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REPORT

CADRE, CATCH-ALL OR CARTEL?

A Rejoinder

Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair

ABSTRACT

In response to Koole's criticisms of our cartel party argument, we suggest that the relationship between participation in an inter-party cartel (a systemic characteristic) and the characteristics of the individual parties participating in the cartel is strong enough to generate a 'cartel party' as a party type. While the boundaries between interest organizations and the state have blurred, this is a generalization of the blurring of boundaries between parties and the state to which we referred, and only means that more of the traditional linkages between society and the state are becoming problematic. Precursors of the cartel party phenomenon can be traced to the 1950s or before, but in recent years it has become increasingly typical rather than aberrational. While there are no fully fledged cartel parties (as there never were fully fledged mass or catch-all parties), the type has developed sufficiently as to justify the specification of an additional 'corner' in space, relative to which real-world cases can be anchored.

KEY WORDS • cartel party • party competition • party organization

Ruud Koole (1996) has raised a number of interesting points and criticisms concerning the cartel party argument that we originally advanced in the pages of this journal (Katz and Mair, 1995). Although some of these points are, in our view, based on misinterpretations of our argument, and although some raise concerns that we have already anticipated in other contexts, Koole does nevertheless also highlight errors of commission or omission that we have made, and therefore offers us an opportunity to clarify and improve

our understanding of contemporary developments in party politics. Koole has, of course, also been a highly valued collaborator of ours in the research project out of which the cartel party argument developed, and we have profited greatly from his comments and criticisms as that research project has developed. Challenge and response are crucial steps in the refinement of theory and in the definition of research questions, and we are therefore pleased to have this opportunity to respond to what is an interesting and sometimes valuable critique.

Koole's first principal criticism concerns definitions. He argues that whereas we actually write about the 'cartel party' as a particular party type, the hypothesized cartel phenomenon with which we are concerned should actually be seen as a property of the relations *among* parties rather than as a property of individual parties, per se. Moreover, he argues, we never adequately define that party type.

Strictly speaking, Koole is of course correct to emphasize the systemic character of the phenomenon, and we indicated as much in the original article (p. 17) in suggesting that it would perhaps be more accurate to speak of 'cartel parties' (in the plural) or that 'at one level this development relates to the party system as a whole'. That said, however, it is our contention, as was also stated in the original article, that the development of cartel-like patterns of inter-party relations will have a significant impact on the internal organization and activities of the parties involved. It is therefore not so much that we use a *systemic* property to characterize *individual* parties, as Koole suggests we do (p. 508), but rather that we try to hypothesize a relationship between systemic characteristics, on the one hand, and individual party characteristics, on the other, and this seems to us a perfectly reasonable approach. Indeed, the notion that a relationship exists between patterns of inter-party competition, on the one hand, and intra-party developments, on the other, is well attested in the literature, and already formed a core element of Kirchheimer's (1966) catch-all party model. In this sense, our use of the term 'cartel' as a modifier of 'party' in the singular reflects the hypothesis that there is an identifiable complex of intra-party characteristics which can be associated with the interpenetration of party and state, as well as with those patterns of inter-party collusion that aim to blur the distinction between 'ins' and 'outs' and to mitigate the consequences of electoral competition. Koole is also correct in stating that we never offer a tight and explicit definition of the cartel party. One reason is that although we believe that we have identified an important trend in party development, the trend itself remains in its early stages; and given the tendency of a first specification to stick (as the term 'cartel' has), it does not seem wise to be overly precise at this point. Nonetheless, we have identified at some length what we believe to be the main characteristics of the cartel party phenomenon, at both the systemic and the intra-party organizational levels, and since these were summarized clearly in our original article (pp. 17–23 and Table 1), there seems little point in repeating them here.

Koole's second key criticism is that we misspecify the relationships among society, state and parties, and, in particular, that we ignore the interpenetration of society and the state, maintaining (especially in our figures) a sharp distinction where in fact the reality has become blurred. In addition, he suggests that because of this blurring of the boundary between state and society, a greater identification of parties with the state does not necessarily imply the development of a greater distance between parties and society.

That the identification of party with state does not necessarily mean greater distance between party and society is certainly true. Indeed, the hypothesis of a detachment of party from society, which was already raised by Kirchheimer, and which has been the subject, inter alia, of a recent special issue of the *European Journal of Political Research* (Sainsbury, 1990), clearly needs careful empirical research. Nonetheless there are strong reasons for advancing such a hypothesis. First, by drawing resources from the state, the parties make it simply that much easier to become remote from society. Whether parties have in fact become more remote may well merit a serious empirical investigation; what is beyond doubt, however, is that their changing balance of resources means that they are now likely to suffer significantly less material disadvantage through such remoteness. Second, the interpenetration of state and party encourages party strategists to focus their attention on the state and therefore risks the neglect of their connections to the wider society. Time is short, and periods spent in the pursuit and management of public office must clearly detract from those spent cultivating popular constituencies. Finally, and whatever the empirical reality, there is no question but that entanglement with, and finance by, the state risks presenting the voters with the 'image' and 'sense' of remoteness. Parties are busy with themselves, and with the state, and this can result in their being seen as putting greater distance between themselves and the voters. To be sure, we may well end up by giving too much credit to what Koole (p. 517) refers to as 'the rhetorics of the challengers'; our point would simply be that contemporary party styles have allowed these rhetorics to achieve a certain resonance,[1] however much an objective academic eye might judge this resonance to be unwarranted.

Koole's diagrams differ from ours most particularly in that he shows a growing overlap between 'state' and '(civil) society', whereas we show 'state' and 'civil society' always to be separate. Although this is neither the time nor the place to begin to enter into a series of theoretical discussions of state–society relationships,[2] it is apparent from both his references and his explicit mention of the phenomenon that Koole is here referring primarily to the growth of neocorporatist arrangements, in which interest organizations (the manifestations of civil society organized to influence the 'authoritative allocations of values') become quasi-governmentalized (see also the valuable analysis by Crouch, 1986). This is an important phenomenon to which we gave little direct attention, in that our concern obviously lay with the relationships among parties, society and the state, rather than with all

possible linkages between society and the state, although we did observe in our conclusion that many established interest organizations 'have developed relationships with the state that are not unlike those developed by the parties themselves' (p. 23). Even then, however, far from undermining our argument concerning state–party–society relationships, Koole's observation actually generalizes it to a wider universe, in which the governmentalization of parties becomes a special case of the governmentalization of many organizations heretofore regarded as primarily serving the function of linkage between society and the state. Indeed, if one were to take Koole's diagrams as three frames of a moving picture and project forward, one would end up with a party–state relationship that is precisely the same as we projected from the analogous diagrams in our own article – party is entirely contained within the state.

This leads us to think a bit more carefully about what the referents of terms like 'society' and 'civil society' (which both Koole and we use rather loosely as synonyms) actually are. Are we referring to the general population, or perhaps that segment of the general population admitted to 'full citizenship', recognizing that society in this respect also includes a variety of unspecified organizations and structures? Or are we referring precisely to the organizations that apparently arise from society in order to channel communication and negotiation among societal interests, on the one hand, and between those interests and the state, on the other? If we adopt the first meaning, then the idea of the interpenetration of state and society makes little sense unless it refers simply to a broadening of the social basis of recruitment to positions in the state structures. If we adopt the second meaning, however, and everything in Koole's article suggests that this is the meaning he intends, then while interpenetration of state and society (interest organizations) certainly has grown substantially over recent decades (although there is evidence that this trend has reversed as neocorporatist arrangements have come unstuck in many countries), this does not make parties 'binders' between society and the state, but rather undermines yet another of the traditional linkages between society (in the first sense) and the state. And this, in turn, simply furthers the potential for 'anti-politics' to which Koole refers, and which we also suggest in discussing 'challenges to the cartel party'.

Seen from this perspective, our analyses actually have many points in common. We both recognize that voters are less tied to parties than before, in part because citizens have access to more alternatives (new social movements, courts, corporatism, and so on). We also both recognize that the increased scope and complexity of state power have reduced the capacity of parties (or anyone else) to steer society and produce results. But where Koole would like us to conclude that the changed relationship between state and society renders meaningless our claim that 'parties are no longer simple brokers ... [but] become absorbed by the state', we would argue instead that it is possible to accept all of Koole's analysis about this relationship and then

conclude that *therefore* 'parties are no longer simple brokers ... [but] become absorbed by the state'. In other words, our respective conclusions are not really so different – the parties lean more heavily on the state because (Katz and Mair) or whilst (Koole) their degree of social integration becomes eroded. In the end, therefore, what Koole seem to be arguing is that the parties remain prominent (because the role of the state has become more prominent), and this is something that we never really sought to deny.

Koole's third major point is Janus faced. Looking backward, and referring to the consociational literature in particular, he complains that the phenomenon of an inter-party cartel is nothing new. Looking forward, he complains that the 'alleged cartels' are neither very descriptive of reality nor very successful. And while one can ask whether he really can have it both ways, one can also more usefully ask whether either of these observations is seriously to the point.

We are suggesting that the development of cartel parties is a response to a variety of processes that have been going on for some time in Europe, and in western democracies more generally. There is no suggestion that these developments have suddenly occurred overnight, and correspondingly no suggestion that the cartel party has suddenly emerged fully grown at any particular moment in time. Like Koole, we project forwards, and we also hypothesize. But if the roots of inter-party cooperation or collusion can be traced back to before the 1970s – and '*kartel democratie*' in the Netherlands and the use of the 'Magic Formula' to form governments in Switzerland offer apt examples – then well and good. Our claim is simply that these phenomena and their equivalents, which previously were regarded as aberrations, are now becoming more widespread, in much the same way as Lijphart (1968: 35–9) originally hypothesized that 'depoliticized democracy' would develop into the prevalent European model. Thus, and paraphrasing Koole, the fact that all major parties have had a 'governmental status' in several (consociational) countries since at least 1945 (p. 516), should not be allowed to obscure the more interesting observation that most major parties have now acquired a 'governmental status' in *all* the European democracies in the last two decades. What was once a feature of consociational democracies in particular is therefore now rapidly becoming a feature of European democracies more generally.

Let us now turn to some other points, albeit in no particular order of importance. First, Koole is certainly correct in pointing out that in the western democracies, access to the publicly controlled electronic media at election time is sometimes very egalitarian. With very few exceptions, nominating candidates for election to public office will usually guarantee at least some broadcast time even to very small parties, and/or new parties, and/or 'outsider' parties, and this is often the only way such actors can make their voices heard within the public domain. That said, however, Koole's Dutch example of strict equality of media access for all parties is far from universal: although new parties may get access to the state media if they nominate a

sufficiently large number of candidates, that access is sometimes minimal, or is available only at the least attractive times (e.g. in the UK or Canada), while equal allocations of time to 'government' and 'opposition' (as in France) may seriously disadvantage, if not completely exclude, parties that are outside the 'establishment' groups altogether. Moreover, the argument itself is inadequate, in that evidence of equal access is usually relevant to these media *only* at election time, thereby neglecting the very important – and evident – bias in favour of the established parties at all other periods. In this sense, access to free election broadcasts is clearly not the key issue. New and different voices might well be capable of being heard when voters are preparing to go to the polls; at all other times, however, and this is clearly the norm, it is only the bigger parties, and those that have a substantial position in public office, that continue to be privileged by the media, not least because it is precisely these parties that are in a position to employ the most effective spin doctors, and therefore remain 'dominant and omnipresent' (Galbraith, 1992: 144) on the airwaves.

Second, Koole also challenges our assertion concerning the 'toning down' of competition, arguing that the opening of electoral markets has actually made the contests much more fierce. And, again, at one level he is clearly correct: the electorate has become more available, the parties have become more vulnerable, and the resources – at least in a material sense – devoted to campaign efforts have certainly tended to increase. In this sense, the game – the horse-race – has obviously become more intense. Substantively, however, there is now much less at stake: in most countries, the mainstream parties have tended to converge with one another in left–right terms; there has been a marked increase in the promiscuity of coalition formation, with almost all possible combinations of parties being conceivable both in theory and in practice; and finally, not least as a result of international pressures and the weight of past commitments, the scope for policy innovation is becoming increasingly circumscribed (Mair, 1995: 46–51). If one then adds to this the apparently enhanced scope for the 'co-government of oppositional parties' (Koole, p. 516), as well as our own arguments concerning the diminishing material differences between winning and losing, it would appear that the real substance of competition is evaporating. What we see, therefore, and what is perhaps not surprising, is an apparently inverse relationship between the intensity with which the game is played (Koole's point), on the one hand, and the relative importance of the outcome of that game (our point), on the other. When it appears to matter less to voters who might win or lose, then the choices of these voters may often be determined simply by how the game is played.[3]

Third, and perhaps more importantly, Koole contends that by the criteria that we appear to establish, the so-called cartel parties have not in fact proved very successful, at least in the sense that they have not managed to prevent the entry of new parties. This is, of course, quite correct; indeed, as has been emphasized elsewhere (Gallagher et al., 1995: 231–3), one of the

very few consistent trends that can be seen in the make-up of European party systems over the post-war decades has been that of increased fragmentation, even though many of the new parties that have emerged onto the scene have continued to remain quite marginal in terms of electoral and parliamentary support. In fact, our initial formulation of this point was highly misleading, particularly in so far as we implied a concerted effort by the established parties to prevent the emergence of new parties, and thanks to Koole's welcome criticisms we can now perhaps begin to clarify the argument in this brief rejoinder.

In the first place, we would never contend that the established parties in established party systems generally seek to exclude outsiders through the imposition of formal legal thresholds or whatever; nor could a given set of parties 'conspire' to give themselves public subsidies and free access to public media while totally denying those resources to challengers, and still maintain any pretence of democracy. Obstacles do of course exist in practice, such that, for example, while new parties may be eligible for state campaign subsidies, these are generally paid only after the election, when they are obviously far less useful, and with even the first steps of getting candidates on the ballot and winning recognition as a party being generally easier for parties that are already established (as in the USA). In the end, however, these simply handicap rather than exclude the new challengers. Second, albeit exceptionally so, a concerted exclusionary process does sometimes exist in practice, but this is not so much directed at preventing the *emergence* of 'outsider' parties as at denying them access to executive office; in other words, there are clearly some instances in which 'outsider' parties (such as the Danish Progress Party, the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, the current FPÖ in Austria) are actually treated as pariahs by the established political class, even though the right of these parties to contest elections is never actually challenged. Third, and more commonly, when new parties do emerge, it is clearly of benefit to the existing parties to try to incorporate them into the cartel itself. In this sense, it is not so much any attempt at the formal exclusion of outsiders that is relevant, but rather their socialization, and the Dutch D'66, as well as perhaps the German Greens – which are among the successful new parties cited by Koole as challenging our argument – offer close to textbook examples of precisely this sort of translation from outsider to insider status. We would therefore wish to emphasize the restriction of competition not so much through exclusion but rather through control and absorption, and it is in this sense that, like many equivalent cartels in commodity production, the cartels of established parties have actually proved quite successful. Indeed, it is particularly when potential challenges are posed to the established parties as a whole (Katz and Mair, 1995: 23–5) that there develops a tendency to collude against the newcomers – at least until the newcomers have learned to play the game according to the established rules (see also Schattschneider, 1960).

Since the space available for this rejoinder is necessarily limited, let us conclude with two brief observations. First, Koole's comments on the question

of stratarchic and federalist modes of intra-party organization are both insightful and well taken. This is a difficult and problematic area, which probably demands more careful thinking through than any of us have allowed for up to now. Our own sense, but it is little more than that, is that the stratarchic model is perhaps the most appropriate, even when higher party bodies are actually composed of delegates – indeed, this was exactly how the Wayne County Democratic Party was actually structured (Eldersveld, 1964: 36–7). Moreover, while local parties might well wield considerable power when acting together, as Koole suggests, our sense is that they simply don't usually act together, hence allowing the party in public office to remain effectively autonomous in practice (see also Katz and Mair, forthcoming). Second, notwithstanding Koole's concluding remarks, we never in fact intended to suggest that there existed some single evolutionary model with a single dominant party type. Our point would be simply that the development of party organizations reflects a stimulus–response dynamic, and while a sequence can be discerned – not least as a result of the sequential development of favourable and unfavourable conditions – this does not necessarily characterize the trajectory of every specific party. On the contrary, and echoing Koole's belief in the existence of a plurality of party types, we would see each model as representing one of a series of organizational 'inventions' which then becomes part of the available repertoire, or menu, from which political actors may draw (see also Katz and Mair, forthcoming), but where, *ceteris paribus*, the existence of particular circumstances (state funding, a newly enfranchised electorate, or whatever) will tend to favour the adoption of one model rather than another. It must also be added, of course, that there are in fact no fully fledged cartel parties, just as there are, or were, no fully fledged mass parties, catch-all parties, or cadre parties; what we have sought to do is to draw attention to what we believe to be an important development in the on-going evolution of party politics, and to anchor a 'corner' in space relative to which real-world cases can be attempted to be located (see, for example, the attempted applications in the recent papers of Ágh, 1995; Hoskin, 1995; MacIvor, 1996). In the end, therefore, we are not trying to think of this discussion as one in which we are right and Koole is wrong, or vice versa; rather we would see ourselves as engaged in placing different emphases – and rhetorics – on what we believe to be a basically agreed phenomenon.

Notes

1 For a pungent example of the resonance of these rhetorics, note a somewhat appropriate newspaper comment which lies to hand at the time of writing:

> The real dirt of elections is a fateful compact within the political class: on the one hand the candidates, using every artifice to distract from the real problems and mask their own terror of solutions; on the other hand the media, stretching and exaggerating and purporting to de-construct political evasions, but actually playing the same game, partners in a plot that locates politics for ever between the voter and the real world.
>
> (Young, 1996)

2 Although a number of useful insights are offered by Mitchell (1991) and the debate that he subsequently provoked (Bendix et al., 1992), where at one point it is argued that 'the traffic across the border between state and society is more interesting than where the somewhat arbitrary demarcation line is drawn' (Bendix et al., 1992: 1007).

3 For a recent and comprehensive discussion of the various parameters of electoral competition, see Bartolini (1995). Note also Poggi's (1990: 128–9) point, that 'although it remains largely true ... that politics is the matrix of policy, the politics in question more and more rarely consists in the open confrontation in the public sphere between organized bodies of opinion, competing for public support for alternative policy proposals on the part of the citizenry. ... To this extent, an increasingly politically managed society is at the same time, paradoxically, progressively depoliticised' (cited in McLaverty, 1996: 2). These arguments also clearly echo Pizzorno's (1981) observations on the hypothesis of 'illusory choice'.

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REPORT
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TANZANIA'S 1995 MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS

The Emerging Party System

Oda van Cranenburgh

ABSTRACT

In 1995 Tanzania held its first multi-party elections since the 1965 constitution formally established a one-party system. This article seeks to assess the emerging party system in Tanzania and examines the question of whether the competition that emerged represents an expansion of political choice for citizens and a broader representation of societal forces. The emerging party system is assessed in view of several salient features of the Tanzanian political system. The legal and institutional framework strongly favours the governing party. The conclusion argues that in view of the nature and capacities of the new political parties and the legal/institutional framework, the expansion of both choice and representation is very limited. The most we can expect from the Tanzanian transition is a dominant-party system with the governing party flanked by marginal opposition parties

KEY WORDS ■ CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) ■ electoral system ■ multi-party elections ■ Tanzania

Introduction

In 1995 Tanzania held its first multi-party elections since the 1965 constitution had formalized a de facto one-party system. After briefly sketching the background to these elections, this article assesses these elections as a step in the country's transition to democracy. The Tanzanian one-party state has