutions, these chapters argue, in the spirit of equilibrium institutions. These parties were chosen because of their consequences for winning, thereby creating institutional equilibria.
faced; the same arrangements may not work adequately under other conditions. And in a purely logical sense, any given set of partisan institutions will necessarily fail at some time, if these are indeed true impossibility results. It is in part for this reason that the historical context is so important for understanding political parties.

**CHAPTER TWO**

1. In fact, they are problems endemic to a far broader range of social settings than republican democracy.

2. Readers should be forewarned that though I will proceed mostly by example, some symbols remain.

3. Such recognition requires knowledge of the payoffs of the other player(s), unlike the personal incentive to defect based solely on consideration of the player's own preferences.

4. Commitment is generally achieved by imposing a punishment for failure to honor the commitment.

5. Defeating all three bills is not Pareto superior to the partisan outcome. The (0, 0, 0) and the (4, 3, −9) payoffs cannot be compared by the Pareto criterion (nor are [4, 3, −9] and [−2, −2, −2] Pareto comparable), since in neither pair does one alternative make all better (or no worse) off. In this sense there is no collective action problem with the party coalition.

6. To see this, there are three minimal winning coalitions, A-B, B-C, and A-C. Each legislator is in two of the winning coalitions, and all three coalitions are by assumption, equally likely to occur. Thus there is a two-thirds chance of being a winner and a one-third chance of being a loser, a priory. Expected utility is determined by multiplying the chance of an outcome's occurring by its payoff and summing over all outcomes. In this case, each has a two-thirds chance of receiving a payoﬀ of 2 and a one-third chance of receiving −2, yielding an expected payoﬀ of 2/3.

7. With geographic-based districting, we might also expect that legislators would favor bills that distribute beneﬁts geographically, a feature consistent even with the intersectional alliances of the second party system, as well as with the regionally based parties of the later party systems and the contemporary era.

8. Arrow's theorem, of course, imposes conditions, so that it does not cover all possible methods of choosing. It does cover, however, all methods that choose between pairs, and thus all procedures used in legislatures. It also includes many other methods, such as the free market.

9. Preferences are single peaked if the alternatives can be arranged so that each voter's preferences increase monotonically, decrease monotonically, or monotonically increase to a peak and then monotonically decrease, moving across the dimension. Graphically, then, a single-peaked preference order looks like a single mountain peak. Generalization of single peakedness to multiple dimensions is similar. In two dimensions, such preferences look like a topographical contour map of a single mountain peak, and so on.

10. Indeed, one deﬁnition of multidimensionality of the "choice space" is precisely when it requires more than one dimension to yield single-peaked preferences for all voters. Thus dimensionality is a function of the preferences held by members of the society, not the nature of the alternatives themselves. Such spatial models, especially in studying large electorates (e.g., Downs 1957), typically deﬁne dimensions by the nature of the alternatives. For example, alternatives for the Vietnam War issue might have been arrayed by the degree of United States involvement. Voters might have preferred a "win or get out" option, so that their preferences would not look single peaked on that dimension (they would, instead, look like a V). But if all voters least preferred the middle option of continued involvement short of achieving a military victory, alternatives could be (re-)arranged so that preferences were all single peaked.

11. Plott's and similar theorems are more general than this statement, but this gets at their essence.

12. See also Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich (1972) and Schwartz (1986). For the most general form of the spatial model of candidate competition and proof of the major theorems, see McKelvey (1975).

13. See Riker and Ordeshook (1973), who point out that Wilson's (1971) observation that Arrow's theorem is "essentially the observation that the core of a voting game is ordinarily empty" is also accompanied by the existence of a core precisely under the conditions of Black's median voter theorem.

14. "Anything happening" includes the possibility that the outcome might "wander" anywhere, including to Pareto inferior (unanimously opposed) outcomes. McKelvey's (1976) example of the "anything" that can happen was of a single agenda setter who could exploit the chaos result to ensure that his or her ideal point was (always) selected. Thus another incentive for parties might be to capture control over agenda setting.

15. Other important results include Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwait's (1975) demonstration that whenever there was an Arrovian cycle, there were also incentives for at least one player to misreport preferences, that is, to act "strategically" or "sophisticatedly" rather than to express preferences "sincerely." Riker (1982a) further argued that even when there was no cycle, there were incentives to create one, that is, to manipulate the agenda to concoct a cycle "falsely."

16. So far this review has pointed to the parallels between committees and large electorates. The information needed to vote in a sophisticated (or "strategic") manner is much more likely to be held by legislators in an ongoing, professionalized legislature than in mass electorates. This marks, therefore, one major divergence between these two settings.

17. In this sense Krebbel's argument (1991; see the discussion of it in chap. 7) is strong: if there is a majority preference, the majority "works its will."

18. A similar argument holds for symmetric, multidimensional preferences.

19. This interpretation assumes that the candidate with the most votes
wins the election and that all that matters is who wins. The winner might be able to accomplish more in office the larger the margin of victory, or the outcome might be valued in some way other than by who wins and loses. If so the interpretation becomes more complex, and the degree of the collective action problem is attenuated, but probably so little as to be irrelevant.

20. Especially for decision-making costs, C must be understood as the costs of turning out, net of the costs of abstaining. There may be psychic costs for failing to vote. More important, deciding to abstain is also costly, since it requires gathering information, processing it, and determining that R is indeed not positive. In a presidential election, in fact, these costs are usually very small (this may not be true for other contests, such as the lesser well known of the numerous proposals on the typical California ballot). As a result, deciding not to vote is nearly as costly as deciding to turn out and deciding whom to vote for together. This calculus also assumes that this is the only contest on the ballot. Time and effort costs of turning out are paid only once, even though the ballot typically includes a large number of contests. Thus, as Niemi has argued (1976), the costs of voting are typically very small for most eligible Americans.

21. The connection between the voting calculus and the prisoners' dilemma can be seen by comparing the row chooser's payoffs in the prisoners' dilemma (e.g., Table 2.2) with the following decision table (developed more completely in Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974). Ignoring voting for the less preferred candidate, there are two choices: vote for the preferred candidate or abstain. There are four possible situations: 1. hold before casting a vote: (a) the preferred candidate is ahead by one vote or more; (b) the candidates are tied; (c) the preferred candidate trails by exactly one vote; or (d) that candidate trails by more than one vote. The citizen's vote is ineffective if (a) or (d) holds, whereas it makes a tie if (c) holds and breaks a tie if (b) is true. Ignoring D, letting the voter's preference for the favored candidate be 1 and for the opponent be 0, and counting the value of a tie as 1/2, the table below holds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choose to</th>
<th>Situation That Holds prior to Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - c</td>
<td>1 - c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abstention is preferred to voting if (a) or (d) holds. Voting is preferred under situations (b) and (c) (and if c < 1/2). If P is set to zero, one's vote does not make or break a tie, so that (b) and (c) cannot hold. Erasing them makes the payoffs to the voter identical in form to the payoffs to the row chooser in the prisoners' dilemma, as in Table 2.2, thus showing that the individual decision-making model of the calculus, when P = 0, is identical to the individual's incentives in the prisoners' dilemma.

22. Although reinterpreted, the following example of the calculus of candidacy also provides more detail about the calculus of voting formulation. Simi-

larly, the calculus of partisan affiliation in the next section adds further theoretical detail to these two calculi as well.

23. This calculus therefore represents a departure from Schlesinger's theory by making static and progressive ambition derivations from the theory rather than assumptions of it, as in Schlesinger's original account.

24. Duverger's law does not depend on single-member districts, but it is clear that having single-member districts instead of at-large elections or multimember districts accentuates the pressures plurality elections impose toward two-party systems. As we will see in chapter 4, it is probably not coincidental that legislation to require single-member districts in United States congressional elections was enacted after the very first appearance of a full two-party system in 1840.

25. Yet this may be true for only one of the two strongest candidates. In 1980, for example, Reagan was certainly not displeased to see Anderson attract votes that would otherwise have been cast for Carter.

26. The name derives from the attempt to blend the strengths of the traditional study of institutions in political science with the focus on the actions of individuals central to the "behavioral revolution" in political science in the post–World War II period.

27. It is thus no surprise that proposed rule changes that would materially affect the fortunes of presidential contenders are often determined by the preferences of the delegates for president rather than by their preferences for the rules per se. Voting on such rules, adopted before the presidential voting, typically tests the strength of the candidates, as in the Republican convention in 1976 or the Democratic convention in 1980 (see Aldrich 1993a).

28. These chapters therefore study only positive cases. They are not a full sample of cases, which would include instances of politicians' turning from parties or turning to solutions other than parties. In this sense there is a selection bias that means these chapters do not add up to a full test of the theory. See Hansen (1991) for an instance when politicians turned to devices other than parties. Although the decline of parties literature might suggest that the third section of this book studies a turn from parties in the contemporary era, the argument I make is more complex.

CHAPTER THREE

1. At least that is my count of roll call votes in the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research data set.
2. The portion of his plan advanced in the first session concerned public credit, to establish a revolving fund for debt assumption was evidently central. A second portion of the plan, including the creation of a central bank, was proposed later.
3. Jefferson cited Carroll and Gale as those who would be persuaded to switch votes in the vote agreement. Lee and White, it appears, were prevailed upon subsequently by unknown parties, when their votes became critical because of changes among other representatives. The new capital was to be carved from the districts of these four, providing economic benefits to their districts, which implies some useful leverage in prevailing on them to switch.
4. Moreover, he argued that a compromise coalition on the capital issue in
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