THE PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC INTEGRATION

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Modern parties have steadily enlarged their scope and power within the political community and have consequently changed their own functions and character. In place of a party of individual representation, our contemporary society increasingly shows a party of social integration.

This shift must be seen within the context of our changing society and its underlying philosophy. Three major stages can be observed in its development. Modern parties originated with the drive of a rising, self-conscious middle class that fought for liberation from the shackles of a feudal society and for representation to check monarchical absolutism. While the French Revolution officially proclaimed the end of this first phase of modern social development, the successful emancipation of rational man from the bonds of the ancien régime and its caste system proved to be only a transitional second stage. The individual, set free, was soon striving at reintegration into a new society. In fact, since the middle of the nineteenth century diverse claims for such a new orientation have been raised, promising to stop the fragmentation of a laissez-faire society. The first and lasting challenge of rising socialism, the emergence and appeal of political irrationalism, and an awakening social liberalism gave contrasting answers to this key issue of our century. The dislocations caused by the sweeping industrialization, radical urbanization, and international migration, by world wars and total revolutions, gave substance to a planned search for a new social order. We are still in the midst of this third phase. It constitutes the crisis of modern society.

Sigmund Neumann, excerpted from 'Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties', in Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties (1956), pp. 395–421, © 1956 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
of 'free recruitment' among a socially uncommitted, free-floating electorate (the bulk of which, in reality, may not be so independent). The following of the new movement is, indeed, much more clearly circumscribed by its permanent membership, the definite class alignment of its voting population, and its far-flung participation in overall social affairs. The party can count on its adherents; it has taken over a good part of their social existence.

Despite such extensive organization and intensified ties of its partisans, the Socialist party (and in an even more limited way the Catholic movement and other democratic parties of integration) include only a small active core among its wider circle of mere dues-paying members and its even greater number of mere voters. In fact, this differentiation is at the base of the much-disputed 'oligarchical' tendencies of modern mass parties which permit a relatively small group to decide the political fate of the disinterested and apathetic majority. Still, what is important is that the party in modern mass democracies has generally taken on an ever increasing area of commitments and responsibilities assuring the individual's share in society and incorporating him into the community. This is no mere usurpation of power by the politicians but the natural consequence of the extension of the public domain and the constantly increasing governmental functions in a re-integrated twentieth-century society.

In this sense the phenomenon of the party of democratic integration has become a matter of record. This fact makes it more imperative to recognize its basic variance from the party of total integration, which has found its prototype in Bolshevism, Fascism, and National Socialism. This all-inclusive party demands the citizen's unconditional surrender. It denies not only the relative freedom of choice among the voters and followers but also any possibility of coalition and compromise among parties. It can perceive nothing but total seizure and exercise of power, undisputed acceptance of the party line, and monolithic rule. The rise of this absolutist police state decrees the end of democracy, of constitutionalism, of communal self-government, of Western man and his inalienable rights, of political parties.

This radical juxtaposition should forewarn the responsible student of modern mass society against the threat of party petrifaction, but such a mortal peril cannot be met simply by a denial of the extended functions of modern parties and of their radically changing character—for the choice is not between the absolute state and the absolute individual or between autocracy or anarchy, as the great simplifiers and political demagogues make us believe. On the contrary, constructive thinking must concentrate on the much more difficult and urgent task of devising political institutions that allow for a new adjustment between the integrated society and the free individual. It is within such a realistic delineation of the fundamental prerequisites, present-day responsibilities, and necessary safeguards of a democratic society that the sociology of modern parties must be re-examined.
much more effective agents in the politicization of the masses
than their participation in occasional elections, their fight for
the extension of suffrage (Belgium, Britain, Germany), or even
their encadrement in political parties and trade union organiza-
tions. But politicization is not tantamount to political integra-
tion; integration presupposes a general willingness by a society
to offer and accept full-fledged political partnership of all
citizens without reservations. The consequences of integration
into the class-mass party depended on the responses of other
forces in the existing political system; in some cases those
responses were so negative as to lead to delayed integration into
the political system or to make for its disintegration.

Now we come to the other side of this failure to progress from
integration into the proletarian mass party and industrial
society at large to integration into the political system proper.
This is the failure of bourgeois parties to advance from parties
of individual representation to parties of integration, a failure
already noted in France. The two tendencies, the failure of the
integration of proletarian mass parties into the official political
system and the failure of the bourgeois parties to advance to the
stage of integration parties, condition each other. An exception,
if only a partial one, is that of denominational parties such as
the German Centre or Don Sturzo’s Partito Popolare. These
parties to a certain extent fulfilled both functions: social inte-
gration into industrial society and political integration within
the existing political system. Yet their denominational nature
gave such parties a fortress-type character seriously restricting
their growth potential.

With these partial exceptions, bourgeois parties showed
no capacity to change from clubs for parliamentary represen-
tation into agencies for mass politics able to bargain with the
integration-type mass parties according to the laws of the
political market. There was only a limited incentive for
intensive bourgeois party organization. Access to the favours
of the state, even after formal democratization, remained reserved
via educational and other class privileges. What the
bourgeoisie lacked in numbers it could make good by strategic
relations with the army and the bureaucracy.

Not all bourgeois groups accepted the need for transforma-
tion to integration parties. As long as such groups had other
means of access to the state apparatus they might find it convenient to delay setting up counterparts to existing mass parties while still using the state apparatus for keeping mass integration parties from becoming fully effective in the political market. Yet after the Second World War the acceptance of the law of the political market became inevitable in the major Western European countries. This change in turn found its echo in the changing structure of political parties.

2. THE POST-WAR CATCH-ALL PARTY

Following the Second World War, the old-style bourgeois party of individual representation became the exception. While some of the species continue to survive, they do not determine the nature of the party system any longer. By the same token, the mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all ‘people’s’ party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former all-embracing concerns; today the latter are seen as counter-productive since they deter segments of a potential nationwide clientele.

For the class-mass parties we may roughly distinguish three stages in this process of transformation. There is first the period of gathering strength lasting to the beginning of the First World War; then comes their first governmental experience in the 1920s and 1930s (MacDonald, Weimar Republic, Front Populaire), unsatisfactory if measured both against the expectations of the class-mass party followers or leaders and suggesting the need for a broader basis of consensus in the political system. This period is followed by the present more or less advanced stages in the catch-all grouping, with some of the parties still trying to hold their special working-class clientele and at the same time embracing a variety of other clienteles.

Can we find some rules according to which this transform-

ation is taking place, singling out factors which advance or delay or arrest it? We might think of the current rate of economic development as the most important determinant; but if it were so important, France would certainly be ahead of Great Britain and, for that matter, also of the United States, still the classical example of an all-pervasive catch-all party system. What about the impact of the continuity or discontinuity of the political system? If this were so important, Germany and Great Britain would appear at opposite ends of the spectrum rather than showing a similar speed of transformation. We must then be satisfied to make some comments on the general trend and to note special limiting factors.

In some instances the catch-all performance meets definite limits in the traditional framework of society. The all-pervasive denominational background of the Italian Democrazia Cristiano means from the outset that the party cannot successfully appeal to the anticlerical elements of the population. Otherwise nothing prevents the party from phrasing its appeals so as to maximize its chances of catching more of those numerous elements which are not disturbed by the party’s clerical ties. The solidary element of its doctrinal core has long been successfully employed to attract a socially diversified clientele.

Or take the case of two other major European parties, the German SPD (Social Democratic party) and the British Labour party. It is unlikely that either of them is able to make any concession to the specific desires of real estate interests or independent operators of agricultural properties while at the same time maintaining credibility with the masses of the urban population. Fortunately, however, there is enough community of interest between wage-and-salary earning urban or suburban white- and blue-collar workers and civil servants to designate them all as strategic objects of simultaneous appeals. Thus tradition and the pattern of social and professional stratification may set limits and offer potential audiences to the party’s appeal.

If the party cannot hope to catch all categories of voters, it may have a reasonable expectation of catching more voters in all those categories whose interests do not adamantly conflict. Minor differences between group claims, such as between white-collar and manual labour groups, might be smoothed
over by vigorous emphasis on programmes which benefit both sections alike, for example, some cushioning against the shocks of automation.

Even more important is the heavy concentration on issues which are scarcely liable to meet resistance in the community. National societal goals transcending group interests offer the best sales prospect for the party intent on establishing or enlarging an appeal previously limited to specific sections of the population. The party which propagates most aggressively, for example, enlarged educational facilities may hear faint rumblings over the excessive cost or the danger to the quality of education from élites previously enjoying educational privileges. Yet the party’s stock with any other family may be influenced only by how much more quickly and aggressively it took up the new national priority than its major competitor and how well its propaganda linked the individual family’s future with the enlarged educational structures. To that extent its potential clientele is almost limitless. The catch-all of a given category performance turns virtually into an unlimited catch-all performance.

The last remark already transcends the group-interest confines. On the one hand, in such developed societies as I am dealing with, thanks to general levels of economic well-being and security and to existing welfare schemes universalized by the state or enshrined in collective bargaining, many individuals no longer need such protection as they once sought from the state. On the other hand, many have become aware of the number and complexity of the general factors on which their future well-being depends. This change of priorities and pre-occupation may lead them to examine political offerings less under the aspect of their own particular claims than under that of the political leader’s ability to meet general future contingencies. Among the major present-day parties, it is the French UNR (National Republican Union), a latecomer, that speculates most clearly on the possibility of its channelling such less specialized needs to which its patron saint de Gaulle constantly appeals into its own version of the catch-all party. Its assumed asset would rest in a doctrine of national purpose and unity vague and flexible enough to allow the most variegated interpretation and yet—at least as long as the General continues to function—attractive enough to serve as a convenient rallying point for many groups and isolated individuals.

While the UNR thus manipulates ideology for maximum general appeal, we have noted that ideology in the case of the Democrazia Cristiana is a slightly limiting factor. The UNR ideology in principle excludes no one. The Christian Democratic ideology by definition excludes the non-believers, or at least the seriously non-believing voter. It pays for the ties of religious solidarity and the advantages of supporting organizations by repelling some millions of voters. The catch-all parties in Europe appear at a time of de-ideologization which has substantially contributed to their rise and spread. De-ideologization in the political field involves the transfer of ideology from partnership in a clearly visible political goal structure into one of many sufficient but by no means necessary motivational forces operative in the voters’ choice. The German and Austrian Social Democratic parties in the last two decades most clearly exhibit the politics of de-ideologization. The example of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is less clear only because there was less to de-ideologize. In the CDU, ideology was from the outset only a general background atmosphere, both all-embracing and conveniently vague enough to allow recruiting among Catholic and Protestant denominations.

As a rule, only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. Neither a small, strictly regional party such as the South Tyrolian Peoples’ party nor a party built around the espousal of harsh and limited ideological claims, like the Dutch Calvinists; or transitory group claims, such as the German Refugees; or a specific professional category’s claims, such as the Swedish Agrarians; or a limited-action programme, such as the Danish single-tax Justice party can aspire to a catch-all performance. Its raison d’être is the defence of a specific clientele or the lobbying for a limited reform clearly delineated to allow for a restricted appeal, perhaps intense, but excluding a wider impact or—once the original job is terminated—excluding a life-saving transformation.

Nor is the catch-all performance in vogue or even sought among the majority of the larger parties in small democracies. Securely entrenched, often enjoying majority status for
decades—as the Norwegian and Swedish Social Democratic parties—and accustomed to a large amount of interparty co-operation, such parties have no incentive to change their form of recruitment or their appeal to well-defined social groups. With fewer factors intervening and therefore more clearly foreseeable results of political actions and decisions, it seems easier to stabilize political relations on the basis of strictly circumscribed competition (Switzerland, for instance) than to change over to the more aleatory form of catch-all competition.

Conversion to catch-all parties constitutes a competitive phenomenon. A party is apt to accommodate to its competitor’s successful style because of hope of benefits or fear of losses on election day. Conversely, the more a party convinces itself that a competitor’s favourable results were due only to some non-repetitive circumstances, and that the competitor’s capacity of overcoming internal dissension is a temporary phenomenon, the smaller the over-all conversion chance and the greater the inclination to hold fast to a loyal—though limited—clientele.

To evaluate the impact of these changes I have found it useful to list the functions which European parties exercised during earlier decades (late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries) and to compare them with the present situation. Parties have functioned as channels for integrating individuals and groups into the existing political order, or as instruments for modifying or altogether replacing that order (integration—disintegration). Parties have attempted to determine political action preferences and influence other participants in the political process into accepting them. Parties have nominated public office-holders and presented them to the public at large for confirmation.

The so-called ‘expressive function’ of the party, if not belonging to a category by itself, nevertheless warrants a special word. Its high tide belongs to the era of the nineteenth-century constitutionalism when a more clear-cut separation existed between opinion formation—and—expression and the business of government. At that time the internally created parliamentary parties expressed opinions and criticism widely shared among the educated minority of the population. They pressed these opinions on their governments. But as the governments largely rested on an independent social and constitutional basis, they could if necessary hold out against the promptings of parliamentary factions and clubs. Full democratization merged the opinion—expressing and the governmental business in the same political parties and put them in the seat either of government or an alternative government. But it has left the expressive function of the party in a more ambiguous state. For electoral reasons, the democratic catch-all party, intent on spreading as wide as possible a net over a potential clientele, must continue to express widely felt popular concerns. Yet, bent on continuing in power or moving into governmental power, it performs this expressive function subject to manifold restrictions and changing tactical considerations. The party would atrophy if it were no longer able to function as a relay between the population and governmental structure, taking up grievances, ideas, and problems developed in a more searching and systematic fashion elsewhere in the body politic. Yet the caution it must give its present or prospective governmental role requires modulation and restraint. The very nature of today’s catch-all party forbids an option between these two performances. It requires a constant shift between the party’s critical role and its role as establishment support, a shift hard to perform but still harder to avoid.

In order to leave a maximum imprint on the polity a party has to exercise all of the first three functions. Without the ability

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1 Ulf Torgersen, ‘The Trend Towards Political Consensus: The Case of Norway,’ in Stein Rokkan (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Political Participation (Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute, 1962); and Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, ‘Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics’ (1963, mimeographed), esp. p. 29. For both weighty historical and contemporary reasons the Austrian Social Democratic party forms a partial exception to the rule of less clear-cut transformation tendencies among major class-mass parties in smaller countries. It is becoming an eager and rather successful member of the catch-all club. For the most adequate treatment see K. L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1962).

to integrate people into the community the party could not compel other power-holders to listen to its clarions. The party influences other power centres to the extent that people are willing to follow its leadership. Conversely, people are willing to listen to the party because the party is the carrier of messages—here called action preferences—that are at least partially in accord with the images, desires, hopes, and fears of the electorate. Nominations for public office serve to tie together all these purposes; they may further the realization of action preferences if they elicit positive response from voters or from other power-holders. The nominations concretize the party's image with the public at large, on which confidence the party's effective functioning depends.

Now we can discuss the presence or absence of these three functions in Western society today. Under present conditions of spreading secular and mass consumer-goods orientation, with shifting and less obtrusive class lines, the former class-mass parties and denominational mass parties are both under pressure to become catch-all peoples' parties. The same applies to those few remnants of former bourgeois parties of individual representation which aspire to a secure future as political organizations independent of the vagaries of electoral laws and the tactical moves of their mass-party competitors. This change involves: (a) Drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage. In France's SFIO, for example, ideological remnants serve at best as scant cover for what has become known as 'Molletisme', the absolute reign of short-term tactical considerations. (b) Further strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and omissions are now judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification with the goals of their particular organization. (c) Downgrading of the role of the individual party member, a role considered a historical relic which may obscure the newly built-up catch-all party image. (d) De-emphasis of the classe gardée, specific social-class or denominational clientele, in favour of recruiting voters among the population at large. (e) Securing access to a variety of interest groups. The financial reasons are obvious, but they are not the most important where official financing is available, as in Germany, or where access to the most important media of communication is fairly open, as in England and Germany. The chief reason is to secure electoral support via interest-group intercession.

From this fairly universal development the sometimes considerable remnants of two old class-mass parties, the French and the Italian Communist parties, are excluding themselves. These parties are in part ossified, in part solidified by a combination of official rejection and legitimate sectional grievances. In this situation the ceremonial invocation of the rapidly fading background of a remote and inapplicable revolutionary experience has not yet been completely abandoned as a part of political strategy. What is the position of such opposition parties of the older class-mass type, which still jealously try to hold an exclusive loyalty of their members, while not admitted nor fully ready to share in the hostile state power? Such parties face the same difficulties in recruiting and holding intensity of membership interest as other political organizations. Yet, in contrast to their competitors working within the confines of the existing political order, they cannot make a virtue out of necessity and adapt themselves fully to the new style of catch-all peoples' party. This conservatism does not cost them the confidence of their regular corps of voters. On the other hand, the continued renewal of confidence on election day does not involve an intimate enough bond to utilize as a basis for major political operations.

The attitudes of regular voters—in contrast to those of members and activists—attest to the extent of incongruency between full-fledged participation in the social processes of a consumer-goods oriented society and the old political style which rested on the primordial need for sweeping political

3 Liberal parties without sharply profiled programme or clientele may, however, make such conversion attempts. Val Lorwin draws my attention to the excellent example of a former bourgeois party, the Belgian Liberal party, which became in 1961 the 'Party of Liberty and Progress', de-emphasizing anticlericalism and appealing to the right wing of the Social Christian party, worried about this party's governmental alliance with the Socialists.

4 See also A. Pizzorno, 'The Individualistic Mobilization of Europe', in Daedalus (Winter 1964), pp. 199, 217.
change. The latter option has gone out of fashion in Western
countries and has been carefully eliminated from the expect-
tations, calculations, and symbols of the catch-all mass party.
The incongruency may rest on the total absence of any connec-
tion between general social-cultural behaviour and political
style. In this sense electoral choice may rest on family tradition
or empathy with the political underdog without thereby be-
coming part of a coherent personality structure. Or the choice
may be made in the expectation that it will have no influence on
the course of political development; it is then an act of either
adjusting to or, as the case may be, signing out of the existing
political system rather than a manifestation of signing up
somewhere else.

PARTIES IN PLURALISM

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It has been frequently observed that despite the wide range of
parties in the parliaments of the representative democracies
they tend increasingly to say the same things to their electorate.
Tingsten in 1955 backed up this observation with systematic
data, and recently J. C. Thomas, in a thorough enquiry into
party programmes presented in the parliaments of eleven
countries, has shown that over the past forty to sixty years the
average differences among party positions on ten principal
programmatic themes have constantly decreased. Likewise
diminished is the intensity with which reforms are advocated in
these programmes: 'There has been a dramatic narrowing of
the scope of domestic political conflict between parties in
western nations. The limit of this narrowing is just short of zero,
like in American parties.' Observations on the marketing style
of latter-day electoral campaigns, on the way the various
parties compete to represent the same social groups and hence
the development of what Kirchheimer called the 'catch-all'
parties, constitute less systematic but nevertheless telling
proofs of the same phenomenon.

Is this phenomenon restricted to programme 'enunciations',
or does it reflect a deeper lack of political alternatives, some

Alessandro Pizzorno, excerpted from 'Interests and Parties in Pluralism',
in Suzanne Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism,
permission of Cambridge University Press.

1 J. C. Thomas, The Decline of Ideology in Western Political Parties (London:
Sage Publications, 1975). It should be remembered that Thomas's data go
only until the early sixties. The countries analysed are Australia, Austria,
Canada, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden,
USSR, USA.

2 Ibid. 46.