Electoral Engineering:
Voting Rules and Political Behavior

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Preface

“It is complicated.” With these words, Hans-Dieter Klingemann warned me, with typical German understatement, of what was ahead when I first mentioned plans for this book over a (not very good) dinner in Turin. The words have echoed in my mind on countless occasions since then, sticking rather like an annoying few bars from a television commercial. He did not say impossible. He did not say impractical. He said complicated. Yes, I said casually, of course. But I didn’t really listen. I had just completed another book that covered 193 nations. The core dataset for this volume covers just over thirty. It was a little puzzling to me that so few others had ever attempted a book comparing voting behavior across many different types of societies, including older and newer democracies. But with the arrogance of ignorance I plunged ahead. After all, courtesy of the hardworking team at the University of Michigan, I had access to the first integrated cross-national dataset bringing together election studies from Australia to the Ukraine. But as I soon discovered, complicated, it was and still is. But also, I happily discovered, fascinating, stimulating, and challenging.

This book would not have been possible without the work of all those who contributed towards the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), especially Virginia Sapiro, Phil Shively, David Howell, Karen Long, and all the staff who worked on this project at the Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. Details are available at www.umich.edu/~nes/cses. The 1996-2001 Module 1 Study was carried by CSES collaborators in more than thirty countries. These collaborators are: Australia (Ian McAllister), Belarus (David Rotman and Larysa Saglaeva) Belgium (in Flanders, Jacques Billet), Canada (André Blais & Neil Neavette), Chile (Marta Lagos), Czech Republic (Gabor Toka), Denmark (Ole Borre), Germany (Bernhard Wessels & Herman Schmitt), Great Britain (Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice), Hong Kong (Pang Kwong Li and Kwong Ka Shi), Hungary (Gabor Toka), Iceland (Olafur Th. Hardarson), Israel (Michal Shamir), Japan (Yoshitaka Nishizawa), Korea (Nam Young Lee), Lithuania (Elena Liubsiene), Mexico (Ulises Beltran & Benito Nacif), the Netherlands (Kees Aarts), New Zealand (Jack Vowles), Norway (Bernt Aardal), Peru (Catalina Romero), Poland (Radoslaw Markowski), Romania (Gabriel Badeescu), Russia (Timothy Colton & Michael McFaul), Slovenia (Janez Stebe), Spain (Juan Diez-Nicolas), Sweden (Soren Holmberg & Per Hedberg), Switzerland (Sibylle Hardmeier), Taiwan (Hu Fu), Thailand (Robert Albritton), Ukraine (Olga Balakireva), and the United States (Virginia Sapiro). Planning Committee Members for Module 1 were Members of the Planning Committee: Rita Bajarunieni (Lithuania), John Curtice (Great Britain), Juan Diez Nicolas (Spain), Oscar Hernandez (Costa Rica), Soren Holmberg (Sweden), Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Germany), Marta Lagos (Chile), Felipe B. Miranda (Philippines), Yoshitaka Nishizawa (Japan), Steven Rosenstone (United States), Jacques Thomassen (Netherlands), Gabor Toka (Hungary). Consultants to the Planning Committee were: Gary Cox (University of California, San Diego), Ekkehard Moellmann (Zentralarchiv fur empirische Sozialforschung), Richard Rockwell (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research), Herman Schmitt (European Election Study), and W. Phillips Shively (University of Minnesota).

Work on this book gradually developed over the years in conjunction with many other projects. As ever, I am indebted to many. Research on women’s election to office, on gender quotas, and on constituency service was developed in collaboration with Joni Lovenduski and successive surveys of British parliamentary candidates in the British Representation Study 1992-2001, resulting in numerous related publications. A special issue of the International Political Science Review that I edited in 1995, originally suggested by Pat Dunleavy, generated my initial interest in the comparative politics of electoral reform. Work with colleagues on the 1997 British Election Study helped clarify my ideas on social and partisan dealignment. An earlier version of chapter 9 was presented at the International Conference on Institutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century, Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, 9-11 December 1999. I would like to thank Andy Reynolds, Jorgen Elklit, and Giovanni Sartori for many helpful comments at the meeting that stimulated my thinking on this topic. An earlier version of chapter 10 on constituency service was presented at the British Politics Group annual meeting at APSA in August 2000. Other chapters were presented as work-in-progress at...
other professional meetings, including the conference on Political Reform in Brazil in Comparative
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Chapter 1
Do Rules Matter? Structure versus culture

From Kosovo to Kabul, the last decade has witnessed growing interest in 'electoral engineering'. The end of the Cold War, the global spread of democracy, and new thinking about development spurred this process. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the flowering of transitional and consolidating third wave democracies around the globe generated a wave of institution building. International agencies like the World Bank came to understand that good governance was not a luxury that could be delayed while more basic social needs were being met, like the provision of clean water, basic health care and schooling. Instead the establishment of democracy was understood as an essential pre-condition for effective human development and management of poverty, inequality and ethnic conflict. The donor community recognized that the downfall of many corrupt dictatorships in Latin America, Central Europe, Asia and Africa created new opportunities for political development. Subsequent histories show that the process of deepening democracy and good governance has proved fraught with many difficulties, with little change to many repressive regimes in the Middle East, only fragile and unstable consolidation in Argentina and Venezuela, and even occasional reversions back to authoritarian rule exemplified by Zimbabwe and Pakistan.

International agencies have used a triple strategy to promote democracy. Institution building has been one priority, by strengthening independent judiciaries and effective legislatures designed to curb and counterbalance executive powers. Civic society has been another, with attempts to nurture grassroots organizations, advocacy NGOs, and independent media. But among all the strategies, attempts to establish competitive, free and fair elections have attracted the most attention. Only the ballot box provides regular opportunities for the public to select representatives, to hold governments to account, and to 'kick the rascals out', where necessary. Electoral systems are commonly regarded as some of the most basic democratic structures, from which much else flows. Elections are not sufficient by themselves for representative democracy, by any means, but they are a necessary minimal condition. Views differ sharply about the appropriate evaluative criteria but most agree that at minimum elections must meet certain essential conditions to ensure democratic legitimacy. They should be free of violence, intimidation, bribery, vote rigging, irregularities, systematic fraud, and deliberate partisan manipulation. Contests should provide an unrestricted choice of competing parties and candidates, without repression of opposition parties or undue bias in the distribution of campaign resources and media access. Elections should use fair, honest, efficient and transparent procedures from voter registration to the final vote tally. Parliamentary representatives should reflect the society from which they are drawn and not systematically exclude any minority group. And campaigns should generate widespread public participation. Where rulers have blocked, derailed or corrupted the electoral process in attempts to retain power, as in Burma, Zimbabwe or Iraq, this has undermined their legitimacy and attracted critical scrutiny.

Until the 1980s, international electoral assistance was fairly exceptional, applied only in special cases, such as in the first transfer of power following decolonization or the end of civil wars. Yet from the early 1990s onwards, international observers, technical aid experts, and constitutional advisers played a leading role as dozens of transitional elections occurred throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America. Attempts to deepen and strengthen good governance have focused on the basic design of electoral systems, and more generally on issues of electoral administration, voter education, election observing, and party capacity-building. Elections played a particularly important role in attempts to manage ethnic tensions in plural societies such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. Debates about electoral systems have traditionally revolved around the desirability of the major ideal types. Majoritarian electoral systems are designed to promote accountable single-party government, by awarding the greatest representation to the two leading parties with the most votes. Proportional electoral systems aim to generate inclusive and consensual power sharing, by producing parliaments that reflect the vote shares of multiple parties. During the 1990s debates turned increasingly towards the pros and cons of 'combined' (or 'mixed') electoral systems, incorporating features of each of the major ideal types.
Interest in electoral engineering has not been confined to ‘third wave’ democracies. During the postwar era, electoral systems have usually proved relatively stable institutions in most established democracies. Nevertheless occasional modifications to electoral law have occurred, including minor adjustment to voting thresholds, electoral formulas, and suffrage qualifications. Moreover some long-standing democracies have implemented far more radical reforms of the basic electoral system during the last decade. In the United Kingdom, the Blair government radically overhauled the electoral system of first-past-the-post, with alternative systems adopted at almost every level except for Westminster and local councils. In 1993 New Zealand, after more than a century of first-past-the-post, the nation switched to a mixed-member proportional system, producing a sudden fragmentation of the two-party system. In 1992 Israel introduced direct elections for the prime minister to create a stronger executive capable of counterbalancing party fragmentation in the Knesset and overcoming the problems of frequent government turnover. The following year Italy changed. After prolonged debate about the best way to overcome unstable party governments, and a deep crisis in the parliamentary system, Italy adopted a combined electoral system where three-quarters of the parliamentary seats were distributed by plurality vote in single member districts and the remaining one-quarter as a proportional compensation for minor parties. Venezuela, one of Latin America’s oldest democracies, aiming to strengthen the independence of elected members over the national party leadership, changed in 1993 from a closed list PR system for the Chamber of Deputies to a combined system. In March 1994, Japan moved from a Single Non-Transferable Vote to a system combining PR seats with first-past-the-post single-member districts, in the attempt to craft a competitive two-party, issue-oriented politics, and a cleaner, more efficient government.

Beyond the basic electoral formula, many democracies have overhauled electoral procedures by reforming the legal statutes and party rules to facilitate positive action for women, improving the administrative process of electoral registration and voting facilities, and revising the regulation of campaign finance and broadcasting.

During the last decade, therefore, issues of effective democratic design have risen sharply on the policy agenda in many nations. The first ‘founding’ contests held under any revised rules may prove anomalous and unstable, as citizens and parties learn the ropes, but their effects can be assessed more reliably after a decade of elections held under the revised arrangements. Attempts at electoral engineering have commonly sought to achieve a balance between greater democratic accountability through majoritarian systems or wider parliamentary diversity through proportional systems. Underlying the long-standing normative debates are certain important empirical claims about the consequences of electoral engineering for voting choices and for political representation. Electoral reform is founded upon the principle that altering the formal rules matters based on the assumption that certain desirable consequences for social and political engineering can be achieved through the public policy process. There is certainly persuasive evidence that electoral rules have important mechanical effects as they help to determine which candidates are elected to parliament and which parties enter government. This is an essential function in representative democracies. Even if electoral rules had no other impact, this still provides ample justification for their study. But do formal rules have important psychological effects with the capacity to alter the behavior of political actors and citizens? Far less agreement surrounds this question.

To understand these issues, this book compares and evaluates alternative perspectives offered by rational-choice institutionalism and cultural modernization theories. These broad schools of thought shape the literature, each with multiple contributors. Each offers contrasting expectations about the impact and the consequences of electoral engineering on human behavior, one more optimistic, one more cautious. Each also reflects deeper divisions within the social sciences. Both perspectives offer alternative interpretations about how far political actors will respond to changes in the formal rules of the game, resting ultimately upon contrasting visions of human behavior. Of course many other perspectives are possible, such as historical institutionalism emphasizing the distinctive process of path-dependency in any nation. There are also general cultural theories, which do not make any assumptions about processes of societal development. The framework chosen as the focus in this book should not be regarded as providing an exhaustive and definitive overview of the arguments. Nevertheless the two
approaches that are the selected focus of this study can be regarded as among the most pervasive and important theories. Essentially rational-choice institutionalism assumes that formal electoral rules have a substantial impact upon the strategic incentives facing politicians, parties and citizens, so that changing the formal rules has the capacity to alter political behavior. Yet it remains unclear how much formal rules and strategic incentives matter in comparison with deep-rooted cultural ‘habits of the heart’ arising from the process of societal modernization; and we know even less about how structure and culture interact. This, in a nutshell, is the central puzzle to be unraveled at the heart of this book. Rules are thought to have multiple consequences so this study focuses upon understanding their potential impact upon many important dimensions of electoral behavior and political representation. The most important aspects of voting behavior concern patterns of party competition, the strength of social cleavages and party loyalties, and levels of electoral turnout. Political representation is compared by the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities in elected office, and the provision of constituency service.

The aim of this book is therefore to reintegrate two strands in the literature. One rich and extensive set of studies has long sought to understand electoral systems through classifying the formal rules, deducing certain consequences, and analyzing the evidence from aggregate election results held under different systems. Another substantial literature has sought to analyze how voters respond to the electoral choices before them, based on the evidence from individual-level national surveys of the electorate, and more occasional experiments or focus groups, often studied within each country or region in isolation from their broader institutional context. What this study seeks to do is to reintegrate some of the core strands in these literatures, so that we can explore how formal electoral rules (the independent variable) shape the strategic behavior of political actors (both parties and politicians, as the intervening variables) and how, in turn, the behavior of political actors affect voting choices (the dependent variable). The study does not claim to be a comprehensive and exhaustive treatment of electoral systems or voting behavior, but rather it seeks to open new questions and identify new challenges for further research that arise from combining these perspectives. The claim is made that the sum is greater than the parts, and creative synthesis across the sub-fields of electoral systems and voting behavior, even if difficult, can be a fruitful and illuminating path of inquiry. This introduction first compares and clarifies the key assumptions made within each theoretical perspective then summarizes the research design, comparative evidence, and overall plan of the book.

**Rational-choice institutionalism and the calculus of rewards**

The basic idea that formal rules determine political behavior is a popular approach to understanding electoral laws, particularly common in rational choice institutionalism and game-theoretic models, as well as implicit in the assumptions made within many legal, historical and structural accounts of electoral systems. The core theoretical claim in rational-choice institutionalism is that formal electoral rules generate important incentives that are capable of shaping and constraining political behavior. Formal electoral rules are understood here as the legislative framework governing elections, as embodied in official documents, constitutional conventions, legal statutes, codes of conduct, and administrative procedures, authorized by law and enforceable by courts. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for rules to be embodied in the legal system to be effective; social norms, informal patterns of behavior, and social sanctions also create shared mutual expectations among political actors. Nevertheless we focus here upon the formal rules as most attention in the literature on electoral engineering has emphasized these as core instruments of public policy. The key distinction is that formal rules are open to amendment by the political process, whether by legislation, executive order, constitutional revision, judicial judgment, or bureaucratic decree. Although there is a ‘gray’ over-lapping area, by contrast most social norms are altered gradually by informal processes such as social pressures, media campaigns, and cultural value shifts located outside of the formal policy arena.

The account of rational choice institutionalism explored in this book rests upon a series of claims, illustrated schematically in Figure 1.1:

1. Formal electoral rules shape the incentives facing political actors;
2. Political actors are rational vote-maximizers in pursuit of electoral office who respond
strategically to electoral incentives.

3. In particular, based on the formal rules, we hypothesize that:

3.1. According to the electoral threshold, parties decide whether to follow bridging or bonding strategies,

3.2. According to the ballot structure, politicians calculate whether to offer particularistic or programmatic benefits.

3.3. According to the ballot structure, parties choose whether to select socially homogeneous or socially diverse legislative candidates;

4. Citizens respond to the alternative electoral strategies adopted by political actors, as well as responding directly to electoral rules affecting their role as citizens, with observable consequences evident in mass behavior;

5. Electoral engineering - changing the formal electoral rules - has the capacity to generate major consequences by altering the strategic behavior of politicians, parties, and citizens.

Subsequent chapters compare systematic survey evidence to test whether formal rules do indeed confirm to these expectations, as claimed. Before considering the data, what is the logic of this argument?

1. Electoral incentives

Rational-choice institutionalism is founded upon the premise that the rules adopted in any political system have the capacity to shape the electoral rewards and punishments facing political actors. That is to say, the theory assumes that the basic choice of either a proportional or majoritarian electoral system, or more detailed matters such as the average size of electoral districts, the type of ballot structure, or the use of statutory gender quotas, influence the structure of opportunities for parties and individual politicians. To take a simple and uncontroversial illustration, some countries have public financing of election campaigns, free election broadcasting, and moreover legislative candidates are elected every four or five years on the basis of closed party lists; within this context individual candidates have little incentive for political fund-raising, and indeed they may have few opportunities to do this, even if they wanted, because election financing may be strictly controlled. In other places there are frequent elections, entrepreneurial candidates raise most funds on an individual basis, there are few or no public subsidies covering the costs of election campaigns and limited party resources, political advertising is commercially-priced and expensive, and rules controlling campaign expenditure are lax. In such a context, candidates face every electoral incentive to devote much of their time and energies to campaign fund-raising. In this regard, as in many others, formal electoral rules are not neutral in their impact; instead they systematically benefit some while penalizing others.

2. Vote-maximizing political actors

The second premise of the theory assumes that political actors in representative democracies are essentially vote-maximizers seeking office in the electoral marketplace. The idea that politicians are only seeking public popularity is, of course, a drastic simplification given the complex range of motivations driving the pursuit of power. Legislators may fail to follow this logic because of many other priorities. Biographies suggest that politicians come in all shapes and sizes. Elected representatives may prefer the cut-and-thrust drama of parliamentary debate in the public spotlight to less-glamorous behind-the-scenes constituency casework. Ideologues may opt for purity to fundamental principles rather than the ambulance-chasing pursuit of public popularity ('better red than dead'). Materialists may want to line their own pockets. Philanthropists may be attracted to serve the public good. Status-seekers may enjoy the seductive aphrodisiac of the Ministerial limo. Statespersons may seek to make their mark upon the history books. Yet in all these cases the Darwinian theory predicts that politicians who are not vote-maximizers, at
least to some degree, will gradually become less common, because in general they will be less successful in gaining election or re-election. This premise is empty of content: it does not assume what particular strategies political actors will pursue to gain power, merely that they will seek votes.

3.1 Party bridging or bonding strategies

If we accept these two premises as working assumptions or axioms they generate a series of testable specific hypotheses about how certain formal electoral rules shape the opportunities for politicians to garner votes.

The first core hypothesis is that the electoral threshold will shape the inducements for parties to campaign collectively using either bridging or bonding strategies. The theory that parties are ‘masters of their fate’, so that they can actively reinforce or weaken party-voter linkages, was developed by Przeworski and Sprague, and subsequently expanded by Kitschelt. But how does this process relate systematically to electoral rules? Majoritarian electoral systems provide higher electoral hurdles, since parties need a simple plurality or a majority of votes in each district to win. Under these rules, we theorize that successful parties will commonly adopt ‘bridging’ strategies designed to gather votes promiscuously and indiscriminately wherever campaign support can be found among diverse sectors of the electorate. Bridging parties seek to create a broad coalition across diverse social and ideological groups in the electorate, typically by focusing upon uncontroversial middle-of-the-road issues that are widely shared among the public: the benefits of economic growth, the importance of efficient public services, and the need for effective defense. These strategies bring together heterogeneous publics into loose, shifting coalitions, linking different generations, faiths, and ethnic identities, thereby aggregating interests and creating crosscutting allegiances. Bridging parties are highly permeable and open organizations, characterized by easy-entrance, easy-exit among voters rather than by fixed lifetime loyalties. This proposition suggests many important consequences, not least that under majoritarian electoral rules, parties are likely to be centripetal socially and ideologically, with competition clustered in the middle of the political spectrum.

Alternatively proportional representation electoral systems provide lower hurdles to office, based on a far smaller share of the electorate. Where there are lower electoral thresholds, we hypothesize that parties will typically adopt bonding strategies. These appeals focus upon gaining votes from a narrower home-base among particular segmented sectors of the electorate – whether blue-collar workers, rural farmers, environmentalists, trade unionists, ethnic minorities, older women, or Catholic church-goers. Bonding parties bring together citizens who are homogeneous in certain important respects, whether sharing class, faith, or ethnic identities, or bound together ideologically by common beliefs about capitalism and socialism, environmentalism, or nationalism. Bonding parties are sticky organizations, promoting the interests of their own members, and developing tightly knit social networks and clear one-of-us boundaries. Such strategies are usually efficient for parties, since it is often easier to mobilize niche sectors with specific social and ideological appeals that are distinctive to each party, rather than trying to attract the mass public on consensual issues advocated by many parties. Party systems under proportional rules are more likely to be centrifugal, with competition dispersed throughout the ideological spectrum and issue space, rather than clustered closely around the center-point. Bonding parties maintain strong ties with social cleavages in the electorate and enduring party loyalties. They are also more likely to be able to mobilize their supporters through programmatic appeals, thereby maximizing turnout at the ballot box. One-of-us campaigns reinforce party unity among ideologically motivated members, activists, and politicians. This proposition predicts that the type of electoral rules will therefore have important results for party campaign strategies and for voting behavior.

Through their bridging or bonding strategies, we assume that parties can either reinforce or weaken the political salience of social and partisan identities. The linkages between parties and citizens should therefore differ systematically according to the electoral threshold, and therefore by the basic type of majoritarian, combined, or proportional electoral system. It is not claimed that politicians have the capacity to create social cleavages. But the account assumes
that the initial adoption of certain electoral rules (for whatever reason) will generate incentives for parties to maintain, reinforce (and possibly exacerbate) the political salience of one-of-us bonding, or alternatively to modify, downplay (and possibly erode) group consciousness by encouraging catchall bridging. This is most important in plural societies divided by deep-rooted ethnic conflict, exemplified by Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, or Israel/Palestine, if leaders can heighten sectarian consciousness or alternatively moderate community divisions. The electoral rules of the game should be regarded as one (although only one) of the critical influences shaping the behavior of leaders and their followers.

In practice this distinction between bridging and bonding parties obviously involves considerable over-simplification, as with any ideal type. Many parties blend both elements, as complex organizations composed of different interests among party leaders, parliamentary candidates and elected representatives, paid officers, grassroots members and more occasional voters. Case studies such as the British Labour party or the German SDP suggest that parties are also capable of shifting type at different points of time, as they alternatively choose to prioritize ideological purity or electoral popularity, rather than conforming strictly to fixed categories. Despite these important limitations, some parties can be identified as ideal types at both polar extremes, at least impressionistically, as well as recognizing the basic conceptual and theoretical distinction. By comparing the strength of social cleavages, party loyalties, and patterns of turnout evident in contests held under majoritarian, combined and proportional electoral rules, this study can test how far there are indeed significant differences, as predicted theoretically.

3.2 Particularistic or programmatic benefits

The second core hypothesis suggests that the ballot structure, determining how electors can express their choices, is paramount in campaign strategies designed to secure election. Ballot structures can be classified into the following four categories based on the choices facing citizens when they enter the voting booth:

Candidate-Ballots: In single member districts, citizens in each constituency cast a single ballot for an individual candidate. The candidate winning either a plurality or majority of votes in each district is elected. Through casting a ballot, electors indirectly express support for parties, but they have to vote directly for a particular candidate. In this context, politicians have a strong incentive to offer particularistic benefits, exemplified by casework helping individual constituents and by the delivery of local services ('pork'), designed to strengthen their personal support within local communities.

Preference-Ballots: In open-list multimember districts electors cast a ballot for a party, but they can express their preference for a particular candidate or candidates within a party list. Where citizens exercise a preference vote (otherwise known as an ‘open’ or ‘non-blocked’ vote), this strengthens the chances that particular candidates from the list will be elected and therefore changes their rank. Under these rules, politicians have a moderately strong incentive to offer particularistic benefits, to stand out from rivals within their own party.

Dual-Ballots: In ‘combined’ (or ‘mixed’) electoral systems voters can cast separate ballots in both single-member and multi-member districts, as exemplified by elections in Italy, Germany and New Zealand.

Party-Ballots: Lastly in closed-list multimember districts, citizens cast a single ballot for a party. Each party ranks the order of the candidates to be elected within their list, based on the decisions of the party selectorate, and the public cannot express a preference for any particular candidate within each list. Closed-list multimember districts, where voters can only ‘vote the ticket’ rather than supporting a particular candidate, are expected to encourage politicians to offer programmatic benefits, focused on the collective record and program of their party, and to strengthen cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties.

The ballot structures are therefore closely related to the basic type of electoral system, although party-ballots can be used with both majoritarian and proportional systems. Other secondary rules that may influence the incentives for constituency service concern the centralization of the candidate selection processes within parties; the size of any multimember
districts; and any term limitations on legislators. Politicians have limited time and energies, and in considering multiple demands vying for their attention, they have to decide among alternative priorities. Where politicians face strong electoral incentives to stand out from other rivals within their own party then they are expected to prioritize particularistic benefits offered through constituency service, allowing elected members to claim credit for dealing with local problems and community concerns. In this context, politicians will emphasize the delivery of services and public goods ('pork') to their home district, as well as prioritizing contact with local voters and party activists through their post-bags, community meetings, surgeries, and doorstep canvassing. By contrast, closed list PR systems, where voters can only ‘vote the ticket’ rather than supporting a particular candidate, generate few electoral incentives encouraging politicians to offer constituency service. In this context, we can hypothesize that politicians will rationally focus their efforts upon collective party appeals, typically based on their party’s retrospective record in office or their prospective manifesto policies. Given accurate information about the ballot structure, we theorize that successful vote-seeking politicians will rationally adopt whichever particularistic or programmatic strategy is necessary for gaining and maintaining office.

Of course some politicians may not conform to these expectations. Despite party ballots, legislators may still engage in constituency service, because of tacit social norms, informal rules within parliaments, or because some enjoy the intrinsic philanthropic rewards of helping the public. Despite candidate ballots, given other personal ambitions, Westminster MPs or US House Members may also prioritize the cut and thrust of legislative debate about the nation’s affairs, or the glory and glamour of appearing in TV studios, while neglecting the more prosaic matter of sorting out particular housing claims or welfare benefits with dusty government bureaucracies. Yet the Darwinian logic suggests that, if citizens reward constituency service in candidate ballots, under these rules politicians who fail to behave strategically will be less likely to be returned to parliament. Natural selection through the ballot box means that over time the legislature will gradually become composed of politicians pursuing more successful electoral strategies. These propositions can be examined systematically by testing whether constituency service and voter contact with members does indeed vary systematically under different ballot structures.

3.3 The diversity of parliamentary representatives

The third hypothesis suggests that the ballot structure also influences the diversity of parliamentary bodies, by shaping the inducements for parties to select socially homogeneous or socially diverse parliamentary candidates. Rational-choice institutionalism assumes that in selecting candidates for parliament, parties will also act collectively in a vote-maximizing manner, seeking popular standard-bearers. Yet when picking candidates, parties possess limited information about public preferences. To minimize electoral risks, as the default position, it is rational for parties to re-select incumbents, and to choose new candidates that share similar characteristics to representatives who have been elected in the past, thereby preserving the status quo and creating a socially homogeneous parliament. Since many legislative elites are usually disproportionately male, middle-aged professionals, such as lawyers, teachers and journalists, as well as drawn from the predominant ethnic group in any society, it minimizes electoral risks to select candidates with a similar social profile for future contests.

Yet this process may also be affected by electoral law, including the basic type of ballot structure, as well as by the statutory adoption of gender or ethnic quotas, and the use of reserved seats for women and ethnic minorities. Electoral rules can alter the balance of incentives. Most obviously, statutory quotas create legal sanctions if parties fail to select a minimum number of women or minority candidates. The basic type of ballot structure may be important as well. Party ballots present voters with collective list of legislative candidates, and parties risk an electoral penalty if they exclude any major social group. By contrast under candidate ballots, each local party can pick their own contestant within each constituency, without any collective accountability or electoral penalty for any overall social imbalance across the whole party list. These propositions can be examined by seeing whether electoral rules are consistently associated with the social diversity or homogeneity of parliamentary candidates.

4. The direct and indirect impact of rules upon citizens
How can we test these core hypotheses? This model assumes that formal electoral rules (the independent variable) impact the behavior of rational politicians (the intermediate variable). By shaping the strategies of political actors, we predict that rules exert an indirect impact upon citizens (the dependent variable), as well as having the capacity to exert a direct effect on the electorate. Despite their central importance in many rational-choice theories, although we can make logically plausible deductions, we commonly lack directly observable evidence of the electoral strategies adopted by political actors. Before the contest, party campaign tactics are often cloaked in official secrecy, like the battle plans of generals. Post-hoc accounts of contests provided by party managers and politicians can be heavily colored by self-serving post-hoc rationalizations ('No, we never really tried to win California'). Proxy indicators of campaign strategies can be found through analyzing patterns of campaign spending and advertising, where reliable information is publicly available. Yet too often even this is absent, especially where legal regulations are not enforced, or where disclosure of public accounts is inadequate. Through surveys or personal interviews it also remains difficult to establish systematic cross-national evidence for patterns of constituency service among legislators ('Sure, I spend 30 hours a week on dealing with local case-work'), or the factors influencing the selection of parliamentary candidates ('We really choose the best candidate, irrespective of their race or gender'). Nevertheless reliable evidence is widely available allowing us to document, compare, and classify formal electoral rules, based on analysis of legal statutes, official electoral guidelines, and written constitutions, as the independent variable. Moreover we can also analyze cross-national surveys of voting behavior in the electorate, and also aggregate electoral results such as the percentage of women in parliament or levels of electoral turnout, to measure the dependent variables. If we can establish certain systematic pattern of electoral behavior and political representation that are consistently associated with the type of electoral rules, then we can infer the linkages between electoral rules, political actors, and voting behavior.

5. Reforming the formal electoral rules

To recap the argument, given a few simple assumptions about rational motivations, knowledge of the formal rule-based incentives should allow us to predict certain consistent patterns of behavior. It follows that policy reforms that alter the formal rules – or electoral engineering - should have the capacity to generate important consequences for political representation and for voting behavior. As mentioned earlier, the international community has become deeply engaged in attempts to generate free and fair elections in dozens of nations around the globe, exemplified by the transitions following the collapse of the authoritarian regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, decolonization in East Timor, and the end of civil war in Cambodia. In established democracies, as well, beyond the basic electoral formula, debates have also been common about the best way to overhaul electoral procedures. This includes reforms to the legal statutes and party rules governing party eligibility and candidate nomination, the administrative process of electoral registration and voting facilities, the regulation of campaign finance and political broadcasting, and the process of election management. Established democracies have introduced a range of reforms, whether switching between d'Hondt and LR-Hare formula, adjusting the effective voting threshold for minor parties to qualify for parliamentary representation, expanding the conditions of electoral suffrage, or altering the size of their legislative assemblies. In all these cases, it is assumed that electoral reform has the capacity to overcome certain problems, such as the paucity of women in elected office, the management of ethnic tensions, or civic disengagement. This account is therefore worth investigating because it is theoretically important in the literature, but also policy-relevant to real-world problems.

Rational-choice institutionalism generates certain important propositions that are tested systematically in subsequent chapters. In particular, if the assumptions are correct, and formal electoral rules do indeed shape the behavior of politicians, parties and citizens, then, all other things being equal, systematic cross-national contrasts in voting behavior and in political representation should be evident under different electoral rules. The impact of the basic type of majoritarian, combined, and proportional electoral systems can be compared, along with subsidiary legal rules such as the ballot structure, the use of statutory gender quotas, the
regulation of registration and voting facilities, and the employment of compulsory voting laws. Chapters examine whether electoral rules are systematically related to many important indicators, especially patterns of party competition, the strength of social cleavages and party loyalties, levels of electoral turnout, the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities in parliaments, and patterns of constituency service.

**Cultural Modernization Theory and ‘Habits of the Heart’**

The logic of rational-choice institutionalism is both powerful and attractive, with a seductive elegance and a parsimonious Ockham’s razor capable of cutting through the swathe of complexities in understanding human behavior. Formal legal rules embodied in written constitutions, laws, and regulations can be carefully documented, exhaustively categorized, precisely measured, and hence fruitfully compared across many nations. Yet of course it is widely recognized that the rational calculus of rewards may have limited impact, for multiple reasons. Deep-seated and habitual patterns of behavior may persist unaltered, frustrating the dreams of electoral reformers. Political actors may be ill informed, blind, or unaware of the potential consequences of institutional rules. Legislators may prioritize career goals such as the achievement of programmatic policy goals, or rising up the greasy pole to higher office, over immediate electoral rewards. Rational-choice institutionalism can always be rescued by stretching the notion of ‘career goals’ to cover many priorities for legislators beyond electoral survival. But if so the danger is that any reward becomes equally rational, leading towards empty tautologies with minimal predictive or analytical capacity. In the same way, parties may determine their campaign strategies and tactics due to internal organizational structures, factional power-struggles, and traditional tried-and-tested methods of campaigning, almost irrespective of the calculation of any electoral benefits. And citizens may also fail to respond rationally to the carrots and sticks designed by legal reformers. Strong party loyalists may ‘vote the ticket’ in open list PR systems, supporting all party candidates listed on the ballot paper, irrespective of their record of constituency service. Apathetic citizens may stay away from the polls, even if registration and voting procedures are simplified.

Alternative cultural modernization theories differ in their emphasis on the primary motors driving human behavior, their expectations about the pace of change, and also their assumptions about the ability of formal institutional rules to alter, rather than adapt to, deeply embedded and habitual social norms and patterns of human behavior. While many assume that cultural modernization matters, again it remains unclear how much it matters compared with legal-institutional electoral rules. Cultural modernization theories, representing one of the mainstream perspectives in voting behavior, share four basic claims (see Figure 1.2):

1. The process of societal modernization transforms the structure of society in predictable ways. In particular, the shift from industrial to postindustrial societies is associated with rising levels of human capital (education, literacy, and cognitive skills).

2. Societal modernization has profound consequences for the political culture, with new forms of citizen politics arising in post-industrial societies. The theory predicts that there will be marked contrasts in the mass basis of electoral politics evident in industrial and post-industrial societies, notably in the strength of social identities and party loyalties, and patterns of electoral turnout.

3. The political culture is transmitted through the socialization process experienced in early childhood and adolescence, including the acquisition of habitual social norms and values. Political elites and citizens are driven primarily by affective motivations, and by habitual ‘habits of the heart’, rather than by the strategic calculation of rule-based rewards.

4. Electoral engineering has limited capacity to generate short-term changes in political behavior, although reforms will probably have a cumulative impact in the longer term as new generations grow up under different rules.

If these assumptions are correct, then systematic differences in political representation and mass
electoral behavior should be evident among societies at different levels of development, especially contrast between industrial and postindustrial nations, even if countries share similar electoral rules.

1. The process of societal modernization

Cultural modernization theories start from the premise that economic, cultural and political changes go together in coherent ways, so that industrialization brings broadly similar trajectories. Even if situation-specific factors make it impossible to predict exactly what will happen in a given society, certain changes become increasingly likely to occur, but the changes are probabilistic, not deterministic. Modernization theories originated in the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim and these ideas were revived and popularized in the late 1950s and early 1960s by Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Lerner, Walt Rostow, Karl Deutsch, and Daniel Bell. Theories of cultural modernization were later developed most fully in the work of Ronald Inglehart and Russell Dalton. These accounts emphasize that mass electoral behavior is profoundly influenced by the process of societal development, particularly by rising levels of human capital in the transition from agrarian to industrial and then postindustrial societies.

Modernization theories emphasize that traditional agrarian societies are characterized by subsistence livelihoods largely based on farming, fishing, extraction and unskilled work, with low levels of literacy and education, predominately agrarian populations, minimum standards of living, and restricted social and geographic mobility. Citizens in these societies are strongly rooted to local communities through ties of ‘blood and belonging’, including those of kinship, family, ethnicity and religion, as well as long-standing cultural bonds. The shift towards industrial production leads towards a range of societal developments -- notably growing prosperity and an expanding middle class, higher levels of education and literacy, the growth of the mass media, and urbanization -- which in turn are believed to lay the social foundations for democratic participation in the political system.

In the early 1970s, Daniel Bell popularized the view that after a certain period of industrialization a further distinct stage of development could be distinguished, as a non-linear process, in the rise of postindustrial societies. For Bell the critical tipping point was reached when the majority of the work force moved from manufacturing into the service sector, generating profound social and economic shifts. These include the rise of a highly educated, skilled and specialized workforce, the population shifts from urban to suburban neighborhoods and greater geographic mobility including immigration across national borders, rising living standards and growing leisure time, rapid scientific and technological innovation, the expansion and fragmentation of mass media channels, technologies and markets, the growth of multi-layered governance with power shifting away from the nation state towards global and local levels, market liberalization and the expansion of non-profit social protection schemes, the erosion of the traditional nuclear family, and growing equality of sex roles within the home, family and workforce.

2. The impact of modernization on political culture

The account offered by Ronald Inglehart emphasized that societal developments have profound consequences for political culture, in particular that postindustrial societies are characterized by an extensive value shift, with important implications for the size of a new citizen politics. After World War II, post-industrial societies developed unprecedented levels of prosperity and economic security, with rising standards of living fuelled by steady economic growth, despite occasional cyclical downturns. Governments in these societies expanded the role of the welfare state to provide greater social protection for the worst-off citizens; more recently, contracting out services to the non-profit and private sectors, under state regulation. In conditions of greater security, Inglehart theorizes, public concern about the material issues of unemployment, healthcare, and housing no longer takes top priority. Instead in postindustrial societies the public has given increasingly high priority to quality of life issues, individual autonomy and self-expression, the need for environmental protection. Dalton theorizes that this process has given rise to a new form of citizen politics, making greater demands for direct
participation in the policy-making process through activities such as petitions, protests and demonstrations.

Most importantly, the traditional party-voter loyalties, and the social identities upon which these are founded, can be expected to erode in postindustrial societies, to be replaced by more contingent patterns of party support based upon particular leaders, issues and events. Many studies, discussed fully in chapters 5 and 6, have documented trends in partisan and social dealignment occurring in many post-industrial societies. Growing levels of education and cognitive skills, and the access this provides to a diverse range of information sources via the mass media, are thought to play a particularly important role in transforming the basis of individual voting behavior, representing a shift from the politics of loyalties towards the politics of choice. Moreover, because the causes are essentially societal factors -- exemplified by changes in educational levels, access to the mass media, and the decline of traditional political organizations -- these processes are widely assumed to affect all post-industrial societies equally, whether the Netherlands or Britain, the United States or Sweden, irrespective of the particular electoral rules operating in each political system. If processes of societal modernization have indeed shaped political cultures and patterns of electoral behavior, then, all other things being equal, this should be evident by contrasts in voting behavior and political representation among societies at different levels of human development, in particular we would expect to find substantial differences between industrial and postindustrial societies.

3. The acquisition of enduring cultural values and the socialization process

Cultural modernization accounts are based upon traditional theories of socialization. These assume that social and political values are gradually acquired during the formative years in childhood and adolescence, due to early experiences in the home, school, community and workplace, influenced by family, friends, teachers, neighbors, and colleagues. The formal rules play a significant role in the acquisition of social norms and values during the formative years, but in this theory once established, these stable patterns of human behavior are likely to persist even if the institutions change. Cultural accounts emphasize that habitual patterns of electoral behavior evolve slowly and incrementally, adapting new laws to existing social norms, predominant practices, and enduring values. Society is regarded as the primeval ‘soup’ or base from which the legal system arises as superstructure. In this view, for example, even if exactly the same formal gender quota policies are implemented to generate positive action policies for women in parliaments in Buenos Aires, Berlin, and Bogotà, the effect of these rules are likely to vary in different contexts. In one society these laws may result in substantial gains for women in elected office, yet in another the same regulations may exist on paper more than in practice. Similar illustrations could be drawn concerning the failure of electoral laws governing compulsory voting or party funding. What defeats these attempts at social engineering, skeptics suggest, is the unwillingness of citizens and legal authorities to implement the statutes in practice, the strength of tacit social norms and unwritten rules governing patterns of political behavior, and the meaning and interpretation of any formal laws within a broader culture. Hence, for example, the Single Transferable Vote system is used in Australia, Malta and Ireland, and yet the effects of STV vary substantially in different countries.

Cultural modernization theorists suggest that the political behavior of politicians and citizens is shaped by multiple complex factors, especially by affective orientations towards the predominant values, tacit norms, and attitudes in any society, rather than by any strategic calculation of electoral rewards. Hence socio-psychological accounts emphasize that leaders often have diverse motivations for pursuing a political career; some prioritize the need for ideological purity, or the public-service role of legislative committee work, or the national interest, rather than the simple pursuit of public popularity. Along similar lines, the classic ‘Michigan’ social psychological studies of voting behavior, discussed fully in Chapter 5, emphasize that citizens commonly know little about the government’s record, the party leaders, or the policy platforms offered by each party. Nevertheless many citizens do participate and in this view they are guided by affective partisan identification, ideological shortcuts, and long-standing ties between parties and social groups, based on class, ethnic, and regional identities. Social-psychological studies emphasize that we should avoid generating post-hoc rationalizations for
human behavior that is, at heart, purely habitual and irrational.

4. The limits of electoral engineering

This account has important implications for understanding the pace of change brought about through electoral engineering. The primary impact of any institutional reforms is expected to be glacial and cumulative, as enduring social practices gradually adapt to the new policies. In many older democracies, for example, when the suffrage qualification was first expanded to women, the initial impact was a sharp fall in the overall level of electoral turnout. This reform only brought women into the voting booths at the same rate as men many decades later, once younger generations of women had gradually acquired the habit of voting. At elite-level, as well, cultural theories suggest that politicians who have acquired their habitual patterns of legislative behavior under one set of rules will respond slowly to new conditions and incentives, with the greatest impact upon the socialization process of younger cohorts of legislators. As a result institutional reforms may take many years to become fully embedded within parliamentary cultures. For example, although constituency service is strongly entrenched within Anglo-American democracies, cultural modernization theories suggest that the adoption of single-member districts in the Italian Chamber of Deputies or the Russian Duma would not generate similar behavior in these parliaments, as predominant values, ideological beliefs, and institutional customs are deeply rooted and socially determined. Moreover in democratic systems successful parties and politicians are largely following social tides and adapting to patterns of mass political behavior in the electorate, rather than attempting to reshape them, still less to determine the strength of linkages between citizens and parties.

Overall, therefore, these accounts suggest serious doubts about the more grandiose claims of rational-choice institutionalism and the capacity of electoral reform for social engineering. During earlier decades it was commonly thought that formal institutions of representative government, like the Westminster parliament, could be uprooted from their embedded institutional context and exported to newly independent countries undergoing decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The attempts usually failed. Hence it has been argued that rational-choice institutionalism has difficulty explaining the complicated, variegated, and fluid patterns of Latin American politics by overemphasizing the electoral and legislative arenas, by overestimating the importance of formal rules and institutions; by failing to explain the origins of political crisis and change, and by neglecting the importance of political beliefs. Moreover when considering issues of electoral reform, there is considerable evidence that existing institutions matter as the starting point for any modifications, in an incremental process, rather than starting de novo. Institutional imports may fail to flourish in alien soil, such as the introduction of single member districts designed to change the behavior of representatives in the Italian Chamber of Deputies or the Japanese Diet. For cultural modernization theorists, incentives-based approaches sacrifice too much to the altar of theoretical elegance, naively over-simplifying the multiple and messy reality of complex motivations driving human behavior, as well as failing to recognize the embedded quality of taken-for-granted institutional traditions and cultural norms. Short-term mechanical fixes, while sounding simple and attractive, can founder on the unintended consequences of institutional reforms.

Comparing Electoral Rules.

Therefore debates in the literature on electoral systems and voting behavior can be divided into alternative schools of thought, of which the two we have summarized provide perhaps the most pervasive viewpoints. Scholars differ sharply about the democratic criteria that electoral rules should meet, as well as the possible consequences that can flow from these choices. What evidence is available to allow us to evaluate these theories? The most extensive body of research on electoral systems, following seminal work by Maurice Duverger (1954) and by Douglas Rae (1967), established systematic typologies of electoral systems and then analyzed their consequences for a variety of macro-level phenomenon, either through formal game-theoretic models or through inductive generalizations. Electoral rules are typically defined, operationalized, and classified, including variations in the electoral formula, assembly size, and ballot structure. The outcome of elections conducted under different rules is then
compared using multiple indicators, such as patterns of vote-seat disproportionality, electoral turnout, the proportion of women in parliament, or multiparty competition. Most attention has focused on analyzing the results of national elections to the lower house of parliament, although comparison have also been drawn with many other types of contest, including elections to the European parliament, contrasts among state, regional or local contests within one nation, as well as differences between presidential and parliamentary systems.

Invaluable insights are derived from pre-post ‘natural experiments’, comparing the outcome in cases when the electoral system changes in one nation. In the early twentieth century many countries in Western Europe shifted from majoritarian to proportional electoral systems, while in this era a dozen American cities experimented with PR then abandoned this project. During the postwar era France shifted between majoritarian and proportional elections. During the 1990s major reforms were implemented in New Zealand, the UK, Israel, Venezuela, Italy, and Japan, allowing pre-post comparisons in each nation, holding many other factors constant.

Structural-institutional comparison has many advantages since the basic features of electoral systems can be classified consistently around the world, or in a sequence of elections over time, along with indicators about their consequences.

Yet at the same time this approach has serious limitations, as we know more about what Duverger termed the ‘mechanical’ than the ‘psychological’ impact of electoral systems. The ‘mechanical’ focuses on the effects that flow directly from the electoral rules, and the structural conditions in which such relationships vary in a consistent manner at macro-level, exemplified by legal electoral thresholds that automatically exclude some minor parties from parliamentary representation. By contrast, far less is known about the ‘psychological’ effects of how the public, politicians, and parties respond to electoral rules, and hence the underlying reasons for some of these relationships. For example, it is well established in the literature that more women are usually elected to office under proportional than majoritarian electoral systems, all other things being equal, a generalization confirmed in repeated studies. Yet the precise reasons for this pattern remain a matter of speculation. Many similar generalizations can be drawn from the literature, such as the way that turnout is usually higher in proportional than majoritarian systems, although exactly why this occurs has never been satisfactorily established. Of course it could be argued that it is more important to identify this sort of regularity than it is to understand the underlying reasons. Yet unless the causes are discovered any attempt at practical electoral engineering may well fail under different conditions. In the well-known but nevertheless true cliché, correlation does not mean causation, no matter its strength and statistical significance. For all these reasons, despite the extensive body of literature, electoral design remains more ‘art’ than ‘science’. To understand how electoral rules constrain social expectations, structural comparisons need supplementing with individual-level survey analysis.

Comparing Electoral Behavior

The main alternative approach in electoral behavior has focused on understanding how social norms, political attitudes, cognitive opinions, and cultural values shape patterns of voting choice and party support. Studies have employed increasingly sophisticated research designs, including cross-sectional post-election surveys representative of electors and parliamentary elites, multi-wave campaign panel surveys, experimental methods, and content analysis of the mass media and party platforms. The literature on voting behavior based on single nation election studies is flourishing and extensive, yet most research focuses upon individual-level attitudes and behavior, necessarily taking for granted the context of the electoral rules and the broader constitutional arrangements that operate within each country, an approach which has come under increasing challenge in recent decades.

Time-series trends

One traditional way to understand the impact of electoral rules would be to collect a series of national election surveys to compare trends over time in countries using proportional, combined, or majoritarian electoral systems. Time-series analysis has commonly been used to
compare the strength of cleavage politics and the erosion of partisan loyalties in a wide range of advanced industrial societies. Yet the available survey evidence on voting behavior is limited in the consistency and length of the time-series data, and usually restricted in the range of countries where election surveys have been conducted on a regular basis. Most series of national election surveys started in established democracies only in the 1960s or 1970s, with the oldest in the United States (1952), Sweden (1956), and Norway (1957), hindering our ability to examine longer-term trends associated with societal modernization. Surveys repeated over successive elections provide a continuous series of regular observations, sometimes for almost half a century, but even so the precise wording and coding of many survey core items have often been slightly amended over time, introducing inconsistencies into the series. Even where similar concepts shape the research traditions in voting behavior, and networks of data archives are sharing national election surveys, nevertheless there are often significant differences among different countries based on matters such as the precise question wording, coding conventions, the order of the survey items within the questionnaire, fieldwork techniques, and sampling procedures. The comparison of trends over time on matters such as partisan identification, issue voting, or leadership popularity using similar but not identical questions within one country often requires heroic assumptions, even more so when comparing a series of independent national election studies conducted using different questionnaires in different nations.

Case studies of reform

Another fruitful line of inquiry uses case studies to analyze changes over time in countries where surveys were conducted ‘before’ and ‘after’ major electoral reforms were implemented, such as in New Zealand and the UK, generating a prolific literature in these nations. Aggregate election results, such as patterns of turnout or the proportion of women in office, can also be compared in countries like France that have altered their electoral system back and forth between proportional and majoritarian formula. The introduction of statutory gender quotas in the selection of parliamentary candidates provides one such ‘natural experiment’, as discussed in chapter 8. Still, many factors vary over successive elections in these countries beyond changes in the electoral law, including the pattern of party competition, the campaign efforts at voter mobilization, the popularity of the government, the party in government, and the personality of particular party leaders. As a result it can prove difficult to disentangle these separate effects from the role of the formal rules per se. Moreover only a handful of established democracies have experienced fundamental electoral reform during the last decade, and even fewer have consistent before-and-after surveys, so it remains difficult to generalize from the available survey evidence in specific countries such as New Zealand. The comparison of the election immediately before and after reforms is also limited, because cultural theories suggest any long-term shifts in party competition, in voting behavior, and in the activities of elected representatives, may take many years, perhaps even decades, to become established.

The Research Design and Comparative Framework

The research design adopted by this study is, at heart, extremely simple. If rational incentive theories are accurate, and electoral rules do indeed have the capacity to shape the behavior of politicians, parties and citizens, then, all other things being equal, this should become evident in systematic cross-national differences in voting behavior and political representation evident under different rules, notably contrasts among countries using majoritarian, combined, and proportional electoral systems. Alternatively if processes of societal modernization have shaped the political culture of nations, then, all other things being equal, this should be evident by contrasts in voting behavior and political representation among societies at different levels of human development, in particular between industrial and postindustrial societies. To build upon this approach, subsequent chapters explore how far electoral systems and societal modernization affect party competition (chapter 4), the strength of social cleavages and partisan alignments (chapters 5 and 6), patterns of voting turnout (chapter 7). At elite level, chapters analyze how far electoral rules and societal modernization have the capacity to influence political representation, including the gender and ethnic diversity of legislatures (chapters 8 and 9), as well as patterns of constituency service (chapter 10).
Data sources

The book uses multiple sources of data. The most important concerns survey research drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). This project is based on an international team of collaborators who have incorporated a special battery of survey questions into the national election studies, based on a representative sample of the electorate in each country. Data from each of the separate election studies was coordinated, integrated and cleaned by the Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, at the University of Michigan. The dataset is designed to facilitate the comparison of macro and micro-level electoral data. Module 1 of the CSES (released in July 2002) used in this study allows us to compare surveys of a representative cross-section of the electorate in 37 legislative and presidential national elections in 32 countries. The geographic coverage includes countries containing in total over 1.2 million inhabitants, or one fifth of the world’s population. The focus on voters’ choices, the cross-national integration, and above all the timing of the data collection (within a year following each of the elections), provide a unique opportunity to compare voting behavior in a way that is not possible through other common sources of comparative data such as the World Values Survey. Throughout the book, the national elections under comparison are those held from 1996-2001 for the lower house of the national parliament and for presidential contests. The definition and typology of electoral systems is discussed in detail in the next chapter and the main contrasts among nations are illustrated in Table 1.1.

Comparative framework

Many previous studies have commonly adopted a ‘most similar’ comparative framework, seeking to consider patterns of electoral behavior within Western Europe, or post-Communist Europe, or Latin America, or within the universe of established democracies. This approach helps isolate the effects of different electoral rules from certain common historical traditions, shared cultural values, or political experiences, but nevertheless it remains difficult to generalize from any particular regional context, for example for any lessons derived from new democracies in Latin America that might also hold in Central and Eastern Europe. This is particularly problematic if one wants to test the effects of societal modernization and electoral rules on voting behavior in both older and newer democracies. For example, Lijphart’s theory claims that PR elections lead towards greater long-term democratic stability in deeply-divided plural societies, yet this cannot be tested effectively if studies are limited to the comparison of older democracies which have persisted uninterrupted in recent decades, rather than examining the characteristics of a wide range of political systems that have, and have not, undergone major regime change.

Given these considerations, and the nature of the primary CSES dataset, the comparative framework in this book adopts instead the ‘most different’ comparative framework. The study focuses upon how far certain patterns of voting behavior and political representation are systematically related to either levels of societal modernization (in industrial v. postindustrial societies) or to types of electoral systems (majoritarian, combined or proportional). This approach also carries certain well-known difficulties, particularly the familiar problem of too many variables and too few cases. Multiple contrasts can be drawn among the countries under comparison, ranging from Australia, the United States and Sweden to the Ukraine, Peru and Taiwan. As a result it remains difficult to establish whether the outcomes can indeed be attributed to the selected factors under comparison (societal modernization or the type of electoral rules), or if these relationships are spurious due to omitted variables not included in our simple models, such as the role of economic inequality, the history of military coups in Latin America, the legacy of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, or religious traditions in Asia. The ‘controls’ introduced into the multivariate models can provide only rough proxies for a few of the multiple cross-national differences among political systems around the world. The limited number of elections and countries inevitably restricts the reliability of the generalizations that can be drawn from the study. Survey-based research covering many different nations and cultures also encounters the familiar problems of establishing equivalence, and whether responses to questions asked in each country, for example items monitoring satisfaction with democracy in
Belarus, Belgium and Peru, can be treated as functionally-equivalent. Yet the comparison of a
diverse range of countries facilitates theory-building and testing in a way that is not possible with
regionally-based studies.

This approach is particularly well suited to the societies included in the CSES survey
ranging from low or middle-income developing nations, such as Thailand, Mexico, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Romania (all with a per capita PPP GDP of less than $5000 in 1998), to some of the
most affluent societies in the world, including Switzerland, the United States and Japan (with an
equivalent per capita GDP of more than $30,000). The countries under comparison have varied
political systems, rates of human development, patterns of democratization, and cultural
traditions, all of which can be incorporated into explanations of patterns of electoral behavior.
Ethnically-homogeneous societies such as Poland, Norway and Britain are included, as well as
plural societies with multiple cleavages exemplified by Israel and Belgium. The length of time that
each country has experienced democratic institutions also varies considerably, which can be
expected to have an important impact upon electoral behavior and patterns of party competition.
While Australia and Sweden are long-established democracies, countries such as Spain and
Portugal consolidated within recent decades, while still others like the Ukraine and Belarus
remain in the ‘transitional’ stage, characterized by unstable and fragmented opposition parties,
ineffective legislatures, and limited checks on the executive.

The historical experiences of democracy during the late twentieth century can be
compared using the mean score for each nation on the 7-point Gastil Index of democratization,
based on an annual assessments of political rights and civil liberties monitored by Freedom
House from 1972 to 2000. The Gastil scale is reversed so that a high score represents a more
consolidated democracy. Many indices attempt to gauge levels of democratization, each with
different strengths and weaknesses, but the measure by Freedom House provides annual
benchmarks over three decades. The results of the comparison in Figure 1.3 show that just over
half the countries in the CSES dataset had a mean score on this index of 4.0 or above, and all
these seventeen nations can be classified as ‘established’, ‘consolidated’, or ‘older’ democracies.
This includes Spain and Portugal, which were part of the ‘third-wave’ of democratization starting
in 1973. The other fifteen nations falling clearly well below the overall mean of 4.1 are
classified as ‘newer electoral democracies’ still experiencing the transition, at different levels of
consolidation. Some like South Korean, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Mexico have gone a
long way down the road towards establishing stable democratic institutions. Others, including
Ukraine and Belarus, ranked at the bottom of the scale, currently lack many political rights and
civil liberties commonly taken for granted in older democracies, although they hold competitive
elections contested by more than one party. Belarus, in particular, has deeply-flawed elections,
with opposition leaders silenced, intimidated and even imprisoned by the government of
President Lukashenko. The nations in the CSES dataset can be categorized by this classification
in almost equal numbers as either older or newer democracies. The sample in the CSES dataset
reflects this rough balance, with 53% of respondents drawn from older democracies (28,800)
while the remaining 47% are living in newer democracies (25,600).

The countries using proportional electoral systems have slightly higher levels of per
capita GDP and also smaller populations (see Table 1.2) but with similar levels of education,
urbanization, or average life expectancy. PR countries are rated as slightly more democratic
today than countries using majoritarian systems, and with a stronger record of democratic
consolidation during the last thirty years (see Table 1.3).

Some of the main contrasts between nations, and the relationship between economic and
political development, are illustrated in Figure 1.4. The level of societal modernization is
measured by the United National Development Program (UNDP) 1998 Human Development
Index, combining indicators of longevity, educational attainment, and standard of living. The level
of democratization is gauged by the mean score on the Gastil Index of political rights and civil
liberties from 1972 to 2000, as already discussed. Most of the established democracies are
clustered in the top right-hand corner, as the most developed societies as well. The newer democracies in Latin America and post-Communist Central Europe, as well as the countries of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, are clustered in the lower-left hand corner. The distribution of types of electoral systems used for the lower house of parliament (discussed in detail in the next chapter) shows that these are spread throughout all levels of human and democratic development.

[Figures 1.4 and 1.5 about here]

There are a number of important limitations of the dataset for our purposes. The first concerns the range of countries, in particular those using majoritarian electoral systems for legislative elections. All these cases are drawn from the Anglo-American democracies, which restricts the direct comparison of how majoritarian systems work in parliamentary elections in developing societies such as India, Jamaica, or Malawi. Nevertheless comparisons can be drawn with majoritarian electoral systems used for presidential elections in developing nations, including Chile, Lithuania, and Peru, which greatly expands the range of societies within this category. In this approach, we assume that there is sufficient similarity between voting in parliamentary and presidential elections, so that the electoral systems can be compared across both types of contest. Now it is always possible that certain features of the type of office mean that there are important contrasts between these types of elections, for example if presidential elections generate more personal appeals based on the character and experience of the candidates whereas parliamentary elections encourage more programmatic party campaigns. A simple comparison of the typical election campaigns fought in Western European parliamentary elections and the United State presidential races lends some superficial plausibility to such an argument. Yet it remains unclear whether this assumption is supported by the systematic empirical evidence; in the United States, for example, the national party conventions used for nominating the presidential candidate and for endorsing the party platform may make the presidential races more programmatic, partisan and nationally issue-oriented than the mid-term Congressional elections, which are often fought on the personal record and experience of particular candidates in each district, with little capacity of the presidential candidate or party to exert any national ‘coat-tails’. In countries such as Brazil where party politics tends to be personalistic and clientalistic rather than programmatic, with weak national party organizations and minimal party discipline in the legislature, campaigning based on personal appeals may be equally evident in both Presidential and Congressional elections. From systematic cross-national election research it remains unclear whether any apparent differences in presidential and parliamentary elections are due to the nature of the office per se, or the type of electoral system used in these contests. Further research, with an expanded range of countries under Module II of the CSES survey, will eventually allow us to test these sort of propositions more fully, as well as any systematic contrasts between presidential and parliamentary elections. Where there are good reasons to suspect from the literature that the level of office will probably make a significant difference – for example in the lower levels of electoral turnout common in second-order legislative elections – we can test for this by classifying countries into presidential and parliamentary executives then adding this factor to the analytical models to see whether this does indeed matter. But we can only follow this strategy by comparing both presidential and parliamentary elections within our comparative framework.

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The comparative framework for the CSES dataset remains limited in another important respect. The countries that collaborated in the project reflect those that regularly fund national election surveys, with a network of scholars and experienced market research companies, and their geographical distribution is uneven. Figure 1.5 maps the 32 countries included in Module 1 of the CSES dataset and this highlights the lack of coverage of much of the developing world, especially in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Much existing research on electoral systems and electoral administration is based upon analysis of established democracies with a long tradition of national elections, including the Anglo-American countries, Western Europe, and Scandinavia. Yet it is unclear how far generalizations can be drawn more widely from these particular contexts, and during the last decade much has been learnt much about the impact of electoral systems in newer democracies. The focus on comparative electoral behavior has been spurred by broader
intellectual developments, particularly the breakdown of the old-fashioned tripartite ‘Cold War’ framework that used to divide the globe into advanced industrialized nations, Communist states, and developing societies. A revival of interest in the study of political institutions and the role of the state has also swept through the discipline in recent years. This process has also been encouraged by the globalization of political science and the wider availability of social and political survey data in many developing countries. To compensate for the limited geographic coverage of the CSES, and to provide a more systematic worldwide comparison of parliamentary and presidential elections, as in previous work, this study also utilizes multiple datasets, drawing upon sources provided by the World Bank, the United Nations, International IDEA, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Where relevant, the book also draws upon other suitable public opinion surveys for time-series and cross-national data.

The Plan of the Book

Debates about electoral reform have often produced conflict about means (what would be the effects on party fortunes of alternative systems?) but even more fundamentally about ends (what is the primary objective of the electoral system?). To examine these issues, we need to analyze what consequences flow from the adoption of alternative electoral rules.

Chapter 2 goes on to classify and describe the main institutional variations in electoral systems that can be expected to influence voting behavior and political representation. The chapter defines the key terms and classifies the major differences among electoral systems, with illustrations drawn from the nations included in the CSES dataset. The chapter develops a typology classifying the major families of electoral systems worldwide, and presents tables summarizing the detailed features of the electoral systems used for the elections to the lower house of parliament and for presidential elections in the CSES nations under comparison.

Chapter 3 considers the normative arguments underlying debates about electoral reform, comparing visions of ‘adversarial’ versus ‘consensus’ democracy. Institutional reform is often regarded as the fix for many endemic problems associated with the process of democratic consolidation and good governance, whether the lack of accountability of public officials, failures of an effective opposition in parliament, the splintering of fragmented party systems, eroding electoral participation, conflict arising from deep-seated ethnic cleavages, the paucity of women in elected office, or general problems of public confidence in government and the policy process. Argument about these issues produced growing awareness that taken-for-granted electoral rules are not neutral: instead the way that votes translate into seats means that some groups, parties, and representatives are systematically ruled into the policymaking process, while some are systematically ruled out. We need to understand and clarify the normative claims and evaluative criteria concerning the consequences that flow from electoral rules for political representation and voting behavior before we can consider the empirical evidence.

The consequences for voting behavior

Chapter 4 considers how electoral rules influence party systems. The starting point for the analysis is Duverger’s famous claim that, in a law-like relationship, plurality elections in single-member districts favor a two-party system while simple-majority and proportional systems lead towards multipartyism. The accuracy of these claims has attracted considerable debate in the literature. The underlying reasons for this relationship are believed to be partly mechanical, depending upon the hurdles that plurality systems create for minor parties, especially those such as the Greens with widely dispersed support. Proportional formula with large district magnitudes and low vote thresholds, exemplified by elections to the Israeli Knesset, lower the barriers to entry into elected office faced by minor parties. There is considerable evidence that this correlation holds in many established democracies, although there are some important exceptions, and debate continues to question the causal direction of the relationship. It is usually assumed that electoral systems are ‘given’, as fairly stable institutions in most established democracies, and that party systems are therefore constrained by the existing electoral rules, such as the way that third parties are systematically penalized in the United States. Yet the interpretation of the direction of causality may be reversed; historically countries already highly factionalized by multiple social cleavages may well adopt electoral systems facilitating and perpetuating multi-
partyism. This chapter examines how far ‘Duverger’s Law’ applies in different countries worldwide, comparing the major families and types of electoral systems by measures of the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties and measures of proportionality.

Chapter 5 analyzes the major traditional social cleavages in the countries under comparison and explores the classic debate in electoral behavior about how far class and religious cleavages continue to predict patterns of voting behavior. Modernization theories suggest that in many postindustrial societies, class and religious identities -- the traditional foundations of the mass basis of party politics in the postwar era -- are no longer capable of generating stable affective party loyalties\textsuperscript{50}. If traditional voter-party bonds are fraying in these societies, this could have important political consequences, by boosting electoral volatility, the proportion of late-deciders, more split ticket voting, and potential support for minor parties and protest parties\textsuperscript{71}. If theories are correct in linking processes of societal modernization to social and partisan dealignment, then social class and religion should play a less important role in structuring voting behavior in affluent postindustrial societies than in less-developed, industrialized nations. Given different cultural legacies, historical traditions, and social structures, we also expect to find considerable differences in the role of class and religion in structuring voting behavior in post-Communist and developing societies. By contrast, rational-choice institutionalism suggests that the strength of cleavage politics is closely related to the type of electoral system, particularly levels of electoral thresholds, so that the ties of class and religion will prove a stronger predictor of voting choices in proportional systems with lower thresholds.

Chapter 5 therefore (i) examines the influence of social class, religiosity, and other social cleavages on voting choice in the range of countries under comparison; (ii) compares how far this pattern is systematically related to levels of societal modernization; and (iii) analyzes how far these relationships vary according to the type of electoral system.

Building upon this foundation, Chapter 6 considers the impact of party loyalties upon voting choice, contrasting institutional and cultural modernization explanations for patterns of party identification in the electorate. Classic ‘Michigan’ theories of electoral behavior suggested that most citizens in Western democracies were anchored over successive elections, and sometimes for their lifetimes, by long-standing affective party loyalties. Theories of cultural modernization suggest that over time rising levels of education and cognitive skills have gradually reduced dependence upon these long-standing party attachments, replacing the politics of loyalties with the politics of choice. If modernization theories are essentially correct, then party and social identities can be expected to prove strong influences upon voting behavior in industrialized societies, while these attachments would have faded somewhat in affluent postindustrial nations. By contrast, rational incentive-based accounts suggest that the institutional environment determines the rewards for adopting bridging or bonding campaign appeals. In particular, rational-choice institutionalism suggests that electoral thresholds shape the behavior of parties and candidates directly, and therefore, all other things being equal, the strength of partisan identification in the electorate.

Chapter 7 proceeds to consider the reasons why levels of electoral turnout vary among the countries under comparison, and how far this is influenced by the institutional or cultural context. Previous studies have commonly found that the type of electoral formula shapes participation, with proportional representation systems generating higher voter participation than majoritarian or plurality elections\textsuperscript{72}. This pattern seems well supported by the evidence in established democracies, although the exact reasons for this relationship remain unclear\textsuperscript{73}. Strategic explanations focus on the differential rewards facing citizens under alternative electoral arrangements. Under majoritarian systems, such as First-Past-the-Post used for the House of Commons in Westminster and the United States Congress, supporters of minor and fringe parties with geographic support dispersed widely but thinly across the country, like the Greens, may feel that casting their votes will make no difference to who wins in their constituency, still less to the overall composition of government and the policy agenda. The ‘wasted votes’ argument is strongest in safe seats where the incumbent party is unlikely to be defeated. In contrast PR elections with low vote thresholds and large district magnitudes, such as the party list system used in the Netherlands, increase the opportunities for minor parties with dispersed support to
enter parliament even with a relatively modest share of the vote, and therefore increases the incentives for their supporters to participate. Cultural theories offer alternative reasons for differential patterns of turnout, emphasizing the role of rising levels of education and cognitive skills. Building on my previous book, Democratic Phoenix, this chapter seeks to understand the reasons for differential pattern of electoral turnout in more depth.

The consequences for political representation

Beyond the mass electorate, the selection of electoral rules is also believed to have important consequences for political representation. Chapter 8 considers the classic issue of the barriers to women in elected office and how far this process is influenced by cultural traditions and by electoral rules. These factors are not the only ones that influence opportunities for elected office, by any means, but a substantial literature suggests that these are among the most important at national-level. It is well known that more women usually win office under party-ballots than under candidate-ballots, despite some important exceptions to this rule. Moreover in recent years many positive action policies have been used to boost the number of women in office, including the use of reserved seats and statutory gender quotas applying by law to all parties in a country, as well as voluntary gender quotas implemented in rule books within particular parties. In some cases positive action policies have had a decisive effect on women’s representation, whereas elsewhere they have generated only meager gains. This chapter analyzes the reasons for this phenomenon, and how far formal rules interact with the political culture, especially in societies where traditional attitudes towards sex roles prevail so that women are still perceived as fulfilling their primary roles only as wives and mothers.

Chapter 9 then outlines and presents evidence for how electoral systems influence the election of ethnic minority representatives and parties. One of the most influential accounts in the literature has been provided by the theory of ‘consociational’ or ‘consensus’ democracy developed by Arend Lijphart which suggests that nations can maintain stable governments despite being deeply divided into distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural communities. Majoritarian electoral systems, like First-Past-the-Post, systematically exaggerate the parliamentary lead for the party in first place, with the aim of securing a decisive outcome and government accountability, thereby excluding smaller parties from the division of spoils. By contrast, proportional electoral systems lower the hurdles for smaller parties, maximizing their inclusion into the legislature and ultimately into coalition governments. Consociational theories suggest that proportional electoral systems are therefore most likely to facilitate accommodation between diverse ethnic parties and groups, making them more suitable for new democracies struggling to achieve legitimacy and stability in plural societies. These are important claims that, if true, have significant consequences for agencies seeking to promote democratic development and peacekeeping. Yet critics suggest that by appealing only to a small ethnic base, PR systems can actually reinforce ethnic cleavages, so that majoritarian systems are preferable because they provide incentives for politicians to appeal across ethnic lines. The chapter breaks down the predominant ethnic majority and minority populations in the countries under comparison and tests the central propositions about the effects of electoral systems on differences in minority-majority support for the political system.

Chapter 10 analyzes the impact of constituency service. Rational-choice institutionalism suggests that elected representatives are more likely to be responsive and accountable to electors, offering particularistic benefits to cultivate a personal vote, where they are directly elected using candidate-ballots. One classic argument for First-Past-the-Post is that single member territorial districts allow citizens to hold individual MPs, not just parties, to account for their actions (or inactions). It is argued that this provides an incentive for constituency service, maintains MPs independence from the party leadership, and ensures that representatives serve the needs and concerns of all their local constituents, not just party stalwarts. Candidates can also be expected to emphasize personalistic appeals under preference-ballots. These are used in multimember constituencies where candidates compete for votes with others within their own party, exemplified by the Single Transferable Vote in Ireland, the Single Non-Transferable Vote used for two-thirds of the districts in Taiwan, and the use of open list PR where voters can prioritize candidates within each party, such as in Belgium, Peru and Denmark. By contrast,
party labels and programmatic benefits are likely to be given greater emphasis in campaigns where there are party-ballots, such as in Israel or Portugal, since all candidates on the party ticket sink or swim together. This chapter examines whether there is good evidence supporting the claim that citizens living under candidate-ballot and preference-ballot systems generally know more about parliamentary candidates and have more contact with elected representatives - and can therefore hold them to account more effectively - than those living under party-ballot systems.

Finally Chapter 11 recapitulates the theoretical arguments and summarizes the major findings documented throughout the book. The conclusion considers the implications for understanding the impact of electoral rules on voting choices and political representation, the lessons for the process of electoral engineering, and the consequences for the democratization process worldwide.
Table 1.1: The elections under comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majoritarian electoral systems (14 elections)</th>
<th>Combined electoral systems (10 elections)</th>
<th>Proportional electoral systems (15 elections)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative</strong></td>
<td><strong>Legislative</strong></td>
<td><strong>Legislative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential</strong></td>
<td>Mexico (1997) (c)</td>
<td>Israel (1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The year of the election included in the CSES dataset Module I is listed in parenthesis. Under combined electoral systems the election study collected either the candidate vote (c), the party list vote (l), or both (l,c).

(i) The elections in Israel are for the Prime Minister not President. For the classification of electoral systems see Chapter 2.
Table 1.2: Social indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of electoral system for lower house</th>
<th>N. Nations</th>
<th>HDI</th>
<th>GDP ($)</th>
<th>Education (%)</th>
<th>Urban Pop. (%)</th>
<th>Life expectancy (years)</th>
<th>% GNP from services</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.898</td>
<td>18,891</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>78m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.824</td>
<td>11,791</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>59m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.872</td>
<td>19,059</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>14m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.861</td>
<td>16,687</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>39m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Comparisons among the 32 nations included in the CSES dataset.

*Electoral system:* The countries are classified by the electoral system used for the lower house of parliament. For the classification of electoral systems see Chapter 2. For the list of nations see Table 1.1.

*HDI:* Countries are classified based on the 1998 rankings of the Human Development Index.


*Education:* Gross educational enrollment ratio in 1998

*% Urban population, 2000*

*Average life expectancy (years), 1997.*

*% Gross National Product from the service sector*

*Total population (in millions), 1997.*

Table 1.3: Political indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of electoral system</th>
<th>N. Nations</th>
<th>Level of democratization 1999-2000</th>
<th>Mean level of democratization 1972-2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Levels of democratization: The 32 nations included in the CSES dataset are classified based on the annual ratings provided by Freedom House from 1972 to 2000. Countries are classified according to the most recent (1999-2000) ratings, and also the combined mean score for political rights and civil liberties in Freedom House’s annual surveys from 1972-2000. The 7-point Gastil Index is reversed for ease of interpretation so that it ranges from low levels of civil liberties and political rights (coded 1) to high levels of civil liberties and political rights (coded 7). For details see Freedom of the World. [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

Nations: The countries are classified by the electoral system used for the lower house of parliament. For the classification of electoral systems see Chapter 2. For the list of nations see Table 1.1.
Figure 1.1: The rational-choice institutionalism model

A1. Formal electoral rules generate incentives

A2. Rational motivations:
   Political actors respond to incentives

H3.1. According to the electoral threshold, parties adopt bridging or bonding strategies
H3.2. According to the ballot structure, parties adopt socially diverse or homogeneous candidates
H3.3. According to the ballot structure, politicians emphasize programmatic or particularistic benefits

Indirect effects of rules

4. Citizens respond rationally

5. Reforming the formal rules has the capacity to alter political behavior at mass and elite levels

Direct effects of rules
Figure 1.2: The cultural modernization model

1. Societal modernization: Distribution of human capital (education & cognitive skills)

2. Political culture: The predominant norms, values and beliefs in any society will vary with levels of modernization

3. Socialization process Leads to acquisition of predominant norms and values

4. Limits of electoral engineering to generate short-term changes in political behavior
Figure 1.3: Societies by length of democratization

Note: The mean scores on the 7-point Gastil Index of political rights and civil liberties, 1972-2000, based on annual assessments by Freedom House, with the scores reversed so that 1 = least democratic and 7 = most democratic. Source: Calculated from Freedom House ‘Freedom of the World’. [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

Figure 1.4: Societies by level of development
Notes:


*Mean level of democratization:* Societies are classified based on the annual ratings provided by Freedom House from 1972 to 2000. The Gastil Index is classified according to the combined 7-point mean score for political rights and civil liberties (reversed) from Freedom House’s 1972-2000 annual surveys Freedom of the World. www.freedomhouse.org

For the classification of electoral systems see Chapter 2.
Figure 1.5: The countries included in Module I of the CSES dataset


3 For an annual assessment of the state of democracy and changes worldwide see Freedom House. Freedom in the World. See www.freedomhouse.org.


8 UK reforms include the introduction of the Additional Member system for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and the London Assembly; the Supplementary Vote for the London Mayor; the Regional Party List system for European elections; and the Single Transferable Vote for the Northern Ireland Assembly. For details see Robin Blackburn, 1995. The Electoral System in Britain. New York: St. Martin's Press; Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts. 1995. 'Understanding the dynamics of electoral reform.' International Political Science Review 16(1): 9-30; Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts. 2001. 'From majoritarian to pluralist


14 For more details see the Administration and Cost of Elections Project (ACE). www.aceproject.org

15 The original distinction between the ‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ effects of electoral systems was made by Maurice Duverger. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.


17 We put aside, for the moment, any consideration concerning ‘informal’ electoral rules, which can be understood as those widely shared tacit social norms and conventions governing electoral behavior within any particular culture, enforced by social sanction. These are more properly understood, as discussed later within cultural modernization theories, as ‘social norms’ rather than informal institutions. This definition also excludes more ambiguous cases, such as party rulebooks that are enforced by internal committees within particular party organizations rather than by court of law, although there is a gray dividing line as these cases may be relevant for legal redress. For a discussion of the meaning of ‘rules’ see J. M. Carey. ‘Parchment, equilibria, and institutions.’ Comparative Political Studies 33 (6-7): 735-761.


57 It should be noted that the CSES dataset includes election surveys in Hong Kong, but these were dropped to facilitate consistent comparison across independent nation-states. The data set used in this study is based on the 31 July 2002 release of Module 1. The dataset also merged two separate election studies for Belgium-Walloon and Belgium-Flemish and these were merged for analysis. Full details are available at [www.umich.edu/~nes/cses](http://www.umich.edu/~nes/cses).


Although Thomas Carothers suggests that even the use of the term ‘transitional democracies’ is misleading as it can suggest a teleological view of democratic progress for many countries which have elections but which have experienced little substantial political change beyond these contests during the last decade. See Thomas Carothers. 2002. ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm.’ *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 5-21.


Alternative sources of time-series and cross-national survey data that are available include the American National Election Study, the World Values Survey (WVS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and the 15-nation Eurobarometer.


40


Chapter 2

Classifying Electoral Systems

Before we can examine the impact of rules on voting behavior and political representation, we first need to outline a typology of the main families of electoral systems and classify their sub-types. The most important institutions influencing electoral rules can be divided into three nested components, ranging from the most diffuse to the most specific levels.

- **The constitutional structure** represents the broadest institutional context, denoted most importantly by whether the executive is presidential or parliamentary, whether the national legislature is bicameral or unicameral, and whether power is centralized in unitary government or more widely dispersed through federal arrangements.

- The ‘electoral system’ concerns multiple aspects of electoral law and the most basic features involve the ballot structure, determining how voters can express their choices, the electoral threshold, or the minimum votes needed by a party to secure representation, the electoral formula, determining how votes are counted to allocate seats, and the district magnitude, referring to the number of seats per district. Electoral systems are categorized in this study into three primary families, majoritarian, combined, and proportional, each with many subsidiary types.

- Lastly electoral procedures concern more detailed rules, codes of conduct, and official guidelines, including practical and technical issues that can also prove important to the outcome, such as the distribution of polling places, rules governing the nomination procedure for candidates, the qualifications for citizenship, facilities for voter registration and for casting a ballot, the design of the ballot paper, procedures for scrutiny of the election results, the use of compulsory voting, the process of boundary revisions, and regulations governing campaign finance and election broadcasting.

The constitutional structure is obviously important by setting the institutional context for many aspects of political behavior, but systematic comparison of all these features it also well beyond the scope of this limited study. This chapter focuses instead upon classifying electoral systems used in all independent nation-states around the globe, to examine their distribution worldwide. Subsequent chapters consider specific electoral procedures and legal rules in more detail, such as the use of statutory gender quotas on women's representation or the impact of voting facilities on turnout. The way that electoral rules work is illustrated by examples from the countries under comparison in the CSES study. Electoral systems can be compared at every level of office - Presidential, parliamentary, supranational and sub-national – but to compare like-with-like this chapter focuses on national elections, including systems used for parliamentary elections for the lower house and for Presidential contests.

The Classification of Electoral Systems

Ever since the seminal work of Maurice Duverger (1954) and Douglas Rae (1967), a flourishing literature has classified the main types of electoral systems and sought to analyze their consequences. Any classification needs to strike a difficult balance between being detailed enough to reflect subtle and nuanced differences between systems, which can be almost infinitely varied, while also being sufficiently parsimonious and clear so as to distinguish the major types that are actually used around the globe. Worldwide, excluding dependent territories, we can compare the electoral system for the lower house of parliament in 191 independent nation states. Of these nations, seven authoritarian regimes currently lack a working, directly elected parliament, including Saudi Arabia, Brunei, and Libya. Electoral systems in the remaining countries are classified into three major families (see Figure 2.1), each including a number of sub-categories: majoritarian formula (including First-Past-the-Post, Second Ballot, the Block vote, Single Non-Transferable Vote, and Alternative Voting systems); combined systems (incorporating both majoritarian and proportional formula); and proportional formula (including Party Lists as well as the Single Transferable Vote systems).

[Figure 2.1 about here] The comparison in Figure 2.1 shows that in elections to the lower house, about half of all...
countries worldwide use majoritarian formula, while one-third use proportional formula, and the remainder employ combined systems. As discussed earlier, electoral systems vary according to a number of key dimensions; the most important concern the electoral formula, ballot structures, effective thresholds, district magnitude, malapportionment, assembly size, and the use of open/closed lists. Within the family of proportional systems, for example, in Israel the combination of a single national constituency and a low minimum vote threshold allows the election of far more parties than in Poland, which has a 7% threshold and small electoral districts. Moreover electoral laws and administrative procedures, broadly defined, regulate campaigns in numerous ways beyond the basic electoral formulae, from the administration of voting facilities to the provision of political broadcasts, the rules of campaign funding, the drawing of constituency boundaries, the citizenship qualifications for the franchise, and the legal requirements for candidate nomination.

**Majoritarian formula**

Worldwide in total 91 out of 191 countries use majoritarian formula in national election to the lower house of parliament. The aim of majoritarian electoral systems is to create a ‘natural’ or a ‘manufactured’ majority, that is, to produce an effective one-party government with a working parliamentary majority while simultaneously penalising minor parties, especially those with spatially dispersed support. In ‘winner take all’ elections, the leading party boosts its legislative base, while the trailing parties get meager rewards. The design aims to concentrate legislative power in the hands of a single-party government, not to generate parliamentary representation of all minority views. This category of electoral systems can be subdivided into those where the winner needs to achieve a simple plurality of votes, or those where they need to gain an absolute majority of votes (50+ percent).

**Plurality Elections**

The system of ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) or single-member plurality elections is used for election to the lower chamber in 54 countries worldwide, including the United Kingdom, Canada, India, the United States, and many Commonwealth states. This is the oldest electoral system, dating back at least to the 12th Century, and also the simplest. Plurality electoral systems can also use multimember constituencies, for example some dual-member seats persisted in Britain until 1948. As discussed later, the Bloc Vote continues to be employed in nine nations such as Bermuda and Laos, using multi-member districts with plurality thresholds. But today first-past-the-post elections for the lower house at Westminster are all based on single-member districts with candidate-ballots. The basic system of how FPTP works in parliamentary general elections is widely familiar: countries are divided into territorial single-member constituencies; voters within each constituency cast a single ballot (marked by a ‘X’) for one candidate (see Figure 2.2); the candidate with the largest share of the vote in each seat is elected; and in turn the party with the largest number of parliamentary seats forms the government. Under first-past-the-post candidates usually do not need to pass a minimum threshold of votes to be elected, nor do they require an absolute majority of votes to be elected, instead all they need is a simple plurality i.e. one more vote than their closest rivals. Hence in seats where the vote splits almost equally three ways, the winning candidate may have only 35% of the vote, while the other contestants fail with 34% and 32% respectively. Although two-thirds of all voters supported other candidates, the plurality of votes is decisive.

Under this system, the party share of parliamentary seats, not their share of the popular vote, counts for the formation of government. Government may also be elected without a plurality of votes, so long as they have a parliamentary majority. In 1951, for instance, the British Conservative party was returned to power with a sixteen-seat majority in parliament based on 48.0 percent of the popular vote, although Labour won slightly more (48.8 percent) of the vote. In February 1974 the reverse pattern occurred: the Conservatives gained a slightly higher share of the national vote but Labour won more seats and formed the government. Another example is the 2000 US presidential contest, where across the whole country, out of over 100 million votes cast, the result gave Gore a lead of 357,852 in the popular vote, or 0.4%, but Bush beat Gore by 271 to 267 votes in the Electoral College. Moreover under first-past-the-post, governments are commonly returned without a majority of votes. No governing party in the UK has won as much as half the popular vote since 1935. For instance in 1983 Mrs. Thatcher was returned with a landslide of seats, producing a substantial parliamentary majority of 144, yet with the support of less than a third of the total electorate (30.8 percent).
One of the best-known features of winner-takes-all elections is that they create high thresholds for minor parties with support that is spatially dispersed across many constituencies. In single-member seats, if the candidates standing for the minor parties frequently come 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} or 4\textsuperscript{th}, then even although these parties may obtain substantial support across the whole country, nevertheless they will fail to win a share of seats that is in any way reflects their share of the national vote. This characteristic is the basis of Maurice Duverger’s well-known assertion that “simple-majority single ballot system favors the two party system” whereas “both the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favor multi-partyism”. As discussed fully in the next chapter, the accuracy of these claims has attracted much debate in the literature. One important qualification to these generalizations is the recognition that first-past-the-post is based on territorial constituencies and the geographical distribution of votes is critical to the outcome for minor parties, and for minority social groups. Green parties, for example, which usually have shallow support spread evenly across multiple constituencies, do far less well under FPTP than nationalist parties with support concentrated in a few areas. Hence, for example, in the 1993 Canadian elections the Progressive Conservatives won 16.1 percent of the vote but suffered a chronic meltdown reducing their parliamentary representation to only two MPs. In contrast the Bloc Quebecois, concentrated in one region, won 18.1 percent of the vote, but returned a solid phalanx of 54 MPs. In the same election, the New Democratic Party won even fewer votes (6.6 percent), but they emerged with 9 MPs, far more than the Progressive Conservatives. In a similar way, in America ethnic groups with concentrated support, such as African-American or Latino voters in inner-city urban areas, can get more representatives into the US Congress than groups like Korean-Americans which are widely dispersed across multiple legislative districts.

Malapportionment (producing constituencies containing different sized electorates) and gerrymandering (the intentional drawing of electoral boundaries for partisan advantage) can both exacerbate partisan biases in constituency boundaries, but electoral geography is also a large part of the cause. Single-member constituencies usually contain roughly equal numbers of the electorate; for example the United States is divided into 435 Congressional districts each including roughly equal populations, with one House representative per district. Boundaries are reviewed at periodic intervals, based on the census, to equalize the electorate. Yet the number of electors per constituency can vary substantially within nations, where boundary commissions take account of ‘natural’ communities, where census information is incomplete or flawed, or where periodic boundary reviews fail to keep up with periods of rapid migration. There are also substantial differences cross-nationally: India, for example, has 545 representatives for a population of 898 million, so that each Member of Parliament serves about 1.6 million people. By contrast, Ireland has 166 members in the Dail for a population of 3.5 million, or one seat per 21,000 people. The geographic size of constituencies also varies a great deal within countries, from small, densely packed inner-city seats to sprawling and more remote rural areas.

The way that FPTP systems work in practice can be illustrated most clearly with illustrations from the elections compared in the CSES surveys, including the 1997 British general election, the 1997 Canadian election, and the 1996 United States presidential and Congressional elections. Although all Anglo-American democracies, important differences in how these systems operate include variations in the number of parties contesting elections, the size of the legislatures, the number of electors per district, the dominant types of social cleavages in the electorate, the geographic distribution of voters, the regulations governing campaign finance and party election broadcasts, and the maximum number of years between elections.

The system of first-past-the-post used for Westminster elections to the British House of Commons generally produces a manufactured ‘winner’s bonus’, exaggerating the proportion of seats won by the party in first place compared with their proportion of votes. For proponents of plurality elections, this bias is a virtue since it can guarantee a decisive outcome at Westminster, and a workable parliamentary majority, even in a close contest in the electorate. One simple and intuitive way to capture the size of the ‘winner’s bonus’ produced by any electoral system is to divide the proportion of votes into the proportion of seats. A ratio of 1:1 would suggest no bias at all. But in contrast the size in the bias in the ‘winner’s bonus’ at Westminster has fluctuated over time but also gradually risen since the 1950s until in the 1997 election, the winner’s bonus was the second highest ever recorded in the postwar era (only surpassed by the 2001 election). This phenomenon is the product of three factors: the geographical spread of party support in Britain, the effects of anti-Conservative tactical voting, and disparities in the
size of constituency electorates. The 1997 British general election witnessed one of the most dramatic results in British postwar history, where eighteen years of Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher and then John Major were replaced by the Labour landslide of seats under the prime ministerial leadership of Tony Blair. The UK is divided into 659 single-member parliamentary constituencies where voters cast a single ballot and MPs are elected on a simple plurality of votes. At Westminster, the party share of parliamentary seats, not their share of the popular vote, counts for the formation of the government. Under first-past-the-post British governments are commonly elected with less than a majority of votes; in 1997 Tony Blair was returned with almost two-thirds of the House of Commons, and a massive parliamentary majority of 179 out of 659 seats, based on 43.3% of the UK vote. As the party in first place Labour enjoyed a seats: votes ratio of 1.47 whereas in contrast, with 30.7% of the vote, the Conservatives gained only 25% of all seats, producing a seats: votes ratio of 0.81.

The US system is also based on first-past-the-post in single-member districts for multiple offices including Congressional races for the House and Senate, and the system of the Electoral College used for presidential contest. The ballot paper presents the voter with more complex choices than in Britain due to multi-level elections, as shown by Figure 2.3, as well as by the use of referendum and initiatives in many states, and the sheer frequency of primary, congressional and presidential elections. The winner’s bonus under majoritarian systems is also exemplified by the outcome of the 1996 American presidential elections pitting the incumbent, President Bill Clinton, against the Republican nominee, Senator Bob Dole; in this contest President Clinton was returned with 70.4% of the Electoral College vote, mainly by winning the largest states, but this substantial lead was based on only 50.1% of the popular vote across the whole country. In 1996 the Congressional results for the 435 seat House of Representatives was highly proportional, however, because FPTP leads to proportional results in two-party systems when the vote totals of the two parties are fairly close. Roughly in accordance with the ‘cube’ law, disproportionality increases as the vote totals diverge.

The 1997 Canadian federal election saw at least a partial consolidation of the multiparty system that had developed so dramatically with the emergence of two new parties, the Bloc Québécois and Reform, during the 1993 contest. The result of the 1997 Canadian election saw the return of the Liberals under the leadership of Jean Chrétien, although with a sharply reduced majority of only four seats, and with 38% of the popular vote. The Bloc Québécois lost its status as the official opposition, dropping from 54 to 44 seats after a sharp decline in support. By contrast, the Reform party moved into second place in the House of Commons, with 60 seats, although with its strongest base in the West. Both the Progressive Conservatives and the New Democratic Party improved their positions after their disastrous results in 1993. The level of proportionality in the Canadian system was similar to that found in the British general election, with the Liberal party and the Bloc Québécois enjoying the highest votes-to-seats bonus, and both countries had far lower in proportionality than the United States. The existence of a multiparty system within plurality elections could be expected to lead for stronger calls for electoral reform by moving towards a proportional or combined formula, but the regional basis of party competition allows minor parties to be elected to parliament despite the hurdles created by the Canadian electoral system.

STNV, the Cumulative Vote, the Limited Vote, and the Bloc Vote

Many other variants on majoritarian formula are available. From 1948 to 1993, Japanese voters used the Single Non-Transferable Vote for the lower house of the Diet, where each citizen casts a single vote in small multi-member district. Multiple candidates from the same party compete with each other for support within each district. Those candidates with the highest vote totals (a simple plurality) are elected. Under these rules, parties need to consider how many candidates to nominate strategically in each district, and how to make sure that their supporters spread their votes across all their candidates. The system has been classified as ‘semi-proportional’ (Reynolds and Reilly), or even ‘proportional’ (Sartori) but it seems preferable to regard this as a variation of the majoritarian family, since candidates need a simple plurality of votes in their district to be elected and there is no quota or requirement for proportionality across districts. The system continues to be employed for parliamentary elections in Jordan and Vanuatu, as well as for two-thirds of the legislators in the Taiwanese elections under comparison (see Combined Systems below). Other alternatives that fall within the majoritarian category, although not employed at national level for the lower house, include the Cumulative Vote where
citizens are given as many votes as representatives, and where votes can be cumulated on a single candidate (used in dual-member seats in 19th Century Britain where voters could ‘plump’ both votes for one candidate and in the State of Illinois until 1980). The Limited Vote system is similar, but citizens are given fewer votes than the number of members to be elected (used in elections to the Spanish Senate). The Bloc Vote system is similar to first-past-the-post but with multi-member districts. Each elector is given as many votes as there are seats to be filled and they are usually free to vote for individual candidates regardless of party. The candidates winning a simple plurality of votes in each constituency win office. This system has been used for national parliamentary elections in nine countries including in Laos, Thailand and Mauritius. Such contests allow citizens to prioritize particular candidates within parties, as well as maintaining the link between representatives and local communities. On the other hand where electors cast all their votes for a single party, rather than distinguishing among candidates for different parties, this can exaggerate the disproportionality of the results and give an overwhelming parliamentary majority to the leading party.

Second Ballot Elections

Other systems use alternative mechanisms to ensure that the winning candidate gets an overall majority of votes. Second Ballot systems (also known as ‘runoff’ elections) are used in two-dozen nations worldwide for election to the lower house. In these, any candidate obtaining an absolute majority of votes (50 percent or more) in the first round is declared elected. If no candidate reaches a majority in this stage of the process, a second round of elections is held between the two candidates with the highest share of the vote. The traditional way that this process is understood is that the first vote is regarded as largely expressive or sincere (voting ‘with the heart’), whereas the second is regarded as the more decisive ballot between the major contenders, where strategic considerations and alliances among left and right party blocs come into stronger play (voting ‘with the head’). In the countries under comparison, the second ballot system was employed for two-thirds of the seats in the Lithuanian combined system, as well as in seven of the presidential elections. Runoff elections are also most common in presidential elections but they are also used for elections to the lower house in France, in eleven ex-French colonies (including Chad, Haiti, Mali, and Gabon), in seven authoritarian ex-Soviet Eastern European states (such as Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan) and in some unreconstructed Communist states (Cuba and North Korea), as well as in Louisiana. This system can be seen as encouraging centrist party competition, as well as bolstering the legitimacy of the eventual winner, by ensuring that they receive the support of at least half the public. On the other hand the rules harshly penalize minor parties and the need for citizens to go to the polls on at least two occasions in rapid succession can induce voter fatigue, thereby depressing turnout. This phenomenon was exemplified by the May-June 2002 French elections where voters were called to the polls four times following non-concurrent Presidential and parliamentary elections.

Alternative Vote

The Alternative Vote, used in elections to the Australian House of Representatives and in Ireland for Presidential elections and by-elections, is also majoritarian. This system, or ‘preferential voting’ as it is commonly known in Australia, was introduced for Australian federal elections in 1919 and in now employed in all states except Tasmania, which uses STV16. Australia is divided into 148 single-member constituencies. Instead of a simple ‘X’ on the ballot paper, voters rank their preferences among candidate (1,2,3...) (see Figure 2.4). To win, candidates need an absolute majority of votes. Where no one candidate wins over 50 per cent after first preferences are counted, then the candidate with the least votes is eliminated, and their votes are redistributed amongst the other candidates. The process continues until an absolute majority is secured. In the 1996 Australian federal elections under comparison, for example, the victory of the conservative Liberal-National coalition ended the longest period of Labor party government in Australia’s history. The contest saw an extremely close call on the first preferences, with both the Australian Labour Party and the Liberal party getting an identical share of the vote (38.7 percent). In the final preferences, however, the ALP won 46.4 percent compared with 53.6 percent for non-ALP candidates. As a result the Liberal-National government won 93 seats, and a substantial majority, while Labor won only 4917. This process worked as intended by translating an extremely close result in the first preference vote into a decisive majority of parliamentary seats for the leading party elected to government. This process systematically discriminates against those parties and candidates at the bottom of the poll to promote single-party government for the winner. The Alternative
Vote functions in many ways similarly to the Second Ballot system, with the important distinction that there is no opportunity for citizens to revote, nor for parties to create new alliances, in the light of the outcome of the first preference ballots. The balloting and counting process is also more efficient, avoiding repeated trips to the polling station and possible falls in turnout due to voter fatigue.

[Figure 2.4 about here]

Proportional Representation Formula

Adversarial democracies and majoritarian electoral systems emphasize popular control by the party in government. By contrast, consensus democracies and proportional representation electoral systems focus on the inclusion of all voices, emphasizing the need for and bargaining and compromise within parliament, government, and the policymaking process. The basic principle of proportional representation (PR) is that parliamentary seats are allocated according to the proportion of votes cast for each party. The main variations concern the use of open or closed lists of candidates, the formula for translating votes into seats, the level of the electoral threshold, and the size of the district magnitude. The Party List system exemplifies proportional formula but the Single Transferable Vote system (STV) should also be included in this category, since this system allocates seats based on quotas.

Party Lists Systems

Proportional electoral systems based on party lists in multimember constituencies are widespread throughout Western Europe. Worldwide 62 out of 191 countries use Party List PR (see Figure 2.1). Party lists may be open as in Norway, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy, in which case voters can express preferences for particular candidates within the list. Or they may be closed, as in Israel, Portugal, Spain and Germany, in which case voters can only select which party to support, and each party decides the ranking of their candidates on the list. The rank order of candidates on the party list determines who is elected to parliament. In Israel all the country is one constituency divided into 120 seats, but often lists are regional, as in the Czech Republic where 200 total members are elected from eight regional lists. Proportional Party List electoral systems are used in 15 of the countries under comparison in the CSES dataset. A typical ballot paper from South Africa is illustrated in Figure 2.5.

[Figure 2.5 about here]

The electoral formula for the lower house legislative elections varies among proportional systems (see Table 2.1). Votes can be allocated to seats based on the highest averages method. This requires the number of votes for each party to be divided successively by a series of divisors, and seats are allocated to parties that secure the highest resulting quotient, up to the total number of seats available. The most widely used is the d'Hondt formula, using divisors (such as 1,2,3 etc), employed in Poland, Romania, Spain and Israel. The ‘pure’ Sainte-Laguë method, used in New Zealand, divides the votes with odd numbers (1,3,5,7 etc). The ‘modified’ Sainte-Laguë replace the first divisor by 1.4 but is otherwise identical to the pure version. An alternative is the largest remainder methods, which uses a minimum quota, which can be calculated, in a number of ways. In the simplest with the Hare quota, used in Denmark and Costa Rica, and for the list constituencies in Taiwan, Ukraine and Lithuania, the total number of valid votes in each constituency is divided by the total number of seats to be allocated. The Droop quota, used in South Africa, the Czech Republic, and Greece, raises the divisor by the number of seats plus one, producing a slightly less proportional result.

Other important differences in countries under comparison within the PR category include the formal threshold that parties must pass to qualify for seats. It should be noted that the formal threshold set by statute or specified in constitutional requirements is distinct from the effective vote threshold, which is the actual minimum share of the vote that leads to gaining at least one seat. The formal threshold ranges from the lowest level of 0.67% of the national vote, used in the Netherlands, up to 7 percent of the vote, used in Poland. Worldwide one of the highest vote thresholds is in Turkey, with a 10% hurdle whereas there is no formal threshold in some countries such as South Africa, where less that 0.25% of the national vote is necessary for election. The formal threshold can have an important impact upon proportionality and the opportunities for minor parties. District magnitude, or the mean number of seats per constituency, also varies substantially. In Israel, for example, all 120 members of the Knesset run in one nation-wide constituency. By contrast, in Spain the 350 members are elected in fifty list districts, each district electing seven members on average. Generally under PR systems, the larger the district
magnitude, the more proportional the outcome, and the lower the hurdles facing smaller parties.

**Single Transferable Vote**

The other alternative system in the proportional category is the ‘Single Transferable Vote’ (STV), currently employed in legislative elections in Ireland, Malta, and for the Australian Senate. The system can be classified as proportional because of the use of the quota for election. Under this system, each country is divided into multi-member constituencies that each have about four or five representatives. Parties put forward as many candidates as they think could win in each constituency. Voters rank their preferences among candidates in an ordinal fashion (1st, 2nd, 3rd,...). The total number of votes is counted, and then the number of seats divides this vote total in the constituency to produce a quota. To be elected, candidates must reach the minimum quota. When the first preferences are counted, if no candidates reach the quota, then the candidate with the least votes is eliminated, and their votes redistributed according to second preferences. This process continues until all seats are filled. Proponents argue that by allowing citizens to identify a rank order for their preferences within parties, or by ballot-splitting their votes across different parties, STV provides greater freedom of choice than other systems. Moreover by retaining proportionality, these rules also generate a fair outcome in terms of the votes-to-seats ratio.

**Combined Systems**

Moreover an increasing number of countries, including Italy, New Zealand, and Russia, use ‘combined’ systems, employing different electoral formulae in the same contest, although with a variety of alternative designs. In this regard we follow Massicotte and Blais in classifying ‘combined’ systems (otherwise known as ‘mixed’, ‘hybrid’ or ‘side-by-side’ systems) according to their mechanics, not by their outcome. If we followed the later strategy, such as defining or labeling electoral systems based on their level of proportionality, then this approach could create circular arguments. There is an important distinction within this category, which is overlooked in some discussions, between combined-dependent systems, where both parts are interrelated, and combined-independent systems, where two electoral formulae operate in parallel towards each other.

**Combined-Dependent Systems**

Combined-dependent systems, exemplified by the German and New Zealand parliamentary elections, include both single-member and party list constituencies, but the distribution of seats is proportional to the share of the vote cast in the party list. As a result the outcome of combined-dependent systems is closer to the ‘proportional’ than the ‘majoritarian’ end of the spectrum, although the logic of voter choice in these systems means that they still remain different from pure PR. The best-known application is in Germany, where electors can each cast two votes (see Figure 2.6). Half the members of the Bundestag (328) are elected in single-member constituencies based on a simple plurality of votes. The remaining MPs are elected from closed party lists in each region (Land). Parties, which receive, less than a specified minimum threshold of list votes (5 per cent) are not be entitled to any seats. The total number of seats, which a party receives in Germany, is based on the Niemeyer method, which ensures that seats are proportional to second votes cast for party lists. Smaller parties which received, say, 10 per cent of the list vote, but which did not win any single-member seats outright, are topped up until they have 10 per cent of all the seats in Parliament. It is possible for a party to be allocated ‘surplus’ seats when it wins more district seats in the single-member district vote than it is entitled to under the result of the list vote.

[Figure 2.6 about here]

New Zealand is also classified as a ‘combined-dependent system’, because the outcome is proportional to the party list share of the vote. The ‘Mixed Member Proportion’ (MMP) system (as it is known in New Zealand) gives each elector two votes, one for the district candidate in single-member seats and one for the party list. As in Germany, the list PR seats compensate for any disproportionality produced by the single-member districts. In total 65 of the 120 members of the House of Representatives are elected in single-member constituencies based on a simple plurality of votes in single-member districts. The remainder is elected from closed national party lists. Parties receiving less than 5% of list votes fall below the minimal threshold to quality for any seats. All other parties are allocated seats based on the Sainte-Lagué method, which ensures that the total allocation of seats is highly proportional to the share of votes cast for party lists. Smaller parties which received, say, 10 per cent of the list vote, but
which did not win any single-member seats outright, are topped up until they have 10 per cent of all the seats in the House of Representatives. The 1996 New Zealand election saw the entry of six parties into parliament and produced a National-New Zealand First coalition government.

**Combined-Independent Systems**

Other electoral systems under comparison can be classified as ‘combined-independent’ systems, following the Massicotte and Blais distinction, with two electoral systems used in parallel, exemplified by the Ukraine and Taiwan. In these systems the votes are counted separately in both types of seat so that the share of the vote for each party cast in the party lists is unrelated to the distribution of seats in the single-member districts. As a result combined-independent systems are closer to the ‘majoritarian’ than the ‘proportional’ end of the spectrum.

The March 1996 elections to the National Assembly in Taiwan exemplify this system. The Taiwanese National Assembly is composed of 334 seats, of which 234 are filled by the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). Voters cast a single vote in one of 58 multimember districts, each with 5-10 seats. The votes of all candidates belonging to the same party in all districts are aggregated into party votes and the list PR seats are allocated among those parties meeting the 5% threshold. There are 80 PR list seats on a nationwide constituency and 20 PR list seats reserved for the overseas Chinese community. Taiwan has a three party system, with the Nationalist Party (KMT) dominant since 1945, the Democratic Progressive Party, founded in 1986, providing the main opposition and the New Party, founded in 1993, with the smallest support. The major cleavage in Taiwanese party politics is the issue of national identity, dividing those who identify themselves as mainlanders who favor reunification with China and many native Taiwanese who favor independence. The New Party is commonly considered most pro-unification and the Democratic Progressive Party the most pro-independence.

The Ukrainian elections also illustrate how combined-independent systems work. The 29 March 1998 parliamentary contests were the second elections held since Ukrainian independence. Ukrainian voters could each cast two ballots. Half the deputies were elected by First-Past-The-Post in single-member districts and others were elected from nation-wide party lists, with a 4% threshold. Unlike the system in New Zealand and Germany, the two systems operated separately so that many smaller parties were elected from the single-member districts. The 1998 elections were contested by 30 parties and party blocks, although only ten of these groups could be said to have a clear programmatic profile and organizational base. The Ukrainian result produced both an extremely fragmented and unstable party system: 8 parties were elected via party lists and 17 won seats via the single-member districts, along with 116 Independents. The election produced the highest Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (5.98) in the countries under comparison, and it also generated also fairly disproportional votes: seats ratio that benefited the larger parties. Ethnicity was reflected in the appeal of particular parties, including the Russophile Social Liberal Union, the Party of Regional Revival, and the Soyuz (Union) party, and also in the way that ethnic-Russians were twice as likely to support the Communist party as ethnic-Ukrainians.

For the comparison of the consequences of electoral systems, such as the link between different types of formula and patterns of party competition or electoral turnout, this study compares the broadest range of countries worldwide that is available from sources of international data. For the survey analysis, however, we compare a more limited range of legislative and presidential elections. For parliamentary elections for the lower house, in the countries under comparison in Module I of the CSES dataset, fifteen elections were held from 1996 to 2002 using proportional electoral systems. Ten nations held parliamentary elections using combined electoral systems, including independent and dependent sub-types. Lastly four countries held parliamentary elections for the lower house under majoritarian rules. There are also many important differences in electoral systems within each category, summarized in Table 2.1, for example in the ballot structure of first-past-the-post in the UK and the Alternative Vote in Australia, in the proportion of members elected in single-member and proportional districts in combined systems, as well as in the level of electoral thresholds facing minor parties.

[Table 2.1 about here]

The distribution of electoral systems around the world, illustrated in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.7, confirms the regional patterns and the residual legacy stamped upon constitutions by their colonial histories. Three-quarters of the former-British colonies continue to use a majoritarian electoral system...
today, as do two-thirds of the ex-French colonies. By contrast, three-quarters of the former-Portuguese colonies, two-thirds of the ex-Spanish colonies, and all the former Dutch colonies use proportional electoral systems today. The post-communist states freed from rule by the Soviet Union divided almost evenly among the three major electoral families, although slightly more countries (37%) have adopted proportional systems. While Eastern Europe leans towards majoritarian arrangements, Central Europe adopted more proportional systems.

[Figure Table 2.2 and 2.7 about here]

**Presidential Electoral Systems**

The countries under comparison in Module I of the CSES dataset also allow comparison of ten presidential elections, illustrated in Table 2.2, all held under majoritarian or plurality rules. The simple plurality First-Past-the-Post was used in Mexico and Taiwan. The 2nd ballot 'majority-runoff' system (also known as the 'double ballot') is used worldwide in fifteen of the 25 countries with direct Presidential elections, including in Austria, Columbia, Finland, Russia, France, Belarus, and Russia, and in seven of the nations under comparison in the CSES dataset. In these elections, if no candidate gets at least 50% of the vote in the first round, then the top two candidates face each other in a second round to insure a majority of votes for the leading candidate. This system is exemplified by the 1996 Russian Presidential election, where 78 candidates registered to run for election, of which 17 qualified for nomination. In the first round Boris Yeltsin won 35.3 percent of the vote, with Gennadii Zyuganov, the Communist candidate; close behind with 32 percent, and Alexander Lebed third with 14.5 percent of the vote. After the other candidates dropped out, and Lebed swung his supporters behind Yeltsin, the final result of the second election was a decisive 53.8 percent of the vote for Yeltsin against 40.3 percent for Zyuganov. Runoff elections aim to consolidate support behind the major contenders and to encourage broad cross-party coalition building in the final stages of the campaign.

The United States uses the unique device of the Electoral College. The president is not decided directly by popular vote, instead popular votes are collected within each state and, since 1964, the District of Columbia. Each state casts all of its electoral votes for the candidate receiving a plurality of votes within each state (the unit rule). Each state is allowed as many electoral votes as it has senators and representatives in Congress. This means that even sparsely populated states like Alaska have at least three electoral votes. Nevertheless the most populous states each cast by far the greatest number of electoral votes, and therefore presidential contenders devote most attention and strategic resources (spending, political ads, and visits) during the campaign to these states, such as New York, California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, Illinois, Michigan and Texas, especially when polls suggest that the race is close in these areas. The importance of these rules is exemplified by the outcome of the 2000 election, where Republican George W. Bush won a 271-266 majority in the electoral college despite the fact that his opponent, Al Gore, won about half a million more popular votes. The results called attention to the need to alter the electoral college, which has not experienced major reform since 1804, despite the fact that many critics have regarded the system as archaic, outmoded, and essentially undemocratic. Other important variations among the presidential electoral systems under comparison include the length of office, ranging from four to six years, and whether presidential elections are held in conjunction with legislative contests, which could be expected to strengthen the party coat-tails of presidential candidates and therefore create stronger legislative-executive links, or whether they are held separately, which reinforces the separation of powers.

[Table 2.3 about here]
ticket voting between levels, but at the same time frequent demands from successive elections at multiple levels of office carries the danger of voter fatigue.

[Table 2.4 about here]

Conclusion: The Consequences of Electoral Systems

Often the choice of electoral system seems mechanistic, abstract, and highly technical, with constitutional engineering designed to bring about certain objectives. But the issue of how the electoral system should function reflects essentially contested normative concepts of representative government. For advocates of adversarial democracy, the most important considerations for electoral systems are that the votes cast in elections (not the subsequent process of coalition building) should determine the party or parties in government. The government should be empowered to implement their programme during their full term of office, without depending upon the support of minority parties. The government should remain accountable for their actions to parliament, and ultimately to the public. And at periodic intervals the electorate should be allowed to judge the government’s record, evaluate prospective policy platforms offered by the opposition parties, and cast their votes accordingly. Minor parties in third or fourth place are discriminated against by majoritarian elections for the sake of governability. From this perspective, proportional elections are ineffective since they can produce indecisive outcomes, unstable regimes, disproportionate power for minor parties in ‘kingmaker’ roles, and a lack of clear-cut accountability and transparency in decision-making.

By contrast, proponents of consensual democracy argue that majoritarian systems place too much faith in the winning party, especially in plural societies divided by ethnic conflict, with too few constraints on government during their term of office. For the vision of consensual democracy, the electoral system should promote a process of conciliation, consultation, and coalition-building within parliaments. Parties above a minimum threshold should be included in the legislature in rough proportion to their level of electoral support. The party or parties in government should craft policies based on a consensus among their coalition partners. Moreover the composition of parliament should reflect the main divisions in society and the electorate, so that all citizens have spokespersons articulating their interests, perspectives and concerns in national debates. In this view, majoritarian systems over-reward the winner, producing ‘an elected dictatorship’ where a government based on a plurality can steamroller its policies, and implement its programmes, without the need for consultation and compromise with other parties in parliament or other groups in society. The unfairness and disproportionate results of plurality electoral systems, outside of two-party contests, means that some voices in the electorate are systematically excluded from public debate.

We can conclude, agnostically, that there is no single ‘best’ electoral system: the central arguments between adversarial and consensual democratic theorists represent irresolvable value conflicts. For societies, which are divided by deep-rooted ethnic, religious or ethnic conflict, like Mali, Bosnia, or Israel, proportional electoral systems may prove more inclusive, as Lijphart argues. But, as others warn, PR elections may also reinforce, rather than ameliorate, such cleavages. For states, which are highly centralized, like Britain or New Zealand, majoritarian systems can insulate the government from the need for broader consultation and for democratic checks and balances. In constitutional design it appears that, despite the widespread appeal of the rhetoric of ‘electoral engineering’ for optimal decision-making, in practice there are no easy choices. A wide range of alternative rules can potentially influence the impact of these electoral systems both on patterns of voting behavior and political representation. The ‘mechanical’ effects of electoral rules are easier to predict that the ‘psychological’ ones, and in both cases many effects are highly contingent, since they are embedded within many other institutional, political, cultural and social contexts. The next chapters go on to discuss the normative debates about electoral systems in more detail and then considers some of the most important consequences of electoral rules for voting behavior, including for party competition, the strength of social cleavages and partisan identification, and patterns of electoral turnout.
Figure 2.1 Electoral systems used worldwide for the lower house of parliament, 1997

Figure 2.2. An example of the First-Past-the-Post ballot in the UK general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE FOR ONE CANDIDATE ONLY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COTTIER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Elizabeth Cottier,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Twines Close, Sparkford,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeovil, Somerset. BA22 7JW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party Candidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAHAM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leona Alice-Mae Graham,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Coach House, Hornebliton House,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hornebliton, Nr. Shepton Mallet,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset. BA4 6SB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAYER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodor Mayer,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forty Acres Farm, South Barrow,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeovil, Somerset. BA22 7LE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WINCHILSEA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirley Winchilsea,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Cadbury House, Nr. Yeovil,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset. BA22 7HA</td>
</tr>
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<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
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</table>
Figure 2.3: An example of First-Past-the-Post ballot with multiple offices for the United States General Election: Sonoma County
Figure 2.4: An example of the Alternative Vote ballot for the Australian House of Representatives
Figure 2.5: An example of the Party List ballot for the South African Parliament
Figure 2.6: An example of a Combined or Mixed-Member ballot used for the German Bundestag.
Figure 2.7: The world of electoral systems, 1997
Table 2.1: Electoral Systems for the Lower House of Parliament, selected elections under comparison, 1996-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Districts</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Party List</th>
<th>Voting Age Population (VAP)</th>
<th>Average VAP per member</th>
<th>Mean District Mag. List seats</th>
<th>ENPP</th>
<th>Max. Years between Elections</th>
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<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>AV</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>13,547,900</td>
<td>91,500</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>23,088,800</td>
<td>78,300</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>45,933,500</td>
<td>68,400</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
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<td>196,511,000</td>
<td>438,700</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined-Independent</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>FPTP+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>96,672,700</td>
<td>193,400</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
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<td>FPTP+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>LR-Hare</td>
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<td>114,900</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>FPTP+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>LR-Hare</td>
<td>109,212,000</td>
<td>242,700</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>SNTV+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>LR-Hare</td>
<td>14,340,600</td>
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<td>50</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>LR-Hare</td>
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<td>86,500</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>FPTP+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>LR-Hare</td>
<td>65,942,100</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>3.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2nd Ballot+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>7,742,900</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.45</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>FPTP+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>St Laguë</td>
<td>2,571,800</td>
<td>21,400</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3.78</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>FPTP+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>LR-Hare</td>
<td>55,406,800</td>
<td>110,800</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>FPTP+PR</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>42,663,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportional</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>PR Lists</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>53,300</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>PR Lists</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>LR-Droop</td>
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<td>39,300</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Open</td>
<td>St Laguë</td>
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<td>196,604</td>
<td>3,120</td>
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<td>D’Hondt</td>
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<td>120</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Closed</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>11,996,400</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>4.81</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>PR Lists</td>
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<td>St Laguë</td>
<td>3,360,100</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.36</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>PR Lists</td>
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<td>15,187,000</td>
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<td>PR Lists</td>
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<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>27,901,700</td>
<td>60,700</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>PR Lists</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>8,882,561</td>
<td>38,619</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>D’Hondt</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>PR Lists</td>
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<td>17,000</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>PR Lists</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>31,013,030</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>6,915,000</td>
<td>19,800</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.29</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>PR Lists</td>
<td>Panachage</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>5,736,300</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>5.08</td>
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</table>

Notes: PR Proportional Representation; FPTP First Past the Post; AV Alternative Vote; SMD Single-member Districts; List Party List; SMD Single-member Districts; List Party List. For the measures of proportionality and ENPP see Table A1. ENPP is the Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties calculated following the method of Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Prop. The Index of Proportionality is calculated following as the difference between a party’s share of the vote and its share of the total seats in Parliament, summed, divided by two, and subtracted from 100. Theoretically it can range from 0 to 100. This is a standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby index. For details see Rose, Munro and Mackie (1998). The formal vote threshold is the minimum share of the vote (in the district or nation) required by law to qualify for a seat, and this is distinct from the informal threshold or the actual minimum share of the vote required to win a seat. Note that the classification distinguishes between combined dependent systems, where the outcome depends upon the proportion of votes cast in the party lists, and independent combined systems used in Japan, Russia and Korea where the single-member districts and party lists operate in parallel. It should be noted that Belgium subsequently introduced a 5% formal vote threshold for the May 2003 general elections. Voting Age Population: IDEA Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997; www.idea.int

### Table 2.2. Type of electoral system in use by past colonial history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>All</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Majoritarian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>First-Past-The-Post</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>26.3</td>
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<td>Second Ballot</td>
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<td>39.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<td>Bloc Vote</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<td>Alternative Vote</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
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<td>Single Non-Transferable Vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined-independent</td>
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<td>14.3</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Combined-dependent</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party List PR</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Transferable Vote</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of states</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentage of each colonial group using different types of electoral systemsCountries were classified by electoral system using the typology and sources in Figure 2.1 and by their predominant colonial history from the CIA World Fact book, 2002. [www.cia.org](http://www.cia.org). The comparison covers 191 nation-states worldwide, excluding the seven states without direct elections during this period.
Table 2.3: Direct elections for president/prime minister, selected elections under comparison, 1996-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>In conjunction with legislative elections</th>
<th>Voting Age</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Vote/VAP</th>
<th>Max. Years between Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2nd Ballot</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>7 585 000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2nd Ballot</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>10 066 000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (i)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2nd Ballot</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>3 995 000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2nd Ballot</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>2 740 000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>62 685 000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2nd Ballot</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>15 430 000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2nd Ballot</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>16 737 000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2nd Ballot</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>109 037 000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>14 154 000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>Electoral College</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>196 511 000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (i) Direct elections for the Prime Minister in Israel, not the president.

Sources: See Table 2.1
Table 2.4: The parliamentary and presidential elections under comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Vote</th>
<th>District Vote</th>
<th>Party List Vote</th>
<th>Party List Candidate Preferential Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (i)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This does not count other electoral options on the ballot, such as for local, regional, state-level, upper house/Senate, European, or other elected office, or any referenda issues.

(i) Note Israel includes direct elections for the Prime Minister, not president.


3 It can be argued that a further distinction needs to be drawn between majority and plurality elections, given the higher effective electoral threshold used in the former. The contrast is evident for example between First-Past-the-Post used in Canadian parliamentary elections, which requires a plurality of votes (winning at least one more vote than any other candidate) to gain office and the Second Ballot system used in the Russian Presidential elections, which requires an absolute majority to win office. Nevertheless the classification used in this study is more parsimonious, the ballot structure used for plurality and majoritarian elections is similar (casting a vote for a single candidate), and it is the standard typology used in the literature.

4 In a few countries using plurality presidential elections, such as Costa Rica and Argentina, there is a minimum threshold requirement, otherwise a runoff is held.


18 For details of these election see: Richard Rose, Neil Munro and Tom Mackie. 1998. Elections in Central


20 See, for example, the arguments of Enid Lakeman. 1974. How Democracies Vote. London: Faber and Faber.


Chapter 3

Evaluating electoral systems

In recent decades, debate about electoral engineering has moved from margin to mainstream on the policy agenda in many nations. Political discussions about electoral reform have largely revolved around the practical options, the sometimes-bewildering combination of trade-off choices, and the consequences of particular reforms to the status quo within each state. Underlying these pragmatic arguments are contested normative visions about the basic principles of representative government. The most fundamental debate raises questions about the ultimate ends as well as means of elections. The general consensus in the literature emphasizes that no ‘perfect’ bespoke electoral system fits every society. Instead, arrangements have to be tailored to different contexts and choices require trade-offs among competing public goods. The most common argument today revolves around the pros and cons claimed for majoritarian, combined, and proportional types of electoral systems, for example which is best for maximizing electoral participation or for containing ethnic conflict. Major questions underlying these empirical claims concern what forms of representative democracy are more desirable and what functions electoral systems should perform. Some studies of electoral systems fail to deal explicitly with the normative assumptions, preferring to focus exclusively upon the factual claims. Others present lengthy shopping lists of the alternative values that electoral systems are supposed to meet, emphasizing the desirability of, say, the inclusion of women, the management of ethnic conflict, or the importance of governability, agnostically letting readers pick and choose whatever values they regard as most important. A comprehensive list has the advantages of identifying all the possible claims that people can and often do make about electoral systems. Many practical arguments about reform are conducted at this level. But from this procedure it remains unclear why we should prioritize one value over another, or how values are logically connected to form part of a broader framework. What reasonable person could not want, say, both social inclusiveness in parliamentary representation and also effective governance, in a win-win situation, even if these values may conflict or contradict each other in practice.

A preferable strategy seeks to locate the normative values underlying the choice of electoral systems within coherent theories of representative democracy. In one of the most familiar frameworks of ideal types used in comparative politics, Lijphart contrasts ‘consensus’ (or ‘consociational’) democracies based upon proportional representation electoral systems with ‘majoritarian’ (or ‘Westminster’) democracies based upon majoritarian and plurality electoral systems. Consensus democracies are defined as those aiming at power sharing among multiple political actors to maximize deliberation, bargaining and compromise. Majoritarian political systems are envisaged as those concentrating power in the hands in the largest parliamentary party to maximize governability. This dichotomy represents an important typology, commonly used in the comparative literature. Yet the term ‘majoritarian’ can become confusing when used to refer simultaneously both to the type of democracy as well as to the type of electoral system that both bear these names. The term ‘Westminster democracy’ is equally inadequate, referring as it does to a form of parliamentary government exported from the UK to many Commonwealth nations decades ago, yet a system which can find few recognizable exemplars today, even in its original home. The term is also potentially misleading given that the Westminster House of Commons uses First-Past-the-Post, a plurality not a simple-majority electoral system, while the House of Lords currently remains an unelected body, an anomaly in the modern democratic world. The traditional terminology also seems to weight the deck by disingenuously framing the choice as one between either consensual (‘kinder’, ‘gentler’) democracy or effective majoritarian government, rather than understanding the central choice as between competing visions of the best form of representative democracy.

In a recent comprehensive study, G. Bingham Powell, Jr. proposes that the alternative ideal types can be conceptualized as ‘majoritarian’ or ‘proportional’ visions of democracy. Yet this strategy extends the term ‘proportional’, that originally referred to the PR type of electoral formula, to many other aspects of the basic political system or constitution that are conceptually distinct from the type of proportional formula per se, such as the distribution of power within the legislature. Moreover Powell does not classify some systems with PR electoral formula as
proportional democracies (such as Greece which is classified as majoritarian, or Ireland which is classified as 'mixed'). As a result it seems best to maintain a clear conceptual distinction to avoid any confusing slippage between ‘proportional representation electoral formulas’ per se and any notion of a ‘proportional’ democracy. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John Carey, focusing upon two dimensions of political systems, develop another alternative typology used to understand presidentialism. The authors distinguish between ‘efficient’ political systems designed to maximize government accountability, disciplined programmatic parties, and identifiable policy mandates and ‘inefficient’ systems maximizing the provision of particularistic local concerns and personal votes. They also distinguish the ‘representative’ dimension, with systems reflecting either local or group interests. While the central typology is useful, the term ‘efficiency’, originally drawn from Walter Bagehot’s *The English Constitution*, seems potentially misleading, since ‘efficiency’ is conventionally understood to concern the most appropriate means to an end, rather than any specific end goal per se. Hence there can be an efficient or inefficient delivery of particularistic ‘pork’ and patronage.

For all these reasons, we will draw upon an older conceptualization suggested by the noted constitutional expert, Samuel Finer. In this study the central normative debate about the fundamental ideals that electoral systems should meet is conceptualized as one between either ‘adversarial’ or ‘consensual’ visions of representative democracy. This distinction captures the central features of the argument more closely than many of the current alternatives in the literature.

**The arguments for and against adversarial democracy**

Advocates of adversarial democracy believe that democratic political systems should promote government accountability, transparency, and responsiveness, through generating single-party executives, responsible programmatic parties, and vigorous parliamentary opposition. Electoral systems designed to give the leading party the majority of parliamentary seats, through the use of majoritarian and plurality electoral formula, are an essential, although not sufficient, component of adversarial democracy by connecting voter’s preferences directly to a representative in parliament and, indirectly to the party that enters government. The purported virtuous of these electoral systems, advocates claim, are that they maximize democratic accountability, strengthen citizen-member linkages, facilitate governability, generate decisive electoral outcomes, and encourage political responsiveness.

(i) **Democratic accountability**

Proponents of adversarial democracy envisage elections primarily as a critical link in the chain designed to insure that parties in government remain collectively accountable to parliament (on a day-to-day basis) and to the electorate (at regular intervals). This vision suggests that electoral systems which systematically reduce the multiple contenders for office to the leading parties which win power both simplifies electoral choices and clarifies responsibility for government decisions. In this ideal, the ‘In’ and the ‘Out’ parties compete for popular support by presenting alternative programmatic platforms, leadership teams, and candidates for elected office. In the words of Walter Lippmann: “To support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when things seem to be going badly, this, in spite of all that has been said about Tweedeldum and Tweedledee, is the essence of popular government.” By facilitating a veto on governing incumbents, elections function as instruments of democratic control. At the end of their tenure in office, the single party in government remains collectively accountable for their legislative record and policy performance, and if the ‘trains do not run on time’, or if there is evidence of corruption, malfeasance, or incompetence, then the electorate can punish the incumbent administration, if they so wish. In comparison, where proportional representation electoral systems generate multiparty parliaments and coalition governments, it is believed that this process makes it more difficult for voters to assign blame or praise for the government’s performance, and to reward or punish parties accordingly, even if the public becomes deeply dissatisfied with those in power. Proponents argue that under majoritarian and plurality electoral systems, the party with the largest share of parliamentary seats usually forms the government, so
that there is a direct link between the votes cast and the outcome for government. Where PR produces multiparty parliaments, the process of coalition building after the result, not the election per se, determines the allocation of Cabinet portfolios and government policies. For proponents of adversarial political systems, representative democracy is preserved by the ability of the electorate to reward or punish parties when asked to judge their performance and promises, by rigorous scrutiny of government actions, and by vigorous debate between government and opposition parties.

The closest analogy to adversarial democracy is the legal arguments propounded by public defenders and prosecutors, with the judge (constitutional courts) ensuring fair play, the news media functioning as official recorders, and the electorate serving as the ultimate jury. In the courts, the function of the defender and prosecutor is to argue the pros and cons of each case to the best of their abilities, within the boundaries of legal ethics, irrespective of their personal beliefs about the guilt or innocence of their client, because though the battle of courtroom debate it is believed that justice will be done. In this conception, drawing upon the classical liberal theory of John Stuart Mill, adversarial parliamentary debate reveals flaws in any political argument, weaknesses in policy proposals, and mistakes or errors by government ministers, and as such it is to be valued more than a false consensus that could potentially stifle debate, hide certain failings from the public eye, and exclude the full range of alternative proposals from consideration. Parliament ideally functions in this view as the nation’s forum for debate, where the government proposes and the opposition’s duty, like the public prosecutor, is to oppose in principle.

(ii) Strong voter-member accountability

At the local level, advocates argue that the link between citizens and their member of parliament elected in geographically-based single-member districts provides local communities with a voice in the nation’s affairs, as well as making elected members directly responsive to constituency concerns. Due to single-member districts and candidate-ballots, elected members are believed to remain individually accountable to their local party organization on a day-to-day basis and to all their local constituents at regular intervals. Members are thought to have stronger electoral incentives to provide constituency service, and thereby build a personal vote, in single-member districts using candidate-ballots. In this context it is believed that members will prioritize local constituency service, with individual casework sorting out problems such as housing or welfare benefits, as well as listening to community concerns and raising these matters in parliamentary debates. The independence and autonomy of MPs from the central party leadership is further strengthened where local party members and activists determine the recruitment, nomination, and selection process for parliamentary candidates in their constituency. By contrast, members are thought to be more accountable to party leaders under electoral systems with party-ballots, especially in large multi-member constituencies with closed party lists and nomination procedures controlled by the central party. Such a system is believed to promote parliamentary discipline within programmatic and cohesive legislative parties since the leadership has the power to sanction rebels by refusing their renomination.

(iii) Governability

Majoritarian and plurality electoral systems used in legislative contests have strong reductive effects designed to generate single-party executives and to limit the degree of party fragmentation in parliaments. What they thereby lose in fairness to minor parties, proponents argue, they gain in governing capacity, as the single party in Cabinet government is thereby empowered to implement their programmatic manifesto promises during their term of office, if they hold a majority of parliamentary seats and maintain the support of cohesive and disciplined parliamentary backbenchers. By systematically exaggerating the seat lead for the winning party with the largest share of votes, these electoral systems generate either a ‘natural’ or a ‘manufactured’ majority, producing a decisive outcome in seats. This process thereby legitimates the governing authority of the winner, even in relatively close contests in the share of the popular vote. Single-party governments, with an overall parliamentary majority, can enact whatever policies they feel are necessary during their term of office, taking difficult or unpopular decisions
where they believe these are in the country’s long-term interests, while knowing that they face the judgment of the electorate when their term ends and the potential sanction of losing power.

Given the concentration of executive power in the hands of a single party, the main check on the Cabinet during their term of office is a vote of confidence in parliament. Governments capable of surviving such a vote, which in practice usually means carrying their own backbenchers with them, often face few other effective curbs on power, beyond the courts. For advocates, this system has certain decisive advantages: providing government with the authority to legislate and the capacity to implement their policies, especially radical proposals; to respond decisively and in timely fashion to contingent events and sudden emergencies; to overcome parliamentary stalemate on controversial and divisive issues; and to take difficult decisions that may generate short-term unpopularity if they believe that these policies are in the country’s long-term interests. Majoritarian systems remove the need for closed-door post-election negotiations and policy compromises with other parties, or frequent coalition changes between elections. There is a single democratic chain of accountability within each nation stretching from citizens to particular members of parliament, from parliamentarians to cabinet ministers, and from ministers to civil servants implementing policies. Proponents believe that in this regard, the provision of accountable single-party government is more important than the inclusion of all parties in strict proportion to their share of the vote. Indeed the way that majoritarian and plurality electoral systems usually penalize minor and fringe parties can be regarded as a virtue, if this process prevents extremists on the far right or far left from acquiring representative legitimacy, thereby avoiding a fragmented parliament full of ‘fads and faddists’.

(iv) Decisive elections

Majoritarian and plurality electoral systems function as a substantial hurdle that systematically reduces the multiple number of parties and candidates contending for elected office so that, although electoral competition remains open as almost anyone can usually stand (with some minor legal regulations for matters like citizenship and age requirements), only the leading contenders win parliamentary seats and governing power. Where electoral systems succeed in fulfilling this function, proponents argue, they thereby have the capacity to generate decisive outcomes where voter’s preferences directly determine the selection of members of parliament and the overall distribution of parliamentary seats among parties. In turn, the majority of seats awarded to the largest party lead to the formation of single-party cabinet governments. Majoritarian electoral systems thereby maintain a direct and transparent link between the share of the votes cast and the single party in government.

(v) Responsiveness to the electorate

Yet proponents claim that government and opposition parties, and also individual elected members, remain ‘responsive’ to public concerns. In adversarial democracies, the governing party is entrusted with considerable powers during their term in office, with few checks and balances, but nevertheless it is thought that politicians remain sensitive to public opinion because they are aware that even a small swing in the popular vote in a competitive and balanced two-party system is sufficient to bring the opposition into office. This system can be envisaged as a pulley-and-weights mechanism where a modest pull on the electoral rope can produce a disproportionate displacement of weight. Proponents believe that these characteristics mean that under majoritarian systems governments are granted considerable power during their tenure in office, yet this power is shackled with ultimate accountability to the electorate. Moreover individual members are thought to remain responsive to their particular community, representing local interests and articulating diverse constituency concerns in national legislative debates, which may be a particularly important function in large and heterogeneous societies.

Critics

Yet critics suggest that adversarial democracy suffers from certain well-known dangers. In particular, adversarial democracy involves a zero-sum game between the ‘Ins’ and the ‘Outs’. If one party is repeatedly returned to government over successive elections, with a majority or even just a plurality of votes, the opposition has limited powers of checks and balances. Where
communities are divided into multiple cleavages, especially between enduring majority and minority populations, and where these social divisions and ethnic cleavages are reflected in party politics, then the balanced rotation between government and opposition implied in the adversarial model may be absent. Predominant parties can exercise undue power and trample over the interests of minority groups. Exacerbating adversarial debate may work in stable democracies and homogeneous societies, but in deeply divided plural societies and transitional democracies, critics suggest, where there is minimal agreement about the rules of the game as well as basic policy issues, this can be a recipe for disaster. The potential dangers, it is argued, are ‘elective dictatorship’, disregard for minority rights, administrative corruption arising from insufficient checks and balances, unfairness to minor parties, and public disillusionment if citizens feel that governments are unresponsive to their needs and if fragmented opposition parties mean that elections are unable to insure a regular rotation of parties in power.

Arguments for and against consensual democracy

To guard against these dangers, critics present many alternative visions of how representative democracy should function and what institutions are necessary as the structural foundations for these normative ideals. These arguments can also be discussed and framed in many ways, including as Madisonian, deliberative, or consociational models of democracy. This study focuses upon the arguments developed by Lijphart in favor of ‘consensus’ democracy, as the most systematic comparative treatment of the subject. The vision of consensual representative democracy emphasizes that political institutions should promote consensual decision-making, bargaining and compromise among multiple parliamentary parties, each with a stake in power, and dispersed decision-making processes. Proponents of consensual democracy suggest that proportional electoral systems facilitate deliberative and collaborative governance, reduce the barriers to minority parties, maximize voting turnout, and ensure that parliaments faithfully mirror the social and political diversity in society, all of which can be regarded as essential, but not sufficient, conditions for checking and balancing the power of predominant majorities.

(i) Facilitate deliberative and collaborative governance

For those who favor consensual democracy, the primary function of elections is to allow citizens to choose spokespersons to discuss, negotiate, and bargain on their behalf. Representation is less geographical than social. Far from concentrating collective responsibility in the hands of the single-party government, it is believed that the process of governance should be dispersed as widely as possible among elected representatives who are empowered to deliberate, bargain, and achieve compromise acceptable to all actors, with many institutional checks and balances, including multiple political parties in parliament, to ensure that plural interests are heard in a consensual decision-making process. The vision of democracy underlying this perspective is essentially more deliberative and collaborative than adversarial.

(ii) Reduce the barriers to minor parties

Advocates of consensual democracy emphasize the need for electoral systems to give fair and just representation so that the distribution of parliamentary seats reflects the share of the popular vote won by all parties. This process is thought to provide Madisonian checks to single-party government and majority predominance. For many critics, the traditional moral case against majoritarian electoral systems is based on the way this system systematically penalizes the share of seats awarded to minor parties who achieve a significant share of the vote but with support dispersed thinly across many districts, exemplified by the Canadian Progressive Conservatives in 1993, the Alliance party in New Zealand in 1993, or the British Liberal Democrats in 1983. All electoral systems winnow out the field of candidates and parties that enter office, by translating votes into seats. In theory, pure PR systems have little reductive impact, as the seat share received by each party reflects their vote share. In practice no PR system is wholly proportional in outcome, even with minimum vote thresholds, large district magnitudes and proportional formulas. But PR electoral systems are designed to allocate seats more closely to the share of the vote received by each party than majoritarian and plurality electoral systems, which prioritize different objectives. By facilitating the election of more minor
parties, PR systems also broaden electoral choice, providing voters with a wider range of alternatives. By contrast, by discouraging some minor parties from standing, voters face fewer party choices, although also simpler options, under majoritarian electoral systems.

(iii) Maximizing Electoral Participation

Under majoritarian and plurality electoral systems, supporters of minor and fringe parties with geographic support dispersed widely but thinly across the country, may feel that casting their votes will make no difference to who wins in their constituency, still less to the overall composition of government and the policy agenda. The ‘wasted votes’ argument is strongest in safe seats in single-member districts where the incumbent candidate or party is unlikely to be defeated. In contrast proportional elections with low vote thresholds and large district magnitudes, such as the party list system used in the Netherlands, increase the opportunities for minor parties to enter parliament even with a relatively modest share of the vote and dispersed support, and therefore increases the incentives for their supporters to cast a vote. Because fewer votes are ‘wasted’ in a PR system, it is believed that proportional representation systems should therefore generate higher electoral turnout than majoritarian or plurality electoral systems.

(iv) Ensure Parliamentary Diversity

Proponents of consensus democracy also emphasize the importance of social inclusion, so that all voices and multiple interests are brought to the policymaking process, and in this regard they emphasize the need for diversity in the composition of parliaments. It is well established that certain social groups are over-represented in elected office, with parliamentary elites commonly drawn from predominant ethnic groups, men, and those of higher occupational status. While there are substantial variations worldwide, overall women constitute only one sixth (14.4 percent) of national legislators worldwide, with women usually lagging furthest behind in national parliaments using majoritarian electoral systems. Reformers have considered various strategies designed to widen opportunities for women and minorities, including legally binding candidate quotas, dual-member constituencies designated by minority group or gender, and affirmative action for candidacies and official positions within party organizations. Some of these mechanisms can be adopted in single-member districts, for example in the mid-nineties the British Labour party adopted all-women shortlists for nomination in half its target seats. But advocates argue that affirmative action can be implemented most easily when applied to balancing the social composition of party lists, for example by designating every other position on the candidate list for women. These mechanisms, proponents suggest, can also increase the number of regional, linguistic, ethnic or religious minorities in parliament, although their effects depend upon the spatial concentration of each group. Socially diverse representation can be regarded as intrinsically valuable for consensus democracy, by improving the range of voices and experience brought to policy discussions, and also because the entry of minority representatives into public office can increases a sense of democratic legitimacy and develop leadership capacity. Proponents argue that it is important to maximize the number of ‘winners’ in elections, particularly in divided or heterogeneous societies, so that separate communities can peacefully coexist within the common borders of a single nation-state.

Critics

Against these arguments, most critics of proportional representation emphasize certain well-known themes, arguing that these electoral systems are prone to generate indecisive electoral results and weak, ineffective, and unstable governing coalitions where it is difficult for voters to assign clear responsibility; create institutional checks and balances characterized by policy stalemate, administrative paralysis, and legislative gridlock; foster cautious, slow and incremental decision-making and limit the inability of policymakers to respond in timely and coherent fashion to a sudden crisis; encourage the legitimation of extremist parties on the far right and left; reduce the accountability of elected members to local parties and constituents; and weaken the inability of the electorate to throw out some ‘king-making’ parties that are semi-permanent members of coalition governments.
The alternative visions of democracy have often fuelled attempts to reform the electoral system to achieve either greater government accountability through majoritarian systems or wider parliamentary diversity through proportional systems. Underlying the normative debate are certain important empirical claims about the consequences of electoral rules for voting behavior and for political representation. We therefore need to go on to examine systematic evidence to see how far the normative claims are supported by comparative evidence. Do PR systems generate more opportunities for minor parties but also the dangers of excessive party fragmentation? Do majoritarian systems produce decisive outcomes where the leading party is empowered to govern alone for the duration of their term in office, but also exclude minor parties from fair representation? It is to these issues that we now turn.
### Table 3.1: The ideal functions of electoral institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal function of the political system</th>
<th>Adversarial democracy</th>
<th>Consensual democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal function of the political system</strong></td>
<td>Should promote government accountability, transparency of decision-making, and responsible parties through single-party executives, effective opposition parties, vigorous parliamentary debate, and decisive elections.</td>
<td>Should promote consensual decision-making, bargaining and compromise among multiple parliamentary parties, each with a stake in power, and dispersed decision-making processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal function of the electoral system</strong></td>
<td>The system should maximize electoral decisiveness by directly linking the votes cast to the parties and members elected to parliament, thereby providing an indirect link from voters to the party in government. The system should winnow the number of electoral parties and candidates that enter parliament and should ensure that the leading party gains a workable parliamentary majority.</td>
<td>The system should maximize electoral choice among multiple parties, should fairly translate vote shares into seat shares, and should be socially inclusive in parliamentary representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal function of opposition parties</strong></td>
<td>Should provide adversarial scrutiny of government policy proposals and actions.</td>
<td>Should be part of the consultation process and act as an important check on the power of the largest party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal function of citizens</strong></td>
<td>Should be able to evaluate the performance of the governing party and the prospective policies offered by alternative electoral parties in opposition.</td>
<td>Should be able to evaluate the performance and policies of parties that are empowered to negotiate, bargain and compromise on behalf of their supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal function of elected representatives</strong></td>
<td>Should act as community spokespersons reflecting local concerns and representing all local constituents in parliament.</td>
<td>Should deliberate, negotiate, and bargain as spokespersons on behalf of their party supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential dangers</strong></td>
<td>May lead to ‘elective dictatorship’ characterized by entrenched power for predominant majority populations, disregard for minority rights, and lack of effective checks and balances.</td>
<td>May lead to problems of governance associated with extreme multiparty fragmentation, unstable governments, lack of accountability for the government and for elected representatives, and indecisive election results.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3.1: Models of representative democracy

A: Adversarial model

B: Consensual model


5 Richard Katz provides the most comprehensive overview of classic debates in the history of political thought, although some of the considerations in democratic theory are rather remote from the practical arguments commonly heard in policy debates, as well as from the operation of actual electoral systems. See Richard Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


10 Samuel E. Finer, ed. 1975. *Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform*. London: Anthony Wigram. It should be noted that Lijphart uses the term ‘consensus’ democracy, not ‘consensual’, but it seems preferable to refer to this by the ideal mode of operation as a democratic process, rather than by its ideal end state.


Chapter 4

Party Systems

Effective parties that work well can serve multiple functions in democracies: simplifying and structuring electoral choices; organizing and mobilizing campaigns; articulating and aggregating disparate interests; channeling communication, consultation and debate; training, recruiting and selecting candidates; structuring parliamentary divisions; acting as policy think tanks; and organizing government. The direct impact of electoral systems on patterns of party competition has long been regarded as one of their most important effects. Electoral engineering has been advocated in systems suffering either from the dangers of excessively unstable and fragmented party systems, such as Italy and Israel, or from the opposite dangers of unchanging one-party predominant systems, exemplified by Singapore and Japan. But electoral systems can potentially indirectly affect many other features of how parties work, such as the strength of bonds between citizens and parties and how far party identification shapes voters’ choices. This chapter therefore explores how far electoral systems are systematically related to patterns of party competition. Subsequent chapters then examine the relationship between electoral systems, the strength of party identification and general orientations towards political parties, as well as how far partisan alignments influence voter decisions in the countries under comparison.

The Mechanical effects of Electoral Systems on Party Competition

The classic starting point for any analysis has to be Duverger’s famous claims about the relationship between electoral systems and party systems. Duverger’s first law is (1) “the plurality single-ballot rule tends to party dualism.” The second claim is that (2) “The double-ballot system and proportional representation tend to multipartyism.” While originally stated as a universal law-like regularity, without exception, Duverger subsequently suggested that this was only a weaker probabilistic generalization. The conditions under which this relationship holds, and its status as a law, have attracted considerable debate marked by continued reformulations of the original statement and many efforts to define precisely was is to ‘count’ as a party in order to verify these claims. The effects of electoral systems are partly mechanical, depending upon the working of the rules, exemplified by the vote hurdles that single-member districts create for minor parties with dispersed support. The effects can also be partly psychological, by shaping the incentives facing parties and the public, for example if minor party candidates are discouraged from running in majoritarian elections where they believe they cannot win, or if citizens cast a ‘strategic’, ‘tactical’ or ‘insincere’ vote for a major party in the belief that voting for minor parties in these systems is a ‘wasted vote’. Subsequent studies have recognized that the hurdles facing minor parties under majoritarian electoral systems vary under certain conditions, the most important of which concern: (i) the geographic distribution or concentration of party support; (ii) specific aspects of electoral systems beyond the basic formula, notably the use of voting thresholds, the size of the district magnitude in proportional systems, and the use of manipulated partisan bias such as gerrymandering to include or exclude minor parties; and also (iii) the type of major social cleavages within a nation, an issue explored in the next chapter. The reasons why geography is so important is that minor parties with spatially-concentrated support can still win seats in single-member districts and plurality elections, such as regional, nationalist, or ethnic parties that are strong in particular constituencies, exemplified by the success of the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform party in Canada, or the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru in the UK. Majoritarian and plurality systems are most problematic for parties with modest support that is widely dispersed across many single-member districts, such as the Australian Greens or the Canadian Progressive Conservatives. Specific aspects of the electoral system are also important because minor parties still face considerable barriers under proportional electoral formula that combine small district magnitudes with high vote thresholds, exemplified in the countries under comparison by contests for the Polish Sejm. Partisan manipulation of the electoral rules, such as the use of malapportionment (producing constituencies containing different sized electorates), gerrymandering (the intentional drawing of electoral boundaries for partisan advantage), as well as restrictive legal rules for nomination to get on the ballot, can also function to benefit or penalize minor parties. Lastly the number, distribution, and depth of social cleavages, and their
politickization by linking groups to political parties, is also critical to differences between the workings of electoral systems in relatively homogeneous and heterogeneous societies, producing an interaction between the type of electoral rules and social heterogeneity.

Before examining the evidence for the relationship between electoral and party systems in the societies under comparison, we first need to consider what is to ‘count’ as a party. One problem in the literature concerns how to distinguish between fringe parties and independent candidates, a problem particularly evident in the Ukrainian and Russian parliamentary election, where many candidates stood (and were often elected in single-member districts) as a strategy to gain exception from criminal prosecution. Since there is no single best measure, the wisest strategy is to compare alternative summary measures of the number of parties in different countries, ranging from simple to more complex indices, to see if the specific choice of measures makes a substantial difference to the interpretation of the results. ‘Electoral parties’ are defined most simply as all those parties standing for election, and ‘parliamentary parties’ as all those that win at least one seat in the lower house. Yet these simple measures are too generous to capture many of the most important distinctions commonly made between systems: for example, if all electoral parties count equally for ‘one’, then almost every country except those where opposition parties are banned by law would qualify as a multiparty system. In the United States, for example, normally understood as a classic two-party system, the Democrats and Republicans would count as equal to all other fringe parties holding no seats but contesting presidential elections, including the Greens, the Reform party, the Communist party, the Natural Law party, the Libertarians, and the Workers’ Party. One way to narrow this measure to generate a more meaningful comparison is to count relevant parties, defined as those gaining more than a certain threshold of national votes or parliamentary seats; in this study ‘relevant electoral parties’ are defined as those gaining 3% or more of the national vote, while ‘relevant parliamentary parties’ are understood as those getting 3% or more of seats in election to the lower house.

Yet adoption of the conventional 3% threshold is in itself arbitrary, as the cut-off point could equally be set slightly higher or lower. Measures of relevant parties can also prove misleading: for example, if four parties are of roughly equal size, each gaining about one quarter of the parliamentary seats, then there is no problem about counting them all equally as a four-party system. But if there are considerable disparities in size among parties, for example, if two major parties predominate with over 75% of all parliamentary seats, holding the balance of power between the opposition and government, and yet another eight fringe parties each get only 3% of seats, then given the imbalance of power it does not seem satisfactory to count each party equally to produce a ten-party system. The most popular method to overcome this problem is the Laakso and Taagepera measure of the ‘effective number of parliamentary parties’ (ENPP), and also the ‘effective number of electoral parties’ (ENEP), both of which take account not only of the number of parties but also the relative size of each. Although the measure is abstract, it is also fairly intuitively meaningful to grasp the difference between party systems containing, say, 2.6 and 5.5 effective parliamentary parties. Using this measure, Arend Lijphart reexamined the evidence for the Duverger thesis by comparing election results in 27 advanced industrialized democracies from 1945-90. The study estimated that the effective number of parliamentary parties was 2.0 in plurality systems, 2.8 in majority, and 3.6 in proportional systems. Yet even here there are important variations beyond the basic formula, because Lijphart found that the minimum threshold of votes within proportional systems also had an important effect on the inclusion of minor parties. An alternative study by Richard Katz compared a broader range of countries, using a database with over 800 national elections held until 1985, and found many significant deviations around the mean effective number of parliamentary parties, particularly among sub-types within the basic proportional and majoritarian families. Katz concluded that there was little support for any simple version of Duverger’s claim that plurality elections inevitably generate two-party systems, as a universal law, although nevertheless as a probabilistic generalizations plurality systems usually proved more reductive than PR elections.

To examine the evidence for a wider range of countries in recent years we can compare party systems in national elections for the lower house of parliament held under the different electoral families and their sub-types. For comparison across alternative measures, to see if the
results are robust when replicated, the analysis uses three summary indicators to assess levels of party competition:

**Party competition**

- The mean number of *all* parliamentary parties (defined as all parties winning at least one seat),
- The mean number of *relevant* parliamentary parties (all parties holding 3% or more of parliamentary seats),
- The mean number of *effective* parliamentary parties (calculated for the CSES elections by the Laakso and Taagepera method (1979)),

The estimates are based on the most recent national election for the lower house of parliament, with 170 contests held worldwide from 1995 to 2000, and the 32 parliamentary elections in the CSES countries under comparison, with the results derived from *Elections Around the World*.

Table 4.1 shows that worldwide the mean number of parliamentary parties (based on the simplest definition of parties holding at least one seat) was 5.22 in the countries using majoritarian systems, 8.85 in combined systems, and 9.52 in societies with proportional electoral systems. In other words, in countries using any form of PR there are almost twice as many parliamentary parties as in countries using any form of majoritarian electoral system. Confirming this broad pattern, although with less of a sharp contrast between the major types of electoral system, the comparison of the mean number of *relevant* parties (holding over 3% of parliamentary seats) was 3.33 in all majoritarian systems, 4.52 for combined systems, and 4.74 for all proportional systems. Yet at the same time there are also some important variations evident among sub-types of electoral systems within each family, for example among proportional systems, systems using party lists had more parliamentary parties (and relevant parliamentary parties) than in the two nations (Ireland and Malta) using the Single Transferable Vote. Duverger claims that there is an important difference between simple plurality (first-past-the-post) and majoritarian 2nd ballot systems. The comparison shows that there were indeed more parliamentary parties (and more relevant parties) in the 28 nations using 2nd ballot runoff elections than in the 49 states using first-past-the-post. Yet at the same time under the 2nd ballot system far fewer parliamentary parties, and relevant parliamentary parties, were elected than under party list PR.

[Table 4.1 about here]

Nevertheless despite establishing these broad patterns by electoral family, the means can disguise considerable deviations, as there are important cross-national differences within each of the major types. Deviations from the mean are produced as the relationship between the type of electoral system and party system in each country is conditioned by the geographical distribution of party support, the level of electoral threshold, the average size of the district magnitude, and any manipulated partisan bias in the system. To illustrate this, the mean number of effective parliamentary parties (ENPP) for the thirty countries in the CSES dataset under detailed comparison is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Again the basic pattern by party family is shown, with majoritarian systems having an average ENPP of 2.42, compared with 3.54 in combined systems, and 4.45 in proportional systems. If we break this down further by country, the pattern shows that among Anglo-American countries all using first-past-the-post, the mean number of effective parliamentary parties is 2.0 in the United States, 2.1 in the UK, but 3.0 in Canada; in the latter case, despite first-past-the-post, regional Canadian parties gain seats in their heartland provinces. There is some overlap between plurality systems and the least proportional party list electoral systems, notably Spain with a mean ENPP of 2.7 due to small district magnitude, and Poland (ENPP 3.0) which has a high (7%) vote threshold to enter the Sejm. Nevertheless as predicted many of the PR systems under comparison can be classified as moderate multiparty systems, with an ENPP ranging from 3.4 to 5.6, while Belgium qualifies as a polarized party system with an ENPP of 9.1.

[Figure 4.1 about here]
The combined electoral systems show substantial variations in party competition. As expected, some of the combined-independent systems with many single-member districts, including South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, are closer to the mean ENPP found in majoritarian systems. In comparison, the combined-dependent systems, with the outcome based on the party list share of the vote, exemplified by New Zealand and Hungary, are closer to the multiparty system common under PR systems. The primary exceptions to the overall pattern are Russia and Ukraine, which both have fragmented multiparty systems, despite using combined-independent electoral systems. The pattern in these nations is explained by the instability of their party systems, the fragility of the consolidation process in their democratic transitions, along with the existence of multiple social cleavages, and the election of many independents and small parties via the single-member districts for reasons explored more fully in the next chapter.

Therefore overall the analysis of all elections worldwide, and the more detailed comparison of elections held in the thirty nations within the CSES dataset, support the reductive effect of the basic electoral formula. This generally confirms Duverger’s main proposition that plurality electoral systems tend towards party dualism, while PR is associated with multipartyism. Yet the extent of the difference in the effective number of parliamentary parties should not be exaggerated, ranging in the CSES countries under comparison from an average of 2.42 in majoritarian systems to 4.45 in proportional systems. Moreover the variations evident within each electoral family show that the relationship between electoral systems and party systems is probabilistic not universal, as illustrated by the marked contrasts between Spain and Belgium, although both have proportional party list elections. These variations are generated by the factors discussed earlier, namely (i) the geographic distribution of party support; (ii) specific features of electoral design beyond the basic electoral formula, such as formal vote thresholds and district magnitude; and, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, (iii) the number and depth of social cleavages within each nation. Smaller parties can do well under first-past-the-post, especially regional or ethnic-national parties with spatially concentrated support. At the same time, minor parties can be heavily penalized in proportional systems with high thresholds and small district magnitudes.

The Proportionality of Votes to Seats

Many studies have commonly found proportionality to be significantly greater under PR than under majoritarian systems, although again important variations exist within electoral families and sub-types. Proportionality is gauged in this study by three measures:

- The percentage share of the vote won by the party in first place, to provide an indication of how far electoral systems generated a vote majority for the leading party.
- The percentage share of seats won by the party in first place, to provide an indication of how far the electoral system generated a parliamentary majority for the leading party.
- The Rose index of proportionality to show the relationship of votes to seats (a standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby index).

All the alternative measures of proportionality summarize the degree to which each party’s share of seats corresponds to their share of votes but alternative measures reflect slightly divergent notions of the underlying concepts. The oldest measure used by Douglas Rae simple uses the average of the deviations, summing the absolute differences between the vote percentages and the seat percentages and then dividing by the number of parties. One potential problem with the Rae Index, however, is that it is over-sensitive to the number of parties, understating the disproportionality of systems with many small parties. One of the most widely used alternatives is the Loosemore-Hanby index which adds the absolute values of all vote-seat share differences and then divides by 2, instead of Rae’s division by the number of parties. For ease of interpretation, following Rose, this measure can be standardized, and in theory the standardized Loosemore-Hanby index of proportionality ranges from 0 to 100. Majoritarian systems provide a winner's bonus for the party in first place, while penalising others, so the size of the winner's
bonus provides another indication of disproportionality. As expected, the variations are predictable; the mean Rose Index of Proportionality was 91.2 for all proportional systems around the world, compared with 85.0 for all combined systems, and 81.9 for all majoritarian systems.

To see whether this pattern was generated by the specific measure used, or whether it remains robust under alternative indicators, the proportionality of the electoral systems can also be compared by calculating the votes-to-seats ratio for each party in elections held from 1995 to 2000 in 143 nations around the globe, based on the summary unstandardized regression coefficient (beta) for each electoral family. The results in Figure 4.3 further confirm, as expected, that proportional electoral formula produce the closest reflection of votes to seats ratios ($R^2 = .95$). A few parties scatter more widely around the top of the regression line in these systems, but most fall where expected, suggesting a fairly close match between the percentage of votes that a party receives and its percentage of seats won. The combined formula proved marginally less proportional results ($R^2 = .93$). In comparison, the majoritarian formula shows the widest scatter of votes to seats ($R^2 = .82$). This is caused primarily by minor and fringe parties failing to gain any or few seats in these elections, shown visually by the parties falling above the regression line. The 'winner’s bonus' is illustrated by the parties falling below the regression line, where parties gain a greater percentage of seats than their share of the vote.

The indicators of the capacity of the electoral system to generate a working majority can also be examined by comparing the vote share and the seat share for the leading party in worldwide national elections (see Table 4.2). These comparisons in Table 4.2 confirm, as expected, that the leading party usually won a comfortable majority of votes (54.5%) and seats (56.8%) in majoritarian and plurality electoral systems (with the exception of the Australian AV system first preference distribution). Majorities of votes and seats for the leading party were also evident under combined-independent electoral systems. By contrast, the leading party generally failed to gain a majority of votes or seats under combined-dependent and proportional party list systems. Under all proportional systems, the leading party gained on average 45.3% of the vote and 43.8% of the seats. This evidence confirms, as proponents of each type of electoral system claim, that PR systems are more likely to prioritize legislative inclusiveness and multiparty systems while in comparison majoritarian systems are more likely to provide a decisive outcome and single-party executives. The electoral threshold for government office, if gauged by the average share of the vote for the party in first place, is about 10% higher under majoritarian than proportional electoral systems worldwide. This is important if, as argued in the introduction, the higher level of threshold in majoritarian systems provides incentives for parties to develop bridging strategies appealing to multiple sectors of the electorate, and if the lower thresholds in proportional systems provide incentives for bonding strategies designed to mobilize core groups of supporters. These claims are examined further in the next chapter.

To explore the consistency of these patterns further, the distribution of the standardized Loosemore-Hanby index of proportionality, a common measure used in the literature, can be compared in more detail for the nations included in the CSES. Figure 4.2 confirms the pattern observed earlier: the mean proportionality was 85.3 under majoritarian systems, 89.6 under combined systems, and 92.6 under proportional systems. Proportionality was therefore usually lower in majoritarian elections, with the exception of the United States that generated a highly proportional result despite FPTP elections due to the two-party predominance in the House of Representatives and a fairly even share of the vote. Proportionality was usually highest under party list PR, although again there are some exceptions, in Poland and Romania, due to high thresholds or low district magnitudes. Combined systems generally fell into the middle of the distribution although dependent-combined systems prove more proportional than independent-combined systems. In the countries under comparison, the average 'winner’s bonus' (representing the difference between the vote share and seat share for the leading party, exaggerating their legislative lead over all other parties) is 12.5 percentage points under
majoritarian systems, compared with 7.4 under mixed systems, and 5.7 percent under proportional representation. Hence under majoritarian electoral systems a party which won 37.5 percent of the vote or more could usually be assured of a parliamentary majority (50%+) in seats, whereas under PR systems a party would normally require 46.3 percent of the vote or more to achieve an equivalent result. As proponents argue, therefore, one-party governments with a working parliamentary majority are generated more easily in majoritarian than in proportional electoral systems, but at the expense of the legislative representation of minor parties.

Conclusions

Reformers often suggest that constitutional changes, particularly modifications to the electoral system, can contribute towards better governance, either through more majoritarian arrangements that are believed to strengthen governability or through more proportional formula that are designed to improve power-sharing and social inclusiveness. In this chapter we focused upon the consequences of electoral systems for party systems, and in particular whether there is convincing evidence that electoral system have the capacity to shape patterns of party competition. Throughout the analysis we have assumed that the electoral system is exogenous, so that it is capable of determining patterns of party competition. Where electoral systems have been in existence for many decades, indeed in some cases for more than a century, it seems safe to assume that the cumulative effect of repeated contests under these rules is capable of shaping the party system, for example by constantly excluding minor parties from office or by giving them as seat as ‘king-maker’ in cabinet governments. Nevertheless where electoral systems are experienced frequent changes from majoritarian to proportional or vice versa, as in France, or where electoral systems in newer democracies have only recently been adopted, it is far more difficult to regard the institutional rules as truly exogenous. In this context, levels of party competition, and the process of bargaining and negotiation over the constitutional rules of the game, are likely to shape the adoption of electoral systems. In newer democracies, then, there is likely to be interaction between the type of electoral system and the type of party system, and estimates that treat electoral systems as exogenous are likely to over-estimate their causal effects. Case studies examining a series of election results within each country, as well as policy studies of the adoption and reform of electoral rules in each nation, as well as more sophisticated models using two-staged least squares analysis, are the most satisfactory approaches to disentangling these relationships, taking us far beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless even if unable to establish the direction of the causal relationship within the limitations of the cross-sectional comparison, the results provided in this chapter serve to confirm some of the basic patterns in the relationship between electoral systems and party systems, which is necessary as the basis for subsequent chapters.

Overall the results of the comparison of elections in all nations worldwide, and the detailed analysis of elections held in the thirty-two countries in the CSES dataset, lends further confirmation to support the reductive impact of the basic electoral formula. With the important limitations already noted, the analysis generally supports Duverger's generalization that plurality electoral systems tend towards party dualism, while PR is associated with multipartyism. The comparisons support the classic claims made by proponents on both sides of the normative arguments, namely that majoritarian elections usually generate one-party governments with a secure parliamentary majority, while proportional elections generally lead towards more inclusive multiparty parliaments and more proportional results. Yet two important qualifications should be stressed when interpreting these results.

First, the difference in party competition by electoral family proved relatively modest in size; worldwide, the mean number of relevant parties was 3.33 in majoritarian systems and 4.74 in PR systems. The contrasts were slightly greater in the CSES elections under comparison, where the effective number of parliamentary parties was 2.42 in majoritarian systems and 4.45 in proportional elections. Yet although the relative or the effective number of parliamentary parties elected under each system may not appear greatly different, the contrast does reflect the classic categorical distinction between a two-party system (or two-and-a-half party) where the organizing principle is a division of the spoils of office between the government and opposition, accompanied by one-party cabinet government resting upon a secure parliamentary majority, and multiparty
competition, where parliament contains multiple actors and coalition government among multiple parties is the essential to secure a working parliamentary majority.

At the same time, it should be noted that there are important variations in party competition and proportionality within each electoral family. As discussed earlier, the relationship between electoral systems and party systems is conditional upon many factors, including most importantly: (i) the geography of electoral support; (ii) specific features of electoral design such as the use of formal thresholds and the size of districts; and (iii) the number and depth of social cleavages within a nation. Minor parties can do well in gaining seats under first-past-the-post, especially regional or ethnic-national parties with spatially concentrated support, while at the same time such parties can also be heavily penalized in proportional systems with high thresholds and small district magnitudes. Having confirmed these basic patterns and tendencies, the next chapters go on to explore the psychological capacity of electoral systems to influence the relationship between parties and voters, and in particular the strength of social cleavages and partisan identities in the electorate.
**Table 4.1: Electoral systems and party systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Mean number of parliamentary parties (with at least one seat)</th>
<th>Mean number of relevant parliamentary parties (with over 3% of seats)</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Majoritarian</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Vote</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block vote</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Ballot</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Combined</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>8.71</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL Proportional</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STV</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party List</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.05</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.12</strong></td>
<td><strong>170</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The data includes the results for 1,263 parties contesting the latest elections to the lower house of parliament from 1995 to June 2000. Parliamentary parties are defined as those winning at least one seat in the lower house. The results of the elections were calculated from *Elections Around the World*. [www.agora.stm.it/elections/alllinks.htm](http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/alllinks.htm).

The classification of electoral systems is discussed fully in chapter 2 and is derived from Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. 1997. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. Stockholm: International IDEA. Annex A. 'Independent' combined systems include two electoral systems used in parallel. 'Dependent combined' systems include two electoral systems used where the results depend upon the combined share of the vote.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 4.2: Electoral systems and proportionality</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rose’s Index of Proportionality</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Majoritarian</td>
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<td>Alternative Vote</td>
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<td>Block vote</td>
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The classification of electoral systems is discussed fully in chapter 2 and is derived from Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. 1997. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. Stockholm: International IDEA. Annex A. ‘Independent’ combined systems include two electoral systems used in parallel. ‘Dependent combined’ systems include two electoral systems used where the results depend upon the combined share of the vote.
Note: The Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) is calculated following the method of Laakso and Taagepera (1979). For details of the elections see Table 2.1.
Note: The Index of Proportionality, following Rose, is a standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby index. This is calculated as the difference between a party’s percentage share of the vote and its percentage share of the total seats in Parliament, summed, divided by two and subtracted from 100. Theoretically it can range from 0 to 100. For details see Rose, Munro and Mackie 1998. For details of the elections see Table 2.1.
Figure 4.3: The proportionality of party votes to seats

**Majoritarian formula**

- SNTV
- Two round
- AV
- Block Vote
- FPTP

Rsq = 0.8128

**Combined formula**

- MMP
- Parallel

Rsq = 0.9291

**Proportional formula**

- STV
- List PR

Rsq = 0.9532


7 M. Laakso and Rein Taagepera. 1979. ‘Effective number of parties: a measure with application to Western Europe.’ *Comparative Political Studies*. 12: 3-27.


10 Election results were compared based on the data contained in *Elections Around the World*. [www.agora.stm.it/elections/alllinks.htm](http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/alllinks.htm). Where election results were missing from this source then alternatives were used, including *Electoral Studies* and the *International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (IFES) http://www.ifes.org/eguide/elecguide.htm. The total analysis compared elections held from 1995 to 2000 for the lower house of parliament in 143 nations where results were available, including the share of votes and seats held by 1,244 electoral parties.

11 Similar patterns were found if the analysis is confined to the 37 nations classified worldwide by the Freedom House Gastil index as ‘older’ or ‘newer’ democracies. In these countries, the mean number of parliamentary parties was 7.4 in majoritarian systems and 10.22 in PR systems. The mean effective number of relevant parties was 3.0 in majoritarian systems and 5.5 in PR systems.


Chapter 5

Social Cleavages

The previous chapter documented how electoral systems have important mechanical effects upon party systems. They can also be expected to exercise an indirect psychological impact upon patterns of electoral behavior as well, including how far voting choices are determined by social identities. To explore these matters, the first part of this chapter outlines the framework for understanding these issues by comparing rational-choice institutionalism and cultural modernization theories. Part II examines patterns of cleavage politics and the influence of the primary cleavages on voting behavior in the legislative and presidential elections under comparison, including the role of social class and religion. The conclusion considers how far these relationships are contingent upon the incentives provided under different electoral system and how far they are determined by broader secular trends.

Part I: Theories of Social Cleavages and Voting Behavior

The seminal sociological studies of voting behavior developed during 1960s by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan emphasized that social identities formed the basic building blocks of party support in Western Europe. For Lipset and Rokkan, European nation-states were stamped by social divisions established decades earlier including the regional cleavages of center-periphery, the class inequalities of workers-owners, and sectarian cleavages over church and state that split Christendom between Catholics and Protestants. These traditional cleavages were powerful for several reasons. First, they reflected major ideological fissions in party politics. Social class mirrored the basic schism between the left favoring a strong role for the state through egalitarian welfare policies, fiscal redistribution, and interventionist economic management and the right preferring a more limited role for government and laissez-faire market economics. The religious division reflected conservative and liberal moral debates, such as those surrounding the role of women, marriage and the family. Differences between core and periphery concerned how far the nation-state should be centralized or how far power should be devolved downwards to the regions. Lipset and Rokkan theorized that organizational linkages gradually strengthened over the years, as party systems ‘froze’ from around the 1920s until at least the mid-1960s, with stable patterns of party competition revolving around the salient primary cleavages dividing each society, as exemplified by the role of class in Britain, religion in France, and language in Belgium. The electoral systems used in Western Europe at the time that the mass franchise was expanded played a vital role in stabilizing party competition, by reinforcing the legitimacy of those parties and social groups that had achieved parliamentary representation, so long as parties remained internally united and maintained their electoral base. Electoral systems created hurdles for newer parties threatening to disturb the status quo. Party systems, with patterned and predictable interactions in the competition for seats and votes, became settled features of the electoral landscape throughout many established democracies. Of course this picture exaggerates as some nations like Germany and Italy experienced major disruptions, while the great depression triggered important realignments in the mass base of parties in America. Nevertheless in the absence of sudden demographic upheavals, the external shock of events like the Second World War, electoral reforms, or massive new expansions of the electorate, party systems in many European countries seemed to exhibit a rock-like stability permitting only glacial evolution.

The structural theory provided by Lipset and Rokkan became widely influential as the established orthodoxy in understanding voting behavior and party competition in Western Europe, as well as in many other established democracies such as Australia and Canada, but from the mid-1970s onwards these accounts came under increasing challenge. New minor parties started to gain electoral momentum and a foot-hold of parliamentary representation, including ethno-nationalist parties in Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom, environmentalists in Germany and France, the anti-immigrant radical right like the National Front in Britain, or a range of diverse ‘protest’ parties advocating cross-cutting moral and economic issues in Denmark, Italy, and the
Netherlands. This led observers to suggest that the process of societal modernization was eroding the ‘traditional’ social identities of class and religion that predicted the mass basis of party support in late 1950s and 1960s. These identities no longer seemed capable of generating unwavering and habitual party loyalties in many postindustrial societies. If the rock-like ballast of class and religion no longer anchored voters to parties, this promised to have significant consequences for patterns of growing volatility in electoral behavior and in party competition, opening the door for more split-ticket voting across different levels, the occasional sudden rise of protest parties, as well as more vote-switching within and across the left-right blocks of party families, and the growing influence of short-term events, party strategy, candidates and leaders, and media coverage in determining the outcome of election campaigns.

In this study we lack time-series data to compare trends in social dealignment since the early 1960s, but we will focus here instead upon comparing the cross-national evidence in over thirty countries for two alternative accounts seeking to explain where social dealignment should have advanced furthest and fastest. Incentive-based explanations, building upon organizational studies of party politics, emphasize the strategic role of political actors in reinforcing or weakening party-voter bonds, including how far social democratic parties make class appeals. We will develop these ideas to consider in particular whether electoral rules have the capacity to shape the incentives for parties either to reinforce support among their natural electoral constituency or alternatively to develop catch-all electoral appeals outside their base. By contrast, cultural theories of societal modernization, providing orthodox ‘bottom up’ accounts grounded in traditional account of mass political behavior, focus upon secular trends in the nature of postindustrial societies, both in the cognitive skills of electors and in the value basis of issue conflict, that are believed to have eroded the traditional affective bonds linking citizens to parties. If incentive based accounts are accurate, then we might expect to find considerable differences in the strength of cleavage politics in elections held under majoritarian and proportional formula. If cultural accounts are closer to the mark, and rising levels of education and cognitive skills have altered the basis of voting decisions, then we would expect that cleavage politics would be weakest in postindustrial societies. Let us first outline these accounts in more detail then turn to consider the available cross-national evidence.

Rational-Choice Institutionalism and Campaign Strategies

Alternative theories based on rational-choice institutionalism emphasize the importance of the electoral rewards facing political parties when either deliberately reinforcing the strength of group-party ties through bonding appeals or in weakening these linkages through bridging strategies. These ideas were developed by Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, and subsequently expanded by Herbert Kitschelt. The earliest party organizations that evolved from the late eighteenth century onwards were essentially elite-driven parliamentary factions, loosely coordinating elected members of parliament and their followers, built around rival leaders. With minimal party discipline in parliament, and a limited franchise, elections were based around informal networks and patron-client relations. When the mass suffrage spread throughout different countries in Western Europe during the mid-nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, the electorate became too large to manage through the older associations of local elites. Duverger suggested that the mass-branch party emerged, primarily among trade unionists and Labour and Social Democratic parties, to organize the newly enfranchised working class populations. European parties had an incentive to foster close links with their natural social base in the electorate, so that Labour, socialist and communist parties collaborated closely with the organized labor movement, while Christian Democrats created strong links with the Catholic Church and with the business sector. The emphasis on common ideological principles, clear and distinctive programmatic party platforms reflecting these goals, and a sense of one-of-us belonging to a clan with clear boundaries and fee-paying membership demarcating ‘them’ and ‘us’ served multiple functions for parties by helping to mobilize supporters, raise funds, attract volunteers, and therefore contributed ultimately towards their electoral success.

In recent decades, however, due to secular social trends sweeping through post-industrial societies, West European socialist parties have faced the gradual shrinkage in the size of their working class base through the contraction of manufacturing industry and the rise in the
white-collar service sector. Faced with these developments, Kitschelt suggests that some social democratic parties have successfully adapted by altering the basis of their electoral appeals beyond their traditional blue-collar base. The most electorally-successful parties of the left have adopted 'catch-all' or 'bridging' strategies designed to attract diverse constituencies by selecting moderate leaders and promoting centrist economic policies, as well as by expanding their programmatic agenda beyond redistributive politics to prioritise diverse issues such as environmental protection, human rights, and women’s equality. This strategy is exemplified most dramatically by the popularity of the ‘middle-England’ politics leading to successive electoral victories for Tony Blair’s Labour party in the UK, where Labour 'leapfrogged' over the Liberal Democrats to become the party in the centre of the political spectrum. While post-war Labour was pure one-of-us ‘bonding’, concerned with heartland appeals to factory workers, unions and pensioners, and then under Blair’s leadership New Labour perfectly illustrates ‘bridging’ tactics across diverse constituencies. The electoral success of President Bill Clinton’s moderate coalition for the Democrats in the United States is another classic example of this approach. Older illustrations include the German Social Democratic party abandonment of the ‘Bad Godesburg’ Marxist rhetoric in the late 1950s and their successful shift towards the catchall middle ground. Where Labor, Socialist and Social Democratic parties and candidates move towards the center ground in the attempt to develop ‘catch-all’ bridging strategies, they may thereby abandon reliance upon their working class supporters and their trade union base, as well as discarding traditional socialist programs advocating egalitarian income redistribution, nationalization, and Keynesian economic management. Similar strategies could influence West European Christian Democrat parties, such as those in Germany and Italy, when faced with shrinking numbers of regular church-goers. Bridging strategies involve dissolving traditional boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, adopting whatever ideas and policy proposals seem more practical and effective regardless of their ideological origins, encouraging fuzzy, inclusive, and consensual party platforms, and fostering easy-entry, easy-exit shifting coalitions of informal support built around particular issues, rather than formal fee-paying membership and life-long loyalties. Bridging strategies trample upon sacerdotal principles and traditional one-of-us boundaries. Reducing dependence upon loyalists carries risks as well as benefits, including the dangers of facing widespread desertion in hard times, as well as requiring constant attention to crafting and maintaining popular support, and therefore greater attention to the dark arts of political marketing, including polling, publicity, and the press. But successful bridging strategies also allow parties to ‘cross-over’ and thereby break out of dependence upon limited sectors of the electorate. Therefore according to the theory developed by Przeworski and Sprague, the basis of cleavage politics is not an inevitable sociological process, instead they argue that political actors create, reinforce and maintain the links between political parties and social groups, within the context of institutional arenas, social structures and cultural histories that constrain the strategic alternatives facing politicians.

Building upon these ideas, we can theorize that one of the institutional contexts shaping the incentives for parties to develop strong and stable bonds with core groups of supporters or to adopt catchall bridging strategies concerns the basic type of electoral formula. In particular, Donald Horowitz has suggested that adoption of majoritarian electoral systems in deeply divided plural societies provides incentives for parties to ‘pool votes’ by broadening their electoral base beyond their core constituents. In support of this thesis, Ben Reilly has provided case study evidence that the Alternative Vote system has moderated ethnic appeals made by parties in elections held in Papua New Guinea from 1964 to 1972. If we extend this argument to other core cleavages of class, religion or language, this suggests that majoritarian electoral systems, exemplified by the Alternative Vote or 2nd Ballot systems, should generate strong incentives for political actors to adopt moderate or centrist bridging appeals in heterogeneous constituencies. Indeed this was the rationale for the adoption of the 2nd ballot system by de Gaulle for the Fifth French Republic, as the system was intended to reduce the extreme party fragmentation of the Fourth Republic by encouraging cooperation among rivals within party blocks on the left and right. Under majoritarian rules, parties and candidates must appeal to a great variety of diverse interests if they are to secure an absolute majority (50%+) of votes. As such, they face considerable pressures to adopt broad-church ‘catch-all’ appeals to multiple social groups.
distributed throughout the electorate, including working and middle class sectors, as well as different religious sects and creeds, and varied ethnic minorities. The 2nd Ballot system, with a run-off ballot amongst the two leading contenders, such as that used in single member districts in Hungarian parliamentary elections, and in the Lithuanian and Chilean presidential elections, could be expected to serve this function by encouraging cooperation within party blocs on the left and on the right. Plurality systems exemplified by first-past-the-post could serve a similar function, although with lower voting hurdles, and therefore more modest incentives for cross-group appeals, as parties and candidates can be elected with less than a majority of votes. Single transferable vote or party list elections in small multimember heterogeneous constituencies, each electing about 3-5 members per district, present a similar if weaker logic of electoral incentives where parties and candidates need to spread the distribution of their support. By contrast, in proportional electoral systems with low thresholds and large district magnitudes, exemplified by the Netherlands and Israel, parties and candidates can be returned to parliament by appealing to a far narrower segment of the population, which could be expected to exacerbate class, faith-based, or ethnic bonding strategies in plural societies. Therefore, if electoral systems shape the electoral incentives for political actors to either reinforce their bonds with core homogeneous groups of supporters, or to dilute these linkages with bridging appeals to heterogeneous groups, and if parties have the strategic capacity to respond rationally to these electoral rewards, then cleavage voting should be stronger under proportional than majoritarian electoral systems.

**Cultural Values and Modernization Theory**

Alternative cultural explanation emphasize that the strength of cleavage politics is primarily the product of ‘bottom-up’ developments in the nature of mass societies. In this view basic social identities of class, religion, gender and ethnicity cannot be created or manipulated at the whim of politicians; instead these reflect deep-rooted cultural phenomenon arising from enduring sociological processes. Political actors and institutions, in this view, are the superstructure arising from the broader social base. This perspective has been developed most fully in theories of societal modernization suggesting that multiple long-term secular trends have transformed political behavior in postindustrial societies in the late twentieth century. Modernization theories originated in the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, and these ideas were subsequently revived and popularized in the late 1950s and early 1960s by many developmental theorists, notably Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Lerner, Walt Rostow, and Karl Deutsch. More recently these ideas have been developed and applied to understanding changes in the mass basis of political culture in the work of Ronald Inglehart and Russell Dalton. Modernization theories suggest that the shift from agriculture towards industrial production leads towards growing prosperity, higher levels of education, and urbanization, which in turn lays the social foundations for democratic participation in the political system and the rise of mass-based party organizations rooted in their electoral base. Traditional societies are characterized by subsistence livelihoods largely based on farming, fishing, extraction and unskilled work, with low levels of literacy and education, predominately agrarian populations, minimum standards of living, and restricted social and geographic mobility. Citizens in agrarian societies are strongly rooted to local communities through ties of ‘blood and belonging’, including those of kinship, family, ethnicity and religion, as well as long-standing cultural bonds. The shift from traditional agrarian society towards industrialized society concerns the move from agricultural production to manufacturing, from farms to factories, from peasants to workers. Social trends accompanying these developments, include migration to metropolitan conurbations, the rise of the working class and urban bourgeoisie, rising living standards, the separation of church and state, increasing penetration of the mass media, the growth of Weberian bureaucratization and rational-legal authority in the state, the foundations of the early welfare state and the spread of primary schooling. This phase occurred in the Industrial Revolution in Britain during the mid-to-late 18th Century and spread throughout the Western world during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Daniel Bell popularized the view that after a certain period of industrialization a further distinct stage of development could be distinguished, as a non-linear process, with the rise of postindustrial societies. For Bell the critical tipping point was reached when the majority of the
work force moved from manufacturing into the service sector, working as lawyers, bankers, financial analysts, technologists, scientists, and professionals employed in the knowledge industries. According to Inglehart, the social and economic shifts characterizing post-industrial societies include the rise of a highly educated, skilled and specialized workforce; the population shifts from urban to suburban neighborhoods and greater geographic mobility including immigration across national borders; rising living standards and growing leisure time; rapid scientific and technological innovation; the expansion and fragmentation of mass media channels, technologies and markets; the growth of multi-layered governance with power shifting away from the nation state towards global and local levels; market liberalization and the expansion of non-profit social protection schemes; the erosion of the traditional nuclear family and growing equality of sex roles within the home, family and workforce.

Most importantly for voting behavior, modernization theories emphasize that in agrarian and industrial societies, religious and class identities orient citizens towards the political system and provide a simple, low-cost guide to voting, enabling information shortcuts that allowed people to decide which politicians and policies to support over successive contests. These cognitive shortcuts are particularly useful for the least sophisticated citizens with minimal literacy and schooling, and with limited access to political information from the mass media. By contrast, social trends in affluent postindustrial societies have led towards rising levels of education and cognitive-skills, providing the human capital that can help to master the complexities of public affairs and the policymaking process. Better-educated and more sophisticated citizens may have less need to rely upon social cues in electoral choices. Compared with earlier eras, the public in postindustrial societies today has many opportunities to learn about political events and current affairs from regular exposure to multiple non-partisan information sources in the press, television news, and the Internet. These sources allow voters to compare a range of parties, leaders, and public policy issues, potentially exposing them to many dissonant values beyond those shared with friends, family, and colleagues in their local community. Life-style changes in postindustrial society include the rise of a more socially and geographically mobile citizenry, less rooted in their local area. At the same time patterns of secularization in West European societies have emptied church pews and weakened the traditional organizational linkages between the churches and Christian Democratic parties. The capacity of trade unions to generate support among traditional working class communities for parties of the left may also have faded in those societies experiencing the decline of manufacturing industry and falling union membership rolls. Therefore, to sum up, if the modernization thesis correctly identifies the causes of any dealignment, then the strength of cleavage politics should vary systematically among different nations in accordance with levels of socioeconomic and human development. In particular, social class and religion should have least influence on voting behavior in postindustrial societies when compared with industrialized nations. The role of class and religion can also be expected to vary between post-Communist and developing societies, in the light of different political legacies, historical traditions, and social structures, such as the role of the Catholic Church in Latin America and Orthodox religion in Eastern Europe.

Part II: The Strength of Cleavage Politics

How can we evaluate the evidence for these accounts by comparing the available cross-national survey data? In measuring the strength of cleavage politics the classification of voting choices along a consistent left-right scale is critical to the reliability of the analysis. The vote in each legislative and presidential election was recoded into a consistent 10-point left-right scale, based on the party families identified in the CSES dataset by the international teams of collaborators. Party families were classified as follows: (1) Communist, (2) Ecology, (3) Socialist, (4) Social Democrat, (5) Left-liberal, (6) Liberal, (7) Christian Democrat, (8) Right-liberal, (9) Conservative, and (10) Nationalist/Religious. Parties that could not be categorized reliably by the traditional left-right scale were excluded from the analysis, including regional, ethnic, agrarian, and independent parties. In interpreting the results, a positive coefficient denotes greater voting support for parties of the right. The 10-point scale captures gradations within voting blocs, for example differences between countries in support for communist, socialist and social democratic
parties of the left. For ease of interpretation, however, to illustrate the simple distribution of voting without any prior controls, the 10-point scale was collapsed into a left-wing voting block (including the parties coded from 1-5) and a right wing bloc (6-10). The CSES data was weighted to produce national samples of equal size. Table 5.1 illustrates the distribution of voting support for the left-right voting blocks showing the legislative elections ranging across the spectrum from Japan, Mexico and Peru, where the right block parties predominated, down to Britain, Denmark and the Ukraine, where the left block were in the clear majority.

[Figure 5.1 about here]

For the independent variables, the models monitored the effects of the standard social cleavages that are usually found to influence voting. Models first entered the demographic factors of age (in years) and gender (men=1, women=0). The main indicators commonly associated closely with socioeconomic status were then entered including education (using a 4-point scale from only primary school to university qualifications), household income (using a standardized 5-point quintile scale), occupational class (using a five-point scale recoding the respondent’s employment), and whether the respondent was a union member (0/1). In addition, the main language spoken at home (coded 0/1) was employed to gauge linguistic majorities, and the strength of religiosity was compared using the frequency of attending religious services. Lastly, in order to compare the strength of social identities against alternative measures of political ideology, the 10-point left-right self-placement scale was included. Comparison with alternative regression models were tested, to see if the inclusion or ordering of certain variables made a significant difference to the interpretation of the analysis, and the results of the core model presented here were found to be reliable and stable irrespective of the exact operationalization.

The social characteristics are presented most simply in Figure 5.2, showing the percentage of each group that voted for either the right-wing or left-wing bloc in the pooled sample of legislative elections in 28 nations, without any prior controls. Multivariate regression analysis then used the 10-point left-right voting scale as the dependent variable with the independent variables entered in the order listed.

[Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 about here]

The results of the baseline regression model for the pooled sample of legislative elections in 28 nations are presented in Table 5.1. In this analysis, Model A included the structural variables then Model B added the measure of left-right ideology. The results in Model A show two patterns. First, in the pooled sample all the standard structural factors proved significantly related to left-right voting choice in these elections, in the expected direction, confirming many previous studies. Across all countries, younger voters proved slightly more leftwing than their parents and grandparents. Men proved significantly more rightwing than women, displaying the modern gender gap that first emerged in the United States. Overall among the indicators of SES, union membership proved the strongest predictor of voting behavior, followed by income and then education. Language was also important, with linguistic minorities more likely to support parties of the left. Among all the structural factors, the strength of religiosity emerged as by far the best predictor of voting support for parties of the right. Secondly, however, although all the factors proved to be statistically significant, nevertheless all the structural variables in the pooled sample explained only 7% of the variance in voting behavior, as summarized by the adjusted R^2. Once the additional ideological measure of the respondent’s left-right position was added in Model B, however, the proportion of variance explained by the model rose to 25% (measured by the adjusted R^2). In this model, although all the structural variables remain significant and in the predicted direction, nevertheless none of these proved as strongly related to how people voted as left-right ideology.

[Table 5.2 about here]

But how does this pattern vary across elections in different nations? And in particular does the strength of cleavage politics vary, as different theories suggest, according to (a) the basic type of electoral system and (b) the level of socioeconomic development in a country? To examine this further the results were broken down in a series of regression models for each election, with the results presented in Table 5.2. Given some minor differences in the coding and
inclusion of certain variables in the different national election studies, the comparison of separate models run in each election proved more reliable than models pooled by the type of electoral system and level of development. Elections are ranked by the adjusted $R^2$ to summarize the amount of variance in voting behavior explained by each of the models.

*Socioeconomic Status*

Many observers have documented the decline of traditional cleavage politics based on socioeconomic status and religion in Western Europe, although there has been considerable dispute about the most appropriate measurement and classification of these phenomena. The most comprehensive analysis of the available evidence of postwar trends in class politics in twenty postindustrial nations by Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999) suggests that some degree of dealignment has occurred in many European countries where these linkages used to be strong, and these findings are replicated irrespective of the alternative measures of social class employed for analysis. Even commentators who had argued most strongly in the mid-1980s that class still mattered in Britain, if a revised classification and measurement was used, have accepted more recently that some degree of class dealignment has now occurred. Since the impact of socioeconomic status can be measured, categorized and analyzed in many ways, reflecting alternative conceptions of the underlying concept, we will use alternative indicators to see if these make any substantial difference to interpreting the results.

*Household Income*

The cleavage by socioeconomic status (SES) is commonly understood to represent the basic economic and material inequalities in any society. SES can be gauged by household income, the respondent’s or head of household’s occupational status, educational qualifications, and, as a related proxy, union membership. Employment in the public or private sectors, and shared lifestyle characteristics, function as alternative indicators. The primary classification used in this study is based upon a 5-point standardized household income scale as the most reliable cross-national indicator, given substantial differences in the structure of the labor force in postindustrial and industrial societies, and also the classification of occupation was not included in some election studies in the CSES. Income is a basic indicator of socioeconomic status although, of course, there can be affluent households among the skilled manual workers, such as among self-employed plumbers or electricians, as well as less well-off white-collar workers, such as secretaries, shop assistants, and nurses. Across the pooled sample the analysis shows a steady rise in voting support for parties of the right among more affluent household groups, as expected. The voting gap between the richest and poorest households was 11-percentage points, a significant difference. When the analysis was broken down by country, the multivariate models showed that higher income proved a significant predictor of righting voting in about one third of the elections under comparison, including in all the Anglo-American democracies, as well as in the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Russia and Mexico.

*Occupational Class*

But are these results due to the use of income to denote socioeconomic status? Because the definition and classification of occupational class produces little consensus in the literature we also need to compare alternative indicators. The respondent’s own main occupation (rather than the head of household, to avoid a gender bias) was classified into five categories: senior managerial and professional, technicians and associated professional, other skilled white-collar (including clerical and service sector workers), skilled manual (such as plant and machinery operators), and unskilled manual (including construction, miners and agricultural laborers). This five-fold classification reflects different levels of pay, skills and qualifications, as well as job autonomy and authority. In the pooled sample, without any prior controls, the results show the predicted polarized pattern; almost two-thirds (63%) of managers and professionals voted for parties of the right, compared with less than half (49%) of the unskilled manual workers, producing a substantial and significant gap, reflecting that already observed by income. Even if there has been secular dealignment over time, as many studies indicate, nevertheless occupational class continues to predict pattern of voting choice in the pooled sample. At the same time we need to be cautious when generalizing about this pattern, as important variations
emerge once the analysis is broken down by nation. In the multivariate regression models, with controls for income and union membership, occupational class is a significant predictor of voting choices in only three nations (Britain, the Netherlands, and Romania). If income and union membership are dropped from the model, class becomes significant in two additional nations (Australia and the Czech Republic).

**Trade Union Membership**

Trade union membership is another proxy measure commonly closely related to occupational class, although this association may have weakened over the years in countries where unions have sought to diversify their traditional blue collar industrial base through expanding their membership among clerical, service, and professional employees. Overall levels of union membership vary substantially around the world, with density levels remaining strongest in the mid-1990s in many post-Communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the smaller Nordic welfare states. There are many reasons why union membership should help to predict patterns of party support. Where trade unions are strongly linked to socialist and social democratic parties they can provide organizational resources and mobilizing capacity in election campaigns, including local networks of volunteers, office communication facilities like computers, telephones, and copiers, and financial assistance. Membership of the organized labor movement can also be understood as an expression of subjective class-consciousness, while those who actively attend union meetings become part of social networks that can reinforce left-wing attitudes and partisan affiliations. The results of the analysis in Table 5.1 confirms that even after controlling for other social factors, union membership was significantly linked to voting choices in one third of the elections where this measure was available, proving to be particularly strongly related in West European states (Sweden, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain) and the Anglo-American democracies (Britain, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand), and by comparison to be insignificant throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

**Education**

Education is the last variable under analysis that is closely associated with socioeconomic status, with school and university qualifications determining many subsequent opportunities in the work force and society. Where education is closely related to social class, we would expect university graduates to be more rightwing in voting choice, even through there could be cross-cutting pressures as numerous studies have also found education to be one of the most powerful characteristics that is consistently associated with liberal attitudes towards many social and political issues. Moreover in countries that have experienced rapid socioeconomic development, education is often strongly associated with other crosscutting cleavages, such as age. The results of the analysis show that overall, with or without any prior controls, in the pooled sample education proved a relatively poor predictor of voting choice. When broken down by nations, patterns in the multivariate models in Table 5.2 also proved inconsistent: in countries such as Norway, the Ukraine, and Romania, as expected, greater education was positively associated with support for parties on the right. In contrast, however, in some countries this relationship proved negative, including in Israel, Switzerland, and Germany, where the more educated proved more leftwing in orientation. The impact of education generates patterns that differ across societies. The analysis so far suggests two main conclusions about the impact of socioeconomic status on voting behavior. First, of all the alternative indicators of social status that we have compared, income emerges as the most significant and consistent indicator of voting choices across the range of societies within the CSES dataset, although social class and union membership were important in some nations. Yet even income was only a significant predictor of voting choice in the expected direction -- with more affluent households showing greater support for parties on the right -- in one third of the countries under comparison.

**Religion**

For Lipset and Rokkan, the other classic pillar of partisan alignment in postwar Western Europe was religion. Many accounts suggest that in recent decades the process of secularization has eroded habitual church going and religious faith in Western Europe. Nevertheless religious beliefs remain strong in many traditional societies, as well as in the United States, and during the
last decade there may even have been a revival of organized religion in post-Communist Europe. Even if some degree of secularization has been experienced in many societies in Western Europe, the results of the analysis demonstrate that religion remains more strongly and more consistently related to voting choice than any of the indicators of socioeconomic status. In the pooled model, almost three-quarters (70%) of the most devout (those who reported attending religious services at least once per week) voted for parties of the right. By contrast, among the least religious, who never attended religious services, less than half (45%) voted for the right. The substantial 25-point mean voting gap by religiosity proved far stronger than that produced by any of the alternative indicators of socioeconomic status. Across all countries, Catholic voters proved more rightwing than Protestants, while atheists were among the most leftwing of any of the social groups under comparison.

The multivariate analysis in Table 5.2 shows that the strength of religiosity (as measured by frequency of attending religious services) consistently predicted support for parties of the right and the association proved significant in two-thirds of the elections where data was available, even with prior social controls. Religiosity was particularly strongly related to voting choice in Israel, the Netherlands and Belgium, all countries where religious divisions have long been regarded as some of the most critical components of cleavage politics, as well as in Hungary and the Czech Republic. The explanation for the strength of the linkage is that churches in Western Europe have long been strongly associated with Christian Democrat and Conservative parties, as well as representing traditional moral values concerning diverse issues such as marriage and divorce, gender equality, and gay rights. In the United States, as well, 'born again' fundamentalist churches are closely linked to the Republicans, especially in the South, emphasizing traditional moral values such as the Right to Life movement and the use of prayer in school. The role of organized religion elsewhere has developed within varying contexts, for example in Ireland, Poland and Italy the Catholic Church has usually expressed conservative positions on issues such as divorce and reproductive rights, and in Latin American societies the church has supported more liberal causes and defended human rights in opposition to the state.

Demographic factors: Generation and Gender

Traditional socialization theories suggest that political attitudes and values can be expected to reflect decisive experiences shaping the formative years of particular generations. These contrasts are exemplified by the experience of growing up with poverty and job insecurity during the interwar Great Depression era of unemployment, inflation and soup kitchens, in comparison with the baby-boom generation that came of age during the postwar era of affluence and the basic safety-net established by the welfare state in postindustrial societies. Substantial generational contrasts can also be expected following the rapid social and political transformations occurring in post-Communist Europe during the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet state, and the sharp shocks of market adjustments. The 'Asian tigers’ such as Taiwan and the Republic of Korea have experienced equally profound social and economic transformations in shifting from agrarian to industrialized societies during the late twentieth century. The more fundamental and radical the social change, the stronger the generational differences that can be expected to flow from these developments. By itself, in the pooled sample across countries, all the main age groups display similar patterns of voting behavior. Yet the result of the multivariate analysis of voting choice by age group broken down by countries shows two distinct patterns (see Figure 5.3). In one or two West European nations, including Britain and Portugal, the generation that grew up during the interwar years proves slightly more conservative than the younger postwar cohorts. The generational voting gap in these countries is not large but it is significant. Similar patterns are evident in Australia, Norway and Germany, although not approaching conventional levels of statistical significance. The theory of post-materialism developed by Ronald Inglehart provides perhaps the most plausible explanations for this phenomenon, suggesting that growing levels of affluence and the existence of the welfare state safety net experienced by the post-war baby boom generation in Western Europe fostered more liberal values among the young compared with their parent’s or grandparent’s generations, leading younger voters to prioritize issues such as environmental protection, sexual equality, and international human rights, advocated by many parties of the
left. In sharp contrast, the reverse pattern is evident in some post-Communist societies, where the youngest generation proves far more rightwing than older voters. This pattern is most evident in Russia, Hungary, and Romania. The values of older generations in post-Communist nations were shaped by the existence of the managed economy and the security of the welfare state for health care, education and pensions. The youngest generation growing up in Central and Eastern Europe have had the greatest experience of the neo-liberal market reforms and ‘shock’ therapies experienced in these countries, as well as the free and fair elections held during the last decade and the consolidation of representative democracy. The younger generation has adapted most rapidly to social and political change so that they now express greater support to parties on the right in this region, while the older generation remains more wedded to the values expressed by the reformed Communist and the Social Democratic parties of the left.

[Figure 5.3 about here]

Generational changes are important, not just for themselves, but also for the way that these trends have altered the voting behavior of women and men in different ways. During the postwar era the conventional wisdom in political science held that women in Western democracies were politically more conservative than men. Gender differences in party preferences were never as marked as the core cleavages of class and religion; there were no mass ‘women’s parties’ in Western Europe, such as those associated with trade unions and churches. Nevertheless ‘women’s conservatism’ was seen as a persistent and well-established phenomenon. Part of the reason concerns the patterns of religiosity we have already observed, since more women than men tend to be regular churchgoers. During the 1980s this conventional wisdom came under increasing challenge. In many West European countries a process of gender dealignment appeared, with studies reporting minimal sex differences in voting choice and party preferences. And in America the phenomenon of the gender gap manifested itself in the early 1980s, with women shifting their allegiances towards the Democratic Party, while men moved towards the Republican Party on a stable and consistent basis, reversing the previous pattern of voting and partisanship. The initial explanations of the gender gap in United States focused on factors specific to American politics, such as the appeal of President Reagan, programmatic differences between the parties on issues such as reproductive rights and childcare, or particular social conditions affecting American women. But the most recent comparative research has found that far from being specific to the United States, there is a broader generational transformation evident in many established democracies, so that while older women remain slightly more rightwing than older men, among younger generations in affluent nations this situation is commonly reversed. In post-Communist and developing societies, however, reflecting historical experiences, the generational patterns are different.

[Figure 5.4 about here]

The gender gap in the pooled sample of all countries is negligible: 53% of women support rightwing parties compared with 55% of men. Yet once voting patterns are analyzed by nation, the gender gap becomes significant in about one third of the elections under comparison. Nevertheless there are mixed patterns, with women slightly more leftwing than men in a few countries, including Belgium, Canada, and the United States, while women are more conservative than men in Israel. Moreover interesting patterns emerge once the patterns are broken down by age and by type of society. As Figure 5.4 shows, in established democracies there has been a reversal of the traditional gender gap, so that older women remain slightly more conservative than older men, while among the younger generation women are now more leftwing than younger men. Because the values of older women and younger women ‘cancel out’ in the overall figures, there appears to be no significant gender gap in many older democracies. If these patterns persist, however, as cohorts change, then the process of demographic replacement, as older generations die out and younger generations take their place, can be expected to gradually shift women increasingly towards the left in these nations, producing a modern gender gap as in the United States. In contrast among newer democracies, as we can see, there is a different pattern: among the older generation women remain more leftwing than men, perhaps because women have been affected more than men by the economic shock therapy and the cuts in welfare benefits like state pensions and childcare. Yet among the youngest generation in these societies
the gender gap disappears. The patterns lend further confirmation to the existence of the generational-gender gap that has been observed in a wider range of 75 societies using the World Values Surveys. The relationship between gender and voting choices is therefore complicated by the existence of crosscutting generational cleavages and by societal histories and cultures.

Linguistic Cleavages

We also compared the existence of linguistic cleavages, which are expected to divide party politics most deeply in plural multilingual societies such as Canada, Switzerland and Belgium. The predominant language was identified in each nation, and coded by the language usually spoken at home to define linguistic majorities. Of course this is only an imperfect measure, as second-generational immigrants could be equally fluent in more than one language, but this provides a proxy measure for ethno-linguistic divisions. The results of the analysis proved particularly strong in Switzerland (divided by cantons between the German-speaking majority and the French and Italian minorities), Canada, Belgium (split between Francophones and Flemish Walloons), the Ukraine (almost evenly divided between Ukrainian and Russian speakers), as well as significant minority communities in Israel, Taiwan, and Romania. These patterns would probably have been even stronger if we examined support for the ethno-linguistic regional parties separately, rather than left-right support, since ethno-linguistic cleavages often crosscut socioeconomic ones, and this pattern will be further analyzed in chapter 9 when looking in detail at ethnic minority politics.

Left-Right Ideology

Lastly as well as social cleavages we also expected that the ideological position of voters would play an important role in predicting patterns of party support. The left-right scale has been found to be one of the most familiar ways that citizens use to identify their own position and that of the parties along the political spectrum. In the CSES survey, three-quarters of the public could identify their location on this scale. Since we expect these values to be generated by social cleavages, the self-placement of respondents on the 10-point left-right ideological scale was entered last sequentially in the regression models, after the structural variables. The results show that ideological values were significant predictors of voting choice in every country except for two nations (Belarus and Taiwan). The presidential election in Belarus pitted President Lukashenko's, an old-style ex-Soviet-style apparatchik, against the former reformist prime minister and opposition leader, Mikhail Chigir, but official observers declared that the election was hardly free and fair, while in Taiwan the parties were identified mainly by nationalist issues, about relationships with mainland China, rather than by left-right ideology. Elsewhere the ideological position of voters proved to be strongly and consistently related to party support.

Part III: The Effects of Electoral Systems on Cleavage Politics

Given the patterns that we have established, the key question that remains concerns how far the strength of cleavage politics can be related systematically to either the type of electoral system (as suggested by incentive-based theories) or alternatively to levels of socioeconomic development (as predicted by culture-based sociological accounts). The adjusted \( R^2 \) in Table 5.1 summarizes the amount of variance in voting behavior in each election explained by the social cleavages that we have analyzed so far. The results show considerable cross-national differences, from elections such as those in Sweden, Israel and the Ukraine with a high \( R^2 \) where social structure and ideology contributed strongly to whether people voted on the left or right of the political spectrum, down to others such as Taiwan, Peru and the Republic of Korea that are ranked at the bottom of the table.

If the logic of the incentive-based theory is correct then we should expect to find that in majoritarian electoral systems parties will focus their electoral strategies on catch-all bridging appeals, in order to try to maximize their electoral support to secure a plurality or majority of votes that is necessary to win elected office. Alternatively under proportional representation electoral systems with low thresholds parties can use bonding strategies among a narrower constituency and still get elected. Strategic theories are based on the premise that parties and candidates can either reinforce or weaken the political salience of social identities like class and religion by their
use of either bridging or bonding appeals. Hence socialist parties seeking to mobilize their core working class base can emphasize the issues of economic equality, redistributive fiscal policies, and investment in welfare services for health and education. In the same way, if Conservative and Christian Democratic parties want to appeal to their core constituency they can focus on traditional moral values concerning marriage and the family as well as heartland issues such as law and order, defense, and immigration. If, however, they seek to broaden their electoral support parties can focus on centrist issues such as the importance of economic growth, or the need for efficient public services.

To examine the evidence for incentive-based theories, Figure 5.5 compares the strength of cleavage politics, measured by the $R^2$ listed in Table 5.2 in legislative and presidential elections held under majoritarian, combined and proportional electoral systems. The $R^2$ coefficient can be understood as the amount of variance in the left-right voting scale explained by the combined effects of social structure and political ideology. The result of the comparison confirms although there are considerable differences within each category, nevertheless on balance cleavage politics was stronger under proportional electoral systems. As summarized by the mean $R^2$, the strength of cleavage politics was 25% in the fourteen elections conducted under majoritarian systems, 24% in the nine elections conducted using combined systems, but 36% in the fifteen elections held under PR systems. That is to say, in predicting how many people voted for parties on the left and the right of the party scale, over one-third of the total variance in PR elections was generated by social structure and ideology. As discussed in subsequent chapters, comprehensive explanations of voting behavior would also include many other factors, including patterns of partisanship, the retrospective record of the government's performance on major economic and social issues, the popular appeal of party images, party leaders, and prospective policy platforms, and the impact of campaign events and media coverage. But nevertheless social structure and political ideology remain important by explaining between one-quarter and one-third of the variance in left-right electoral behavior in the electoral systems under comparison.

But might the results be due to the type of societies that used different forms of elections? Cultural accounts emphasize that in developing and industrialized societies, traditional social identities of class and religion provide voters with strong cues influencing voting behavior and party loyalties. In postindustrial societies, however, modernization theories suggest that rising levels of education, greater cognitive skills, the erosion of traditional communities, and richer information resources from the mass media have reduced voter's reliance upon traditional social identities and habitual party attachments, increasingly replacing the politics of loyalties with the politics of choice. Figure 5.6 compares the strength of cleavage politics, using the same procedure as before, but dividing societies into industrial and postindustrial levels of human development, classified by the Human Development Index discussed earlier in chapter 1. Again there are important variations within each category but nevertheless the results show quite clearly that, far from being weaker, in fact cleavage politics remains stronger in postindustrial societies. The average amount of variance in voting behavior ($R^2$) explained by cleavage politics was 24% in industrial societies but it was 33% in postindustrial nations. Many other studies have demonstrated that the cues of class and religion have become less influential in many established democracies, but nonetheless social identities continue to have a stronger impact upon voting choices in postindustrial nations. Even if the social bonds anchoring groups to parties have indeed weakened in these nations, as dealignment theories suggest, but this does not mean that they have thereby become irrelevant to electoral choices. Converse's learning model maintained that the strength of attachment to parties should grow with a history of support for one's preferred party. In many industrial societies and newer democracies, with much shorter experience of a series of free and fair elections, and with less consolidated patterns of party competition along the left-right scale, these bonds between political parties and voters' social identities have yet to develop to anything like the same degree.

Accordingly we can conclude that on balance the evidence leans more towards incentive-based than cultural accounts of social dealignment. Of course the indicators remain limited in many important ways. In particular the inclusion of both presidential and legislative elections
could produce some important problems of interpretation, if presidential elections tended towards
stronger bridging appeals than parliamentary contests. This could be a persuasive criticism
because we would expect presidential elections to focus more on personalities and less on
ideological and issue-based appeals. For the time being we will assume that the results
presented in this chapter are the product of the electoral system, not any differences between
presidential and parliamentary systems, and we will examine this issue further in subsequent
chapters that analyze the impact of the personal vote and party reputation for party leaders and
parliamentary candidates. The comparative framework is another important limitation. In the best
of all possible worlds it would be desirable to have electoral studies drawn from many more
countries and regions of the world. In particular, the CSES dataset lacks any newer democracies
and industrialized nations using majoritarian systems for parliamentary elections. Against this, it
has to be said that in fact this dataset represents the broadest range of integrated election studies
that is currently available, including electoral democracies from most continents. As cross-
national collaboration develops among teams of electoral studies, future comparisons will be able
to evaluate how far these generalizations hold within a wider range of contexts.

Moreover without time-series data we are unable to establish trends to demonstrate
whether there has been greater social dealignment within majoritarian systems. The incentive-
based explanation essentially claims that the type of electoral system will predict the
contemporary strength of cleavage politics in different places. If the formal or informal rules of the
game change in important regards, for example if the social composition of constituencies
becomes either more homogeneous or more heterogeneous through the process of boundary
revisions, demographic shifts, or patterns of population migration, then we would expect that this
could have an impact by changing the electoral incentives facing political actors and thereby
weakening or strengthening voter-party bonds. Yet we have no direct historical evidence to
sustain this proposition. What secondary evidence does suggest, however, is that cleavage
politics does appear to have eroded further and faster in postindustrial societies with majoritarian
electoral systems. The most extensive examination of trends in cleavage politics by Franklin et al.
examined election surveys from the mid-sixties until the late-eighties in a dozen postindustrial
societies. The results strongly indicate that countries with majoritarian electoral systems during
this period saw the earliest decline of cleavage politics, including in Canada, the United States,
Britain, Australia, France, and New Zealand. Therefore the type of electoral system may play an
important role in helping to explain the timing of the process of dealignment, and the underlying
conditions in which this occurs, although as a static theory the incentive-based ‘top-down’ theory
cannot by itself satisfactorily explain the process of decline per se, unless the workings of the
electoral system alter in important ways. The theory suggests that we should find significant
differences among countries today, but it lacks a dynamic element.

Lastly, perhaps the most important criticism that could be made of the results is that we
have not established the direction of causality in any relationship; in particular the electoral
system is treated throughout the discussion as exerting an exogenous impact upon parties, which
then shape the political salience of social cleavages. This seems a reasonable assumption in
established democracies where the electoral rules is usually a more or less permanent institution
which generates ‘hard’ incentives and opportunities for particular patterns of behavior by voters,
campaign managers, and party leaders alike. In most older democracies the basic electoral
system has existed for more than a century, although major electoral reforms were introduced in
the last decade in a few countries such as Italy, New Zealand, and Britain, and the specific
administrative arrangements governing voting procedures have altered more regularly. As a
result it is appropriate to regard electoral systems in these nations as exerting an independent
effect on political actors. Yet of course at the time that electoral systems are initially adopted, it
seems plausible that parties will seek to adopt the type of rules serving their rational self-interest.
Hence minor parties in deeply divided plural societies exemplified by Israel and Ukraine will seek
to adopt PR arrangements while major parties in more homogeneous cultures can be expected to
prefer majoritarian rules. In the transition process to democracy, the party system can exert a
decisive influence upon the electoral rules, and therefore in newer democracies it seems more
appropriate to regard electoral systems as both dependent upon parties (when analyzing which
systems are adopted) and also as an independent variable (when explaining the effect of the rules on political behavior).

The central claim in incentive-based theories is not that electoral systems create the social cleavages or their political relevance, but merely that the initial adoption of certain rules (for whatever reason) will create certain incentives to either maintain, reinforce (and possibly exacerbate) one-of-us bonding, or alternatively to modify, downplay (and possibly erode) group consciousness in the political arena by encouraging catch-all bridging strategies. As discussed more fully in chapter 9, this process can be illustrated most clearly by particularly divisive ethnic cleavages, such as the role of racial conflict over civil rights in 1960s America, the clash between Muslims and Christians in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or discord among Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. In these societies, political actors can either seek to mobilize their base by heightening ethnic tensions through adopting populist rhetoric directed to own-group appeals, or alternatively they can seek to maximize their support by downplaying such appeals and proposing consensual policies that will appeal to bridging constituencies. Similar logics follow the politicization of any other major social cleavage such as class and region. The evidence in this chapter suggests that the electoral rules of the game can contribute towards this process as majoritarian rules in heterogeneous geographic constituencies provide greater incentives towards moderate bridging strategies. But do we find similar patterns in terms of party loyalties to those evident concerning social identities? It is to this issue that we now turn.
### Table 5.1: Baseline models predicting rightwing voting support, pooled legislative elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A B</th>
<th>Model A S.E.</th>
<th>Model A Beta</th>
<th>Model A Sig.</th>
<th>Model B B</th>
<th>Model B S.E.</th>
<th>Model B Beta</th>
<th>Model B Sig.</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.05 **</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.04 **</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>A2001 Years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male)</td>
<td>.226</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.05 ***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.02 ***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>A2002 Male=1/Female=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.02 *</td>
<td></td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.02 **</td>
<td></td>
<td>A2003 Highest level of education of respondent. Primary 1, secondary 2, post-secondary technical 3, university 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.06 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.05 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>A2012 5-point scale of household income from lowest to highest quintile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union member</td>
<td>-.609</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>-.11 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-.374</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.07 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>A2005 Respondent is union member 1, else 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic majority</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.08 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.05 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>A2018 Language usually spoken at home. Linguistic majority 1, else 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.24 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.15 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>A2015 6-point strength of religiosity scale from never attend religious service (1) to attend at least weekly (6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDEOLOGY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.43 ***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>A3031 Position respondents placed themselves on the 10-point scale from left (0) to right (10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The figures represent the results of OLS multiple regression analysis models including unstandardized beta coefficients (B), standardized error (S.E.), standardized beta coefficients (Beta) and their significance (P). *** p.001 ** p.01 * p.05.

**Voting Choice**: For the dependent measure, votes for each party family are recoded using a 10-point scale ranging from left (low) to right (high) as follows: (1) Communist, (2) Ecology, (3) Socialist, (4) Social Democrat, (5) Left liberal, (6) Liberal, (7) Christian Democrat, (8) Right liberal, (9) Conservative', and (10) 'Nationalist/ Religious'. A positive coefficient indicates support for parties on the right. For details of the coding for the independent variables see Appendix B. The pooled sample of legislative elections includes 28 nations and 17,794 respondents. Data was weighted by A104_1 to ensure that the size of the sample is equal per nation.

Table 5.2: Predictors of right-wing voting support in legislative and presidential elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Type of election</th>
<th>Type of system</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex (Male)</th>
<th>Educ.</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Union Member</th>
<th>Linguistic majority</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Left-Right Position</th>
<th>Adjusted R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>Prop</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.267</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.461</td>
<td>.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Pres</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.153</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>-.308</td>
<td>-.124</td>
<td>.608</td>
<td>.657</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>-.179</td>
<td>-.173</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>-.206</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>-.172</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>Prop</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>-.175</td>
<td>.085</td>
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<td>-.206</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>-.172</td>
<td>.635</td>
<td>.512</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>Comb</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.389</td>
<td>.551</td>
<td>-.050</td>
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<td>-.110</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.440</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>.478</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>Prop</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.262</td>
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<td>-.133</td>
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<td>-.284</td>
<td>.873</td>
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<td>.539</td>
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<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>Prop</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>-.019</td>
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<td>-.055</td>
<td>-.550</td>
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<td>.390</td>
<td>.416</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>Prop</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.113</td>
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Notes: The figures represent the results of OLS multiple regression analysis models including unstandardized Beta coefficients (B) and their significance (P). ** p.001 ** p.01 * p.05. Blank cells represent missing data. Voting Choice: For the dependent measure, votes for each party family are recoded using a 10-point scale ranging from left (low) to right (high) as follows: (1) Communist, (2) Ecology, (3) Socialist, (4) Social Democrat, (5) Left liberal, (6) Liberal, (7) Christian Democrat, (8) Right liberal, (9) Conservative, and (10) Nationalist/ Religious. A positive coefficient indicates support for parties on the right. For details of the coding used for the independent variables see the baseline model in Table 5.1 and Appendix B. (i) Religiosity was measured by frequency of church attendance.

Figure 5.1: The distribution of support for the left-right voting blocks in legislative elections

**Left-Right Vote:** Party vote in legislative elections for the lower house classified on a 10-point scale ranging from communist (1) to Nationalist (10) then dichotomized into rightwing and leftwing blocks. Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 1996-2002.
Figure 5.2: The social characteristics of right-wing voters

**Left-Right Vote:** Party vote in legislative elections for the lower house classified on a 10-point scale ranging from communist (1) to Nationalist (10) dichotomized into rightwing and leftwing blocks. Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 1996-2002. Pooled sample.
Figure 5.3: Age cohorts and voting support

AGE COHORT

Cases weighted by CSESWGT

Notes:
*Left-Right Vote:* Party vote in legislative general elections classified on a 10-point scale ranging from communist (1) to Nationalist (10).
Figure 5.4: The gender-generation gap

Older Democracies

Age groups
Cases weighted by CSESWGT

Newer Democracies

Age groups
Cases weighted by CSESWGT

Notes:

Age groups: Younger (Low through 39 years old), Middle-aged (40 thru 59 years old), Older (60+).

Left-Right Vote: Party vote in legislative general elections classified on a 10-point scale ranging from communist (1) to Nationalist (10).

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002
Figure 5.5: The strength of cleavage politics by type of electoral system

Note: Legislative Election | Presidential Elections
Source: See Table 5.2
Figure 5.6: The strength of cleavage politics by type of society

Note: Postindustrial Societies  Industrial societies

Source: See Table 5.2


3 For a more recent argument that these stable patterns have persisted with considerable continuity displayed within the major ‘left’ and ‘right’ blocks, see Stephano Bartolini and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates, 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


6 The term 'catch-all' was first developed by Kirchheimer to describe the transformation of the German SDP when they abandoned their radical Marxist roots in the late 1950s. See Otto Kirchheimer. 1966. ‘The Transformation of Western European Party Systems.’ In Political Parties and Political Development, Eds. J. La Palombara and M. Weiner Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


23 For example in some cases regional parties like the Bloc Quebecois or the SNP are to the left, and in others to the right, of the political spectrum, so it seemed preferable to exclude these rather than coding them on a more arbitrary basis. The excluded parties all attracted relatively few voters in any country so their exclusion did not have a major effect on the interpretation of the results.

24 Missing data in some countries means that caution should be exercised in interpreting the results but nevertheless it seemed important to include the full range of indicators of socioeconomic status, given debates about the most appropriate measures. Other regression models were run alternatively excluding social class, linguistic minorities, and left-right position, as well as using different indicators of religiosity. Although this slightly altered the strength of the coefficients, as expected, this did not have a major impact on their significance or direction. Hence, for example, including income but not class in the models strengthened the coefficients for income but did not change its significance. All regression models were also checked for potential problems of multi-collinearity using tolerance statistics and were found to be unaffected by this.


29 Cramer’s V = 0.14 Sig. p.000.


Chapter 6
Party loyalties

Chapter 4 demonstrated the mechanical effects of the electoral rules upon party systems, but we know far less about their indirect psychological impact upon patterns of party loyalties. Part I briefly reviews both cultural modernization and rational choice accounts to establish the theoretical framework. Part II compares the strength of partisan identification, the social and political characteristics of partisans, and also how far these attachments vary under different electoral systems. Part III goes on to consider how far these partisan bonds, in conjunction with social identities, help to explain voting behavior in the countries under comparison.

I: Theories of Partisan Identification

Cultural modernization and partisan identification

Classic ‘Michigan’ theories of electoral behavior by Campbell et al., dominating the field of voting behavior in the United States for many decades, focused on individual-level voting choices rather than their broader institutional context. The model, derived from social psychology, suggested that most voters in the United States were anchored over successive elections, and sometimes for their lifetimes, by persistent loyalties to a particular party. Partisan identification was understood in the original theory as an affective orientation or ‘habit of the heart’, where American voters came to see themselves as habitual Democrats or Republicans, as part of their core self-identity, rather as they came to see themselves as Southerners or New Englanders, Catholics or Protestants, and fans of the Yankees or Red Sox. Partisan identification has two main components: its direction (in support for particular parties across the left-right spectrum) and its strength (whether people feel lasting bonds or whether they only lean towards a particular party). These attachments, acquired through the socialization process in early childhood and adolescence, were believed to provide citizens with a long-standing orientation towards electoral choices and their place within the political system. Partisan identification has been regarded as a stable anchor providing a cognitive short-cut that guided voting decisions and reduced the costs of participation, even where people lacked detailed information about the particular candidates standing for office, or if they had little understanding of complex policy issues and party programs. Because people saw themselves as Democrats or Republicans, they were thought to adopt political attitudes congruent with these identities, for example reflecting core beliefs about the need to reduce taxation in the GOP or the importance of preserving Medicare and Medicaid in the Democrats. Social structure remained an important component in this theory, as partisan identification was believed to be the product of a cohesive socialization process that reinforced the acquisition of early political values within the family, school, work group, and social milieu, so that attachments reflect long-standing structural cleavages of class, religion, gender, and race dividing the American electorate. Cultural accounts stress that habitual loyalties should be strengthened with age, as it takes time for people to acquire stable ties with parties. The theory emphasized that the existence of habitual partisan identities in the mass electorate had important consequences, not just for how voters decide, but also for the behavior of political actors and for processes of stable governance. According to this view, in most US elections each party sought to mobilize and get-out-the-vote for its ‘normal base’ of support. This concept requires splitting the actual vote cast for a party into two parts: a ‘normal’ or baseline vote to be expected from a group, based on their habitual behaviour over successive elections in the past, and the current deviation from that norm, due to the immediate circumstances of the specific election, such as particular leaders, events, and issues. The outcome of elections, and therefore American government, rested upon stable and predictable processes. For the traditional ‘Michigan’ model, therefore, most American voters were anchored psychologically to a particular party for long periods of time, perhaps for their lifetime, through unwavering attachments that are, in turn, rooted in social structure.

When the Michigan model was applied to other established democracies in Western Europe, including Britain, France and Norway, early electoral surveys confirmed that most voters
expressed a party identification and that this sense of attachment was strongly associated with voting behavior in these nations as well. In 1964, for example, 96% of British citizens identified with one of the three main parties, and 44% were ‘strong’ identifiers. Nevertheless even in the 1960s Butler and Stokes observed that vote switching was more often accompanied by a parallel shift of party identification in Britain than in the United States. A voluminous literature in voting behavior developed around the topic and from the mid-1970s onwards the Michigan school came under increasing challenge. Panel studies monitoring the behavior of the same voters over successive elections in various countries, including in Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, and Britain, commonly reported that party identification switched over successive elections in tandem with voting, as well as responding to short-term changes in material conditions and other preferences, rather than proving a stable, enduring anchor for electoral choices and political orientations. If party identification and voting choices essentially co-varied as two sides of the same coin in Western Europe, representing the expression of current political preferences, then models explaining voting decisions which include party identification as an independent variable could prove circular, artificially inflating the impact of party identification on vote choice. Others argued that the concept of party identification needed to be reinterpreted as it represented a running tally of party performance, and therefore a more rational orientation, rather than a simple affective sense of loyalty.

But the most sustained and fundamental critique of the Michigan school came from accounts of societal modernization suggesting that, even if we accept the traditional concepts and measures, there is substantial evidence that traditional party loyalties - particularly strong attachments - have been gradually fraying in many advanced industrialized societies from the 1970s onwards, including in the United States. Social psychological theories of partisan dealignment make three major claims: (i) in postindustrial societies, many citizens no longer have a strong and stable affective identities anchoring them to political parties; (ii) as a result many voters have become more volatile in their electoral behavior and increasingly willing to desert the major parties, thereby producing erratic waves of support for minor parties; and also (iii) short-term factors have become more influential components in voting choice, including the impact of the outgoing government’s policy record, party programs on the major issues of the day, the personal qualities and experience of political leaders and candidates, and the role of the mass media and campaigns. Dealignment theories suggest that in established democracies this development could have significant consequences for many aspects of voting behavior, by potentially boosting electoral volatility, the proportion of late-deciders and non-voters, split-ticket voting, as well as possibly reducing turnout and weakening beliefs about the legitimacy of the political process and trust in government. At systemic level, with less ballast, a fall in partisanship could generate more unpredictable outcomes, strengthen the prospects for minor parties, further fractionalize party systems, and therefore complicate coalition building and the government formation process.

Considerable survey evidence has now accumulated that party attachments have eroded in many established democracies during the late twentieth century, although heated debate continues about the causes and the consequences of this phenomenon. Less systematic research is available to make reliable comparisons with the strength of voter-party attachments in elections held in a wide range of newer transitional and consolidating democracies, although most studies suggest that stable party loyalties will take years or even decades to develop. Schmitt and Holmberg developed one of the most comprehensive analyses of trends in the United States and Western Europe, based on national elections studies and the Eurobarometer from the mid-1960s until the early 1990s. The authors were fairly cautious about drawing any sweeping conclusions from the data but they noted that a general decline of partisanship had occurred in many places, although they emphasized that the depth and spread of any partisan dealignment differed across countries and time. More recently, Dalton analyzed trends in national election studies conducted in nineteen advanced industrialized democracies from the mid-sixties to the late-nineties, excluding the ‘newer’ (third-wave) democracies of Spain, Portugal and Greece. The study concluded that the proportion of party identifiers dropped across all advanced industrialized democracies under comparison, with a fall that was statistically robust in two-thirds of the nations. The significant erosion in the proportion of strong identifiers occurred in
all but three nations (Finland, the Netherlands, and Denmark). The similarity of trends across postindustrial democracies led Dalton to conclude that similar processes of modernization within these countries, particularly the effects of generational change and rising cognitive mobilization, had caused these developments: “In short, the process of cognitive mobilization has increased voter’s political sophistication and their ability to deal with the complexities of politics – and this may have decreased the functional need for partisanship among many better educated and politically involved citizens.” This assumes that partisan attachments function as an organizing device or perceptual prism for political evaluations, facilitating judgments about unfamiliar candidates and cueing attitudes towards new issues, a process thought particularly important for voting choice among less informed citizens. Cultural explanations of the strength of partisan identification typically focus at individual-level upon the social characteristics of voters, including levels of education and age, as well as stressing the linkages between partisanship and subsequent political attitudes and behavior, such as feelings of political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy, and propensity to vote.

Rational-choice institutionalism

The social psychological perspective emphasizes long-term processes of societal modernization affecting decision-making processes in the mass electorate. If there has been a weakening of party bonds, then the primary cause is believed to lie in secular trends such as growing levels of cognitive skills, the rise of the mass media, or generational shifts in post-material values and issue concerns. Yet ever since Downs, a substantial literature has provided an alternative understanding of the notion of partisan identification, where the role of political actors is regarded as critical, in particular how parties place themselves strategically when competing along the left-right ideological spectrum. Schmitt and Holmberg exemplify this claim when they argue that the strength of partisanship lies in the hands of political actors more than in society. If so, then we might expect to find considerable cross-national variations in the vitality of voter-party bonds, both within postindustrial societies, and also within the broader universe of electoral democracies, based on systematic features of electoral institutions and party systems. In this perspective, the strength of partisan attachments in different countries vary according to factors such as the extent of party competition and the degree of ideological polarization around divisive issues; the historical legacy of party systems including the continuity of older parties and the mobilization of new contestants; the performance of parties in government when serving the needs of their core supporters; the structure of party organizations and the strength of their linkages with affiliated associations like unions and churches; systematic organizational and ideological differences among party families such as the Greens, Communists and Social Democrats; the primary face-to-face and mediated channels of campaign communications; the basic type of electoral rules; and the overarching constitutional arrangements such as differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, as well as federal or unitary states.

Many of these explanations would take us far beyond the scope of this limited study but nevertheless we can examine some of the characteristics of parties and electoral systems that could plausibly be associated with strong partisanship. Rational choice institutionalism accounts suggest that political actors such as party leaders, campaign managers and parliamentary candidates respond to the electoral incentives present in their broader context, particularly to the logic of electoral rules and party competition. Strong party-voter linkages and affective loyalties are commonly regarded as an electoral advantage for parties, by helping to mobilize support and to provide a cushion of true believers in good times and bad. Yet under majoritarian rules parties have a strong incentive to develop bridging appeals in order to meet higher electoral thresholds to office. In this context they may decide to advocate broad and diffuse ideological positions, to adopt consensual issue stances, and to stress their competence at managing government, in the attempt to maximize their support across all groups in the electorate even if they calculate that this strategy comes at the cost of some erosion of their core party identifiers. By contrast, under proportional rules parties can get elected to office with a lower share of the vote and in this context they have a stronger incentive to adopt bonding appeals based on their core issues and party image, as an economical way of mobilizing their own party identifiers. Where political actors
focus upon partisan appeals this process, in turn, is thought to have an indirect influence upon the enduring potency of party-voter attachments among the mass public.  

II: The Strength of Partisan Identification

Comparing voting behavior in many countries allows us to test these theories although we immediately encounter debates about the best measurement of partisan identities. The standard question on partisanship, carried since 1952 in the American National Election Study and in many subsequent election studies elsewhere, has traditionally asked: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" The follow-up items then probe for the strength of any partisanship. The phrase ‘usually’ is thought to prompt respondents to consider long-term orientations beyond voting in the particular election. By contrast, the core concept of partisan identification that we can compare from the CSES survey was measured by the following questions:

(i) [Party identification] “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (A3004)

(ii) [Direction] If ‘yes’, “Which party is that?” [A3005_1]

(iii) [Strength] “Do you feel very close to this [party/party block], somewhat close, or not very close?” (A3012)

The key difference is that the first question in the CSES battery does not carry any cues referring to specific parties, unlike the standard items carried in the NES and many other national election studies. The choice of wording could be important, as direct comparison across items in the NES and BES suggests that the CSES version generates significantly lower numbers of partisans than the ‘cued’ question. Nevertheless the essential point for cross-national analysis is the consistency of the item used across different election studies, to generate reliable comparisons. The first part of the battery was carried in all the national election studies contained in the dataset.

The basic distribution of partisans by nation based on this measure is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The results show considerable contrasts between countries with widespread partisanship in Australia, Israel and the Ukraine, compared with the weak partisanship in countries ranking at the bottom of the list, including Chile, Thailand and Belarus. It might be assumed that there should be some straightforward differences in the strength of partisanship between older democracies with long-established party systems and newer democracies with more recently founded parties. Yet the contrasts between nations do not appear to fall into any simple pattern that could be easily explained by a single predominant cause, for example by differences between presidential and parliamentary executives, between Anglo-American or West European nations, or between multiparty and two-party systems. To explore this pattern further, we can compare explanations for the strength of partisanship based on three factors: the characteristics of the political and electoral system at national or macro-level; the type of party, including the party family and longevity, at meso-level; and then the social background and the political attitudes of voters at individual level.

National Context

Figure 6.2 shows some of the main variations in the proportion of partisans by type of society and political system. Many assume that the bonds between voters and political parties should strengthen with the democratic consolidation process, and indeed this is what we find, with almost one half (47%) of the electorate living in older democracies expressing a party identification, compared with about one third (34%) of those living in newer democracies. Most major parties in older democracies have established familiar images in the public’s mind and many parties have continuous historical roots and traditional identities on the left or right of the political spectrum that can be traced back for many decades, in some cases for more than a century. If it takes time for people to acquire stable ties with parties, then party loyalties should be strongest among long-established political parties. By contrast party attachments are weakest in newer democracies where patterns of party competition have not yet stabilized and where
party discipline in parliament remains loose, where party images are fluid, where mass-branch party organizations are under-developed, where parties remain personalistic rather than based on programmatic differences in policy manifestos, and where voters have not yet acquired a lifetime's habit of party support reinforced over successive elections. Party systems have often failed to institutionalize in many newer electoral democracies in Latin America and Asia. Given the strong link between socioeconomic and political development in the countries under comparison in the CSES data, not surprisingly similar patterns of partisanship were evident in the gap between postindustrial and industrial societies.

The electoral system may also have an important influence upon patterns of partisanship. As discussed in detail in chapter 8, in election campaigns, candidates can choose to focus on personal appeals, including their record in the delivery of public services to their local district, as well individual leadership qualities such as their background and experience, to become well known and to develop a personal reputation. Alternatively they can decide to stress party appeals such as the collective party record, policy program and leadership team. If electoral prospects depend upon winning votes cast for the individual politician instead of, or in addition to, votes cast for the party, then politicians face a trade-off between the value of personal and party reputation. In extremely candidate-centered systems, the personal appeal of particular local politicians can be expected to influence the calculus of voters' decisions more strongly than general party labels. In legislative elections, we theorize that the electoral incentive for candidates to emphasize party labels or to emphasize personalistic appeals varies according to the ballot structure:

(i) The highest incentives to stress personal appeals comes from candidate-ballots: used in single-member districts with plurality elections such as those used for the US Congress and UK House of Commons.

(ii) A moderate incentive to stress personal appeals comes from preferential ballots: used in open party list PR systems allowing preferential voting where voters can rank their ballot choices from among candidates within the same party, such as that used in Brazil and Belgium. Preferential ballots are also used in multimember constituencies with low district magnitude where candidates compete for popular votes with others from within their own party, exemplified by the Single Transferable Vote in Ireland and the Single Non-Transferable Vote used for some districts in Taiwan.

(iii) Under dual-ballots, there are mixed incentives, as used in combined systems where electors can express their preferences through some mix of candidate and preferential or party ballots.

(iv) Lastly politicians have the greatest incentive to emphasize their collective record in the context of party-ballots, used in proportional electoral systems with closed party lists, such as in Norway, the Netherlands and Romania. In these contests, all parliamentary candidates on the ticket win or fail together, as votes are pooled, and voters are unable to determine which particular members are elected from the party list.

This argument assumes that campaigns reflect the type of electoral rewards facing vote-seeking politicians, and also that the public will recognize and respond to the type of electoral appeals made by political actors.

The type of candidate selection process is also believed to be important to the type of strategies that candidate will emphasize, since this process determines which applicants succeed in becoming adopted as official parliamentary candidates for each party. Parties can be classified according to the degree of centralization of the selection process, ranging from the most open systems determined mainly by voters, such as the Canadian Conservatives or the US Democrats, to the most closed systems determined mainly by party leaders, exemplified until recently by the Mexican PRI or by Berlosconi's Forza Italia. Between these poles, a range of political actors may
play a role: including party members, local delegates, factions, and affiliated groups, and regional party leaders, as well as external gatekeepers such as financial donors, local notables, and journalists. Extremely party-centered systems combine closed PR lists, so that voters can only choose from among parties, with nomination processes where party candidates are determined by the party leadership. In such circumstances, parliamentary candidates have no incentive to engage in any real campaigning beyond lending their name to the party list. At the opposite pole, extremely candidate-centered system combine open voter primaries determining party nominees with open-list PR. Most systems fall somewhere between these polar extremes. In all these regards, electoral systems, nomination processes and parties can be expected to influence whether elections foster strong or weak party-voter linkages in the mass electorate. According to this account, therefore, party-voter bonds should prove strongest within closed list PR systems while they should prove weakest within open list PR systems.

We cannot compare all aspects of this theory, since there is no way of classifying the process of candidate selection used by each party in the countries under comparison on any systematic basis. This process can vary substantially among parties even within a country, and in most cases it remains a ‘black box’ where we have more information about the formal rules than the informal procedures and norms guiding the outcome. Nevertheless we can compare the strength of partisanship among the basic types of electoral system and ballot structures that we have already classified.

The results of the comparison in Figure 6.2 shows some modest support for this proposition: 46% of those voting in party-balloots had a partisan identification compared with 42% of those voting with preferential-ballots. Nevertheless it must be stressed that this difference, while statistically significant, remains extremely modest. Moreover, contrary to the theory, those voting with candidate-ballots displayed by far the strongest partisanship, as 57% expressed a party identification. Further analysis with a much wider range of countries would be necessary to explore this relationship further, including classifying the degree of centralization of the party recruitment process, but the initial evidence presented here provides limited or indeed contradictory support for claim that the strength of partisan identification varies systematically according to the ballot structure. Later chapters explore how far the ballot structure influences other characteristics of the electorate, such as their knowledge of candidates and their contact with elected members.

Presidential v. parliamentary executives

The basic type of parliamentary or presidential executive is another factor that could influence the strength of party-voter attachments. The results confirm that partisanship is strongest in legislative general elections, where 43% expressed a partisan identity, partisanship is slightly weaker in elections combining legislative and executive contests, and it is weakest of all in presidential elections, where only one third expressed a party identity. In parliamentary systems, where the legislature determines the executive, and maintains the prime minister in office, then we would expect party cohesion to be important as all members win or lose together. If the prime minister fails to win a vote of confidence in parliament, then the government falls, and either the leader of the opposition attempts to form an administration with a working majority, or parliament is dissolved and all representatives have to fight an election campaign. All elected politicians in the governing party or parties have a high incentive to maintain party unity in parliamentary systems or they face the threat of potential electoral defeat. In presidential systems with strong party discipline, where the party leader can play an important role in the selection of parliamentary candidates, the presidential nominee can campaign with a unified platform and coherent set of policies. In presidential systems with weaker party discipline, however, legislative candidates may distance themselves from an unpopular incumbent at the head of the ticket, and indeed from others within their own party or from incumbent politicians as a class, by focusing strategic campaigns upon local issues and their personal record of constituency service.

More detailed aspects of the ballot structure may also play an important direct role by influencing voters’ decision-making processes. In presidential systems electors have the option of splitting their vote for different levels of office. This complexity of choices is illustrated most clearly
in the United States where voters face multi-level elections with candidates ranging from the local city council, state representatives, judicial office, gubernatorial contestants, and nominees for the House and Senate, all the way up to the President and Vice President. Multilevel ballots can be expected to weaken partisanship, by encouraging candidates to make localized personal appeals. Presidential elections held under 2nd ballot systems are designed to weaken allegiance to smaller parties by encouraging coalitions between left-wing and right-wing coalitions in order to achieve an overall majority. By contrast in parliamentary general elections under PR list and majoritarian systems voters face the single choice of either a party list or a party candidate for parliament. European general election can be held in conjunction with those for other levels of office, including for the President in France and the Prime Minister in Israel, but even so there are far fewer elected offices in European democracies than in the United States, and elections in Europe are normally held at less frequent intervals. Given these considerations, it is not surprising that partisanship proves stronger in parliamentary than in presidential systems.

The last comparison in Figure 6.2 shows the patterns of partisanship broken down by major world region. The results show that partisanship was strongest in North America and Scandinavia. Interestingly it was slightly weaker in Western Europe, and similar to the levels found in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia-Pacific. Although we might expect that parties would have far stronger roots in Western European nations, where there is a long tradition of free and fair elections and parties have historical roots dating back sometimes more than a century, nevertheless patterns are similar in the post-Communist nations under comparison. Partisan identification proves weakest of all in the South American nations, namely Chile and Peru, although this could be affected by the fact that both the elections under analysis in this region were for presidential office. We need a wider range of nations and elections that is more generally representative of different world regions before we can establish more reliable generalizations about these patterns.

**Party Systems**

The strength of attachments could also plausibly be influenced by many aspects of political parties, including their mass-branch organization and the strength of their links with other groups in the community. Here we can compare the type of party family based on how people voted; as expected the pattern in Figure 6.3 confirms that party identification was strongest among the most ideologically polarized parties, including among reformed Communist parties on the far left as well as among the nationalist far right. About two-thirds of people who voted for these parties also expressed a party identification. More centrist or moderate parties attracted slightly fewer party identifiers, while Liberal and Ecology parties attracted the weakest partisan attachments. As we observe later, even clearer patterns are evident if we compare the position of respondents on the left-right ideological scale. We would expect supporters to be less loyal where parties focus their strategies on middle-of-the-road ideological or issue appeals, as it becomes easier for voters to switch among contestants. By contrast where parties compete in the middle or center ground, so that voters cannot perceive much difference between them, this generates fewer hurdles to switching parties, and partisan loyalties prove weaker voting anchors. This pattern may be particularly important today when many of the classic economic and foreign policy issues that formerly divided left and right are no longer so salient, following the end of the Cold War, and where newer issues that cross-cut the old left-right cleavage have risen on the policy agenda, exemplified by public concern about issues such as terrorism, environmental protection, and globalization. We find stronger patterns of party attachments where parties are more ideologically polarized, since in this context higher barriers exist to switching between or among parties.

The historical traditions and longevity of party organizations should play an important role in the strength of partisan attachments. As expected older parties (defined as those where the top four parties in each country were established for at least twenty years or more) attracted more party identifiers than younger parties founded more recently. Moreover this is not just a matter of contrasts between older and newer democracies, as there are considerable variations in the
longevity of parties, even within Western Europe and North America. Although there have been major changes in the composition of American parties, their basic identities and labels remain some of the oldest in the world. Elsewhere party systems have usually seen far greater innovations, exemplified by developments in the Netherlands, Belgium, or Canada, with older parties occasionally fading away or splitting into different factions, and newer parties emerging into prominence.

Party competition could also play a role and, as discussed earlier in chapter 4, the effective number of parliamentary parties varies substantially in the countries under comparisons. Yet the pattern in Figure 6.3 shows that by itself the type of party system did now show a substantial difference in the strength of partisan attachments.

Social Structure and Partisanship

Social psychological accounts suggest many reasons why the strength of partisanship should vary according to the social and political characteristics of citizens. In particular, Dalton argues that we would expect partisanship to play the strongest role in voting decisions among the least educated and politically informed groups, who lack cognitive skills and therefore have most need to rely upon partisan shortcuts. Since education is closely related to other indicators of socioeconomic status, partisanship should also be associated with patterns of social class and household income. If habits develop over time, we would also expect that partisanship should be least developed among the younger generation of citizens, and these attachments are expected to strengthen with age, as many previous studies have found. Voter-party bonds are also expected to be stronger among those who belong to voluntary organizations and community associations, such as trade unions and churches, if social networks and membership of these organizations functions to reinforce political attitudes among like-minded groups. Identification with a particular party should also be stronger among those who hold positive orientations towards parties in general.

The patterns evident in Figure 6.4 show that partisanship was indeed stronger by age group, as expected, with a substantial 15-point gap between the youngest cohort and those over sixty. Partisanship was also more advanced among those with ties to affiliated organizations such as unions and churches. But contrary to Dalton’s suggestions, partisan attachments were stronger among the well-educated, as well as among the highest income and class groups, and among those who scored highest on political knowledge tests (although this latter association could be interpreted as the product of partisanship, if party ties generate greater interest in public affairs, as much as its cause). Partisan ties were also slightly stronger among men than women. What this social profile suggests is that general party loyalties tend to reflect the type of characteristics that also predict more active engagement in parties as members or as activists. In this regard, it might be more appropriate to understand partisanship as an orientation similar to political participation, so that a similar range of factors predict whether someone is close to a party and whether they will vote.

Political Attitudes and Partisanship

The political characteristics in Figure 6.5 confirm the patterns that many others have noted, with partisanship associated with many indicators of system support, although here the question of the direction of causality is open to interpretation. A sense of closeness to a particular party could lead people to be more likely to participate, to have a sense of efficacy and the belief they can influence the political process, and to display greater satisfaction both with democracy in general and with the fairness of the electoral process. Alternatively those who display these characteristics are also more likely to feel close to one of the parties, as this is another form of positive engagement with the political process. Probably a reciprocal process is at work here that cannot be disentangled without either time-series panel surveys or careful experimental designs.
The political profile also confirms the observation that ideology plays a critical role, with those who place themselves at either the far left or far right displaying the strongest sense of partisanship. By contrast, those who see themselves in the moderate center of the political spectrum have the lowest feelings of partisanship. To confirm these overall patterns, Table 6.2 used binary logistic regression models comparing the influence of the social and attitudinal predictors of partisanship, using the pooled sample of legislative elections. All these factors proved to be significant, as predicted, with the coefficients pointing in the expected direction.

III: Partisan identities and Voting Choice

But do partisan identities help to explain voting choices in the different countries under comparison? The baseline regression models of voting behavior in Table 6.2 first entered the structural controls of age, gender, education, income, union membership, linguistic majorities, religiosity, and left-right ideology, using the measures that were discussed in the previous chapter. We have already established the importance of these factors in determining voting choice and they can also be expected to exert a similar influence on partisanship. Model B then entered the party that respondents felt closest towards, after recoding to reflect the left-right scale of voting choice. The results confirm that even with the prior social controls, the direction of partisan identification played a major role in voting decisions, with the amount of variance explained by the models rising from 8% in Model A to 83% for the combined effects of social structure and partisan identities in Model B. Nevertheless we need to note an important qualification to interpreting these results. If party attachments are understood, as social psychological accounts claim, as an affective general orientation towards parties, then the results suggest that they still remain capable of exerting an important influence on voting choice. If, alternatively, we interpret these partisan identities as essentially co-varying with voter choice, as revisionist accounts caution, then including these measures in models of voting choice provides little additional explanatory power.

But how far can we explain variations in how far these models predict voting behavior in different nations? On the one hand, theories of cultural modernization suggest that we should observe important contrasts by the basic type of society, in particular that patterns of human development and rising education levels and cognitive skills should have gradually reduced reliance upon party loyalties. If so, partisan identification should exert a stronger influence upon voting behavior in industrialized than in post-industrial nations. On the other hand, if incentives matter, then we expect to find important differences among elections using different types of electoral rules. We expect that home-base appeals and therefore partisan identities to be stronger under proportional representation than with catch-all parties in majoritarian systems. Table 6.3 replicates the baseline voting model in all the elections under comparison, showing just the summary amount of variance explained by social structure (in Model A) and by both partisan attachments and social structure (in Model B). Table 6.3 shows that countries vary substantially in how far voting behavior can be explained by the combination of these two factors. In many elections, exemplified by those in the Czech Republic, Sweden, and Hungary, social structure and partisan identities can account for over 90% of the variance in voting choice, without the need to bring in other medium and short-term factors such as the record of the incumbent administration, the type of issues that features in the campaign, or the personalities of the party leaders. Although there is substantial evidence that dealignment may have weakened social and partisan identities, nevertheless in these societies citizens continue to behave in ways predicted by the classic theories of voting behavior established more than four decades ago. Nevertheless there are many other elections under comparison where these factors seem to exert little grip on the outcome, notably those in Belarus, Chile, and Mexico. In these cases we need to turn to other types of factors such as the personality of political leaders, the government’s economic record or the type of election campaign to account for voting behavior.

[Table 6.2, Figure 6.6 and 6.7 about here]
Table 6.4 summarizes the key comparisons by type of electoral system and by type of society. If cultural modernization theories are correct then we should find that party and social identities remain stronger anchors of voting behavior in industrialized societies, but that these influences should be weaker in postindustrial nations. Instead the results show that the impact of party attachments on electoral choice proved marginally higher (44%) in postindustrial than in industrial societies (41%), a modest difference, but one in the contrary direction to that predicted by theories of cultural modernization. Figure 6.6 illustrates the variance by type of society. Alternatively if incentive-based theories are correct then we would expect the main contrasts to lie between majoritarian electoral systems promoting catch-all vote-maximizing campaign strategies and PR list systems that facilitate more niche-marketing home-base appeals. And indeed this is what we find as illustrated in Figure 6.7 that compares the combined effects of social and partisan identities. The total variance explained by these factors (derived from the final column of Model B) was 63% on average in elections held under majoritarian rules, significantly less than in combined systems (76%) and in PR list systems (77%). That is to say, social structure and partisan attachments explained two-thirds of the variance in voting behavior under majoritarian rules and over three-quarters in combined and PR systems.

Yet certain important qualifications need to be made to these results. Given the limited range of nations and elections, these summary figures should be regarded with considerable caution and it remains to be seen whether these generalizations remain robust when tested with a broader range of contexts. As the figures show, there are also substantial differences among elections within each type of electoral system, rather than a wholly consistent pattern. Other factors exogenous to the model, and well beyond the scope of this study, such as the government's record, leadership popularity, and economic performance, also contribute towards comprehensive explanations of these patterns. The main variance in voting behavior among elections comes from the combined effects of social plus partisan identification, rather than from the latter alone. Yet the summary results lend further confirmation to the basic pattern established in the previous chapter, with the combined effects of social structure and party identities exerting a weaker influence upon voting behavior in majoritarian electoral systems than in proportional systems. The rational choice institutionalism theory suggests that this pattern can best be understood through the way that the electoral system has a direct impact upon the incentives facing parties, and therefore an indirectly impact upon voting behavior.

From the analysis presented so far in this study we can conclude that we have established a fairly predictable pattern of voting behavior in the electorate. But do electoral systems and detailed voting procedures exert an important influence, not on whom people vote for, but whether they cast a ballot at all? We turn to this topic next.
### Table 6.1: Baseline models predicting partisanship, pooled legislative elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A Social structure</th>
<th>Model C Plus political attitudes</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01 (.001) ***</td>
<td>.01 (.001) ***</td>
<td>A2001 Years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male)</td>
<td>.11 (.025) ***</td>
<td>.11 (.026) ***</td>
<td>A2002 Male=1/Female=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.05 (.010) ***</td>
<td>.06 (.010) ***</td>
<td>A2012 5-point scale of household income from lowest to highest quintile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union member</td>
<td>.15 (.028) ***</td>
<td>.14 (.026) ***</td>
<td>A2005 Respondent is union member 1, else 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic majority</td>
<td>.56 (.025) ***</td>
<td>.58 (.007) ***</td>
<td>A2018 Language usually spoken at home. Linguistic majority 1, else 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.10 (.007) ***</td>
<td>.09 (.011) ***</td>
<td>A2015 6-point strength of religiosity scale from never attend religious service (1) to attend at least weekly (6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTISAN ATTITUDES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties care</td>
<td>.17 (.012) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think.&quot; % Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties necessary</td>
<td>.13 (.009) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Political parties are necessary to make our political system work in [country].&quot; % Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological extremism</td>
<td>.27 (.091) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>A3031 Position respondents placed themselves on the 10-point left-right scale, recoded from moderate center (1) to extreme (5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>Proportion of cases correctly predicted by the model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Correctly predicted</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>Overall variance explained by the model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The figures represent the results of binary logistic regression models including unstandardized beta coefficients (B), standardized error (S.E.), and their significance (Sig). *** p.001 ** p.01 * p.05. 
Partisan identity: The dependent variable is coded from the following item: "Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?" For details of the coding for the independent variables see Appendix B. The pooled sample of legislative elections includes 28 nations and 31124 respondents. Data was weighted by sample (A104_1) to ensure that the size of the sample is equal per nation. Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 1996-2002.
Table 6.2: Baseline models predicting rightwing voting support, pooled legislative elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Structure</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male)</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTISANSHIP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan identification</td>
<td>.908</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td></td>
<td>.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td></td>
<td>.826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The figures represent the results of OLS multiple regression analysis models including unstandardized beta coefficients (B), standardized error (S.E.), standardized beta coefficients (Beta) and their significance (P). *** p.001 ** p.01 * p.05.

**Voting Choice:** For the dependent measure, votes for each party family are recoded using a 10-point scale ranging from left (low) to right (high) as follows: (1) Communist, (2) Ecology, (3) Socialist, (4) Social Democrat, (5) Left liberal, (6) Liberal, (7) Christian Democrat, (8) Right liberal, (9) Conservative, and (10) 'Nationalist/Religious'. A positive coefficient indicates support for parties on the right. For details of the coding for the independent variables see Appendix B. The pooled sample of legislative elections includes 28 nations and 17,794 respondents. Data was weighted by sample (A104_1) to ensure that the size of the sample is equal per nation.

**Party Identification:** “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (If yes) “Which party is that?” Parties are recoded into a 10-point scale using the same classification as voting choice.

### Table 6.3: Social structure, partisan identification, and left-right voting support in 37 legislative and presidential elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Model A (Social Structure and L-R Vote)</th>
<th>Model B (Increase when Party ID is added)</th>
<th>Total variance (Social structure + Party ID)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adj R² (i)</td>
<td>Adj R² (ii)</td>
<td>Adj R² (iii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (p)</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (p)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (p)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania (p)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (p)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (p)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus (p)</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile (p)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>Mexico (p)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (i) Model A: The amount of variance (Adjusted R²) in OLS regression analysis models explained by the effects of social structure including sex, age, education, income, union membership, linguistic majority, and religiosity on the left-right voting scale. For the items and coding see table 6.1. (ii) Model B: The increase in the amount of variance when partisan identification is added to the models. (iii) Model B: The total amount of variance explained by social structure and party identification. 

**Voting scale:** For the dependent measure, votes for each party family in legislative and presidential elections are recoded using a 10-point scale from left (low) to right (high) as follows: (1) Communist, (2) Ecology, (3) Socialist, (4) Social Democrat, (5) Left liberal, (6) Liberal, (7) Christian Democrat, (8) Right liberal, (9) Conservative, (10) ‘Nationalist/Religious’. 

**Party Identification:** “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (If yes) “Which party is that?” Parties are recoded into a 10-point scale using the same classification as voting choice. (p) Presidential elections. Significance. *** p.001 ** p.01 * p.05.

Table 6.4: Mean variance in voting behavior explained by social structure and party identities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Structure (%) (i)</th>
<th>Party identification (%) (ii)</th>
<th>Total combined social structure and party (%) (iii)</th>
<th>Number of elections (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Modernization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postindustrial</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral System</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Calculated from Tables 5.2 and 6.3 in 37 legislative and presidential elections.
(i) Model A: The amount of variance on the left-right voting scale (Adjusted R²) in OLS regression analysis models explained by the effects of social structure including sex, age, education, income, union membership, linguistic majority, and religiosity.
(ii) Model B: The increase in the amount of variance in voting behavior when partisan identification is added to the models.
(iii) Model B: The total amount of variance in voting behavior explained by the combined effects of social structure and party identification.

Figure 6.1: Proportion of partisans by nation

Note: Q: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (%‘Yes’).
Figure 6.2: National context of partisanship

Note: Q: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (%‘Yes’).
Figure 6.3: Party characteristics of partisans

Note: Q: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (% ‘Yes’). The differences between groups are all significant at the .001 level using Cramer’s V.

Figure 6.4: Social characteristics of partisans

Note: Q: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (% ‘Yes’). The differences between groups are all significant at the .001 level using Cramer’s V.

Figure 6.5: The political characteristics of partisans

% With party identification

Note: Q: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (% ‘Yes’).
Figure 6.6: Total variance produced by social and partisan identities, by type of society

Postindustrial $R^2 = .72$

Industrial $R^2 = .65$
Figure 6.7: Total variance produced by social and partisan identities, by electoral system

Majoritarian systems $R^2 = 0.63$

Combined systems $R^2 = 0.76$

PR systems $R^2 = 0.77$


By contrast, the standard question on the direction and strength of partisanship carried since 1952 in the American National Election Study asks: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) "Would you call yourself a strong (REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT) or a not very strong (REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT)?" (IF INDEPENDENT, OTHER [1966 and later: OR NO PREFERENCE]:) "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?" The same item, with the inclusion of cues for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democratic parties, has been carried in the series of British Election Studies since 1964. The inclusion of the standard cued item in the Australian and the Belgian election survey in the CSES dataset generated far higher levels of partisanship and as a result these elections were dropped from the analysis in this chapter.


Chapter 7

Turnout

In many established democracies, concern about eroding participation at the ballot box has been widely expressed, with commentators suggesting that we are seeing the ‘vanishing voter’, especially in America. Yet patterns of voting turnout in the United States are far from typical, and indeed always have been during the postwar era, and levels of electoral participation today vary dramatically among democracies. In the countries under comparison, on average more than 80% of the voting age population turned out in legislative elections held during the 1990s in Iceland, Israel, and Sweden, compared with less than half of the equivalent group in the United States and Switzerland (see Figure 7.1). The comparison shows that turnout cannot simply be explained by differences in the historical experiences of older and newer democracies, as the Czech Republic, Chile, and South Korea all rank in the top third of the comparison, while the US, Canada and Japan lag near the bottom. Worldwide there are even greater disparities, with over 90 percent of the voting age population (Vote/VAP) participating in legislative elections during the last decade in Malta, Uruguay and Indonesia compared with less than a third in Mali, Colombia, and Senegal. To explain these patterns, Part I considers accounts based on rational choice institutionalism and the cultural modernization theories. Part II examines the evidence and analyzes how far turnout varies by political institutions, by electoral laws, and by voting procedures, as well as by the social characteristics and cultural attitudes of voters, and by levels of societal modernization. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for electoral engineering, including how far attempts to boost voting participation through electoral reform and civic education can hope to succeed.

Rational-choice and cultural modernization theories of voting participation

Comparative research has long sought to understand the reasons for voting participation and the explanations for cross-national differences in turnout. As in previous chapters, debate surrounds about how far this process is affected by the strategic incentives derived from electoral rules and by the cultural habits arising from the socialization process and societal modernization.

The Costs and Benefits of Participation

Attempts at constitutional engineering are based on the premise that the electoral design can shape the behavior of parties, candidates, and citizens. Rational-choice accounts emphasize that taken-for-granted institutions, rules and regulation are not neutral in outcome; instead they set the context through facilitating participation for some actors while discouraging or restricting others. Three types of factors are believed to be important. (i) Political institutions set the broadest context, most distant from the specific act of casting a ballot, including arrangements such as the type of electoral system, whether the executive is presidential or parliamentary, and the type of party system. (ii) The legal system determines more specific features of electoral regulations, exemplified by the use of compulsory voting laws and the age qualifications for suffrage. Lastly (iii) electoral administrative procedures are most proximate to the act of voting, such as registration processes, the distribution of polling stations, and the facilities for voting. These factors could shape the behavior of political actors indirectly; in majoritarian electoral systems, for example, minor parties could decide to focus their effort and resources in their strongest target seats, rather than campaigning across the country. In countries with compulsory voting laws, parties may invest less effort in get-out-the-vote drives. These factors could also influence citizens directly, through shaping the costs and benefits of voting.

Many comparative studies have emphasized the importance of the institutional and legal arrangements for electoral activism, suggesting that rules do matter. Hence Powell established that turnout in established democracies was boosted by the use of compulsory voting laws, by automatic registration procedures and by the strength of party-group alignments, while it was depressed in one-party predominant systems allowing no rotation of the parties in government. Jackman and Miller confirmed that political institutions and electoral laws provided the most plausible explanation for variations in voter turnout, including levels of electoral proportionality, multi-partyism, and the use of compulsory voting. Blais and Dobrynska analyzed vote as a proportion of the registered electorate in parliamentary elections in 91 democracies from 1972-1995 and concluded that turnout was influenced by...
the use of compulsory voting, the age at which citizens became eligible to vote, the type of electoral system, the closeness of the electoral outcome, and the number of parties, as well as by levels of socioeconomic development and the size of the country. Franklin analyzed postwar elections in 22 established democracies and argued that an important part of the reason for any decline in turnout during the last decade concerned changes in the institutional context, such as the abandonment of compulsory voting laws and the lowering of the age of qualifying for the franchise, yet the impact of any such changes was lagged rather than immediate, as there was a cohort effect upon new generations entering the electorate. In the United States, as well, turnout is believed to be depressed by the hurdle of registration requirements where the onus lies with the applicant, generating attempts at partial reforms like the 'Motor Voter' initiative. Yet even if 'institutions matter' it remains unclear why they matter, whether because they reinforce and reflect long-term cultural habits and taken-for-granted traditions within each society, or because they alter the rational calculus when voters decide whether to participate. Moreover the link between the broader cultural context, and how voters perceive and weigh the costs, choices, and decisiveness of elections, is only poorly understood.

Cultural modernization, civic skills and motivational attitudes

Theories of cultural modernization advanced by Ronald Inglehart and Russell Dalton, discussed in the introduction to the book, suggest that common social trends, including rising affluence, the growth of the service sector, and expanded educational opportunities, have swept through postindustrial societies, contributing towards a new style of citizen politics in Western democracies. This process is believed to have increased demands for more active public participation in the policymaking process through direct action, new social movements, and protest groups, as well as weakening deferential loyalties, support for traditional organizations such as churches, parties and unions, and also eroding conventional participation via the ballot box. Growing levels of human capital are regarded as critical to this process, since education, and the cognitive skills that it provides, is one of the factors that most strongly predicts political activism. If this process is indeed critical, as theorists suggest, then we would expect to find different patterns of electoral participation in industrial and in postindustrial societies.

Rather than consciously calculating the potential rewards and benefits of voting, cultural accounts emphasize that the propensity to participate or abstain is a 'habit of the heart' acquired early in life and reinforced through experience of successive elections, along with other closely related civic attitudes and values such as partisan attachments and political trust. In this view some people will turn out to vote through rain or shine, because they are interested in public affairs, they believe it is their civic duty to vote, they want to express support for a particular party, or they want to express disapproval of the incumbent's performance, irrespective of whether they believe that the vote 'matters' by influencing which particular candidate or party gets elected. Indeed since one vote will not determine the outcome, as Downs argued, if voters are calculating the strategic benefits of casting a ballot for maximizing their interests, the well-known 'paradox' of elections is why anyone votes at all. Cultural theories stress that habits of civic engagement take many years to become engrained over successive elections, so that attempts to boost turnout by administrative fixes and legal modifications, such as the simplification of registration procedures through the Motor Voter Act in the United States, the introduction of all-postal ballots in Oregon, or the use of Internet voting in Geneva, are misguided and impractical. Cultural theories suggest that while institutional reforms are unlikely to achieve their goals in the short-term, in the longer term they may have a more glacial impact, if younger generations gradually start to participate at higher levels by using the new opportunities, and the process of demographic replacement eventually transforms the composition of the electorate. This process is clearly exemplified by the expansion of the franchise to women, since it took many decades after the franchise was granted before they achieved parity with men at the ballot box, before eventually overtaking them. Moreover if the early socialization process stamps the younger generation with participatory habits, then it follows that civic education is one of the most important mechanisms available for encouraging political engagement, by influencing what children learn about democracy and citizenship in schools while habits remain plastic and fluid.

Ever since Almond and Verba's Civic Culture (1963), a long series of studies have stressed that political participation requires the motivational attitudes to become active in public affairs, as well as possession of the resources that facilitate civic engagement. This perspective suggests that psychological orientations towards the political system and participatory habits are learnt at an early age.
from parents, teachers, colleagues, and neighbors, when people are open to change. Among these civic attitudes, Almond and Verba emphasized three elements. Cognitive orientations include knowledge and beliefs about the nation-state, political leaders, and major policy issues, as well as an awareness of citizen’s rights. Affective orientations towards the political system include the belief that citizens are competent and capable of influencing the democratic process (termed ‘internal political efficacy’ or ‘subjective competence’), the sense that government is responsive to public needs and demands (‘external political efficacy’), and interest in politics and public affairs. Evaluative orientations concern judgments about the political process, such as the fairness of elections or the performance of government. Lack of trust and confidence in government has also been regarded as depressing activism, since the rising tide of political cynicism in the United States occurred during roughly the same period as the fall in turnout, although others have argued that dissatisfaction may have the reverse effect by stimulating involvement. For Almond and Verba, the civic culture works most effectively where the predominant psychological orientations are congruent with the political system.

Resources are also regarded as important, since time, money, and civic skills, derived from family, occupation, and associational membership, make it easier for individuals who are predisposed to take part to do so. Since resources are unevenly distributed throughout societies this helps to explain the disparities in participation related to gender, race/ethnicity, age, and social class. Education, in particular, is one of the best predictors of many types of civic engagement, furnishing cognitive skills and civic awareness that allows citizens to make sense of the political world and increasing feelings of subjective competence. People of higher socioeconomic status — in terms of education, income and occupation — are commonly far more active in politics. The most thorough study of generational trends in the United States, by Miller and Shanks, emphasized that a long-term secular trend generated turnout decline, with the post-New Deal generation consistently less likely to vote than their fathers or grandfathers. This phenomenon was not a product of lifecycle, or aging, they suggest, but rather represents an enduring shift among the generation who first came to political consciousness during the turbulent politics of the 1960s. The long-term slide in American turnout, they conclude, is due to the process of generational replacement, not to a fall in the propensity of the older generations to turnout. "It was the gradual replacement of the habitual voters of the pre-New Deal generations with the non-voting post-New Deal cohorts that produced the thirty-year national decline in aggregate voter turnout from the early 1960s to the late 1980s." More recently, Robert Putnam has presented a formidable battery of evidence illustrating lower levels of civic engagement among the post-war generation, including electoral participation. In a comparative study, Franklin also emphasizes the role of generational cohorts in ‘dampening’ the effects of any institutional reforms. If culture were important, then we would expect to see considerable variations in voting participation evident at individual-level associated with patterns of education, age, and socioeconomic status, as well as a strong relationship between turnout and motivational attitudes such as political efficacy and partisan identification. If cultural modernization is important, then we would also expect that patterns of turnout would vary systematically with levels of human development in different societies, as greater human capital (education and cognitive skills) would contribute towards rising levels of citizen activism.

Analyzing Turnout

Multivariate models help us to evaluate the evidence for these accounts. If voters respond to electoral rules, then levels of turnout should vary systematically under different institutional arrangements. If societal modernization affects the civic culture, then national levels of human development, as well as individual civic resources and attitudes, should predict turnout. To test the evidence for these propositions, binary logistic regression analysis is used where the dependent variable is whether the respondent reported voting or not in the legislative elections in the countries under comparison in the CSES dataset. As with other surveys, levels of reported turnout were nearly always slightly higher in each country than the official estimate of either the votes cast as a proportion of the voting age population (Vote/VAP) or as a proportion of the registered electorate (Vote/Reg). Model A in Table 7.1 first entered levels of human development, then adds the main political institutions commonly thought to influence electoral participation, for reasons discussed fully later. These include whether the electoral system is majoritarian, combined or proportional; the average population size of electoral districts; the frequency of national elections; the use of any compulsory voting regulations; whether the political system has a
presidential or parliamentary executive; patterns of party competition (measured by the percentage vote for the party in first place); and the type of party system (measured by ENPP). After including these factors, the model explains 7% of the overall level of variance in turnout (measured by the Nagelkerke $R^2$). Model B then enters the social and cultural factors at individual level, including the standard factors of age, gender, education, income, union membership and religiosity used in earlier chapters, as well as partisan identification and external political efficacy, explaining in total 20% of the variance in turnout. This suggests that Model B improves the goodness-of-fit, although many other factors not included in this limited analysis also influence political participation, including the role of mobilizing agencies such as parties, social networks, and the news media\textsuperscript{21}.

Overall the models suggest that both the institutional context and the cultural factors contribute about equally towards explaining voting turnout. In the countries under comparison, all other things being equal, among the political institutions that matter, voting participation is likely to be maximized in elections using proportional representation, with small electoral districts, regular but relatively infrequent national contests, competitive party systems, and in presidential contests. But even controlling for the institutional context, there are significant inequalities in electoral participation related to human development, socioeconomic resources, and cultural attitudes. The formal rules help to determine overall levels of turnout from one country to another, but even so within each society citizens who are more educated, affluent, and motivated remain more likely to participate than others, and activism is higher in postindustrial nations. Let us examine the meaning and interpretation of these results in more detail.

Cultural modernization

Theories of cultural modernization advanced by Ronald Inglehart and Russell Dalton, discussed in the introduction to the book, suggest that common social trends, including rising affluence, the growth of the service sector, and expanded educational opportunities, have swept through postindustrial societies, contributing towards a new style of citizen politics in Western democracies\textsuperscript{22}. This process is believed to have increased demands for more active public participation in the policymaking process through direct action, new social movements, and protest groups, as well as weakening deferential loyalties, support for traditional organizations such as churches, parties and unions, and also eroding conventional participation via the ballot box\textsuperscript{23}. Growing levels of human capital are regarded as critical to this process, since education, and the cognitive skills that it provides, is one of the factors that most strongly predicts political activism\textsuperscript{24}. The comparison of turnout (Vote/VAP) in legislative elections worldwide during the 1990s confirm these predictions, as shown in Figure 7.2; overall 74\% of the voting age population cast a ballot in industrial societies, compared with 80\% in postindustrial societies. The multivariate model in Table 7.1, using the CSES dataset, confirms that human development is significantly related to higher voting participation. As argued elsewhere, societal modernization does indeed matter, with the main effects of education occurring in the initial stages of the expansion of schooling and literacy in the shift from agrarian to industrial society, and the effects leveling off and thereby proving curvilinear at later stages of societal development\textsuperscript{25}. That is to say, it is basic schooling and literacy which makes the fundamental difference for patterns of turnout, a relatively undemanding act but one that does require some basic familiarity with the major parties and where these can be placed across the political spectrum, as well as some understanding of the electoral process. Basic education facilitates comprehension of political coverage in the news media, particularly newspapers. Further participation in colleges and university-level education makes a difference for more demanding forms of civic engagement, such as protest politics, but the spread of access to further education in a society does not in itself add incrementally to higher electoral turnout. Given the strong interrelationship between levels of economic and democratic development in the 32 nations in the CSES dataset, not surprisingly similar patterns are evident in Figure 7.2, when turnout is compared in older and newer democracies.

The Impact of Political Institutions

Electoral Systems

Previous studies have commonly found that the type of electoral formula shapes participation, with proportional representation generating higher turnout than majoritarian systems\textsuperscript{26}. This pattern
Single Transferable Vote electoral systems. In contrast voting participation was fairly similar among the 11 points less than under PR. The results indicate that the basic type of electoral system does indeed differ between majoritarian and combined systems, with turnout across all these systems about 7.5 to 10% higher than under PR. The results show that the basic type of electoral system does indeed shape the incentive to participate, with the key distinction between PR systems and all others. The exact reasons for this relationship remain unclear, but incentive-based explanations focus on the differential rewards facing citizens under alternative electoral arrangements. Under majoritarian systems, supporters of minor and fringe parties with geographic support dispersed widely but thinly across the country, like the Greens, may feel that casting their votes will make no difference to who wins in their constituency, still less to the overall composition of government and the policy agenda. The ‘wasted votes’ argument is strongest in safe seats where the incumbent party is unlikely to be defeated. In contrast PR elections with low vote thresholds and large district magnitudes, such as the party list system used in the Netherlands, increase the opportunities for minor parties with dispersed support to enter parliament with only a modest share of the vote, and therefore this could increase the incentives for their supporters to participate.

**Electoral Districts**

Many other aspects of the electoral system could shape voter participation, such as the ballot structure, the use of open or closed party lists, and levels of proportionality, but district magnitude, and in particular the population size of the average electoral district, can be expected to be especially important, since this may determine the linkages between voters and their representatives. Observers have long noted a relationship between the size of a country and democracy, although the reasons for this association remain unclear. It is possible that the smaller the number of electors per member of parliament, the greater the potential for constituency service and for elected representatives to maintain communications with local constituents, and therefore the higher the incentive to turnover based on any ‘personal’ vote. Voters may not be able to shape the outcome for government, but in smaller single-member or multi-member districts, as we shall examine in later chapters, they may have greater information, familiarity and contact with their elected representative or representatives, and therefore they may be more interested in affecting who gets into parliament. The simplest way to measure district size is to divide the number of seats in the lower house of the legislature into the total population in each country. There are considerable cross-national variations in the average number of electors per representative depending upon the size of the population and the number of seats in parliament, ranging from India with 1.7 million electors per member of the Lok Sabha down to about 5500 per MP in the Bahamas, Malta and Cape Verde. The results in Table 7.1 confirm that indeed the size of electoral districts proved a significant predictor of turnout, in a negative direction, with smaller districts generally associated with higher voter participation.

**Presidential v. Parliamentary Executives**

Another factor commonly believed to influence the incentives to turnover concerns the power and level of the office and, in particular, whether there is a parliamentary or presidential (or directly elected) executive. First-order elections are the most important national contests, including legislative elections in countries with parliamentary systems of government and presidential contests in countries with strong presidencies. In contrast second-order elections are all others, including state, provincial or local contests, referenda and initiatives, and direct elections to the European Parliament among the 15-member EU states. In parliamentary systems, the head of government - such as the prime minister, premier, or chancellor – is selected by the legislature and can be dismissed by a legislative vote of no confidence. In presidential systems (in the case of Israel, direct elections for the Prime Minister) the head of government is popularly elected for a fixed term and is not dependent upon the legislature.
choice theory suggests that the incentive to vote is likely to be greatest with the most salient elections determining the composition of government. In countries with presidential systems of government where elections for the president and legislature are held on separate occasions, like the mid-term elections in the United States, more people are likely to participate in executive rather than in legislative contests. Where Presidential and parliamentary elections are held on the same date then there is likely to be no substantial difference in levels of turnout in both types of contest. The result of the analysis presented in Table 7.1 confirms that overall turnout was significantly higher in legislative contests with parliamentary executives than in countries with presidential executives, where these become second order contests. In the countries under comparison in the CSES dataset, turnout was 85% in executive-only elections, 83% in election combining legislative and executive office, and 74% in legislative-only contests.

Frequency of Contests

The frequency of elections has also been thought to be important for participation, because this increases the costs facing electors and may produce voting fatigue. Franklin et al. have demonstrated that the closeness of national elections immediately before direct elections to the European parliament is a strong predictor of turnout in European elections. The cases of Switzerland and the United States are commonly cited as exemplifying nations with frequent elections for office at multiple levels, as well as widespread use of referenda and initiatives, and both are characterized by exceptionally low voter participation among Western democracies. California, for example, has primary and general elections for local and state government, including for judicial, Mayoral and Gubernatorial offices, Congressional midterm elections every two years for the House and Senate, Presidential elections every 4 years, as well as multiple referenda issues on the ballot all producing what Anthony King has termed the 'never-ending election campaign'. If the frequency of elections generates voter fatigue, the increase in contests associated with the growth of primaries in the United States after 1968, the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and contests for regional bodies following devolution and decentralization in countries like Spain, France and the UK, could help to explain any decline in turnout in recent decades. A simple measure of electoral frequency can be calculated by the number of national-level parliamentary and presidential elections held during the decade of the 1990s, ranging from only one contest in a few semi-democracies up to seven or more elections in the United States and Taiwan. It should be noted that this measure provides the most consistent and reliable cross-national indicator that is available although it is likely to represent a conservative estimate, since it does not count many other types of contest held during this decade including national or local referenda and initiatives, pre-nomination primaries, nor European, regional/state and local contests. The results in Table 7.1 confirm that the frequency of national elections was strong and significant, in a negative direction: the more often national elections are held, the greater the voter fatigue. This result is likely to provide important clues to some of the sharpest outliers in turnout in the elections under comparison, such as Switzerland and the United States, both among the richest and most developed countries on earth yet characterized by relatively low (and falling) levels of voter participation.

Political Parties

As we have seen in Chapter 4, the type of party system and patterns of electoral competition are closely related to the basic type of electoral system, although there is not a perfect one-to-one fit. Ever since Duverger, it is well known that the plurality method of elections favors two-party systems, by systematically over-representing the largest party when translating votes into seats. We have already demonstrated that as disproportionality rises, so the effective number of parliamentary parties falls. The analysis in chapter 4 showed that the majoritarian elections under comparison were contested by 5.2 parliamentary parties on average, compared with almost twice as many parties (9.5) in proportional systems. In Israel, for example, the May 1999 elections to the 120-member Knesset returned seventeen parties, and no single party won more than 14% of the popular vote. In the Ukraine, thirty parties and party blocks contested the 1998 parliamentary elections and as a result 8 parties were elected via party lists and 17 won seats via the single member districts, along with 116 Independents. By contrast, in the 1996 US mid-term elections, while some minor party challengers like the Greens contested a few districts, only one independent was returned to the House of Representatives. In the 2000 parliamentary elections in South Korea, the two major parties (the Grand National Party and the Millennium Democratic Party), and the minor United Liberal Democrats, swept up all seats. Yet there are a number of important exceptions to this rule, with plural societies such as Papua New Guinea and India characterized by
multiple parties in majoritarian electoral systems, as well as Malta and Austria with two-party and two-and-a-half party systems despite PR elections. Beyond the electoral formula, the electoral fortunes of smaller parties can all be shaped by the existence of social cleavages in plural societies, the geographic distribution of heterogeneous populations, the use of high voting thresholds, and the geographical drawing of constituency boundaries.

The party system can therefore be expected to influence voter turnout, but there is little agreement in the literature about the exact nature of this relationship, and there is a complex interaction between electoral choice and electoral competition. Some suggest that the greater the range of alternative parties listed on the ballot, stretching from the nationalist far right through the moderate center to the post-Communist left, the more people are stimulated to vote. This claim assumes that wider electoral choices across the ideological spectrum means that all sectors of public opinion and all social groups are more likely to find a party to represent their views, preferences and interests. Yet the counter argument is also heard from those who suggest that the higher the level of party fragmentation, the greater the probability of coalition government, the less the share of votes cast determines the formation of government, and therefore the lower the inducement for electors to turnout. As Jackman has argued, voters in multiparty systems that produce coalitions do not directly choose the government that will govern them, instead they vote for the parties in the legislature that will select the government that will determine the policy agenda. Under multiparty coalitions voters appear to be offered a more decisive choice among policies, whereas in fact they are offered a less decisive one. The range of parties contesting an election is related to levels of electoral competition. Where the outcome is anticipated to be close, this seems likely to increase the incentive to participate, while parties have greater inducements to get out the vote. To measure the party system we will use the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP), a measure discussed in chapter 4, as a summary indicator of the range of electoral choice. Table 7.1 confirms that in the countries under comparison the ENPP was significantly related to voting turnout, with more parties maximizing the range of choices on the ballot paper. Nevertheless the 32 CSES nations only included a limited range of party systems, as shown in Figure 4.1, ranging from the two-party system of the US congress (with an ENPP of 1.99) through to the fragmented multipartyism of Belgium (with an ENPP of 9.05). Elsewhere in the world there are wider variations in party competition, including one-party systems where opposition movements are suppressed (such as Uganda, Zimbabwe or Singapore) and even more extreme fragmentation. Examination of the full range of 876 parliamentary elections held worldwide from 1945-2000, explored elsewhere, reveals that the relationship between turnout and party competition is actually curvilinear: voting participation is depressed both by extreme fragmentation (where the leading party wins less that 30% of the vote) and (even more) by one-party predominance (where the leading party gains more than 60% of the vote). In both cases, the party systems hinder the ability of citizens to generate a decisive result if their vote is an attempt to ‘throw the rascals out’ and achieve turnover of the governing party or parties.

Although it might be thought that voters would be more easily mobilized by the more extreme parties across the ideological spectrum, Figure 7.3 shows that although there were some variations by the type of party family, the differences were fairly modest. Overall turnout was slightly lower for the moderate liberal parties, but elsewhere across the political spectrum turnout was fairly evenly spread among parties of the left and right. Clearly many other factors beyond the ideological position of parties may be at work here, including the party’s organizational strength and ability to mobilize and turnout their supporters, as well as their chances of electoral success. Even if partisanship is stronger among supporters of the far-left and far-right parties, as already shown in Figure 6.5, this does not necessarily mean that their supporters will necessarily be more active as the ‘wasted vote’ calculation becomes relevant, where minor parties on the extreme left and right stand less chance of being returned to office. If we compare the age at which parties were founded, there is a modest (4-point) gap between older parties (founded more than twenty years ago) and younger parties, but this is far less than might be expected.
Electoral Laws

Compulsory Voting

The use of compulsory or mandatory voting laws can be expected to have an obvious impact on turnout, although the strength of the effect depends upon how strictly such regulations and any associated sanctions are implemented and enforced. In practice legal rules for voting may be de jure or de facto. The most common legal basis is statutory law although the obligation to vote may also be rooted in constitutional provisions. Implementation ranges from minimal de facto enforcement to the imposition of various sanctions. Fines are most common, as in Brazil, Egypt and Luxembourg, although other punishments include the denial of official documents like passports, identity cards, drivers license or government benefits, used in Italy and Greece, but even occasionally the threat of imprisonment (up to six months in Cyprus) as a criminal offence. The effectiveness of any legal penalties is dependent upon the efficiency of the prior registration process and, where the initiative falls upon the elector, whether there are fines or other penalties associated with failure to register. Where implementation is loosely enforced, then the impact of any mandatory regulations has to operate largely through the impact of the law on social norms, similar to the effect of no-parking restrictions on city streets. Mandatory voting regulations may be genuine attempts to increase widespread public involvement in the political process, or they may be employed by less democratic regimes to compel the public to vote, in the attempt to legitimize one-party contests. Even in democratic states the use of legal regulations may have unintended consequences for participation, since it may reduce the incentive for parties to organize and mobilize their heartland supporters to get them to the polls. Worldwide, twenty-three countries currently use compulsory voting in national parliamentary elections, including seven older democracies such as Australia, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy. In addition this practice is also used for national elections in a few provinces in Austria and in Switzerland, and until 1970 the Netherlands also used such regulations. Voting is also mandatory in many Latin American countries at different levels of democratization, as well as being used by non-democratic regimes in Singapore and Egypt.

Most previous studies have found that compulsory voting is associated with higher turnout, but these have been limited mainly to established democracies, most of which are in Western Europe. Table 7.1 demonstrates that in national elections held worldwide, the use of compulsory voting was related to turnout. To explore this further, Table 7.3 shows the levels of turnout in the 1990s found in all 23 countries worldwide with compulsory voting regulations, broken down by type of democracy. The results show that in older democracies there is indeed a positive relationship; levels of vote as a proportion of the voting age population are 7.7% higher in nations using mandatory voting laws, and are a remarkable 14.2% higher in terms of vote as a proportion of the registered electorate. Where these laws exist in established democracies in Western Europe, Asia-Pacific and South America, then the registered electorate, the group that is most obviously subject to any sanctions, is far more likely to cast a ballot. Yet in all other types of political system the result is very different, with vote/VAP actually slightly lower among newer democracies and semi-democracies with mandatory laws, and far lower in Egypt and Singapore, the only two non-democratic states with mandatory regulations and at least semi-competitive elections.

There may be a number of explanations for this intriguing finding. First, the law may be enforced more strictly, and the registration processes may be more efficient, in the older democracies, so that voters face stronger negative incentives to participate. In addition, it may be that the impact of mandatory laws depends primarily upon broader social norms about the desirability of obeying the law and those in authority, which may prove stronger in established democratic states in Western Europe than in many Latin American cultures. Lastly, newer democracies characterized by low electoral turnout may be more likely to introduce laws in the attempt to mobilize the public, but that without strict implementation these laws prove ineffective correctives. Some evidence to evaluate these propositions is available in the CSES dataset where it is apparent that in countries where compulsory voting is strictly enforced then 95% of the public voted (see Figure 7.2). In countries where the laws on compulsory voting were without any sanction, however, turnout was no greater than in nations without any such laws. This pattern helps to account for some of the striking differences in the impact of compulsory voting laws in different types of political system, and suggest the need for caution in generalizing from how these laws work across nations.
Eligibility for the Franchise

The restrictions to the minimum age at which people qualify to vote is important since in most West European countries for which we have survey data, the young are consistently less likely to vote than older groups, and similar patterns are well-established in the United States\textsuperscript{48}. Ceteris paribus, we would to find that the lower the ages at which citizens are eligible to vote, the lower the turnout. Blais and Dobrzynska confirmed that, all other things being equal, turnout is reduced by almost two points when the voting age is lowered by one year\textsuperscript{49}. Latin American states were the first to lower the age of the franchise from twenty-one to eighteen, beginning in the nineteenth century, and it was only in the 1970s that the United States and west European countries followed suit\textsuperscript{50}. Today the age of the franchise is usually in the region of eighteen to twenty years old. Studies demonstrate that the age of voting eligibility is now unrelated to cross-national variations in turnout, probably because most democracies have now standardized to within a relatively similar age range\textsuperscript{51}.

Restrictions on the franchise vary from one country to another, such as the disenfranchisement of felons, bankrupts, resident aliens, and groups like the mentally incapacitated\textsuperscript{52}. Waves of immigration or increases in the prison population can have an important dampening effect on vote/VAP. In the United States the claim of steadily declining turnout since 1972 has been challenged as an artificial product of the rise in the number of ineligible voters (due to increased numbers of resident aliens and felons in prison or on probation), swelling the size of the voting age population\textsuperscript{53}. The enfranchisement of women has had a dramatic impact on electoral participation. Only four countries enfranchised women before the start of World War I: New Zealand in 1893, Australia in 1902, Finland in 1907 and Norway in 1913. Women had attained the suffrage by the end of World War II in 83 nations, and in 171 nations in total by 1970. In another twenty nations this occurred even later, for example in 1971 in Switzerland, 1976 in Portugal, 1980 in Iraq, 1984 in Liechtenstein, 1994 in Kazakhstan, and today women continue to be barred from voting in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates\textsuperscript{54}. The first election when women were initially enfranchised has usually seen a sudden drop in overall levels of Vote/VAP, as older generations of women who had never participated before suddenly become eligible to vote, followed by a slow recovery in rates of turnout. In the United States and Britain, for example, women were first enfranchised in the early 1920s, and the first election afterwards saw an immediate sharp drop in overall turnout. Subsequent decades saw a slow and steady increase in levels of female turnout until the early 1980s, when women come to participate at similar, or even slightly higher, levels than men. Similar patterns have been found elsewhere\textsuperscript{55}. The residual effect of this pattern is found more widely; countries that enfranchised women prior to 1945 had average turnout (vote/VAP) of 69% in the 1990s, compared with 61% for countries that granted women the vote in the post-war era. Nor is this simply due to a close association between women’s rights and overall levels of democracy. Studies have found this difference to be strong and significant; even after controlling for general levels of political rights and civil liberties, countries that enfranchised women earlier tend to have higher turnout today than those that reformed in more recent decades\textsuperscript{56}.

Electoral Administration

Turnout may also be affected by the administration of registration procedures and facilities for voting that alter the costs for certain groups, such as the use of absentee, advance, overseas, and postal ballots, proxy votes, the distribution of mobile polling facilities for special populations like the elderly, infirm or disabled in nursing homes and hospitals, and polling scheduled for weekend or holidays rather than workdays\textsuperscript{57}. The Bush-Gore debacle in Florida vividly illustrated the importance of seemingly minor and routine practices such as the design and layout of the ballot paper, the security checks used for verifying registration lists, and the type of counting mechanism\textsuperscript{58}. Reformers often focus on administrative procedures, on the grounds that lowering the barriers and simplifying the procedures for registration and voting, while maintaining the integrity of the electoral process, will boost participation. This process is exemplified through special electoral arrangements for mobile populations, such as facilitating the casting of postal, proxy, absentee, or overseas votes, as well as providing polling facilities for the elderly and disabled in nursing homes and hospitals, locating polling stations in areas like shopping centers and supermarkets, and holding elections with lengthy hours on a non-workday. Registration procedures are often thought to be another important hurdle if citizens have to apply to register, often well ahead of the election, and complicated, time-consuming, or restrictive practices depress participation\textsuperscript{59}. Registration is
by application in the United States, France and Brazil, whereas in many other countries eligible citizens are automatically enrolled to vote and registration is the responsibility of the government, conducted via a door-to-door canvas, an annual household census, or a rolling register. Under other regimes, voters can be deterred by far more serious barriers, such as in Belarus, where citizens faced the threat of intimidation at polling places. Incentive-based theories commonly assume that reducing the hurdles to registration and casting a ballot will boost participation. Yet if broader features of the political system remain unchanged, such as the range of parties contesting elected office, then tinkering with administrative procedures may produce minimal change.

**Registration Processes**

The facilities for registration and casting a ballot are commonly expected to affect turnout. The evidence that the registration process matters is most persuasive in comparisons of regulations that vary from state to state within the United States. Rosenstone and Wolfinger examined the difference in turnout between those states with the easiest registration requirements, for example those like North Dakota that allow registration at polling places on election day, and those with the strictest requirements. Their estimates suggest that if all American states had same-day registration, this would provide a one-time boost of turnout by about 5 to 9 percent. Since their study in the 1970s, many states have experimented with easing the requirements, through initiatives like the ‘motor voter’ registration (where citizens can register to vote at the same time as they complete the form used for motor vehicle registration), with limited effects on voter participation. Some states like Oregon have also experimented with postal voting. The 1993 National Voter Registration Act requires all states to make voter registration available in motor vehicle bureaus, as well as by mail, and at various social service agencies, and it also forbids removing citizens from the rolls simply for not voting. Nevertheless as the Florida case vividly illustrated in the 2000 presidential contest, the efficiency of the registration and voting procedure at state level can leave much to be desired. Studies suggest that easing voter registration processes has slightly improved American voter turnout, with a one-time bump when new processes are introduced, but that the impact is not uniform across the whole electorate, as it has had the most impact increasing participation among middle-class citizens.

Yet the comparative evidence is less well established. Studies have long assumed that voluntary registration procedures, where citizens need to apply to be eligible to vote, are an important reason why American turnout lags well behind many comparable democracies. In countries with application processes, including the United States, France, and Australia, prospective voters must usually identify themselves before an election, sometimes many weeks in advance, by registering with a government agency. In other countries the state takes the initiative in registering eligible citizens, through an annual census or similar mechanism. But what is the impact of this process? Katz compared the electoral regulations in thirty-one nations and found that nineteen states used an automatic registration process, while in contrast twelve registered citizens by application. The analysis of electoral participation based on this classification of registration procedures found that these hurdles might be less important than is often assumed, since average vote/VAP proved to be identical in the democracies using either automatic or voluntary registration procedures.

**Polling facilities**

In terms of other voting facilities, most countries hold their elections on a single day, usually at the weekend that makes it easier for employed people to visit a polling station. In a few countries, however, elections are spread over more than one day; in India, for example, where there are more than 600 million voters and some 800 thousand polling stations, balloting takes place on a staggered basis during a month across the whole country. In addition there are important variations in the use of absentee, overseas, postal, advance ballots, proxy voting, and how far polling stations are distributed widely throughout the community for groups who might otherwise have difficulty in getting to the polls, such as the population in residential homes for the elderly, in hospitals, and military personnel posted overseas. Franklin compared average turnout 1960-95 in parliamentary elections in 29 countries and found that compulsory voting, Sunday voting, and postal voting facilities all proved important predictors, along with the proportionality of the electoral system, although not the number of days that polls were open. Studies found that after controlling for levels of development, only polling on a rest day proved to provide a significant boost to turnout in established democracies; in contrast the use of proxy voting and the number of days that the polling stations were open proved to be negatively associated, perhaps because
countries concerned about low turnout try to increase the opportunities to get to the polls\textsuperscript{68}. Other special voting facilities also all proved unrelated to turnout.

\section*{Cultural attitudes and individual resources}

Yet it is well established that even within particular political systems, some groups and individuals remain far more likely to participate than others. Cultural accounts stress that some people choose to vote for largely affective reasons, such as a general sense of civic duty, or to express support for a party or cause without any hope of electoral gain, even if other instrumental citizens are motivated by the rational tradeoff between electoral costs and benefits. We therefore need to turn to analyze the motivation and resources that help predict why some individuals have higher civic engagement than others. Moreover theories of societal modernization suggest that the process of human development may produce fundamental changes to patterns of political participation. Rising levels of human capital (literacy, education, and the cognitive skills that schooling produces), along with access to the mass media, the rising middle classes, and urbanization can be expected to facilitate political activism, although previous studies have established that modernization operates in a curvilinear pattern, as human development increases turnout most in the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, rather than in the stages from industrial to postindustrial\textsuperscript{69}.

The results of the multivariate analysis presented in Table 7.1, and the proportion of people who voted illustrated in Figure 7.4, confirms the familiar pattern: turnout was higher among the middle classes, with a 10-point gap between the unskilled manual working class and managers and professionals. Not surprisingly a similar pattern was reflected in household income, generating an 8-point voting gap between the top and bottom quintiles. The education gap was even larger; 68\% of those with only primary school education voted compared with 82\% of those with either technical or university qualifications. The age profile was familiar; three-quarters of the younger thirties voted, compared with 81\% of the over-sixties. The gender gap was modest and, as noted with the patterns of partisanship, varied by type of society, with the gap proving insignificant in the pooled sample of all legislative elections. Moreover both union membership and church attendance contributed towards higher turnout, suggesting that the social networks and mobilizing resources of these organizations contributed towards civic engagement. In terms of cultural attitudes, as expected, partisan identification produced a dramatic voting gap: 91\% of those who expressed a strong party identification cast a ballot compared with 76\% of those who had only a weak party attachment. External political efficacy also mattered: as cultural theories have long emphasized, people who felt that the system was responsive were more likely to participate. In the multivariate models political ideology also counted, with those on the right slightly more likely to participate, even controlling for their socioeconomic status. Lastly, as expected, turnout was slightly higher in more developed societies, as gauged by the UNDP Human Development Index. The societal changes associated with the modernization process do strengthen electoral participation, as anticipated. A wider range of nations, covering many poorer agrarian economies, could be expected to strengthen this association further.

\section*{Conclusions: Culture, Incentives and Voting Participation}

Rational choice theories suggest that the primary incentives facing citizens in national elections may be understood as a product of the electoral costs of registering and voting, the party choices available to electors, and the degree to which casting a ballot determines the composition of parliament and government. There are multiple costs including the time and effort required to register and to vote, any legal sanctions imposed for failure to turnout, the frequency with which electors are called to the polls. All other things being equal, among postindustrial societies we would expect turnout to be higher in political systems that reduce the costs of voting, such as those with automatic processes for maintaining the electoral register, and electoral arrangements that maximize party competition but which also maintain a strong link between voter’s preferences and the outcome for parliament, for government and for the policy agenda. In this view, as well, effective electoral engineering designed to change the institutional context, such as easier registration processes or the use of all postal voting facilities, should generate improvements in turnout. In contrast, cultural accounts suggest that electors are influenced more by their socioeconomic status and their political attitudes, beliefs, and values, generating habitual
and deeply-rooted patterns of participation, so that mass political behavior will respond only sluggishly, if at all, to changes in political institutions, electoral law, or electoral administration.

In the countries under comparison in the CSES dataset, all other things being equal, the results of the analysis confirm further that political institutions matter, in particular that voting participation is maximized in elections using proportional representation, with small electoral districts, regular but relatively infrequent national contests, competitive party systems, and in presidential contests. These factors lend further confirmation to the pattern established in an earlier study comparing a wider range of nations around the globe. Nevertheless the policy implications of these results are far from straightforward since these institutions represent fundamental parts of political systems which are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to alter in practice. More specific voting facilities, like the role of registration processes, the use of transfer voting or advance voting, are more practical to reform, but comparison of established democracies presented elsewhere shows that these arrangements produce little significant effect on voting turnout. In established democracies, the use of compulsory voting regulations was an important indicator of higher turnout, whereas this was not found among the broader comparison of elections worldwide. The pooled model showed that levels of human development, the institutional context, the social characteristics of electors, and cultural attitudes were all important predictors of turnout. Therefore rather than a false dichotomy, between rational choice strategic incentives and cultural modernization, we should conclude that both these factors contribute towards understanding patterns of political participation, in a ‘nested’ model. Chapters have therefore established that the type of electoral rules do affect mass voting behavior in terms of patterns of cleavage politics, the strength of partisan identities, as well as contributing towards electoral turnout. But do these rules have a more direct impact upon patterns of political representation, such as the diversity of legislative bodies and the role of elected members? The second part of this book turns to these important issues.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 7.1: Models explaining turnout, pooled legislative elections</strong></th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human development</td>
<td>3.02 (.585 ***</td>
<td>4.59 (.621 ***</td>
<td>Human Development Index (reversed) UNDP 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral system: See Table 2.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>.329 (.035 ***</td>
<td>.493 (.038 ***</td>
<td>Majoritarian (1), combined (2), proportional (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District size</td>
<td>-.001 (.035 ***</td>
<td>-.001 (.035 ***</td>
<td>Mean population per elected representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary or Presidential executive</td>
<td>1.505 (.095 ***</td>
<td>1.96 (.105 ***</td>
<td>Parliamentary executive (1), Presidential election (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of national elections</td>
<td>-.008 (.003 **</td>
<td>-.002 (.003</td>
<td>Mean number of national elections (parliamentary and presidential) held during the 1990s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of any compulsory voting</td>
<td>1.82 (.106 ***</td>
<td>1.50 (.109 ***</td>
<td>Compulsory Voting: Yes (1), No (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party competition</td>
<td>.089 (.004 ***</td>
<td>.094 (.004</td>
<td>Mean % vote for the party in 1st place in legislative elections during the 1990s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system</td>
<td>.178 (.013 ***</td>
<td>.124 (.014 ***</td>
<td>Effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002 N. 24413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>2.12 (.113 ***</td>
<td>A2001 Logged Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.003 (.037</td>
<td>A2002 Male=1, female=0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.102 (.014 ***</td>
<td>A2012 5-point scale of household income from lowest to highest quintile.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union membership</td>
<td>.188 (.047 ***</td>
<td>Union member=1, not=0.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.095 (.012 ***</td>
<td>A2015 6-point strength of religiosity scale from never attend religious service (1) to attend at least weekly (6).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CULTURAL ATTITUDES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral system: See Table 2.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right ideology</td>
<td>.019 (.008 **</td>
<td>10-point self-position scale.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>.929 (.040 ***</td>
<td>“Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” Yes=1, no=0.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External political efficacy</td>
<td>.154 (.009 ***</td>
<td>10-point scale from two agree-disagree items: ‘Who is in power can make a difference’ and ‘Who people vote for makes a difference’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.467</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Correctly predicted</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table lists unstandardized logistic regression coefficients, standard errors and significance, with reported voting turnout in legislative elections as the dependent variable in 32 nations. * = p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001.

Electoral system: See Table 2.1.
Party System: See Table 4.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Electoral System</th>
<th>Mean Vote/VAP 1990s</th>
<th>Mean Vote/Reg 1990s</th>
<th>N.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAJORITARIAN</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Vote</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd} Ballot</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Past-The-Post</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Non-Transferable Vote</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block Vote</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All majoritarian</td>
<td><strong>60.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.3</strong></td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBINED</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined-Dependent</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined-Independent</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All combined</td>
<td><strong>64.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>70.4</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROPORTIONAL</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Transferable Vote</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All PR Systems</td>
<td><strong>70.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>74.6</strong></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

*Mean Vote/VAP* is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the Voting Age Population in all nations worldwide that held parliamentary elections during the 1990s.

*Mean Vote/Reg* is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the registered electorate in all nations worldwide that held parliamentary elections during the 1990s.

N. Number of nations

Source: Calculated from International IDEA database *Voter Turnout from 1945 to 2000*. [www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int).
### Table 7.3: Compulsory Voting and electoral turnout, worldwide 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Compulsory</th>
<th>Non-Compulsory</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>N. Of Nations</th>
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<tr>
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<td>86.9</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>+14.2</td>
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**Notes:**
- **Mean Vote/VAP** is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the Voting Age Population in all nations worldwide that held parliamentary elections during the 1990s.
- **Mean Vote/Reg** is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the registered electorate in all nations worldwide that held parliamentary elections during the 1990s.

**Compulsory Voting:** The following 23 nations were classified as currently using compulsory voting with the types of democracy shown in Appendix A:
- **Older democracies:** Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg.
- **Newer Democracies:** Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Liechtenstein, Panama Canal Zone, Thailand, and Uruguay.
- **Semi-democracies:** Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela.
- **Non-democracies:** Singapore and Egypt.

**Source:** Calculated from International IDEA database *Voter Turnout from 1945 to 2000. [www.idea.int]*
Figure 7.1 Votes cast as a proportion of the voting age population, 1990s

Note: Mean Vote/VAP is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the Voting Age Population in parliamentary elections during the 1990s held in the 32 nations in the CSES dataset under comparison.

Source: International IDEA database Voter Turnout from 1945 to 2000. www.idea.int
Figure 7.2: Systemic characteristics of turnout

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002
Figure 7.3: Partisan characteristics of turnout

Note: The proportion of party supporters that vote is classified by partisan identification.
Younger parties: Under 20 years old. Older parties: Over 20 years old.
Party System: Classified based on the ENPP.
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002
Figure 7.4: Social and attitudinal characteristics of turnout

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002


30 See, for example, the discussion of role orientations of MEPs and MPs in different electoral systems in Richard S. Katz. 1999. 'Role orientations in Parliament.' In *The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration.* Eds. Richard S. Katz and Bernhard Wessels. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


45 I am most grateful help received in identifying the countries that use compulsory voting from Gillian Evans, Lisa Hill, Marian Sawer, Ian McAllister, and Wolfgang Hirczy.
47 One difficulty in analyzing the systematic effects of mandatory voting regulations concerns significant differences among alternative reference sources in the particular countries classified as using these laws. In such cases, the rule was adopted that the use of compulsory voting requirements had to be confirmed in at least three independent sources for classification in this study. These sources included the detailed report provided in a private communication by Gillian Evans and Lisa Hill at the Australian National University; the *International Encyclopedia of Elections* edited by Richard Rose. Washington DC: CQ Press; the Inter-Parliamentary Union *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections* annual volumes 1995-1999. Geneva: IPU; the list published by the Australian Electoral Commission as provided by IFES1996 at *www.aec.gov.au/voting/compulsory%5Fcountries.htm*; the *CIA World Factbook 2000* *www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fields/suffrage.html*; and the tables provided by Richard Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Table 13.1 and 13.2. Reference was also made to the electoral laws and constitutions compiled by IFES at *www.IFES.org*.


65 See Pippa Norris. 2002. Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. New York: Cambbridge University Press. The mean Vote/VAP in the 1990s was the same (72%) in the countries classified by Katz as using automatic and those using application registration procedures, and the mean Vote/Reg in the 1990s was slightly higher (78.1%) in countries with application procedures than in those with automatic processes (75.1%).

66 The best discussion of the administrative arrangements for registration and balloting found around the world can be found at www.ACE.org developed by International IDEA and IFES. For further details see Michael Maley. 2000. ‘Absentee Voting.’ In The International Encyclopedia of Elections. Ed. Richard Rose. Washington DC: CQ Press. See also entries by Andre Blais and Louis Massicotte. ‘Day of Election’;


Chapter 8

Women's Representation

The first part of this book examined how electoral rules influenced the strategies adopted by parties and the behavior of the mass electorate. But so far we have not considered the potential impact of rational-choice institutionalism and cultural modernization upon political representation. Debates about electoral reform have revolved around the practical impact of changes to the status quo, including how to achieve social diversity in legislatures so that parliaments look more like the people they serve. Recent decades have witnessed growing demands for the inclusion and empowerment of women in elected office, as well as a stronger voice for ethnic minorities (as discussed fully in the next chapter). Feminist theorists suggest that the presence of women leaders facilitates the articulation of different perspectives on political issues, where elected representatives are not just ‘standing as’ women but also ‘acting for’ women as a group. An accumulating body of evidence in North America, Scandinavia and Western Europe suggests that women legislators do indeed raise distinctive concerns and issue priorities. If so, then their under-representation in parliament may have important consequences for the public policy agenda and for the articulation of women's interests, as well as for the legitimacy of democratic bodies.

As is well known, today women continue to be strongly underrepresented in elected office. This pattern persists despite trends in the home, family, school, and work-force transforming women and men’s lives during the postwar era, as well as the growth of the second wave feminist movement strengthening demands for gender equality in politics. NGOs, parties, and international agencies have often expressed the need for equal opportunities for women. Governments have signed official National Action Plans and international conventions designed to establish conditions of gender equality in the public sphere, exemplified by the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) favoring the principle of equal opportunities in public life, ratified by 163 nations. The 1995 UN Beijing Platform for Action expressed commitment to the empowerment of women based on the conviction that: “Women’s empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace.” The Platform for Action explicitly aims for a 50-50 gender balance in all areas of society, and its analysis places full participation in decision-making in the foremost role.

In practice, however, multiple barriers continue to restrict women’s advancement in elected office. Out of 193 nations worldwide, only nine women are at the pinnacle of power as elected heads of State or Government. Despite some redoubtable and well-known world leaders, like Margaret Thatcher, Gro Harlem Bruntland, Mary Robinson, and Golda Meir, only 39 states have ever elected a woman President or Prime Minister. According to estimates by the United Nations, women represent less than one tenth of the world’s cabinet ministers and one fifth of all sub-ministerial positions. The Inter-Parliamentary Union estimates that about 5,600 women sit in parliament worldwide in mid-2002, representing 14.7% of all members. This is a rise from 9% in 1987 yet if growth at this level is maintained (0.36% per annum), a simple linear projection predicts that women parliamentarians will achieve parity with men at the turn of the 22nd Century.

[See Figure 8.1]

Regional variations show sharp contrasts to these global patterns (see Figure 8.1). Women parliamentarians do best in the Nordic nations, constituting 39% of MPs in the lower house. Sweden leads the world; women are half of all Cabinet Ministers and 149 female members sit in the Riksdag (43%), quadrupling from 10% in 1950. Women political leaders have also moved ahead in the other Nordic countries. Elsewhere the proportion of women members of parliament is lower, including in the Americas (16%), Asia (15%), Europe excluding the Nordic states (15%), Sub-Saharan Africa (14%), and the Pacific (14%). The worst record remains in Arab states, where women are 5% of elected representatives. Women continue to be barred by law from standing for parliament in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. There have been some moves towards reforms in the region, for example Moroccan law introduced 30 reserved
seats for women and after the September 2002 elections 11% of the legislature were female. In Bahrain legal revisions allowed women to stand in elections for the first time, but none were elected although 10% of the candidates in the May 2002 local elections and 5% of the candidates for the national parliament five months later. A glance at the rank order of the proportion of women in office in the countries under comparison in Figure 8.1 suggests that the level of socioeconomic development and length of democracy may be important, but these are neither necessary nor sufficient for gender equality in parliaments; in Mexico, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, for example, women politicians are more successful than in the United States and Japan, two of the most affluent democracies in the world.

[Figure 8.2 about here]

Analyzing Women's Representation

The literature suggests that multiple reasons lie behind this phenomenon. The funnel model in Figure 8.2 identifies the primary steps in the candidate selection process, from the earliest and most diffuse factors operating within each country through more specific stages in each party until the final step of election to parliament. This limited study cannot examine the evidence for all these phases, especially the way the selection process operates within different parties, which is explored in depth elsewhere. But here we can focus upon how far women's representation is influenced by cultural modernization and by electoral laws, the most diffuse factors in any political system, illustrated on the left in the model. Electoral laws, including the basic type of electoral system, the statutory adoption of gender quotas, and the use of reserved seats for women, shape the strategic incentives facing party selectors and candidates. Cultural modernization relates to either egalitarian or traditional attitudes towards gender equality in the home, workplace and public sphere, particularly attitudes towards the role of women as political leaders.

Rational choice institutionalism

Rational choice institutionalism assumes that selectors are vote-maximizers seeking to pick party standard-bearers who will appeal to electors and therefore be returned to parliament. Gatekeepers controlling the nomination and selection of legislative candidates are the party ‘selectorate’, whether centralized in national office or operating at regional or local level, including the role of party voters, members, activists, leaders, and officers. Multiple factors may determine the decision of party selectors, beyond the pursuit of votes, for example ideologues may favor ‘one of us’ nominees within organizational or leadership factions. Selectors may be swayed by personal loyalties to particular colleagues or the rhetorical skills of certain outstanding speakers. But if selectors fail to act at least in part in a rational vote-maximizing manner, then the theory predicts that any candidates they nominate will probably be less successful among the electorate and therefore less likely to enter parliament. Yet when taking their decisions, selectors possess limited information about public preferences. To minimize electoral risks, it is rational for them to re-select incumbents. Members of parliament enjoy the advantages of any personal vote built up from an established legislative track record and parliamentary experience on key committees, as well as the cachet of name-recognition and the organizational resources that accompany office. In the absence of an existing incumbent, to reduce uncertainty, for selectors the default option is to nominate new candidates that share similar social and political characteristics to previous MPs. Since many parliamentary elites are usually disproportionately male, middle-aged professionals, such as lawyers, teachers and journalists, as well as drawn from the predominant ethnic group in any society, it minimizes electoral risks for selectors to prefer candidates with similar characteristics for future contests. Moreover the profile of the typical member of parliament will shape broader role models about who is regarded as most likely to succeed in political careers, encouraging aspirants with the standard characteristics to seek nomination, while discouraging non-traditional groups from coming forward.

Due to these tendencies, without external intervention, the selection process can be expected to reproduce the status quo, picking incumbents or new candidates who reflect the typical social background and experience displayed by most MPs. In this context, opportunities for women may be influenced by electoral law, including the basic type of electoral system, the statutory adoption of gender quotas, and the use of reserved seats for women. Rational choice
institutionalism suggests that electoral laws determine the balance of incentives operating in the selection process, for example the use of statutory gender quotas creates sanctions regulating the outcome.

**Cultural modernization**

By contrast, cultural modernization accounts emphasize that societal values reflect levels of human development. The theory developed by Inglehart and Norris also suggests that the cultural values in any society are not accidental, instead they are related systematically to levels of human development. In many societies, rigid gender roles determine the rights, resources and powers of women and men, notably the division of labor in the home and workplace. In others, men and women’s roles are more interchangeable, and innate biological differences lead to fewer social expectations. Where a culture of gender equality predominates, it provides a climate where electoral laws are more likely to be translated into de facto rights in practice; where institutional reforms are implemented in the workplace and public sphere, where women embrace expanded opportunities in literacy, education and employment, and where the traditional roles of women and men are transformed within the household and family. Moreover the critical importance of culture is that women as well as men share the predominant attitudes, values and beliefs about the appropriate division of sex roles within any society. Sex discrimination reflects deep-rooted attitudes towards gender equality, so that where traditional cultural values prevail then selectors will prefer to select men for political leadership. Moreover in traditional cultures, parties will fail to introduce equal opportunity or positive action policies voluntarily, and they will fail to comply with any statutory positive action laws and disregard any legal penalties against sex discrimination. Where traditional values prevail, women are not just limited by society in terms of the opportunities they seek, but they also choose to limit themselves. Inglehart and Norris argue that cultural change is not an ad hoc and erratic process, rather patterns of human development and societal modernization underpin attitudinal shifts. The broad direction of value change is predictable although the pace is conditioned by the cultural legacy and institutional structure in any given society, exemplified by the role of an Islamic heritage in the Middle East, the legacy of Communism in Central Europe, and the egalitarian traditions in Scandinavia.

**Evidence**

Multivariate models allow us to analyze the evidence using the same logic adopted throughout the book. The models assume that if electoral laws are critical, then levels of female representation should vary systematically under different rules. On the other hand, if cultural values are important, then religious traditions, as a proxy for gender equality attitudes, should prove significant. The summary models presented in Table 8.1 allow us to compare the proportion of women elected to the lower house in the most recent general election prior to 2000. The analysis draws upon worldwide data in 171 nations from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. *Model A* first enters levels of development (measured by the UNDP’s Human Development Index). Electoral systems are classified into the basic types of proportional, combined and majoritarian categories used throughout the book, as categorized in Chapter 2. The model then entered the use of positive action policies implemented by law, including the level of either statutory gender quotas or reserved seats, and also the length of women’s suffrage in a country as a broader indicator of women’s political rights and civil liberties. One important limitation is that the multivariate analysis does not include the use of voluntary gender quotas adopted through internal party rules and regulations, since these vary among different parties within the same country. Their effects are best understood and studied through case studies and comparisons of trends over time conducted at national-level, as discussed later.

In *Model A*, the type of electoral system, the use of reserved seats, and the year of women’s suffrage are all found to be significantly associated with women’s representation, and the measures of human development only prove significant at the .10 level. In *Model B*, to compare the role of structure and culture, the predominant religion in different countries of the world is then entered, as an indirect proxy for cultural differences towards the role of women and men. The amount of variance explained by the analysis increases from 25% based on electoral law in *Model A* to 37% with the addition of cultural factors in *Model B*. Nevertheless although fewer women are
elected in Muslim and Orthodox societies, after controlling for development and the electoral system, none of the cultural indicators of religiosity emerge as statistically significant. After discussing the results in detail, and the reasons for the patterns that are uncovered, the final section then considers their implications.

[Table 8.1 about here]

**Electoral Laws**

The thesis that more women have usually been elected to parliament under party list PR than under majoritarian electoral systems has been confirmed in a series of studies since the mid-eighties, based on research comparing both established democracies and also a broader range of developing societies worldwide. Within proportional electoral systems, district magnitude has commonly been regarded as a particularly important factor, with more women usually elected from large multimember constituencies. The results of the multivariate analysis in Table 8.1 confirm that proportional electoral systems are significant predictors of the proportion of women in parliament, even after controlling for levels of human development. The comparison in Table 8.2, without any controls, shows how women are far more successful under PR List systems. As a simple rule, women proved almost twice as likely to be elected under proportional than under majoritarian electoral systems. Women were on average 8.5 percent of MPs in majoritarian systems, 11.3 percent in combined systems, and 15.4 percent of members in PR systems. Contrasts were also evident in the proportion of women MPs in combined-independent systems (8.7%) and in the more proportional combined-dependent systems (18.0%).

Considerable variations were also clear within each major electoral family, however, which could be attributed to many intervening conditions, including levels of district magnitude (the mean number of candidates per district) and proportionality, the use of legal and voluntary gender quotas, party ideologies (with the left generally more sympathetic towards gender equality), and the type of party organization. More women were elected in certain majoritarian electoral systems, such as in Australia and Canada, than in other highly proportional party list systems, as exemplified by Israel. Although there is a strong and consistent association, by itself the basic type of electoral system is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to guarantee women's representation. Table 8.3 breaks down the analysis by the type of society, showing that the link between the basic type of electoral system and women's representation was strongest among postindustrial societies, where there was a 12-point gap between PR and majoritarian systems. There was a far more modest 4-point gap among poorer agrarian nations although even in developing societies, proportional electoral systems do function as a facilitating mechanism, which expedite women's entry into legislative office.

[Table 8.2 and 8.3 about here]

Strategic incentive theory suggests three main reasons why women usually benefit from PR. First, under proportional systems, each party presents the public with their collective list of candidates for each multimember district. As such, parties have an electoral incentive to maximize their collective appeal in such lists by including candidates representing all the major social cleavages in the electorate, for example by including both middle class professionals and blue-collar workers, farmers and urban shopkeepers, Catholics and Protestants, as well as women and men. Multimember districts encourage collective party accountability for the complete list of candidates. Where parties have to nominate a slate of candidates for a multimember district, the exclusion of any major social sector, including women, could signal discrimination, and could therefore risk an electoral penalty at the ballot box. By contrast in first-past-the-post systems, parliamentary candidates are selected to run within each single member district. Where the selection process is in the hands of the local constituency party, this creates minimal incentive for each particular constituency to pick a ticket that is 'balanced' at the district or national level. Local party members often want a representative who will maximize their chances of winning in that constituency, irrespective of the broader consequences for the party or parliament. The selection of the default option (i.e. a candidate reflecting the traditional characteristics and qualifications of previous parliamentarians) may be expected to predominate in many cases, as the rational vote-maximizing strategy designed to minimize electoral risks.
Moreover the type of electoral system is also related to patterns of incumbency turnover. One major barrier to women candidates lies through the strength of incumbency, with elected officials returned over successive contests, due to the personal vote advantages of familiarity, name recognition, and media attention, as well as greater financial and organizational resources that accompany legislative office. In many contests the key challenge facing women is not just becoming nominated per se, but contesting a winnable seat in single-member districts, or being ranked near the top of the party list of candidates in PR systems. In the United States, for example, 85% of incumbent congressional representatives have been returned in successive election from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. A broader comparison of election to the lower house of the national parliament in twenty-five established democracies from 1979-1994 found that on average about two-thirds of all incumbents were returned from one general election to the next, including 66% in PR electoral systems and 70% in majoritarian elections. This difference is modest but it could generate slightly more opportunities for challengers, including women in the pipeline for elected office. For example, in Britain it was the massive turnover in MPs following Labour’s landslide victory in 1997, coupled with the use of positive action placing women in target seats, which doubled the number of women in the UK House of Commons. As incumbents, Labour women MPs were reelected in the 2001 British general election, despite the fact that the original positive action strategy was discontinued. In the United States, studies have established that from 1998-2000 women increased their numbers in states with term limitations more than elsewhere, although this effect is reversed in states like California where women representatives have already made much progress.

Finally, as discussed below, party list PR also facilitates the use of positive action designed to boost women’s representation; exemplified by legal or voluntary gender quotas in candidate selection procedures. Positive action strategies can also be used under majoritarian electoral systems as well, as shown by the British case, but it can be harder to implement within single member districts than within party lists. For all these reasons, PR systems are likely to be more ‘women-friendly’ than majoritarian electoral systems. These qualities are also present in combined electoral systems, so that in Germany, Hungary and New Zealand more women are usually successful via party lists rather than through single member districts.

**Electoral laws and Positive Action**

During the last decade many policy initiatives have attempted to increase the number of women in elected and appointed office. As shown in Figure 8.3, the most common strategies fall into three main categories.

*Rhetorical strategies* are exemplified by signature of international conventions on women’s rights, and official speeches and statements applauding the principles of equal opportunities for women and men. Where leaders are committed to these statements, and where they have the power of patronage, then this can lead to the promotion of women in elected and appointed office. Yet gains that are not institutionalized may be easily lost again under different leadership, and women who benefit from patronage may appear as ‘token’ representatives without their own electoral or party base. Rhetorical strategies are the weakest and most ineffective instruments, although capable of producing some modest gains.

*Equal opportunity policies* are designed to provide a level playing field so that women can pursue political careers on the same basis as men. Common examples include programs of financial aid to assist with electoral expenses, candidate training in the skills of communication, public speaking, networking, campaigning, and news-management, and the provision of crèches and childcare facilities within legislative assemblies. Equal opportunity strategies can be gender-neutral in design, for example opportunities for training can be offered to both women and men parliamentary candidates, and childcare can be used by both parents, although their effects may be beneficial primarily to women.

Lastly *positive action policies*, by contrast, are explicitly designed to benefit women as a temporary stage until such a time as gender parity is achieved in legislative and elected bodies. Positive action includes three main strategies:
The use of reserved seats for women established in electoral law;

Statutory gender quotas controlling the composition of candidate lists for all parties in each country; and also

Voluntary gender quotas used in the regulations and rules governing the candidate selection procedures within particular parties.

Positive action has become increasingly popular in recent decades, as one of the most effective policy options for achieving short-term change, although the use of these policies remain a matter of controversy within and outside of the women's movement.

Reserved seats

By electoral law, some countries have stipulated a certain number of reserved seats that are only open to women or ethnic minority candidates. This policy has been adopted to boost women's representation under majoritarian electoral systems in developing nations in Africa and South Asia, particularly those with a Muslim culture (see Table 8.4). Reserved seats have been used for the lower house in Morocco (elected from a national list of 30 women members out of 325 representatives), Bangladesh (30/300), Pakistan (60/357), Botswana (2 women appointed by the president out of 44 members), Taiwan (elected), Lesotho (3 women appointed out of 80 seats), and Tanzania (37 women out of 274 members are distributed according to parties according to their share of seats in the House of Representatives). This mechanism guarantees a minimum number of women in elected office, although some have argued that it may be a way to appease, and ultimately sideline, women. Being elected does not necessarily mean that women are given substantive decision-making power, especially given the weakness of many of these legislative bodies. Where appointed by the president, if lacking an independent electoral or organizational base, women may be marginalized from any real decision-making responsibility, and their appointment can reinforce control of parliament by the majority party. Many of the countries using this policy have limited democratic rights and civil liberties, with power concentrated in the executive. In Uganda, for example, 53 parliamentary seats out of 292 are reserved for women (18%), which are indirectly elected, along with seats set aside for representatives drawn from the groups such as the army, youth, the disabled, and trade unions, despite a ban on opposition parties standing for election. Nevertheless against these arguments, reserved seats have also been used at local level in India, with considerable success. In India 33% of seats on local municipal elections are reserved for women, although when it was proposed to extend this practice for elections to the national parliament (Lok Sahba) in 1996 the issue aroused heated debate and was defeated. As discussed further in the next chapter, reserved seats based on regional, linguistic, ethnic, or religious ethno-political cleavages have also been used, although their effects depend upon the size and spatial concentration of such groups.

Legal Gender Quotas

Positive action strategies also include statutory gender quotas applied by law to all political parties, specifying that women must constitute a minimal proportional of parliamentary candidates or elected representatives within each party. Quotas represent an instrument that introduces specific formal selection criteria, in the form of minimal or maximal thresholds for a given group, into selections procedures, whether for elected or appointed office in the public sphere or for personnel recruitment in the private sector, such as for trade union office. There is an important distinction drawn between statutory gender quotas introduced by law, and thereby applying to all parties within a country, and voluntary gender quotas implemented by internal regulations and rule books within each party. Quotas can be specified for women and men, or for other relevant selection criteria, such as ethnicity, language, social sector, or religion. Statutory gender quota laws have been applied to elections in Belgium, France, and Italy, to many nations in Latin America (see
Table 8.5), as well as for appointments to public bodies and consultative committees in many countries such as Finland and Norway25.

As shown by the last column in Table 8.5, monitoring short-term change in the election immediately before and after passage of the law, in some countries, and in some elections, legal gender quotas appear to have worked far more effectively than in other cases. Hence the substantial rise in women in parliament found in Argentina, the modest growth in Peru and Belgium, but minimal progress evident in France, Mexico, or Brazil. Moreover the general comparison of the use of legal gender quotas in the nations where these have been introduced proves insignificant in the multivariate model in Table 8.1. Why is this? The effective implementation of legal gender quotas depends upon multiple factors, including most importantly how the statutory mechanisms are put into practice, the level of the gender quota specified by law, whether the rules for party lists regulate the rank order of women and men candidates, whether party lists are open or closed, and also the penalties associated with any failure to comply with the law. Positive action policies alter the balance of incentives for the party selectorate. Where these laws are implemented, then selectors need to weigh the potential penalties and benefits if they do or do not comply. Selectors may still prefer the default option of nominating a male candidate under certain circumstances, for example if the laws are designed as symbolic window-dressing more than as de facto regulations; if the regulation specify that a certain proportion of women have to be selected for party lists but they fail to specify their rank order so that female candidates cluster in unwinnable positions at the bottom of the list; or if any sanctions for non-compliance are weak or non-existent. As in many attempts to alter the incentive structure, the devil lies in the details, so apparently similar legislative policies turn out to have different consequences in different nations.

In Belgium the Electoral Act of 24 May 1994 specified that no more than two-thirds of the candidates on any party electoral list may be of the same sex. The minimum representation requirement is thus exactly the same for men and women. It applies to the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, and also to regional, community, provincial and municipal councils, as well as elections to the European Parliament. If this requirement is not respected, the list candidacies that would otherwise have been held by women have to be left blank or the whole list is declared invalid26. The Act was first fully enforced in the 1999 European elections that saw the proportion of Belgian women MEPs rise from 18.5 to 23.3%. This was an increase, albeit a modest one, but the powers of incumbency means that it will take many successive elections under the new rules before women become a third or more of Belgian parliamentarians.

In 1999 France passed the parity law, a constitutional amendment requiring parties to include 50% representation of women in their party lists for election, with financial penalties attached for failure to do so. The gender parity law passed in June 2000 specified that for elections to the National Assembly between 48 and 52% of all candidates presented nation-wide by any given political party must be women. If this percentage is higher or lower, the state will cut its financial contribution. The results of the first elections held in March 2001 under the new rules indicate a substantial impact at municipal level, almost doubling the number of women in local office from 25 to 47 percent. Nevertheless in the first elections to the French National Assembly held under the parity rules, in June 2002, the proportion of elected women rose by only 1.4 percent, from 10.9 to 12.3. Only eight more women entered the Assembly, dashing the hopes of the reformers. The main reasons were that the parity law failed to specify the selection of women for particular types of single member seats, so that women nominees could be concentrated in unwinnable constituencies. Moreover the major parties decided to favor incumbents, largely ignored the financial penalty of reduced party funding associated with imbalanced party lists27. The sanction is a reduction in the public funding received for each party’s campaign on a sliding scale of 5% for a gender difference of 10% on party lists of candidates, 30% for a difference of 60%, and a maximum 50% for a difference of 100%. Hence an all-male list would still get half the public funding. Despite the parity law, the proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies means that France is ranked 61st worldwide after reform, compared with 59th before parity was introduced.
Another parallel European case concerns Italy, where a quota system was introduced in 1993 into the legislation governing municipal, provincial and national elections. These laws asserted that a minimum of 30% of both sexes had to be present in electoral lists. In 1995, however, the Italian Constitutional Tribunal repealed these regulations, considering that they were contrary to the principle of equality. Some parties have introduced voluntary gender quotas into their party rules, set at 50% for Verdi, 40% for DS, 40% for the PRC, and 20% for the PPI. Yet in the 2001 election women remained only 9.8% of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, ranking Italy 77th worldwide. In Armenia, the 1999 Electoral Code states that the voting lists of the parties involved in the proportional parliamentary electoral system should contain not less than 5% female candidates, but the low level and poor implementation meant that women in the June 1999 elections were only 3.1% of the national parliament.

During the early 1990s, with the expansion of democracy, the popularity of statutory gender quotas spread rapidly in Latin America. The first and most effective law (‘Ley de Cupos) was passed in Argentina in 1991, introducing an obligatory quota system for all parties contesting national elections to the Chamber of Deputies - "lists must have, as a minimum, 30% of women candidates and in proportions with possibilities of being elected. Any list not complying with these requisites shall not be approved." Most importantly, the law stipulates that women must be ranked throughout party lists, not consigned to the end where they face no realistic chance of election. Party lists failing to comply with the law are rejected. If a rejected list is not corrected so as to bring it into compliance with the law, the party in question cannot compete in that district's congressional election. The provincial branches of the political parties create the closed party lists from which the Argentine deputies are elected, although at times the national party intervenes to impose a list. Following the implementation of the law, in the 1993 Chamber election, 21.3% (27 of 127) of the deputies elected were women, compared to only 4.6% (6 of 130) in the election of 1991. A decade after passage, the proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies had risen to 30.7% (79 out of 257), ranking Argentina 9th from the top worldwide in the representation of women. In total eleven Latin American countries have now adopted national laws establishing a minimum percentage for women's participation as candidates in national elections and a twelfth—Colombia—had approved a quota of 30 percent for women in senior positions in the executive branch. Although their impact has been varied, in these countries a comparison of the elections held immediately before and after passage of these laws in Table 8.4 suggests that legislative quotas generated on average an eight-percentage point gain in women's election to congress. Variation in the effectiveness of the quotas can be explained by whether the PR list is open or closed (with the latter most effective), the existence of placement mandates (requiring parties to rank women candidates in high positions on closed party lists), district magnitude (the higher the number of candidates in a district, the more likely quotas are to work), and good faith party compliance.

Statutory gender quotas have also been applied to local, municipal and regional contests. In South Africa the Municipal Structures Act states that political parties must seek to ensure that women comprise 50% of lists submitted for election at the local level. Following the municipal elections in 2000, women were 28.2% of local councilors. In the Namibian local authority elections in 1992 and 1998, the law required political parties to include at least 30% women on their party candidate lists.

The comparison of legal gender quotas suggests grounds for caution for those who hope that these strategies will automatically produce an immediate short-term rise in women legislators. The French case, in particular, illustrates the way the detailed aspects of how such quotas are implemented, and the sanctions for non-compliance, can generate very different results even for municipal and national elections within the same country. The variations in the results across Latin America confirm these observations.

**Voluntary Gender Quotas in Party Rules**

Most commonly, however, voluntary gender quotas have been introduced within specific parties, particularly those of the left, rather than being implemented by electoral law. Rules, constitutions, and internal regulations determined within each party are distinct from electoral statutes enforceable by the courts. Parties in Scandinavia, Western Europe, and Latin America
have often used voluntary gender quotas, and Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe employed them in the past. It is difficult to provide systematic and comprehensive analysis of party rules worldwide but in spring 2003 International IDEA’s Global Database of Quotas for Women estimates that 181 parties in 58 countries use gender quotas for electoral candidates for national parliaments31. The effects of these measures can be analyzed by focusing on their use within the European Union, since this allows us to compare a range of representative democracies at similar levels of socioeconomic development. Table 8.6 compares the use of gender quotas for the candidate selection process in national elections in the fifteen EU member states. By 2000, among 76 relevant European parties (with at least ten members in the lower house), almost half (35 parties) use gender quotas, and two dozen of these have achieved levels of female representation in the lower house of parliament over 24%32. Among the European parties using gender quotas, on average one third (33%) of their elected representatives were women. By contrast, in the European parties without gender quotas, only 18% of their members of parliament were women. Of course it might be misleading to assume any simple ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ at work here, since parties more sympathetic towards women in public office are also more likely to introduce gender quotas. European parties of the left commonly introduced voluntary gender quotas during the 1980s, including Social Democratic, Labour, Communist, Socialist and Greens parties, before the practice eventually often spread to other parties. Nevertheless the ‘before’ and ‘after’ test, exemplified by cases such as their deployment by parties in Scandinavia, in Germany, and in the British Labour party, suggest that the effect of voluntary gender quotas within parties also varies substantially.

Many of the parties ranking at or near the top of the proportion of women MPs in Table 8.6 are in Scandinavia. The Norwegian Labour Party was the first in this region to implement a 40% gender quota for all elections in 1983, although this did not specify the location of women candidates within their lists. Other Norwegian parties followed suit, including the Social Left, the Center Party, and the Christian Democrats33. This was followed by Denmark where the Social Democratic Party introduced a 50% quota for elections in 198834. Because the rank position of candidates on the party list is critical to their success in being elected, in 1994 the Swedish Social Democratic Party introduced the principle of including a woman as every second name on the list - the ‘zipper’ or ‘zebra’ principle. This means that every second name on the party's nomination list must alternate between women and men. In Sweden, since the general election in 1994, the largest political party, the Social Democrats, and later the Greens and the Christian Democrats, have systematically alternated women and men’s names in their lists of the constituency candidates for parliamentary, local, regional, and the EU-Parliament elections. If we compare the Swedish parties ranked high in Table 8.6, it is apparent that gender quotas are used by some such as the Social Democrats and the Vansterpartiet, although not all the credit should go to the use of positive action, by any means, as other Swedish parties including the Centerpartiet also have a substantial number of women MPs despite not using any gender quotas.

Elsewhere in Western Europe, as shown in Table 8.6, formal practices vary among countries and parties. In Germany, for example, three of the five major political parties have a 40-50% quota system in their party rules. In 1980, when the Greens turned from a social movement into a political party, they instilled gender balance by including a strict 50 per cent quota combined with a zipper system in their statutes. Except for the very top positions in government, the Greens have been more or less able to meet their requirements. In 1988 the Social Democrats followed suit by stipulating in party rules that in all internal party elections at least one third of candidates must be female. From 1994 onwards, 40 per cent of all party positions have to be held by women. For election lists, parliamentarian mandates and public office a transition period with lower percentages was agreed. It started with one-quarter in 1988, required one-third in 1994, and reached 40 per cent in 1998. The SPD met the targets within the party but fell slightly short for seats in parliaments and in governments. In 1996 the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) introduced the so-called ‘quorum’ requiring 30 per cent of female representation in both party functions and election lists, but so far these targets have not being met. After German unification the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, former East German Communist party) introduced a strict 50 percent quota in combination with a zipper system. In many elections the PDS has outperformed its
own targets. Currently only the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU, the Bavarian sister party of the CDU) and the Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) refuse to introduce voluntary gender quotas.

It is often easier to implement positive action in proportional elections using party lists but these strategies can also be used under majoritarian rules. In Britain, the Labour Party first agreed the principle of quotas to promote women's representation in internal party positions in the late 1980s. In 1988 a minimalist measure was agreed for candidate selection for Westminster, so that if a local branch nominated a woman, at least one woman should be included on the constituency shortlist. In 1993, following an electoral defeat where the party failed to attract sufficient support amongst women voters, it was decided that more radical measures were necessary. Consequently the Labour party's annual conference agreed that in half the seats where Labour MPs were retiring, and in half the party's key target marginal seats, local party members would be required to select their parliamentary candidate from an all-women shortlist. Other seats would be open to both women and men. Although this policy was subsequently dropped under legal challenge, it still proved highly effective, contributing towards doubling the number of women in the UK House of Commons from 1992-1997. Despite abandoning the original policy, low levels of incumbency turnover maintained most of these gains in the subsequent general election in 2001. For the first elections to the new Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Great London Assembly, Labour adopted a 'twinning' policy. The system 'twinned' neighboring seats, taking into account their 'winnability', so that each pair would select one man and one woman. This opportunity was uniquely available, given that there were no incumbent members. Under this system, local party selectors in the two constituencies would come together to pick candidates, and each would have two votes - one for a woman and one for a man.

Gender quotas are by no means limited to established democracies. In South Africa, for example, in 1994 the African National Congress implemented a 33.3% gender quota into party rules, while in Mozambique in 1999 the Frelimo Party introduced a 30% quota on electoral lists. This policy has been particularly common among parties of the left, and the Socialist International Women lists 57 socialist parties using gender quotas in April 2002, ranging from 20 to 50 percent, including the Israeli Meretz (40%), the Mali Adema-Pasj (30%), the Nicaraguan FSLN (30%), and the Turkish CHP (25%). Gathering systematic and reliable data on the use of such strategies worldwide is difficult, but a global review of practices by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1993 found that twenty-two parties employed gender quotas for legislative elections, while fifty-one parties used them for elections to internal party posts. By contrast, in the first democratic elections following the fall of the Berlin wall, parties within Central and Eastern Europe often moved in the opposite direction, abandoning gender quotas for parliament and local government that were regarded as part of the old Communist state, although occasionally subsequently reinstating this practice such as in the Czech SDP (25%), the Bosnian SDP (30%) and the Lithuanian SDP (30%).

Cultural Modernization

Yet there is no automatic relationship between women's representation and the type of electoral system, or indeed the use of legal or voluntary gender quotas. For example in the PR countries under comparison, women are four out of ten members of parliament in Sweden, but they are only about one in ten in Romania and Israel. Even within established democracies, during 1950s and 1960s there was little difference between the proportion of women elected under PR and under majoritarian systems. It was only from the 1970s onwards that the proportion of women elected under PR expanded substantially in Western Europe. This pattern suggests that although the electoral system may function as a facilitating condition, it may well interact with broader cultural factors, for example the way that women's opportunities in education and the workforce expanded in postindustrial societies, and the second wave women's movement generated greater demands for women's inclusion in public life, from the late-1960s onwards. Evidence presented elsewhere demonstrates that in recent decades a major shift in cultural attitudes towards the traditional division of sex roles, including the spread of more egalitarian attitudes towards the role of women as political leaders, was far stronger in postindustrial societies than in industrial nations. Therefore parties may respond to electoral rewards by selecting a more ticket for public
office under PR, but the strength of the incentive for parties to respond varies according to cultural attitudes in the general public, and therefore to levels of societal modernization.

The interaction of political culture and the institutional rules may help to provide insights into persistent puzzles about why apparently similar institutional reforms may turn out to have unanticipated consequences, even among relatively similar political and social systems. Why should party list PR be associated with many more women being elected to power in, say, the Netherlands than in Israel? Why should the use of gender quotas for candidacies seem to work better in Argentina than Ecuador? Rather like the failure of Westminster-style parliaments in many African states in the 1960s, uprooted institutions do not necessarily flourish in alien cultural environments. Evidence presented elsewhere suggests that contemporary attitudes towards women’s leadership are more egalitarian in post-industrial than in post-Communist or developing societies, and that traditional attitudes towards gender equality remain a major obstacle to the election of women to parliament.41 Ever since the seminar study on women and politics in the mid-1950s by Duverger,42 it has often been assumed that traditional attitudes towards gender equality influence women’s advancement in elected office, although, despite the conventional wisdom, little systematic cross-national evidence has been available to verify this proposition. Theories of socialization have long emphasized the importance of the division of sex roles within a country — especially egalitarian or traditional attitudes towards women in the private and public spheres. Studies of the process of political recruitment in established democracies like Britain, Finland and the Netherlands have found that these attitudes influence both whether women are prepared to come forward as candidates for office (the supply-side of the equation) as well as the criteria used by gatekeepers like party members and leaders, the news media, financial supporters or the electorate when evaluating suitable candidates (the demand-side).43 In cultures with traditional values concerning the role of women in the home and family, many women may be reluctant to run and, if they seek the office, they may fail to attract sufficient support to win. A study by the Interparliamentary Union found that female politicians in many countries nominated hostile attitudes towards women’s political participation as one of the most important barriers to running for parliament.44 Cultural explanations provide a plausible reason why women have made such striking advances in parliaments within the Nordic region compared with other comparable European societies like Switzerland, Italy or Belgium, since all these are affluent post-industrial welfare states and established parliamentary democracies with proportional representation electoral systems. Karvonen and Selle suggest that in Scandinavia a long tradition of government intervention to promote social equality may have made the public more receptive to the idea of positive action designed to achieve equality for women in public life.45 Abu-Zayd suggests that culture is an important reason why many nations with a strict Islamic background have often ranked at the bottom of the list in terms of women in parliament, despite notable exceptions in Islamic societies in top leadership positions.46

Traditional attitudes towards gender equality have therefore commonly been suspected to be an important determinant of women’s entry into elected office, yet so far little systematic cross-national evidence has been available to prove this thesis. Most comparative studies have adopted proxy indicators of culture, such as the historical prevalence of Catholicism within West European societies, understood as representing more traditional attitudes towards women and the family than Protestant religions.47 An early comparison by Margaret Inglehart found that women’s political activism was lower in the Catholic than Protestant countries of Western Europe, and it was suggest that this was because the Catholic Church was associated with a culture that was more hierarchical and authoritarian in nature.48 A more recent worldwide comparison of women in politics in 180 nation states by Reynolds indicated that the greatest contrasts were between dominant Christian countries (whether Protestant or Catholic) and all other religions including Islamic, Buddhist, Judaic, Confucian and Hindu, all of which had lower proportions of women in legislative and Cabinet offices.49 Karvonen and Selle argue that in Scandinavia a long tradition of government intervention to promote social equality may have made the public more receptive to the idea of positive action designed to achieve equality for women in public life.50 Abu-Zayd suggests that culture is an important reason why many nations with a strict Islamic background have often ranked at the bottom of the list in terms of women in parliament, despite notable exceptions in Islamic societies in top leadership positions.51 The key question is whether the well-established relationship
between electoral systems and female representation continues to hold in different religious cultures, particularly in a wide range of societies.

To assess the role of religious culture we can classify countries worldwide according to the predominant religion in each society, with data drawn from the CIA World Factbook 2002. Evidence presented elsewhere suggests that the type of religion is a suitable proxy indicator of culture, since religious values are closely related to attitudes towards women in politics. Direct evidence of attitudes towards sex roles in the home and family, labor force, and public sphere is available in the last two waves of the World Values Survey conducted in 75 societies during the mid-to-late 1990s. The basic indicator measuring support for gender equality in political leadership used in this survey is the 4-point scale asking respondents how far they agreed or disagreed with the following statement:

"People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each? Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? … On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do."

The predominant religion in each society proved one of the strongest indicators of egalitarian or traditional attitudes. Countries that were most positive towards women’s leadership using this measure included the Protestant Nordic nations (Norway, Sweden and Finland), as well as many Protestant Anglo-American societies such as New Zealand, Australia, and the United States. Those that proved most traditional in orientation included the poorer Muslim societies of Egypt, Jordan, Iran, and Nigeria.

Unfortunately survey evidence of attitudes towards women in politics was only available from the World Values Study in about one third of the countries under comparison in the CSES dataset, and the latter survey did not collect any direct information on this issue. Accordingly the predominant religion in a country was selected to function as a proxy measure predicting cultural orientations towards women’s leadership roles, since Inglehart and Norris had identified the predominant religion as strongly related to support for gender equality. Table 8.7 shows that the proportion of women in parliament was indeed lowest in predominately Muslim states (6.3%), as expected, as well as in those countries sharing an Orthodox tradition in Central and Eastern Europe (7.1%). By contrast, women were about twice as successful in being elected to parliament in Catholic and Protestant societies, as Reynolds noted in an earlier study. Nevertheless despite this pattern, Table 8.1 demonstrates that once multivariate controls are introduced for levels of human development and for electoral law, this relationship is not statistically significant. Cultural-religious values do predict women’s presence in politics, helping to explain important variations in parliamentary elites within similar electoral systems. Inglehart and Norris compared a wide range of electoral democracies and found that the direct survey indicators of attitudes towards gender equality were very powerful predictors of women in office. But nevertheless in the 171 countries under comparison worldwide, structural factors appear more influential factors affecting women’s role in public life than the proxy indicators of cultural attitudes.

Conclusions

International agencies, governments, parties and groups concerned with increasing women’s representation have advocated a range of initiatives designed to break through the barriers for women in elected office, including using rhetorical strategies, equal opportunity, and positive action policies. Some of the principle options that are available include basic reform of majoritarian electoral systems by moving towards combined or proportional arrangements, the most difficult political strategy, as well as the use of reserved seats for women, the implementation of statutory gender quotas by law, and the adoption of voluntary gender quotas within particular parties. These policies all aim to alter the incentives when parties are selecting candidates for legislative bodies.

The evidence presented in this chapter provides further confirmation that the basic type of electoral system does indeed influence opportunities for women in elected office. Women are generally more successful in being nominated and elected under proportional electoral systems. It
seems likely that in cultures where the public is broadly sympathetic towards the principles of gender equality, parties have greater incentives to create a balanced ticket, to avoid any electoral penalties from the appearance of sex discrimination against women. This electoral incentive is absent among local selectors with single member districts in majoritarian elections, where each local party can choose the default option of a male candidate without any collective responsibility for balancing the social profile of candidates at national level. In theory positive action policies can be adopted under any electoral system, but they are implemented most easily when applied to balancing the gendered composition of PR party lists, just as parties seek to balance collective party lists of candidates by the major electoral cleavages of region, occupational class, or religion. More women are elected to office under PR than majoritarian elections in countries from every religious culture worldwide, although by far the biggest gap by type of electoral system is found among Protestant nations as well as among affluent postindustrial societies. Furthermore the multivariate analysis shows that the type of electoral system, the use of reserved seats, and the length of women's suffrage were associated with more women in parliament worldwide, although once these factors were introduced, the predominant religious culture (as a proxy for attitudes towards gender equality in different societies) proved to be insignificant. Although insufficient by themselves, the results suggest that proportional representation electoral systems, in combination with positive action strategies, can serve to increase the diversity of legislative bodies, producing parliaments that look more like the people they serve.
Table 8.1: Explaining the proportion of women in parliament, 171 nations worldwide 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A Electoral Laws</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model B Electoral Laws+Culture</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVELOPMENT:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELECTORAL LAWS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>2.265</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal gender quotas (%)</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserved seats (%)</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of women's suffrage (years)</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.437</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELIGIOUS CULTURE:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>2.594</td>
<td>7.378</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>7.389</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>-4.283</td>
<td>7.292</td>
<td>-.211</td>
<td>.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>-8.072</td>
<td>7.640</td>
<td>-.222</td>
<td>.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-.647</td>
<td>7.363</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.968</td>
<td>2.006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The coefficients represent beta, standard errors, standardized beta and significance derived from OLS regression analysis models, with the proportion of women in the lower house of parliament in 171 nations worldwide as the dependent variable. The variables were entered in the listed order. The coefficients significant at the p.01 level are displayed in **bold**.


**Electoral System:** See chapter 2. Majoritarian (1), Combined (2), and Proportional (3).

**Proportion of women in Parliament:** Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2000. Women in National Parliaments. [www.ipu.org](http://www.ipu.org)

**Legal reserved seats:** see Table 8.4. % Of reserved seats set in Tanzania, Uganda, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Sudan, Morocco, Botswana, and Lesotho.

**Legal gender quotas:** see Table 8.5. % Of gender quota set in Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

**Religious culture:** The predominant religion in each nation classified as dummy variables using the CIA World Factbook. [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov)
## Table 8.2: Women’s representation by type of electoral system, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>% Of women in the lower house of parliament, 2000</th>
<th>Number of nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Vote</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block vote</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Ballot</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Past-The-Post</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Combined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Independent</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Dependent</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL Proportional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Transferable Vote</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party List</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>182</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentage of women in the lower house of national parliaments 2000, 182 nations worldwide. For the classification of electoral systems see chapter 2.

Source: Calculated from Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2000. ‘Women in Parliament Database.’ <www.ipu.org>
Table 8.3: Women’s representation by electoral family and type of society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Society</th>
<th>Electoral family</th>
<th>% Of women in the lower house, 2000</th>
<th>Number of nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postindustrial</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The mean percentage of women in the lower house of the national parliament, 168 nations worldwide (2000).


For the classification of electoral systems see chapter 2.

Source: Calculated from Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2000. ‘Women in Parliament Database.’ <www.ipu.org>
### Table 8.4: Reserved seats for women used in the lower house of parliaments worldwide, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of MPs in the lower house</th>
<th>Number of seats reserved for women</th>
<th>% Of seats reserved for women</th>
<th>Appointed or elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>Indirectly elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
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<td>325</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Elected</td>
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</table>

**Note:** Reserved seats in the lower house of the national parliament are defined as those that by law can only be filled by women, either by appointment or election. It should also be noted that in Nepal three seats are reserved for women in the upper house, according to the 1990 constitution.

**Sources:** The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) [www.eisa.org.za](http://www.eisa.org.za); *Elections Around the World*. [www.electionworld.org](http://www.electionworld.org); International IDEA [www.IDEA.int](http://www.IDEA.int).
### Table 8.5: Statutory gender quotas in use worldwide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Law</th>
<th>Gender Quota %</th>
<th>Legislative Body</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>List open or closed</th>
<th>% Women MPs before law (i)</th>
<th>% Women MPs after law (ii)</th>
<th>Change (i)-(ii)</th>
</tr>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Unicameral</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Lower House</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Lower House</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+21</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Unicameral</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Lower House</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>+2</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Lower House</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+1</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>Combined</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Lower House</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>Closed</td>
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<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>N/a</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+4</td>
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<td>Unicameral</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>+11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Lower House</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Lower House</td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>17.8</td>
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<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Average**: 

| 30 | 10 | 14 | +4 |

**Note**: Legal gender quotas for the lower house of national parliaments are defined as laws which specify that each party must include a minimum proportion of women on party lists of candidates. Change is estimated based on the percentage of women MPs in the parliamentary election held immediately before and after implementation of the gender quota law.
Table 8.6: Voluntary gender quotas in party rules, used in EU-15 1996-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Total number of party MPs</th>
<th>% Women</th>
<th>Gender quota</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>58.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. B90/Grüne</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. GroenLinks</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54.5</td>
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<td>6. Miljöpartiet de Grona</td>
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<td>8. PvdA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ecolo</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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<td>Party</td>
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<td>Total number of party MPs</td>
<td>% Women</td>
<td>Gender quota</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>165</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66. CDS-PP</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67. Vlaams Blok</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68. Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. RCV</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70. UDF</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71. Alleanza Nazionale</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72. Lista Dini</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73. RPR</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. CCD-CDU</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75. UUP</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76. SP</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Voluntary gender quotas are defined as internal party rules, regulations, or constitutions specifying that the party should include a minimum proportion of women as candidates for elected office. The table only includes relevant parties (i.e. those with at least ten seats in lower house of the national parliament). The data, derived originally from the Council of Europe database, has some important limitations. It should be noted that the definition and meaning of ‘quota’ can differ among parties, and some may use this only for internal organizational posts rather than for candidate nomination. Parties without a formal quota may instead apply a ‘gender target’, adhered to more or less rigidly in candidate selection. Parties in bold are in countries using majoritarian electoral systems.

✓ Gender quota is currently used by this party for parliamentary nominations.
X Gender quota is not currently used by this party for parliamentary nominations.
? Information on gender quotas is not available from this source.

Table 8.7: Women’s representation by predominant religious culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious culture</th>
<th>% Women</th>
<th>Number of nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>181</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The mean percentage of women in the lower house of the national parliament, 181 nations worldwide (2000).

*R eligious culture:* The predominant religion in each nation is classified using the CIA World Factbook. www.cia.gov

**Source:** Calculated from Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2000. *Women in Parliament Database.* <www.ipu.org>
Table 8.8: Women’s representation by electoral family and type of religious culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Society</th>
<th>Electoral family</th>
<th>% Of women in the lower house, 2000</th>
<th>Number of nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-17.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The mean percentage of women in the lower house of the national parliament, 159 nations worldwide (2000).

**Religious culture:** The predominant religion in each nation is classified using the CIA World Factbook. www.cia.gov

**Source:** Calculated from Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2000. ‘Women in Parliament Database.’ <www.ipu.org>
Figure 8.1: Percentage of women in the lower house of parliament, 2000

Figure 8.2: Funnel model of the candidate selection process

Political culture & societal modernization:
- Egalitarian or traditional attitudes
- Legal gender quotas
- Reserved seats

Electoral laws:
- Majoritarian, combined or proportional systems
- Legal gender quotas
- Reserved seats

Candidate selection procedures within each party
E.g. Gender quotas in party rulebooks

Demand by party selectors

Demand by electorate

Pool of parliamentary candidates

Supply of eligible candidates

Equal opportunities in education, home, and the workforce

Members of parliament
Figure 8.3. Gender equality strategies

Gender equality strategies

- **Rhetorical**
  - E.g. speeches and conventions

- **Equal opportunities**
  - E.g. training and finance

- **Positive action**
  - E.g. gender quotas

  - **Party rules**

  - **Legal statute**
    - **Party Offices**
    - **Legislative candidates**
    - **Reserved legislative seats**


There is good evidence that electability is the primary consideration, at least in Britain, when party selectors are asked what qualities they seek in parliamentary candidates. See Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


It should be noted that alternative regression models entered the Rose Index of Proportionality instead of the type of electoral system, as an alternative indicator. The results of this process replicated the results of the analysis reported in Table 8.1. This suggests that the results are robust and not just dependent upon the measurement and classification of the type of electoral system.

See, for example, Miki Caul. 2001. ‘Political parties and the adoption of candidate gender quotas: A cross-national analysis.’ *Journal of Politics* 63 (4).


22 It should be noted that the use of reserved seats for women in Bangladesh is currently under review, at the time of writing (October 2002), with debate about the appropriate level and whether there should be direct elections. For details see the election commission. [http://www.bd-ec.org](http://www.bd-ec.org). Reserved seats for women have also been used in the past in Eritrea but parliament is currently suspended in this country.


The Italian articles included law 277\(93\) for elections at the House of Representatives, law 81\(93\) for local elections, and law 43\(95\) regional elections. For details see *Women in Decision-making: European database*. [www.db-decision.de](http://www.db-decision.de).


http://www.idea.int/quota/index.cfm


32


48 Margaret Inglehart. 1979. ‘Political Interest in West European Women.’ *West European Politics*.


Chapter 9

Ethnic Minorities

Some of the most intractable problems facing democracies concern the management of ethnic conflict. The familiar litany of problems ranges from the inclusion of diverse racial groups in South Africa and Namibia to long-standing tensions between Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, violence in the Basque region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Balkans, and the dramatic civil wars that occurred in Rwanda, Kashmir, and East Timor. Ethnic identities can be best understood as social constructs with deep cultural and psychological roots based on national, cultural-linguistic, racial, or religious backgrounds. They provide an affective sense of belonging and are socially defined in terms of their meaning for the actors, representing ties of blood, soil, faith and community. Agencies concerned with the peaceful amelioration of such antagonisms have increasingly turned towards ‘constitutional engineering’ or ‘institutional design’ to achieve these ends. The aim has been to develop electoral rules of the game structuring political competition so that actors have in-built incentives to accommodate the interests of different cultural groups, leading to conflict management, ethnic cooperation, and long-term political stability.

One of the most influential accounts in the literature is provided by the theory of ‘consociational’ or ‘consensus’ democracy developed by Arend Lijphart which suggests that the institutional arrangements, particularly the type of electoral system, can maintain stable governments despite countries being deeply divided into distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural communities. Consociational systems are characterized by institutions facilitating co-operation and compromise among political leaders, maximizing the number of ‘winners’ in the system, so that separate communities can peacefully coexist within the common borders of a single nation-state. Electoral systems represent perhaps the most powerful instrument available for institutional engineering, with far-reaching consequences for party systems, the composition of legislatures, and the durability of democratic arrangements. As we have seen, majoritarian electoral systems systematically exaggerate the parliamentary lead for the party in first place, to secure a decisive outcome and government accountability, thereby excluding smaller parties from the division of spoils. By contrast, proportional electoral systems lower the hurdles for smaller parties, maximizing their inclusion into the legislature and ultimately into coalition governments. Consociational theories suggest that proportional electoral systems are most likely to facilitate accommodation between diverse ethnic groups, making them more suitable for transitional and consolidating democracies struggling to achieve legitimacy and stability in plural societies.

These are important claims that, if true, have significant consequences. To explore the evidence for these arguments, Part I of this study summarizes the key assumptions in consociational theories of democracy and outlines the central propositions examined in this study. Part II describes the research design and methods. Evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems facilitates comparison of political attitudes and behavior among a diverse range of ethnic minorities including the Russian-speaking population living in the Ukraine, residents in the Catalan, Galician and Basque regions in Spain, African-Americans in the United States, the Arab/Muslim populations in Israel, the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Hungarian minority in Rumania, the mainland Chinese in Taiwan, and the Maoris in New Zealand. Part III defines and analyzes the primary ethnic cleavages in each of these societies, and tests the central propositions about the effects of electoral systems on differences in minority-majority support. The results suggest a complex relationship between the basic type of electoral system and majority-minority differences in system support. In particular, the study throws doubt on the claim that PR party list systems automatically generate higher levels of system support among ethnic minorities. The conclusion considers the lessons of these findings for issues of effective electoral designs and conflict mediation through
The Theoretical Framework

The central issue examined in this chapter derives from Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy, in particular the claim that PR systems are more effective at engendering support for the political system among ethnic minorities. The core argument is that, in contrast to majoritarian electoral systems, PR (i) produces a more proportional outcome, (ii) this facilitates the entry of smaller parties into parliament, (iii) this includes the election of ethnic minority parties, and in turn (iv) this produces greater diffuse support for the political system among ethnic minority populations (see Figure 9.1). Although widely influential, the existing evidence for some of these claims is limited and remains controversial.

(i) Proportionality

The first claim is that majoritarian electoral systems are less proportional in translating votes into seats. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, considerable evidence supports this proposition. This study confirms the general patterns established in the literature. Using the Gallagher index, Lijphart compared parliamentary elections from 1945-1996 in 36 democracies and found that the average electoral disproportionality under PR systems ranged from 1.30 (in the Netherlands) to 8.15 (in Spain), and in majoritarian-plurality systems ranged from 9.26 (Australia) to 21.08 (France). Lijphart concluded that disproportionality was the product of district magnitude (the number of members elected per district) combined with the ‘effective threshold’ (that is, the minimum level of votes which a party needs to gain seats).

(ii) The Inclusion of Smaller Parties

The second claim is that more proportional electoral systems lower the barriers for the parliamentary representation of any political minority, whatever their background or ideological persuasion, if groups seek to mobilize and contest elections. Although the association between electoral systems and multipartyism is weaker than that between electoral systems and disproportionality, Chapter 4 established that more parties are usually elected under PR than under majoritarian elections. Lijphart’s comparison of 36 established democracies from 1945-96 found that the level of disproportionality in the electoral system was negatively related to the effective number of parties elected to the lower houses of parliament (r = -0.50 p.01). Katz concluded that PR is associated with greater party competition, including the election of a wider range of parties across the ideological spectrum.

(iii) The Inclusion of Ethnic Minority Parties

By lowering the electoral barrier to smaller parties, it is claimed that PR thereby increases the opportunities for any ethno-political minority to enter parliament if they want to organize as a party and run for office. In plural societies with strong cleavages, consociational arrangements in general, and PR systems in particular, are believed to facilitate minority representation. As Lijphart argues: “In the most deeply divided societies, like Northern Ireland, majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy. What such societies need is a democratic regime that
emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority."^^9

Yet the evidence for the relationship between the electoral system and ethnic representation remains limited and controversial. Systematic comparative data on ethnic minorities is plagued by problems of operationalization and measurement, due to the diversity of ethno-national, ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic cleavages in different societies. Rather than examining direct indicators, both Lijphart and Taagepera argue that we can generalize from the proportion of women in elected office as a proxy indicator of minority representation in general.^^10 The previous chapter confirmed greater female representation under PR party lists than under majoritarian electoral systems. But is it legitimate to generalize from the representation of women to the representation of ethnic minorities? In fact, there are reasons why this strategy may prove misleading. Ethnic minorities are often clustered geographically within certain areas, such as the British Asian community in Leicester or African Americans in New York, allowing local gains in particular constituencies in majoritarian electoral systems even within heterogeneous plural societies. By contrast, the male-to-female ratio is usually fairly uniform in distribution across different constituencies, except in a few retirement areas. Moreover the use of positive action strategies including candidate quotas or reserved seats often differ considerably in the opportunities they provide for women and ethnic minorities. And we also know that, at least in Britain, women and ethnic-racial minorities face different types of discriminatory attitudes among selectors and electors.^^12

Considerable debate also surrounds how far generalizations about the workings of electoral systems in plural societies within established democracies can be extended to the management of ethnic tensions in transitional and consolidating democracies. Much existing research on consociational democracies is based on the experience of West European political systems that, by virtue of their very persistence, have come to a shared consensus about many of the basic constitutional rules of the game and a democratic culture. The classic exemplars of plural democracies are the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. But it may prove difficult to generalize from the context of stable and affluent post-industrial societies, with institutional arrangements and a liberal democratic culture of tolerance which has evolved throughout the twentieth century, to the process of conflict-management in transitional democracies struggling with the triple burden of socioeconomic development, the consolidation of the political system, and the global pressures of the world market. Only limited cross-national survey research has analyzed these issues in countries where ethnic politics is often regarded as particularly critical, such as in Africa.^^13 Some older examples of consociational democracies in developing societies, like the Lebanon and Malaysia, have had a mixed record of success.^^14

The growing literature on newer democracies remains divided on this issue. Sisk and Reynolds argue that PR systems have generally been most effective in mitigating ethnic conflict in culturally-plural African societies, by facilitating the inclusion of minorities in parliament and encouraging ‘balanced’ lists. But this process is contingent upon multiple factors, notably the degree to which ethnicity is politicized, the depth and intensity of ethnic conflict, and the stage of democratization reached by a country, the territorial distribution and concentration of ethnic groups, and the use of positive action strategies in the selection and election process.^^15 Saideman et al used pooled time-series data from the Minorities at Risk dataset and found that PR tends to reduce ethnic conflict.^^16 By contrast, Tsebelis suggests that, although PR is useful in gaining agreement to a new constitution during the initial transition from authoritarian rule, in the longer term proportional arrangements may serve to reinforce and perpetuate rigid segregation along narrow ethnic-cultural, religious and linguistic cleavages, rather than promoting a few major catchall parties that gradually facilitate group cooperation within parties.^^17 Barkan argues that the cases of Namibia and South Africa show that parties representing ethnic
minorities are not necessarily penalized by majoritarian systems. Taagepera warns of the dangers of PR producing extreme multipartyism and fragmentation, which may promote instability in new democracies. Since much of this work is based on country-specific case studies it remains hard to say how far we can generalize more widely, for example whether power-sharing arrangements in the new South Africa would work if transplanted to Angolan or Nigerian soil, let alone exported further afield to the Ukraine or the Balkans. The unintended consequences of electoral reforms - evident even in the cases of Italy, Japan, Israel and New Zealand - illustrate how constitutional engineering remains more art than science. Given all these important considerations, and continuing debate in the literature, we need more evidence to understand the electoral fortunes of ethnic minority parties under majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.

(iv) The Impact on Specific and Diffuse Support for the Political System

The last, and perhaps the most controversial and important claim of consociational theory, is that by facilitating the inclusion of ethnic minority parties into parliament, PR systems increase mass-level ethnic minority support for the political system. Lijphart argues that political minorities are persistent electoral losers in majoritarian systems, excluded from representative institutions in successive contests, thereby reducing their faith in the fairness of the electoral outcome and eroding their diffuse support for the democratic system in general. “Especially in plural societies – societies that are sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate sub-societies with their own political parties, interest groups, and media or communication – the flexibility necessary for majoritarian democracy is absent. Under these conditions, majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous, because minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and will lose their allegiance to the regime.” In contrast under PR, because representatives from ethnic minority parties are incorporated within parliaments and coalition governments, consociational theory assumes that their supporters will gradually come to feel that they have more of a say in the policymaking process, so that minorities will become more satisfied with the fairness of the outcome of specific contests, and more supportive at diffuse level of the electoral system and the democratic rules of the game. Under PR, minorities should display more positive attitudes towards the political system because no group that can mobilize electoral support is systematically excluded from elected office on a persistent basis. Political leaders will learn to collaborate together within parliaments through deliberation, negotiation and compromise, it is hoped, encouraging conciliation among their grassroots supporters.

Yet there is little direct evidence about the impact of electoral systems on cultural attitudes, such as satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system. Census data about the electorate can be aggregated at district or regional level to analyze ethnic minority voting patterns, for example Horowitz used this approach to examine election results in Guyana, Trinidad, Congo, Ghana and India. Blais and Carty compared over 500 elections across twenty nations to demonstrate greater voter participation in PR than in majoritarian electoral systems. The main limitation with aggregate data is that we cannot establish how minority groups felt about the available electoral choices or the fairness of the electoral system. If the rules of the game mean that some groups are systematically organized into politics, and others are systematically organized out, ideally we need to understand not just how groups voted, but also how they regard democracy and the political system.

Some light on this issue comes from a study by Anderson and Guillory that compared satisfaction with democracy among consensual and majoritarian political systems in eleven EU member states. They hypothesized that (i) system support would be consistently influenced by whether people were among the winners and losers in electoral contests, defined by whether the party they supported was returned to government; and (ii) that this process would be mediated by the type of democracy. The
study found that in majoritarian democracies, winners expressed far higher satisfaction with democracy than losers, whereas consociational systems produced a narrower gap between winners and losers. This approach is valuable but it is confined to Western Europe, it does not allow us to distinguish many national-level factors that may co-vary with the political systems in these nations, such as their historical culture and traditions, nor does it allow us to distinguish the impact of electoral systems per se from other institutional variables.

Expanding upon Anderson and Guillory, in an earlier study I examined the impact of electoral systems upon confidence in representative institutions by comparing a wider range of twenty-five established and new democracies, using the 1990-3 World Values Survey. Using regression models controlling for social background, levels of democratization, and socio-economic development, the study found that, contrary to expectation, institutional confidence was generally higher among respondents living in countries using majoritarian rather than PR electoral systems. In an alternative approach, using a single-nation 1993-96 panel study, Banducci, Donovan and Karp tested whether the move from a majoritarian to a proportional electoral system in New Zealand produced more positive attitudes towards the political system among supporters of minor party and the Maori population. The study found that after participating in the first Mixed Member Proportional election, supporters of the minor parties displayed greater increases in political efficacy (they were significantly more likely to see their votes as counting and to see voting as important) than the rest of the electorate, although there was no parallel increase in political trust: “The lack of change on the main measure of trust in government is particularly striking, suggesting that the roots of distrust in government lie in something other than the rules used to translates votes into seats.”

We can conclude that consociational theory makes strong claims for the virtues of PR in plural societies. Lijphart argues that consociational power-sharing arrangements, and particularly highly proportional PR electoral systems with low thresholds, are most likely to include ethno-political minorities within legislatures and coalition governments, thereby to promote support for democracy and cooperation between groups in states deeply divided by ethnic conflict. Yet this brief review of the literature suggests that the direct support for these claims remains mixed. The most convincing and systematic evidence, demonstrated in earlier chapters, concerns the impact of electoral systems upon the proportionality of the outcome and upon the inclusion of smaller parties within parliaments. In turn, under certain conditions, the inclusion of smaller parties in PR systems may influence the electoral fortunes of ethnic minority parties. But it remains an open question whether the inclusion of ethnic minority representatives leads to greater diffuse or specific support for the political system among ethnic minority groups in the electorate, such as stronger feelings of political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy, or trust in government. To go further we need to examine survey evidence measuring support for the political system among members of different minority communities. In Israel, for example, does the Arab community feel that they can influence the Knesset? In the Ukraine, does the Russian-speaking population regard the conduct of elections as free and fair? Does the Hungarian community and Roma (gypsy) groups living in Romania approve of the democratic performance of their political system? Are Basques and Catalans satisfied that their interests are represented through Spanish elections? It is to evidence about these matters that we now turn.

**Testing Consociational Theory**

*Measuring Political Support & Core Hypotheses*

What is the best way to measure the concept of ‘support for the political system’? Elsewhere, building on the Eastonian framework, I have argued that this is essentially multidimensional and so cannot be tapped reliably using single measures, for example of political trust. This approach distinguishes between five levels of support ranging from the most abstract and diffuse level, measured by support for the political community like
the nation-state, down through support for democratic values, for the political regime, for political institutions, and for political actors. In this view, citizens can logically distinguish between levels, for example trusting their local representative and yet having little confidence in parliament as an institution, or approving of democratic ideals but still criticizing of the performance of their government, and so on.

Following this logic, four alternative indicators of political support were used for the analysis. Specific support was measured by perceptions of the fairness of the electoral system; the most direct evaluation of how well the election was seen to work. Responses to this could be colored by the outcome of the specific campaign under analysis, for example by the party that won office. Diffuse support, understood to indicate more general approval of the political system as a whole, was measured by general satisfaction with the democratic process. It would remain consistent to approve of how the last election worked and still to remain dissatisfied with how democracy performed in general, or vice versa. The diffuse sense that citizens could influence the political process was tapped by measures of political efficacy. Lastly, voting turnout was compared as a critical indicator of involvement in the specific election. Factor analysis (not reported here) revealed that these items fell into two principle dimensions: the ‘approval’ dimension meant that perceptions of the fairness of the electoral system were closely related to general satisfaction with democracy, while the ‘participation’ dimension meant that political efficacy was closely related to electoral turnout. Details of the items used in the analysis are listed under Table 9.4.

Survey evidence provides direct insights into political attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy or feelings of political efficacy but at the same time it remains difficult to compare ethnic minorities directly across a diverse range of societies. Multiple factors can influence specific and diffuse levels of support for the political system, including perceptions of government performance, cultural values, and general levels of interpersonal trust and social capital, as well as the standard predictors of political attitudes at individual-level, such as age, education, class and gender. Even with suitable controls, given a limited range of countries it becomes impossible to isolate and disentangle the impact of the electoral system from all these other factors.

Yet what we can compare is the relative gap in majority-minority political support within each nation. Given the existence of social and political disparities within every democracy, in general we would expect to find that ethnic minorities would prove more negative than majority populations, for example that African-Americans would be more cynical about the fairness of elections than whites, that Catalans and Basques would be more critical of the performance of Spanish democracy than other compatriots, that Arabs would feel more powerless to influence Israeli politics than the Jewish population, and so on. Therefore the first core hypothesis is that within each country, ethnic majorities will express greater support than minorities for the political system. Support can be measured by attitudes towards the fairness of particular election outcomes, as well as more diffuse indicators such as satisfaction with democracy, political efficacy and voting turnout. Focusing on relative differences between groups within a country holds cross-national variations constant.

Based on this process, as a second step we can then examine relative differences in political support among majority and minority populations under different electoral systems. If consociational theories are correct in their assumptions, if ethnic minorities feel that the political system is fairer and more inclusive of their interests under proportional representation, then the second core hypothesis is that we would expect to find that these relative majority-minority differences would be smaller in countries with PR rather than majoritarian electoral rules. In contrast, if we find that the majority-minority gap in political support is as great under PR as under majoritarian systems, this would favor the null hypothesis.
Measuring the Primary Ethnic Cleavage

‘Ethnicity’ is one of the most complex and elusive terms to define and measure clearly. As mentioned earlier, ethnic identities are understood in this study as social constructs with deep cultural and psychological roots based on linguistic, ethnic, racial, regional, or religious backgrounds. They provide an affective sense of belonging and are socially defined in terms of their meaning for the actors. In Bulmer’s words: “An ‘ethnic group’ is a collectivity within a larger society, having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the group’s identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging to the group.”

Table 9.3 shows the distribution of the ethnic minority populations in the countries under comparison. The ethno-national category classified respondents by their place of birth in all countries except for Britain, Spain, and the Czech Republic, where this was measured by residency in regions with strong national identities like Scotland and Catalonia. The ethno-racial category in the US and the Britain was based on racial self-identification. In the third category, the distribution of ethnic-linguistic minorities was measured according to the language usually spoken at home. The linguistic cleavage produced the strongest divisions in the Ukraine which was equally divided between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking households, Taiwan where there were sizable minorities speaking Chinese Mandarin and Chinese Hakka, and Israel with its Arab population and Russian émigré groups, with Britain emerging as the most homogeneous population in its dominant language. Ethnic-religious minorities were measured by the respondent’s religious identity, with this Australia, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Britain and the US the most heterogeneous, and Romania and Poland the most homogeneous, societies. It should be noted that this classification does not attempt to measure the strength of religiosity in the society, nor the ‘distance’ between religious faiths, for example between Jewish and Muslim, both of which would increase the intensity of religious differences. The last category taps the center-periphery cleavage classifying countries by the proportion in rural areas.

One consequence of their social construction is that the distinctions used to differentiate ethnic identities, and the political salience of ethnic cleavages, vary from one society to another. This greatly complicates the comparative analysis since we need to be sensitive to the particular conditions in each society, for example the role of race in the United States, regional-national divisions in Britain and Spain, or the critical importance of religion in Israel. The relevant cleavages based on divisions of ethnic identity, race, language, region, or religion varied in the different countries under comparison. After examining the distribution of different social cleavages in the societies under comparison, as a first step to simplify the patterns under comparison it was decided to focus the analysis in this study upon groups selected as the most politically salient majority-minority ethnic cleavage within each country (see Table 9.4). For consistent comparison the aim was to identify the functionally equivalent groups across nations. Groups were selected based on the broader literature on ethnic cleavages in the electorate in each country and also based on scrutiny of the strongest cleavages predicting political support in each nation included within the CSES data.

In three cases the primary ethnic cleavage was defined by language, namely Mandarin Chinese and Hakka speaking minorities in Taiwan; the Russian-speaking v. Ukrainian speaking populations in Ukraine; and the Hungarian-speaking population in Romania. In two cases this was defined by country of origin, namely the Maoris v. European populations in New Zealand and the Lithuanian v. Russian-Polish communities in Lithuania. In three cases the major cleavages was based on region, including the Basque, Galician and Catalan minorities in Spain; the Bohemian v. Moravian
communities in the Czech Republic; and the Scots/Welsh v. English in Britain. Racial identities were used in the United States to distinguish the White v. African-American/Asian populations. In two nations, Poland and Australia, the main center-periphery cleavage was based on rural v. non-rural populations. Lastly, religion proved the primary cleavage distinguishing the Arab v. Jewish population in Israel. In some nations the cleavages were reinforcing, for example the Hungarian population in Romania and the Arabs in Israel proved distinctive in terms of their country of origin, language, and religion. In some other nations there were two distinct and independent types of ethnic cleavages, for example in Britain the main racial cleavage concerns the Asian and Afro-Caribbean minorities, estimated to be about 2.9% of the electorate, and the center-periphery cleavage dividing Scotland/Wales and England (see Table 9.3). The study excluded the separate scrutiny of single groups below 5% of the population where there were too few cases for reliable analysis. Subsequent research will develop this further by comparing majority-minority differences across the full range of ethnic identities.

System Support

What is the relative difference between the majority and minority populations using the four alternative indicators of system support? Table 9.4 shows the distribution of system support, the percentage difference between majority and minority groups ranked by size, and the significance of this difference, estimated using simple correlations without any controls. Where the difference is in a positive direction, this indicates that the minority proved more supportive than the majority. Where the difference is in a negative direction, this indicates the reverse.

In most cases the results confirm the first hypotheses, namely that where there were significant differences, the majority groups tended to prove consistently more positive towards the political system than minorities. In many cases the gap was substantively large, for example there was far greater dissatisfaction with democracy among the Catalans, Galicians and Basques in Spain, among the Hungarians in Romania, and among the Moravians in the Czech Republic. In five countries there was no significant difference in turnout, but in six countries levels of voting turnout were consistently lower for ethnic minorities such as among Arabs in Israel and the rural population in Poland. The only a few cases was there significant indicators of greater political support among minority than majority populations, notably assessments of electoral fairness in Israel and Spain, and also higher levels of political efficacy among minority populations in Taiwan and the Ukraine. If we compare all types of political support, it is apparent that compared with majority populations, minorities proved more positive on only four out of 47 indicators. In all the other cases the gap was either statistically insignificant, or minorities proved more critical of the political system.

The second proposition was that the majority-minority gap would be related to the type of electoral system that operated in each country. Consociational theory suggests that ethnic minorities would prove most critical of the political system where they are systematically excluded from power, due to a majoritarian electoral system. Yet the pattern established in Table 9.4 proves too complex to confirm this proposition. Evaluations of the fairness of elections can be regarded as the most direct support for the electoral system per se. On this indicator, it is apparent that the ethnic minority-majority gap is indeed reversed in Israel and Spain, both using PR. Nevertheless minorities under PR systems in Romania, New Zealand and Poland proved far more negative than majorities by this measure. In addition there was no consistent pattern across indicators. For example, when evaluating the performance of democracy in their country, understood as a more diffuse indicator of political support, minorities proved most critical in the PR nations of Spain, Romania, and the Czech Republic. Similarly mixed patterns, unrelated to the type of electoral system, were evident in terms of the majority-minority gaps on
political efficacy and voting turnout. The analysis demonstrates no simple and clear-cut picture relating the type of electoral system directly to differences in majority-minority political support. This evidence, favoring the null hypothesis, does not support the claims of consociation theory.

[Table 9.5 about here]

To examine this pattern further, a series of regression models were run in each country predicting levels of political support for majority-minority population, adding social controls for age, education, and income. A positive coefficient indicates that the majority populations were more supportive than minority populations. Insufficient coefficients indicate no difference between majority and minorities. A negative coefficient indicates that the minorities were more supportive than the majority. The results in Table 9.5 show few significant differences in minority political support in Australia, Britain and the United States, all with majoritarian electoral systems. The only exceptions were the Scots and Welsh who proved slightly more critical of the fairness of the election and of British democracy, a pattern that could be explained at least in part by the heightened salience of the issue of devolution in the 1997 general election. In the countries using mixed electoral systems, the ethnic minority group tended to be less satisfied with democracy and less convinced about the fairness of the election outcomes. Out of eleven regression models, majorities were more positive than minorities in six models, and the reverse pattern was only evident in two. In the countries using PR, in the 24 separate regression models, where there was a significant majority-minority difference, minorities were more critical of the political system in 14 cases, and the pattern was only reversed in two cases (perceptions of electoral fairness in Israel and Spain, noted earlier). Across all indicators, the Maori population proved consistently more critical of their political system, as did the Hungarian population in Romania, and a similar pattern was evident on three indicators for the Catalan/Basque population in Spain. Therefore overall the evidence examined here fails to support the consociational claims, which have to be regarded as unproven by this analysis.

Conclusions and Discussion

The issue of the most effective institutional design for managing ethnic tensions has risen in salience in the last decade, along with attempts at democratic aid and state-building. The strategy in this chapter has been to compare relative levels of satisfaction with the political system among majority-minority populations to see whether the gap was reduced, or even reversed, under proportional PR party list systems, as consociational theory suggest. The findings indicate that there is a complex pattern at work here, and the claim that PR party list systems are directly associated with higher levels of political support among ethnic minorities is not confirmed by this study.

Yet it could be argued that perhaps the model within this study is too simple and there are a number of reasons why any relationship may be conditional and indirect. First, the territorial distribution of different ethnic minority groups varies considerably and, as Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova suggest, geography has a considerable impact on the working of electoral systems. Some populations are clustered tightly in dense networks within particular geographic localities with distinct territorial boundaries, like the British Sikh and Bangladeshi communities in the center of Bradford, African-Americans living in inner city Detroit, or the French-speaking population in Montreal. Some are living in mosaics where two or more groups are so intermingled within a territory that it is impossible to identify boundaries, such as in Northern Ireland, the South Tyrol and the Balkans. Other diasporas are spread thinly over a wide area across the boundaries of many nation-states, notably the large Russian populations in the 'Near Abroad' such as in Ukraine and Lithuania, the Roma (gypsy) community in Central Europe, and the Kurdish population in the Middle East. The geographic dispersion or concentration of support is particularly important for the way votes get translated into seats in elections that require winning a plurality of votes within a particular single member district, not across the
region or whole nation. In British general elections, for example, Plaid Cymru can win seats roughly proportional to their share of the vote, because of the heavy concentration of Welsh speakers in a few North Coastal Wales constituencies, but in contrast the more dispersed Liberal Democratic supporters are heavily penalized by First-Past-the-Post. African-Americans concentrated in inner city districts can get many more House seats than minorities widely dispersed across legislative districts. Territorial clustering allows homogeneous electoral districts representing different groups within heterogeneous societies.

Furthermore the way that the electoral system shapes ethnic representation can be expected to vary according to the degree of politicization and mobilization of ethnic populations into the political system, as well as in the type of cleavages, whether based on ethno-national, cultural-linguistic, ethnic-religious or racial identities. Some groups represent little more than a formal census categorization which may have little resonance for the common identity of particular groups, like ‘Asians’ in America bringing together émigrés from diverse cultures in India, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and China; other share a single predominant cleavage, like Hispanic groups in the United States with a common language but drawn from diverse national and political backgrounds; whereas still others like African-Americans are bound together by communities based on their common experience of racial and social inequalities, and a shared historical heritage. As Lijphart points out, it is misleading to treat demographic classifications as equivalent to political divisions, for example to regard the Protestant-Catholic division in Northern Ireland as on a par to that in Switzerland. Some societies are sharply segmented organizationally into separate sub-cultures, where groups have distinct political organizations, educational facilities, and cultural associations, while others integrate groups into the mainstream culture. Within the countries in this study, certain minorities find organizational expressing with parties such as the Hungarian Democratic Party in Romania, the (Arab) National Democratic Alliance in Israel, the Catalan Nationalist Party in Spain, the Scottish Nationalist Party in Britain, Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, or the pro-mainland unification New Party in Taiwan. Yet other distinct ethnic groups forward their issue agenda as broader coalitions within mainstream parties, like African-Americans and Hispanics within the Democratic Party. Ethnicity is a particularly difficult concept to operationalize and measure, and single-dimension indicators based on the number and size of ethnic groups in different countries are unsatisfactory unless we can also gauge the geographic distribution and degree of politicization of these groups. As with conceptions of class differentials, there is an important distinction between objective indicators of group membership (such as formal religious affiliations), and subjective consciousness of the political saliency of these group identities (such as religious debates over reproductive rights). Consociational theory assumes that ethno-political identities are given and proportional electoral systems therefore serve to mobilize ethnic parties into the political system. Yet as argued in chapter 5, in the long-term there is probably a more complex process of interaction at work, whereby potential ethno-political identities are accommodated, but also mobilized and strengthened, by PR systems facilitating their organization and political expression through bonding parties.

Furthermore, majoritarian systems, even if they discriminate systematically against smaller parties, can still make special arrangements for minority representation. As discussed in the previous chapter, reserved seats for ethno-political minorities have been adopted in countries as diverse as Jordan (for Christians and Circassians), Pakistan (10 seats for non-Muslim minorities), New Zealand (for Maoris), Kurdistan (for Assyrians and Turkmens), Lebanon (for Maronites, Sunnis, Shites, Greek Orthodox, Druses, Green Catholics and others groups), and Slovenia (for Hungarians and Italians). Another option is the over-representation in the seats allocated to certain districts or regions, to increase the election of minority groups. This practice is exemplified by the smaller size of the electoral quota used in Scottish constituencies, and affirmative gerrymandering (or redistricting) for African-Americans, Latinos and Asian
Americans in the United States. As with positive action strategies for women, discussed earlier, legal statutes and party rules can regulate the selection of parliamentary candidates to ensure that minority candidates are chosen for single member districts or for party lists. Lijphart acknowledges that majoritarian electoral systems can make special provision for the inclusion of certain specified ethnic or religious groups in parliament, but he argues that highly proportional electoral systems with low thresholds automatically minimize the barriers to office, which has the virtue of being seen as fairer than special provisions for special groups. “PR has the great additional advantage of enabling any minority, not just those specifically favored by the electoral law, to be represented (as long as they attain a stipulated minimum level of electoral support). Compared with majoritarian systems, PR can be said to have the advantage of permitting representation by minorities that define themselves as groups wishing to have representation as minority parties. PR thus avoids any invidious choices in favor of certain minority groups and, as a consequence, against other minorities.” But the existence of alternative strategies implies that constitutional engineers could achieve minority parliamentary representation either through the choice of low threshold PR systems or through majoritarian systems with deliberate recognition of predetermined minority groups.

Lastly, the electoral system, while important, remains only one component in consociational systems of democracy. Other institutional arrangements can be expected to prove equally influential in shaping minority views of the political system, such as federal or decentralized designs for regional power-sharing, executive-legislative arrangements including single-party or multi-party coalitional governments, the adoption of parliamentary or presidential systems, and the division of powers between legislative houses, rigid constitutions protecting minority rights and subject to judicial review, and pluralist or corporatist interest group systems. Nevertheless consociational theory suggests that PR electoral systems combined with parliamentary government are the fundamental institutions upon which many other arrangements flow.

Of course the evidence presented here remains limited, both in terms of the range of democracies included within the dataset and the way that ethnic minorities have been measured. If there is a relationship, it may well be one that is more complex and indirect, depending upon intermediary conditions such as the geographical clustering of ethnic minority populations, their levels of politicization as a group, and the relationships between ethnic identities, party systems and parliamentary representation. Special arrangements, like reserved seats for the aboriginal community in Taiwan or affirmative gerrymandering in the United States, can overcome some of the barriers facing minority groups within majoritarian electoral systems. We need to take account of how far ethnic minorities believe that they share a common identity with distinct political interests, and how far they believe parties within the existing power structure represent these interests. All these factors serve as intervening variables mediating the links between the electoral rules and how minorities perceive the political system. Understanding these issues is a major challenge before we can make any sweeping claims about electoral engineering. Nevertheless, given these important qualifications, the idea that more proportional electoral systems directly generate greater support for the political system among ethnic minority groups, as consociational theory claims, is not supported by these results.
### Table 9.1: Major types of ethnic cleavages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethno-National</th>
<th>% Majority</th>
<th>% Minority Ethno-National Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep (ii)</td>
<td>Czech 94.9</td>
<td>Moravian 1.8 Roma 1.2 Other 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (ii)</td>
<td>Romanian 92.0</td>
<td>Hungarian 5.6 Roma (Gypsy) 1.4 Other 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain (i)</td>
<td>English 85.7</td>
<td>Scottish 9.1 Welsh 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania (ii)</td>
<td>Lithuanian 85.2</td>
<td>Russian 6.9 Pole 5.8 Other 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zeal. (ii)</td>
<td>NZ European 81.6</td>
<td>Maori 14.4 Asian 1.4 Other 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (i)</td>
<td>Others 78.9</td>
<td>Catalans 15.8 Pais Vasco (Basque) 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (ii)</td>
<td>Australian 77.8</td>
<td>European 16.6 Asian 3.0 Other 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (ii)</td>
<td>Min Nan 75.2</td>
<td>Hakka 11.5 Mainlanders 12.5 Other 0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine (ii)</td>
<td>Ukrainian 72.4</td>
<td>Russian 24.6 Other 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep (i)</td>
<td>Bohemians 62.4</td>
<td>Moravians 37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (ii)</td>
<td>Jewish-Israeli 54.5</td>
<td>Jewish-European 20.1 Arab 14.2 Jewish-Asia 6.0 Jewish-Africa 4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethno-Racial</th>
<th>% Majority</th>
<th>% Minority Ethno-Racial Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>White 97.1</td>
<td>Indian/Asian 1.6 Other 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>White 86.2</td>
<td>African-American 11.2 Asian 1.4 Other 1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethno-Linguistic (iii)</th>
<th>% Majority</th>
<th>% Minority Ethno-Linguistic Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>English 97.8</td>
<td>Other 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Romanian 93.6</td>
<td>Hungarian 5.0 Other 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>English 84.9</td>
<td>Maori 9.1 Other 6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spanish 82.6</td>
<td>Catalan 10.6 Galician 5.4 Basque 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Hebrew 73.6</td>
<td>Arabic 15.0 Russian 10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Min Nan 67.3</td>
<td>Mandarin 28.1 Hakka 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian 50.4</td>
<td>Ukrainian 49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethno-Religious (iv)</th>
<th>% Majority</th>
<th>% Minority Ethno-Religious Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Catholic 97.1</td>
<td>Other 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Orthodox 89.1</td>
<td>Protestant 6.3 Other 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Jewish 87.0</td>
<td>Muslim 9.6 Christan 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Confucianism 71.4</td>
<td>Buddhist 8.4 None 8.6 Taoism 6.8 I-Kuan-Tao 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Orthodox 67.4</td>
<td>None 25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Protestant 55.5</td>
<td>Catholic 25.2 None 12.4 Jewish 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Protestant 54.9</td>
<td>None 32.0 Catholic 10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Protestant 47.6</td>
<td>Catholic 13.3 None 26.3 Other 12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>Catholic 45.3</td>
<td>None 46.7 Protestant 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Protestant 43.5</td>
<td>Catholic 28.6 None 15.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Center-Periphery (v) | % Majority | % Minority | Rural Groups |
|----------------------|------------|----------------|
| Australia            | Urban 76   | Rural 24       |
| Poland               | Urban 64   | Rural 36       |

Note: The figures represent the proportion of each group in the adult population (of voting age). Only groups over 1% are reported. Note that this survey was of the British electorate, not the UK, and therefore does not include respondents from Northern Ireland. (i) Based on standard regional classifications (ii) Based on place of birth. (iii) Ethnic-Linguistic cleavages are based on the main language spoken at home. (iv) Under religion, ‘None’ includes atheists and agnostics (v) Urban includes small town, suburbs or large town/city.

### Table 9.2: Indicators of majority-minority political support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Major Cleavage</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Majority</th>
<th>Diff. Sig.</th>
<th>Primary minority group</th>
<th>ElecSys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election Fair</strong></td>
<td>% Fair</td>
<td>% Fair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38**</td>
<td>Arabs/Muslims</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>Catalans, Galicians, Basques</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moravians</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Non-Whites</td>
<td>Maj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-3*</td>
<td>Scots/Welsh</td>
<td>Maj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Center-Periphery</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-4*</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-6*</td>
<td>Mandarin/Hakka</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-8*</td>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-9**</td>
<td>Maoris</td>
<td>PR</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-10*</td>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>PR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-20**</td>
<td>Russians/Poles</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction with Democracy</strong></td>
<td>% Satisfied</td>
<td>% Satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arabs/Muslims</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Russians/Poles</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Russians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Center-Periphery</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-8*</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Maj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-9**</td>
<td>Scots/Welsh</td>
<td>Maj</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Center-Periphery</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-10**</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>PR</td>
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<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<td>72</td>
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<td>Maoris</td>
<td>PR</td>
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<tr>
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<td>72</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-10*</td>
<td>Non-Whites</td>
<td>Maj</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-10**</td>
<td>Mandarin/Hakka</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-15**</td>
<td>Catalans, Galacians, Basques</td>
<td>PR</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>-17**</td>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-20**</td>
<td>Moravians</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Efficacy</strong></td>
<td>% High</td>
<td>% High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>Catalans, Galician’s, Basques</td>
<td>PR</td>
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<td><strong>Voting Turnout (%)</strong></td>
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<td>% Voted</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>PR</td>
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<td>Region</td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Type</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Scots/Welsh</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-4</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Center-Periphery</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-11**</td>
<td>Catalans, Galacians, Basques PR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>-10**</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>-18**</td>
<td>Arabs/Muslims</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Note:** The difference represents the majority minus the minority. The significance of the difference between groups was tested with correlation coefficients. **=p.01 *=p.05.

**Fairness of Election:** Q2. “(PLEASE SEE CARD 1) In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election was conducted unfairly?” Percentage who believed election was fair (defined as categories 1 and 2).

**Satisfaction with Democracy:** Q1. “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?” The figures represent the percentage ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied.

**Political Efficacy:** The 15-point political efficacy scale was constructed from the following items that were highly inter-correlated. ‘High’ efficacy was categorized as a total score of 8 or above. Q11. (PLEASE SEE CARD 5) “Some people say that members of [Congress / Parliament] know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of [Congress / Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] know what ordinary people think, and FIVE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?”

Q13. (PLEASE SEE CARD 6) “Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn’t make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn’t make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?”

Q14. (PLEASE SEE CARD 7) “Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself?”

**Turnout:** The question measured whether the respondent cast a ballot in the election. Functionally equivalent but not identical items were used in each national election survey.

**Source:** Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2002
### Table 9.3: Impact of majority-minority cleavage on political support, with social controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Cleavage</th>
<th>Electoral Fairness</th>
<th>Democratic Satisfaction</th>
<th>Political Efficacy</th>
<th>Voting Turnout</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>Sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Center-Periphery</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Scots/Welsh</td>
<td>.041**</td>
<td>.077***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>Non-White</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Russian/Pole</td>
<td>.133***</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>Mandarin/Hakka</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.061*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>.061*</td>
<td>.060*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Moravia</td>
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<td>.110***</td>
</tr>
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<td>.095***</td>
</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Catalan/Basque</td>
<td>-.068**</td>
<td>.071***</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Note:** These figures represent standardized regression coefficients for the effects of majority-minority membership of the main ethnic group within each country on the four indicators of support for the political system after controlling for age (years), gender (0=female, 1=male), standardized household income (5-point scale) and education (8-point scale). All models use OLS regression except for turnout that uses logistic regression. For the scaling of the dependent variables see the footnotes to Tables 5. Significant positive coefficients indicate that majority populations are more supportive of the political system than minorities. Insignificant coefficients indicate that there is no difference between majority and minority populations. Negative coefficients indicate that the minority population is more supportive of the political system than majorities.

**Source:** Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2002


Arend Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press. Other secondary factors influencing this process include the basic electoral formula translating votes into seats (whether majoritarian, mixed, or proportional); the assembly size (the total number of seats in a legislature); linked lists or apparentement provisions; the ballot structure; and malapportionment (the size and distribution of the electorate within each constituency); and the difference between parliamentary and presidential systems.


14 The Gastil Index for these countries estimates that Malaysia can be classified as Party Free (4.5/7) and the Lebanon is Not Free (5.5/7). See the Freedom House Index of Freedom. [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).


perceive group physical differences such as skin color, can be regarded as a sub-set of broader ethnic identities.

31 It is unfortunate that the merged NES data does not appear to define the Hispanic population in the United States.


Chapter 10  
Constituency Service

The lessons from earlier chapters is that we can identify some of the probable ‘mechanical’ results of electoral systems with a fair degree of confidence - such as their impact on the structure of party competition or the proportionality of votes to seats. But what is the psychological effects of electoral systems on the attitudes and behavior of politicians, and thus on broader issues of political representation and accountability in democratic societies? The incentives for legislators to develop a personal vote or incumbency advantage may be determined by many formal rules, including most importantly (i) the ballot structure; (ii) the centralization of the candidate selection processes within parties; (iii) the size of multimember districts; and (iv) the use of any term limitations on legislators1. This chapter scrutinizes some of the available evidence for these claims, focusing particularly upon the idea that candidate-ballots promote the individual accountability of elected members, by fostering stronger links between citizens and their parliamentary representatives than party-ballots. If true, we would expect that citizens voting via candidate-ballots should be more knowledgeable about parliamentary candidates, and should also have more contact with elected representatives, than those expressing their electoral choices through party-ballots.

What is the reasoning behind these claims? The ballot structure, determining how voters can express their choices, is assumed to be paramount for the chain of accountability linking representatives to the central party leadership and to local communities of citizens2. As discussed earlier, ballot structures can be classified into the following categories based on the choices facing electors when they enter the voting booth:

Candidate-Ballots
- In single member districts, citizens in each constituency cast a single ballot for an individual candidate. The candidate winning either a plurality or majority of votes in each district is elected. Through casting a ballot, electors indirectly express support for parties, but they have to vote directly for a particular candidate. In this context, politicians have a strong incentive to offer particularistic benefits, exemplified by casework helping individual constituents and by the delivery of local services (‘pork’), designed to strengthen their personal support within local communities. This inducement is particularly powerful in marginal seats where a handful of additional votes may make all the difference between victory and defeat.

Preference-Ballots
- In open-list multimember districts electors cast a ballot for a party, but they can express their preference for a particular candidate or candidates within a party list. Where citizens exercise a preference vote (otherwise known as an ‘open’ or ‘non-blocked’ vote), this strengthens the chances that particular candidates from the list will be elected and therefore changes their rank. Under these rules, politicians have a moderately strong incentive to offer particularistic benefits, to stand out from rivals within their own party. In most nations the choice of exercising one or more preferential votes is optional, and the practical effect of preference-ballots is contingent upon how many citizens choose to just ‘vote the party ticket’ without expressing a preferential vote. If most people decide to vote for the party list, then the effects are similar to party ballots, whereas if most choose to exercise a preferential vote for an individual on the list, then the effects are similar to candidate-ballots.

Preference-ballots are employed in Party List-PR used in 27 electoral systems worldwide, including in Belgium and the Czech Republic, as well as in Single Transferable Vote elections in Ireland. But this ballot is also used in plurality and majoritarian electoral systems, such as in the Single Non-Transferable Vote that has been used in the Republic of Korea, Japan and Taiwan3. The majoritarian Block Vote also allows citizens to vote for individual candidates in multimember districts with party lists of candidates, used in Bermuda, the Philippines and Mauritius. There are some variants to these rules. In Finland, people must vote for individual candidates, and the number of votes won by candidates determines their party’s share of seats. The panachage systems used in Luxembourg and Switzerland gives each elector as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and electors can distribute them either within or across different party lists.
Dual-Ballots

- In 'combined' (or 'mixed') electoral systems voters can cast separate ballots in both single-member and multi-member districts, as exemplified by elections in Italy, Germany and New Zealand. This category can be divided into either Combined-Independent (where the votes in both types of seats determine the results independently of each other) or Combined-Proportional (where the share of the vote cast for the party list PR determines the final allocation of seats). Where combined systems operate, most use closed-list multimember districts, so that citizens can cast a ballot for a candidate in their single-member districts as well as for a party in their multimember districts. The effects of dual-ballot elections depend upon what proportion of seats are allocated through single or multimember districts: where most seats are single-member then the effects will be closer to candidate-ballots and where most are multi-member then the effects will be closer to party-ballots.

Party-Ballots

- Lastly in closed-list multimember districts, citizens cast a single ballot for a party. Each party ranks the order of the candidates to be elected within their list, based on the decisions of the party selectorate, and the public cannot express a preference for any particular candidate within each list. Closed-list multimember districts, where voters can only 'vote the ticket' rather than supporting a particular candidate, are expected to encourage politicians to offer programmatic benefits, focused on the collective record and program of their party, and to strengthen cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties.

This system is used in Party List PR in 35 electoral systems worldwide, such as in Norway and Romania. It also operates in the Party Block Vote system, where electors can cast a ballot for the party list, and the party with a simple plurality of votes in each district is duly elected, as used in Singapore, Ecuador and Senegal.

While there are many reasons to believe that the ballot structure is important for the chain of accountability from legislators to voters and parties, nevertheless it is only one factor at work here. A related arrangement is the mean district magnitude (referring to the number of seats per district). Extremely large multimember districts are likely to weaken the incentive to cultivate a personal vote in preference-ballot elections, as it will be difficult for any individual candidate to stand out from the throng. Moderate or small multimember districts, on the other hand, are expected to have the opposite tendency, for example where four or five candidates are rivals in STV seats in Ireland.

Although beyond the scope of this chapter, the candidate selection and nomination process operating within parties is also expected to influence channels of accountability, in particular whether decisions are within the hands of the central party leadership or devolved downwards to regional or local party activists, members, or voters (see Figure 10.1). The greater the degree of decentralization, the stronger the incentive for politicians to emphasize local concerns. Although many expect that party rules will reflect the structure of the electoral system, in fact the degree of centralization of the candidate nomination process is quite complex and diverse among parties, depending upon their structure and organization. In mass-branch parties with a tradition of internal democracy, such as in many Scandinavian parties, candidate selection decisions can be localized even within party-ballot elections. At the same time, the party leadership can play an important role in internal party decisions about nominations, even in candidate-ballot elections4. In non-congruent cases, it remains to be seen whether members see themselves as more accountable to the party selectorate or the electorate. The rules governing the candidate nomination process are usually a matter determined by each party, rather than by law, and there can be considerable variations even within the same country (such as the UK), so that these rules cannot be compared through cross-national levels of comparison.

[Figures 10.1 about here]

Given accurate information about the ballot structure, rational vote-seeking politicians are expected to adopt whichever particularistic or programmatic strategy is necessary for gaining and maintaining office. Candidate ballots are expected to generate members who are highly responsive and accountable to local communities. Politicians have limited time and energies, and in considering multiple demands vying for their attention, they have to decide among alternative priorities. Some politicians focus
their resources upon the delivery of particularistic benefits, and campaign upon their personal record of individual case-work with government departments, tackling constituency concerns and delivering public services to their home district, working with groups on community problems, and being responsive to personal contact with local voters and grassroots party activists through attention to their post-bags, community meetings, surgeries, party meetings, and doorstep canvassing. By contrast, party-ballots, where voters can only vote the ticket, are expected to generate strong, disciplined and cohesive parliamentary parties that are capable of passing their collective platform in the legislature. In this context, politicians are expected to emphasize the delivery of programmatic benefits, campaigning upon their party’s collective record, policy platform, ideological image, and leadership team, with the aim of cultivating votes from party loyalists and identifiers. Preferential-ballots and dual-ballots are expected to fall somewhere along the continuum between candidate-ballots and party-ballots.

Yet of course some politicians may fail to conform to these expectations. Despite party-ballots, legislators in Norway, Spain or the Netherlands may still engage in individual casework, due to tacit social norms and expectations or the intrinsic philanthropic rewards of helping members of the public. Despite candidate-ballots, given other personal ambitions, Westminster MPs or US House Members may also prioritize the cut and thrust of legislative debate about the nation’s affairs, or the glory and glamour of appearing in TV studios, while neglecting the more prosaic matter of sorting out particular housing claims or welfare benefits with dusty government bureaucracies. Yet the Darwinian logic suggests that, if citizens reward constituency service in single member districts, under these rules politicians who fail to behave strategically will be less likely to be returned to parliament. Natural selection through the ballot box means that over time the legislature will gradually become composed of politicians pursuing more successful electoral strategies.

This model predicts that ballot structures (the independent variable) directly impact the behavior of rational politicians (the activities that they prioritize, as the intermediate variable) and that, by shaping voting choices, rules also exert an indirect impact upon citizens (the dependent variable). If we can establish certain systematic patterns of electoral behavior that are consistently associated with the type of ballot structure, then we can infer the linkages between electoral rules, political actors, and voting behavior.

It follows that reforms that alter the design of the ballot structure, a relatively simple legal procedure although one that can be politically fraught, should have the capacity to engineer important consequences for legislatures. For example, in parliaments with party-ballot elections, individual legislators are only weakly accountable to citizens, and the only way to get rid of lazy, ineffective, scandal-ridden or corrupt politicians is to throw the baby out with their party bathwater. Altering the ballot design could strengthen the accountability of elected members to local communities. In countries with party-ballots, where legislators neglect constituency service or casework, the priorities of representatives could be altered by the adoption of preference-ballots. Legislatures using candidate-ballots may suffer from an excessive focus on individualistic pork-barrel local politics to the detriment of collective public goods, party discipline, and government instability. In this context, the theory predicts that the cohesion of parliamentary parties could be strengthened by the adoption of party-ballots.

Review of the literature

Despite the plausibility of these arguments, the evidence about these claims from previous studies remains mixed and inconclusive. The focus of so much of the literature on the U.S. Congress means that systematic cross-national research remains underdeveloped. Some of the most plausible work is provided by Bernhard Wessels who compared the role orientations of national MPs in Europe and Members of the European Parliament in the 15-EU member states. He found that district magnitude was significantly related to role orientations: the smaller the district magnitude - and therefore the more personalized the electoral competition - the more members said they prioritized work to represent their constituency. Another important indicator in favor of this proposition is a study where Curtice and Shively examined the evidence that voters were contacted more often and had better knowledge of candidates under single member district systems rather than under PR multimember districts, and concluding that in both cases there was a positive and significant effect.

Evidence within particular countries confirms that parliamentarians in Britain and Australia, like members of the US Congress, dedicate a considerable proportion of their time to constituency service.
British Members of Parliament face multiple conflicting demands, but in recent years they devote a growing amount of time to ‘service responsiveness’: dealing with government departments on behalf of individual citizens and local groups, working with the community in their local area, holding regular surgeries, and attending constituency functions. MPs can help shortcut the bureaucratic maze of housing regulations, police complaint procedures, or social security claims for individuals, or local groups, mediating on behalf of constituents to ensure government officials uphold their rights. The growth of such activities in the post-war period has been well documented in Britain. In the 1950s, Norton and Wood suggest, constituency service by members of the House of Commons was limited, or even non-existent. The amount of constituency correspondence was minimal, perhaps two or three letters a day, while one third of members did not hold regular surgeries, and two-thirds lived outside the seat. By contrast, from the mid-1960 onwards the constituency role expanded: today local surgeries, correspondence, and spending time in the constituency occupy a significant proportion of most MPs' workload. Estimates of timekeeping are never wholly reliable, but a 1971 survey found most MPs spent about eleven hours per week working ‘on behalf of constituents’. A decade later this had increased to sixteen hours. By 2001 MPs estimated that they devoted 33 hours per week to constituency work, representing over a third of their workload. Another indicator is the growth in MPs' correspondence: in 1970 the average member received 25-74 letters per week. By 2001 the weekly post-bag had expanded to about 260 letters, just under half from constituents. Most hold weekly surgeries. These indicators suggest that constituency work for British MPs may have more than doubled in the last two decades. Nevertheless the strength of any rewards from voters for such activity should not be exaggerated. In Britain it has commonly been found that the ‘personal vote’ for MPs is normally limited in scope. Nor is there good evidence that the increase in constituency services offered by British MPs during the postwar era has strengthened any personal vote, since the incumbency advantage remains small and sporadic.

What remains less clear is whether members elected via other types of ballot structures also provide similar local services, especially under preference-ballots. Studies in Ireland under the Single Transferable Vote elections, for example, have shown that representatives (TDs) work hard for their constituents, and they may actually undertake more constituency business than their British equivalents. Carey and Shugart argue that small-to-moderate multimember districts with preferential ballots may promote greater incentives for constituency service than single member districts, since candidates in multimember seats need to distinguish themselves from other contestants within their own party. In Colombia and Brazil, both using party ballots, studies suggest that the national legislatures devote much of their time to ‘pork barrel politics’ with members focused upon district concerns, at the loss of party discipline and legislative cohesion in Congress. One reason for this behavior among members in the Brazilian Congress may be an indirect relationship, if ‘pork’ generates campaign funds that, in turn, lead to a personal vote.

Moreover it is not well established whether legislators in Dual-ballot electoral systems differ in their priorities and activities if elected through party-ballots or candidate-ballots, such as in Germany, Mexico, and the Ukraine. Studies suggest a complex relationship between the type of electoral system, the degree of constituency casework, and knowledge of candidates, mediated by political culture, the traditional role of legislators, and the structure of government services. For example, Wessels suggests that few members of the German Bundestag engage in constituency service, irrespective of whether members are elected via the party lists or single member districts, because local services like housing, education and welfare are the responsibility of the Lander level. Yet others suggests that members of the Bundestag do vary, with those elected via single member districts more likely to be on committee assignments that could help them to serve their districts and this gain reelection. In Dual-ballot systems, such as in the Ukraine, members of the Duma entering via party lists display greater party cohesion than those elected via single member districts, although this relationship is also contingent upon the marginality of districts. The strength of any voter-legislator linkages may be determined by the size of the constituency along with the provision of legislative staff, more than by the type of districts. Consider, for example, the amount of mail that can be generated in a populous U.S. Senate seat like California compared with a small UK constituency like the Western Isles. Based on a comparison of a dozen west European democracies, Vernon Bogdanor was skeptical about assuming any simple and direct relationship between the basic type of electoral system and voters' awareness of candidates or levels of constituency service. The study concluded that cultural and historical traditions play a far more important role in determining parliamentarian-constituent relationships than the electoral rules per se.
skeptics argue that attempts at electoral engineering - changing the electoral rules to alter legislative behavior – commonly fail. For example, although constituency service is strongly entrenched within Anglo-American democracies, the adoption of mixed-ballots in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the Russian Duma, or the Israeli Knesset, may not generate similar behavior in these parliaments, if the predominant values, social norms, and institutional customs operating in these institutions are deeply rooted in historical traditions and socially determined.

**Indicators of personal voting**

These considerations suggest that we need to reexamine whether voter-member linkages are actually higher under candidate-ballots elections than under party-ballots, as claimed. This issue can be investigated in many ways. One approach is through comparing the workings of different ballot structures within a particular country, with appropriate controls, which allow ideal ‘natural experiments’ for testing these propositions. Hence voter’s awareness of candidates can be compared under different contests within the United Kingdom, including mixed-ballots used for elections to the Scottish Parliament, party-ballots used for the European Parliament, and candidate-ballots used for the House of Commons. To compare like-with-like, however, this strategy can only attribute any differences to the type of ballot *per se* after a series of contests have been held. Even then, any differences in the public’s awareness of candidates, or in the provision of constituency service, could be due to the functions and visibility of members of these bodies, rather than to the ballot structures per se. The comparison of ‘before’ and ‘after’ natural experiments, such as New Zealand or Italy, also provide valuable insights, although again much else can change in successive elections beyond the basic ballot structures, such as the role of particular issues, party leaders, and campaign events.

Direct information about constituency service was not included in the CSES survey but we can use two common proxy indicators to gauge the strength of personal voting, namely (i) the name-recognition of candidates and (ii) the reported contact that voters experience with elected members. Both of these measures have been widely used in the literature and both should be higher where politicians focus upon personal campaign appeals. In comparing the strength of personal voting in different nations, we also need to control for many intervening factors that could influence this process. This includes aggregate levels of socioeconomic and human development in each country, as well as the standard social background factors operating at individual-level, including age, education, gender, and income, that previous studies have found to be commonly associated with levels of political knowledge and with voter-initiated contact activity.

**The Impact of Electoral Systems**

*Citizens’ Knowledge of Politicians*

To examine the claims that the ballot structure affects citizens’ awareness about parliamentary candidates, we need to establish what citizens knew about those seeking their vote. The CSES asked people whether they recalled any candidates in their district in the last parliamentary election and, if so, they were asked to identify their name. Up to three candidate names were recorded and these were verified as correct against official lists. It can be argued that citizens may still know much about the elected member or members from their district, and they may be familiar with opposing candidates standing for election, even if they remain unable to recall their names. Citizens may use heuristic shortcuts if they support ‘the Labour man’ or ‘the Christian Democrat woman’. Nevertheless name-recognition is a significant indirect indicator of broader awareness of electoral choices, it has long been used in surveys to test political knowledge, and it is important as a minimal criteria before citizens can evaluate the record of elected members and thereby hold individual politicians to account.

Table 10.1 illustrates how far people could correctly identify candidates, without any controls. The results show that overall almost half of all citizens (47%) could not identify a single candidate. Most importantly, the data confirms that party-ballots generated the lowest level of candidate awareness: two-thirds of those casting a vote in party-ballots failed to recognize a single candidate. On the other hand, levels of awareness were moderate in preferential-ballot elections, and highest in candidate-ballot and dual-ballot elections. Moreover the pattern shows considerable variation among individual countries. The Japanese, Thai, and Korean electorates display the highest awareness of those standing for office: only
6-8% failed correctly to identify any candidate in these elections. In contrast at the other extreme, awareness was particular low in Belarus, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain, where three-quarters or more of the electorate could not identify a single candidate. The other important pattern shown in the comparison is that the countries using candidate-ballots – Britain, Australia, and the United States – emerged as about average, and below the dual-ballot systems in Hungary, Germany, and New Zealand. In the U.S., for example, 52% failed to recognize a single politician, while only one-quarter could correctly identify at least two. Citizens have similar levels of candidate awareness in candidate-ballot and dual-ballot elections, although both these types of contests show stronger knowledge than under party-ballot elections.

**Voter Contact with MPs**

An alternative indicator of the strength of personal voting was measured by asking people whether they had any contact with an MP during the previous twelve months. This need not necessarily have involved constituency work or local service per se, since contact could have been generated by forms of election campaign such as telephone or household canvassing, or by party rallies, as well as by constituency surgeries. Nor does this specify the direction of who originated the contact activity, whether ‘bottom up’ from voters or ‘top down’ from politicians. Nevertheless in general citizen contact with politicians should be strongest where legislators have a greatest incentive to cultivate a personal vote, under candidate-ballot elections.

Table 10.2 shows that on average about 12% of the public reported contact with an elected representative during the previous year, with the highest levels in Iceland, New Zealand and Canada, and minimal contact activity in the Netherlands, Russia, and Spain. Without any controls, the initial pattern shows that voter-legislator linkages were greatest in candidate-ballot elections, as expected, where one sixth of the electorate (16%) reported some contact. Moreover candidate-ballot elections generated twice as much contact than party-ballot elections (8%). This supports the claim that candidate ballots strengthen member-voter linkages, yet at the same time there were minimal differences among all the other types of ballot structures. The national distribution shows that the United States is about average in contact activity. A closer look at the rankings, however, indicates that some party-ballot elections, such as those held in Iceland, Israel and Norway, are also above average in contact activity, as are some mixed-ballot contests such as those held in New Zealand and Lithuania. As discussed further in the conclusion, multiple factors may also be contributing towards variations in the overall pattern – including the processes of candidate selection and nomination – as much as the ballot structure.

Multivariate analysis is required to examine these relationships in more depth. Logistic regression models can be used to examine the impact of the ballot structure upon the core measures of contact activity and knowledge of candidates. The models first entered controls for the level of development in each country (measured by the UNDP Human Development Index 1998), that might be expected to shape societal modernization, and the standard individual-level social factors which are commonly found to influence both contact activity and political knowledge, namely age, sex, education, and household income (the latter as a proxy for socioeconomic status). The second step then entered the electoral system variables, using dummies for whether elections had candidate-ballots, dual-ballots, or preference-ballots, with party-ballots used as the default category. The mean district magnitude was also entered. Details of the coding used for all items are listed below Table 10.3.

Table 10.3 shows that the Human Development index and the demographic variables behaved in the expected way: there was greater contact between voters and elected members in more developed countries. Education, income, and gender also proved significant predictors of the amount of contact activity (although, interestingly, age proved a weak or insignificant predictor). That is to say, greater than average contact activity was reported among the most educated, affluent and men, reflecting patterns commonly found in many other forms of political activism. After controlling for these factors, the ballot structures and the mean district magnitude all proved significant. The candidate-ballot and dual-ballot elections showed significantly more contact activity than party-ballot elections. At the same time, the pattern was not wholly significant as preference-ballots proved negatively related to contact activity, as
did the mean size of the district magnitude. Table 10.4 repeats this exercise for analyzing knowledge of candidates, and finds a similar pattern for the level of development and the role of education and gender. After introducing these controls, the use of candidate-ballots, dual-ballots and preference-ballots all displayed significant greater knowledge of candidates than party-ballot elections. The coefficients were strongest for the candidate-ballots, as expected, followed by dual-ballots and preference-ballots. The mean district magnitude was also significant and in the expected negative direction, suggesting that the larger the candidate list, the lower the ability to recognize any particular candidate names. Extrapolating from these results, they confirm as expected that the two indicators of personal voting - candidate awareness and voter-member contact activity - are stronger in candidate-ballot elections and weaker in party-ballot elections. The effects of the intermediate types of ballot structure are varied among particular countries, and probably contingent upon other related rules discussed earlier, including the centralization of the nomination procedures used within each party, an issue well beyond the limited scope of this study.

Conclusions and Implications

Proponents argue that one of the primary virtues of candidate-ballots, used for the majoritarian electoral systems with single-member districts, is the chain of collective and individual accountability. The core argument is that parliamentary representatives are accountable via elections so that citizens can sanction those in office, retaining those that perform well and ousting those who do not. Four channels of accountability exist within majoritarian systems. The first principle of parliamentary government is that the executive emerges from, and is responsible to, the legislature, so that the cabinet is collectively accountable on a day-to-day basis to members of parliament. The ultimate penalty is a legislative vote of no confidence that removes the party leader and the cabinet from office. Moreover at general elections, the party in government can be held collectively accountable for their actions, and punished or rewarded accordingly by the electorate. Thirdly, given single member districts, strong party discipline, and mass-branch party organizations, members of parliament are accountable for their actions on a regular basis to party members in their local constituency, as well as to party leaders and whips in the House. Members who do not support party policies, or who are seen to fail in their personal conduct, may not be re-nominated for their local seat.

All these forms of democratic accountability may or may not operate. But even if all these mechanisms fail simultaneously, in the final stage, proponents claim that candidate-ballots allow citizens in each community to hold their individual local representative to account. Under first-past-the-post elections in parliamentary democracies, voters cannot directly pick the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, nor even (directly) the overall balance of parties in the Commons, but they can select their local member of parliament. The territorial basis of single member districts is believed to provide a strong incentive for constituency service, ensuring that members remain concerned about the needs and concerns of all their constituents, not just their party faithful. By contrast under party-ballots, used in multimember districts with closed party lists, electors are powerless to reward or punish individual candidates. Citizens can only signify their dissatisfaction with the performance of particular representatives by casting a ballot against the whole party ticket, which may throw the baby out with the bathwater. Preference-ballots, used in PR systems with open party lists, allow electors to prioritize candidates within each party, but it requires more information for voters to evaluate many candidates than to scrutinize the legislative record and performance of a particular local representative standing in a single seat. Dual-ballots used in combined electoral systems are expected to fall somewhere along the continuum between candidate-ballots and party-ballots, depending upon certain specific features, such as the number of seats falling into each category.

But are these normative claims substantiated by the available evidence? To summarize, the results of this study suggest that the use of candidate-ballots does strengthen how far individual politicians emphasize personalistic over party appeals. This process potentially holds many important consequences for representative democracy, including for the strength of party discipline and cohesion in the legislature, the accountability and independence of members from the party leadership, and the primary activities and role priorities of elected members. With preferential ballots, voters can either opt for the party ticket or they can prioritize particular candidates within the list, and their effects depend upon how many citizens choose to exercise their preferential vote. Dual-ballots, with elections combining both single member and multimember districts, are an intermediate category falling somewhere polar types,
and their effects depend upon the balance between single-member and multimember districts. By contrast party ballots, where citizens can only vote the party ticket rather than prioritizing any particular candidate on each list, generate stronger incentives for politicians to emphasize collective party and programmatic appeals in election campaigns. Attempts to strengthen legislatures in newer democracies through institutional capacity-building remain limited. Nevertheless the picture that emerges from this evidence suggests that in the long-term, the design of the ballot structure does have the capacity to shape legislative behavior in important ways. Reformers aiming to strengthen the local responsiveness and accountability of legislators should consider the use of candidate-ballots. Alternatively reformers seeking to strengthen party discipline and cohesion should consider the adoption of party-ballots.

Attempts at electoral reform assume that the formal electoral rules have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the political system. The choice of ballot structure has been important in this debate. In the British discussion about electoral reform, for example The Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System, popularly known as the Jenkins report, was given a wide-ranging brief by the Labour government but the terms specified that any reform had to maintain accountability to local communities: ‘a link between MPs and geographic constituencies’ should be maintained (my italics)\textsuperscript{29}. While electoral systems with a small district magnitude, like the Single Transferable Vote (STV), and mixed systems like the Additional Member System (AMS), could be and were considered for the UK House of Commons, this effectively ruled out any consideration regional party list PR with large multimember districts.

The results of the chapter suggest that the type of ballot structure plays an important role in constitutional design in newer democracies or electoral reform in older democracies. Decisions about the basic rules of the game are likely to prove important in the long-term for making legislatures ‘work’. If countries did want to encourage their elected politicians to be more accountable and responsive to grassroots communities, then the evidence suggests that the adoption of candidate-ballots would encourage this process. There are many reasons to believe that changing the ballot structure cannot automatically alter legislative behavior overnight; it would be naïve to assume that the adoption of candidate-ballot elections could by itself suddenly transform the accountability of legislators in the Ukrainian, Italian or Russian parliaments, so that politicians in these countries suddenly become similar to members of the U.S. Congress or Westminster MPs, who inherit a long tradition of local community representation and parliamentary norms of constituency service. Nevertheless in the longer term over a series of elections, through the Darwinian natural selection process, we would expect that legislative behavior would gradually adapt to the electoral incentives created by the formal rules.
Table 10.1: Knowledge of candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Type of Ballot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>81 10 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>74 15 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>71 19 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>31 18 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>17 14 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All party-ballots</td>
<td>66 15 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>67 23 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>62 22 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>50 16 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>42 21 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>35 34 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>23 20 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All preference-ballots</td>
<td>45 24 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>82 11 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>63 13 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>61 18 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>37 24 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>29 17 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24 43 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>21 20 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Rep</td>
<td>8 51 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7 17 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6 14 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All dual-ballots</td>
<td>41 20 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>84 10 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>52 24 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (i)</td>
<td>43 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>40 32 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>32 22 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All candidate-ballots</td>
<td>41 26 33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Q: “Do you happen to remember the name of any candidates who ran/stood in you [lower house primary electoral district] in the last [parliamentary/congressional] election? [If YES] What were their names?” (i) Only two categories were coded in Australia. Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2002.
Table 10.2: Contact with elected representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% With contact</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Type of Ballot</th>
<th>All Party-ballots</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>Party List PR</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Party-ballots</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Party List PR</td>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>Party List PR</td>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Party List PR</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Party List PR</td>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Preference-ballots</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Dual-ballot</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>Dual-ballot</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>Dual-ballot</td>
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<td>Dual-ballot</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>Dual-ballot</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>Dual-ballot</td>
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<td>Dual-ballot</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Candidate-ballot</td>
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<td>Alternative Vote</td>
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<td>Candidate-ballot</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>All Candidate-ballots</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Q: "During the last twelve months, have you had any contact with a [Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?" Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2002.
Table 10.3: Models predicting contact with elected members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of development</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.001</td>
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<td>Gender (male)</td>
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<td>.029</td>
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<td>.375</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.225</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.011</td>
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<td>.101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidate-ballot</td>
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<td>.297</td>
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<td>Dual-ballot</td>
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<td>.329</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
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<td>-.196</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean district magnitude</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-5.36</td>
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<td>% Correctly predicted</td>
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<td>89.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The models using logistic regression analysis provide the unstandardized beta (B), the standard error (SE) and the significance (Sig.) with knowledge of candidates as the dependent variable.

*Model I:* Models without the electoral variables.

*Model II:* Complete model including electoral rules.

**Ballot structure:** Preference-ballots, dual-ballots and candidate-ballots are all coded as dummy variables, where party-ballot is the default category.

**Mean district magnitude:** see Table 2.


**Age:** In years.

**Education:** 8-point scale from none (1) to completed university graduate (8)

**Income:** Household income on a standardized 5 point scale.

**Source:** Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2002
Table 10.4: Models predicting knowledge of candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL CONTROLS</strong></td>
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<td>Level of Development</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>-.038</td>
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<td>Gender (male)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate-ballot</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-ballot</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean district magnitude</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-5.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Correctly predicted</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2$</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The models using logistic regression analysis provide the unstandardized beta (B), the standard error (SE) and the significance (Sig.) with knowledge of candidates as the dependent variable.

*Model I*: Models without the electoral variables.

*Model II*: Complete model including electoral rules.

*Ballot structure*: Note that party-ballot is the default category.

See Table 5 for details of all data and coding.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2002
Figure 10.1: The interaction of selection rules and ballot structures


4 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Pippa Norris. 1996. ‘Candidate Recruitment.’ In Comparing Democracies. Eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris. Thousand Oaks: Sage; Reuvan Hazan. 2002. ‘Candidate Recruitment.’ In Comparing Democracies 2. Eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris. London: Sage. It should be noted that the use of term limitations preventing politicians from standing for re-election, such as those used in Brazil, can also be expected to curtail the power of electoral incentives that might otherwise operate in preference-ballots, although this is also beyond the scope of this study.


7 For a useful review of the U.S. bias in the literature see Gerald Gamm and John Huber. 2002. ‘Legislatures as political institutions: Beyond the contemporary congress.’ In

9 John Curtice and Phil Shively. 2000. ‘Who represents us best? One member or many?’ Paper presented at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Quebec, August.


Data is derived from the series of surveys of more than 1000 parliamentary candidates and MPs conducted every election by Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski. The British Representation Study, 1992-2001.


19 D. J. Samuels. 2002. ‘Pork barreling is not credit claiming or advertising: Campaign finance and the sources of the personal vote in Brazil.’ Journal of Politics. 64 (3): 845-863.


Chapter 11

The Impact of Electoral Engineering

The starting point for this book was the observation that during the last decade issues of electoral engineering have arisen on the policy agenda in many countries. Major reforms in established democracies have challenged the notion that electoral systems are necessarily stable institutions. In most Western democracies, once the great debate about the universal franchise was resolved and the mass party system consolidated, electoral systems seemed, for the most part, settled and enduring features of the constitutional landscape. Lijphart's study of the electoral systems used in twenty-five established democracies from 1945 to 1990 found that only one (France) had experienced a fundamental change from plurality to PR, or vice versa. Furthermore Bartolini and Mair noted only fourteen unbroken transitions in Europe between 1885 and 1985, meaning a major shift in electoral rules between two democratic elections, excluding disruptions caused by wars, dictatorships, the establishment of a new state or the reappearance of an old one. In Western countries the electoral rules of the game, within which political scientists could get on with analyzing individual-level voting behavior, appeared settled and predictable. No longer. In the 1990s some established democracies experienced the most radical reforms to electoral systems for over a century. Major change from majoritarian to PR, or vice versa, have occurred in five of the twenty-one countries originally identified by Lijphart in the mid-1970s as established post-war democracies (Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Britain, and Italy), and more modest amendments have also been adopted in Austria, Portugal and Switzerland. Moreover the international community has become deeply invested in attempts to generate free and fair competition in dozens of nations around the globe, exemplified by the transitions following the collapse of the Milosevic regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, independence from Indonesia in East Timor, and the end of the bloody civil war in Cambodia. The constitutional settlements in post-Communist Europe, dissatisfaction with political systems in Latin America, and the rise of electoral democracies in Asia, as well as attempts at state-building and regime change in the Middle East and Africa, have all revived interest in what might once might have appeared the rather technical, dull, and rather abstruse issue of electoral engineering.

Beyond the basic electoral formula, in many countries debates have arisen about the best way to overhaul electoral procedures. The legal statutes and party rules governing party eligibility and candidate nomination have been reformed to widen the inclusiveness of elected bodies and bring more diverse voices to the political arena. As we have seen, positive action policies have implemented voluntary gender quotas in parties throughout Latin America, Scandinavia, and West European. Even stronger statutory gender quotas have been employed in Argentina, Belgium, France, and Mexico and reserved seats used in Uganda, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Morocco. Renewed attention has focused on the administrative process of electoral registration and voting facilities, including the creation of independent electoral commissions responsible to parliament, and the professionalisation of electoral management through formal guidelines, training, and awareness of best practices. The regulation of campaign finance and political broadcasting has generated a series of initiatives, designed to make the process of party fundraising and expenditure fairer and more transparent, although with mixed or limited success given the numerous loopholes in this process. Democracies have introduced a series of minor reforms to electoral rules, including switching between d'Hondt and LR-Hare formula, adjusting the effective voting threshold for minor parties to qualify for parliamentary representation, expanding the conditions of electoral suffrage, and expanding the size of legislative assemblies.

During the post-war era issues of basic electoral reform, while politicized in many countries by the exclusion of minor parties in majoritarian systems and by serious problems of government stability in PR elections, were marginalized on the mainstream policy agenda in the United States, with the notable exception of civil rights. By 1961, coast-to-coast, only Cambridge, Massachusetts retained the Single Transferable Vote. In the early 1990s, Lani Guinier's fairly modest proposals for electoral reform were regarded as incendiary. Yet recent years have seen renewed debate about electoral procedures in America, spurring new legislation, generated by
diverse movements concerned about soft money in campaign finance, low levels of voter registration and turnout, the continued lack of women and ethnic minorities in Congress, and serious flaws of electoral administration highlighted by Florida during the 2000 Bush-Gore race. In October 2002 the Help America Vote Act was signed into law, giving states almost $4bn in federal funds to replace outdated voting machines, improve voter education, and train poll workers. States are required to have a computerized voter registration system in place by the 2004 elections, as well as to provide provisional ballots, which will be counted once valid registration is verified, for citizens whose names do not appear on voter rolls. The McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act came into force in November 2002, limiting the amount of ‘soft’ money that an individual could donate to a party, as well as restricting issue ads that mention a candidate by interest groups. The full consequences of these initiatives for voter turnout and campaign funding can only be evaluated in subsequent elections.

Moreover many countries have experimented with newer technological innovations in electoral administration. This includes pilot e-voting schemes, whether casting an electronic vote via the Internet from a home or workplace location, or more simply using new communication and information technologies in existing polling stations and as part of the vote tabulation process. For example e-voting has been used in municipal elections in Geneva and the May 2002 British local elections allowed citizens in selected wards and boroughs to vote electronically using mobile phone text message services, touch telephone, local digital television, as well as on-line voting methods using home computers, local libraries and council-run information kiosks. Proponents argue that the most innovative uses of technology hold potential for facilitating voter participation, mainly by reducing the time and effort required for casting a ballot. Yet there are major practical, legal and technical challenges in e-voting, so that task forces reviewing the evidence have generally proved skeptical about the claims that new technology could automatically either entice more citizens to vote, prevent electoral fraud, improve the accuracy and efficiency of vote-counting, or make elections more representative. Electoral procedures have to meet stringent standards, including high levels of security, secrecy, reliability, accuracy, efficiency, integrity, transparency, and equality. Despite the rise of the Internet, the administrative challenges of e-voting are far more difficult than the implementation of many common forms of electronic commerce or government. Even if the major technical, practical, and legal issues could eventually be overcome, the digital divide in Internet access evident even in affluent nations means that at present it would be premature to consider adopting e-voting at home or at work on a wide-scale basis. Nevertheless technological solutions to electoral management will continue to attract continued attention in future as one potential avenue for voting reform.

Do rules matter?

In evaluating the impact of any of these attempts at electoral engineering - whether major reforms proposed to the basic electoral system or more minor modifications to voting procedures and electoral management – we need clear evidence to guide the choice of policy options. Debate about constitutional choices are divided over the ultimate goals that electoral systems should fulfill, as well as disagreements about how far formal rules can best achieve these goals. Proponents of adversarial democracy argue that links between citizens and their elected representatives are strongest in contests using candidate-ballots, promoting accountability and constituency service via territorial representation. The decisive outcome produced by the ‘exaggerative winner’s bonus’ in majoritarian electoral systems, and the electoral penalties for minor parties, are regarded by proponents as assets. Under these rules, strong but accountable governments are believed capable of taking difficult decisions and implementing their programs during their term of office, yet they can ultimately be reined in by citizens and thrown out of power if overstepping the bounds of public preferences. Proponents of consensus democracy commonly respond that proportional systems are fairer for minority parties and groups, promoting an inclusive legislative assembly containing multiple voices across the political and social spectrum, capable of checking and balancing executive power. Party-ballots can be regarded as more effective in promoting party discipline, coherence, and programmatic campaigning rather than personalistic politics.
Constitutional engineering has risen on the policy agenda in recent years. Institutional inertia has often blocked effective reforms, as incumbents protect the rules from which they have benefited and the policy options are often highly technocratic, even where there is widespread dissatisfaction with existing arrangements. Unless there are dramatic scandals or cases of misadministration, dry issues of electoral reform are rarely going to excite public concern in the same way as bread-and-butter matters of jobs, prices, and pay. Even with Florida, the media hullabaloo and public interest faded fast outside the beltway following President Bush’s inauguration. Where major reforms have been implemented, the new rules can sometimes quickly rigidify, preventing further changes. In this context, it has become even more important to piece together the available evidence for and against arguments about the consequences of electoral reform.

Attempts at electoral engineering are based, implicitly or explicitly, upon the simple claim that formal rules matter, with both mechanical and psychological effects. Rational-choice institutionalism emphasizes that formal rules generate incentives shaping the rational goal-seeking behavior of politicians, parties, and citizens. This theory makes certain simple assumptions about the self-interested aims of rational actors and then seeks to outline and test the predictions that flow logically from these premises. Through altering strategic incentives, this account suggests that reformers have the capacity to shape the electoral appeals of political actors, and that, in turn, the voting behavior of the electorate will respond to these choices. Rules are therefore believed to generate important and far-reaching consequences. In particular the theory of rational-choice institutionalism explored throughout this book is based on the assumptions that electoral rules can influence the incentives for rational vote-seeking politicians to offer either particularistic or programmatic benefits; for parties to campaign using either bridging or bonding strategies; for party selectors to pick either socially homogeneous or diverse parliamentary representatives. In turn it is believed that citizens will respond to these voting choices, so that rules influence political behavior both indirectly (via the strategies adopted by political elites) and directly (for example, where rules are designed to reduce the costs of casting a ballot). If these premises are indeed correct then it follows that reforming the formal electoral rules should have the capacity to alter the behavior of politicians, parties, and voters.

Yet skeptics argue that despite the seductive elegance of rational-choice institutionalism, in practice legal rules reflect rather than transform society, so that our capacity to design formal rules for social engineering is strictly limited. Cultural modernization theories, conventional in social-psychological accounts of voting behavior, emphasize how secular social trends common in post-industrial nations have transformed citizens, notably rising educational levels and cognitive skills, broader access to a variety of information sources through the mass media, and the erosion of participation through traditional political organizations including mass-branch parties, trade unions, and churches. Because these processes have been progressing glacially throughout all post-industrial societies, these are thought to have undermined the traditional anchors of voting behavior common in democracies during the postwar decade, including party loyalties based on identities of class, faith and community. These processes are thought to have operated on affluent mass societies irrespective of the particular electoral rules within each state. In this view, like a flood tide at full rip, political actors, particularly parties of the left, have had to adapt to these inevitable forces of mass society, or go under. Cultural accounts doubt the more far-reaching claims of rational-choice institutionalism as well as the capacity of mechanistic fixes for social engineering.

By deducing the rational logic of how rules may influence the behavior of political actors and therefore the mass electorate, and by piecing together evidence derived from a classification of the electoral rules combined with cross-national surveys of voting behavior, we can unravel at least part of the puzzle surrounding these issues. Inevitably the available evidence presented in this study remains limited, in many important ways. It would have been desirable to compare more countries, including parliamentary elections held under majoritarian rules in developing societies. Subsequent analysis should also break down the unit of comparison, to examine the patterns underlying attitudes and behavior at regional, district and precinct-level, rather than comparing across nations. The richness of detailed case studies focused on particular campaigns
could also illuminate important issues about the electoral strategies used by parties. We need to know far more about patterns of campaign spending, the use of political advertising, campaign coverage by the news media, and grassroots local party activism, as well as the dynamics of voter choice and issue priorities during the elections held in each country. The choice of electoral systems also involves many other considerations, beyond the scope of this study, such as their effects on government stability and coalition politics, the public policy process, and feelings of democratic satisfaction and legitimacy. The second module of questions used in the CSES (2001-2005) expands the range of research questions to explore the issues of government accountability and representation. Nevertheless the preliminary analysis presented in this limited study helps us to understand the behavior of parties, politicians and voters located within the context of the formal electoral rules in each country, comparing both industrial and postindustrial societies.

The consequences for voting behavior

After considering the most appropriate classification of electoral systems, and the normative debate between adversarial and consensus arguments in democratic theory, Chapter 4 considered the impact of electoral rules for party systems. Effective parties that work well can serve multiple functions in democracies: simplifying electoral choices, organizing campaigns, aggregating interests, channeling debate, selecting candidates, structuring parliamentary divisions, acting as policy think tanks, and organizing governments. The direct impact of electoral systems on patterns of party competition has long been regarded as one of their most important effects. The comparison of elections in all nations worldwide, and the detailed analysis of the contests held in the thirty-two countries in the CSES dataset, lends further confirmation about the reductive effect of the basic electoral formula. The evidence presented in this comparison supports Duverger's generalization that plurality electoral systems tend towards party dualism, while PR is associated with multipartyism. The contrast between party systems under majoritarian and proportional electoral systems is not large, depending upon the precise measure employed, but all indicators pointed consistently in the same direction. According to the most restrictive measure, of ENPP, in the 32 countries under detailed comparison there were almost twice as many parliamentary parties under PR than under majoritarian systems. Yet at the same time there are important variations within each electoral family due to many factors, including most importantly (i) the geography of electoral support; (ii) specific features of electoral design, such as the use of voting thresholds and the size of districts; and (iii) the number and depth of social cleavages within a nation. Minor parties can still gain a disproportionate share of seats under first-past-the-post, especially common for smaller regional or ethnic-national parties, if their share of votes is spatially concentrated in particular districts. At the same time, minor parties can also be heavily penalized in proportional electoral systems, if these have high voting thresholds and/or small average district magnitudes.

These conclusions suggest that, if reforms to the electoral law could be passed and implemented, moves towards more majoritarian arrangements should mitigate some of the problems experienced in countries currently suffering from the dangers of excessively unstable, undisciplined, and fragmented party competition, exemplified by Italy, Brazil, the Ukraine, and Israel. At the same time, again if measures could be effectively passed and implemented, electoral reforms should help to overcome the dangers of unchanging one-party predominant party systems, where voters cannot hold governments to account, exemplified by the cases of Singapore, Mexico (until 2000), and Japan. In this regard, at least, electoral engineering can contribute towards effective party competition as well as levels of proportionality. Policy analysis can also contribute towards understanding the more technical aspects of the formal rules with a fair degree of accuracy, including assessing the consequences of the basic type of electoral system, the vote threshold, the votes-to-seats formulae, the average district magnitude, and the legal regulations governing the registration of candidates and parties.

Social Cleavages

But do formal rules generate important consequences for the campaign strategies that parties adopt, with an impact upon mass electoral behavior? This issue remains far more
contentious. Chapter 5 considered the impact of electoral rules on the strength of cleavage politics. The basic social divisions of class, faith and community have traditionally been the building blocks of stable social and partisan identities, anchoring voters to parties over successive elections. The central claim of rational-choice institutionalism is not that electoral rules create social cleavages, or even manufacture their political relevance, but rather that the initial adoption of certain rules (for whatever reason) will create certain incentives for parties to adopt either bonding strategies that will maintain, reinforce (and possibly exacerbate) cleavage politics, or alternatively to adopt catch-all bridging strategies that will modify, downplay (and possibly erode) group consciousness in the political arena.

The evidence in this study suggests that the electoral rules of the game can indeed contribute towards this process. Compared with proportional rules, the analysis confirms that majoritarian elections are significantly associated with weaker cleavage politics. In predicting how many people voted for the left and right on the party scale, about one quarter of the variance in majoritarian elections was generated by the combined effects of social structure and ideology, compared with about one third in the PR elections. The reason is that under majoritarian rules, parties and candidates must appeal to multiple diverse interests and social groups in order to generate the plurality or majority of votes necessary to win office. In this context, rational vote-seeking parties have strong incentives to adopt broad-church catchall bridging strategies that appeal to working and middle class sectors, as well as different religious sects and creeds, and diverse ethnic groups. Focusing exclusively upon any single sector, whether farmers or pensioners, environmentalists or blue-collar workers, carries serious electoral risks. This consideration is particularly important for socialist, social democrat and communist parties facing a shrinking traditional base, given the contraction in the number of manual workers employed in manufacturing industry and the rising proportion of service-sector professionals. In these circumstances, leftwing parties will probably shift more and more towards the center ground in the attempt to develop ‘catch-all’ strategies and cross-class appeals. These patterns are exemplified by the shifts towards straddling the center-ground experienced under the leadership of Tony Blair in the British Labour party and under Bill Clinton for the US Democrats, both countries using majoritarian systems for legislative elections. By contrast, in countries with proportional representation systems, especially those with low voting thresholds and large district magnitudes, parties can be returned to power based on a far narrower segment of the population, based on class, faith-based, or ethnic electoral appeals. Under these rules, parties have less incentive to broaden and moderate their electoral base.

Furthermore, far from cleavage politics being weaker in post-industrial societies, as modernization theory suggests, these linkages actually proved to be stronger. The amount of the total variance in voting behavior explained by the models used for analysis was about one quarter in industrial nations, but it was one-third in postindustrial societies. Of course other factors could be offered to account for these patterns, notably the way that strong party-voter linkages take generations to develop over successive elections, so that patterns of cleavage politics have not yet had time to become established and consolidated in newer democracies. It is also true that many studies provide a wealth of evidence that the strength of cleavage politics, especially the link between parties and class or religious identities, has eroded in many established democracies, and many accounts have commonly linked these developments to processes of societal modernization and the rise of a new ‘citizen politics’. Nevertheless rational-choice institutionalism provides an alternative interpretation of the underlying reasons for this decline, by emphasizing ‘top-down’ patterns of party strategies and electoral incentives to predict the countries where cleavage politics has eroded most clearly.

**Partisan identification**

Subsequent analysis of party identification served to further confirm this general pattern. Theories of cultural modernization suggest that important contrasts in the strength of partisan identification should be evident by the basic type of society, in particular that patterns of human development, especially rising education levels and cognitive skills associated with societal development, should have gradually reduced reliance upon party loyalties. If so, partisan identification should exert a stronger influence upon voting behavior in industrialized than in post-
industrial nations. Yet if institutional incentives play a stronger role, then important differences should be evident among countries using different types of electoral rules, in particular partisan identities should exert a stronger impact on voting choices under proportional representation than majoritarian systems.

The results of the analysis showed that in combination, the joint effects of social structure and partisan attachments explained about two-thirds of the variance in left-right voting behavior under majoritarian rules, but over three-quarters in combined and PR systems. This is far from a complete explanation, as there are also substantial differences among contests within each type of electoral system, rather than a wholly consistent pattern. A comprehensive explanation of voting choices would include many other standard factors exogenous to the model, and well beyond the scope of this limited study, including the role of prospective issues and policy platforms, the popularity of party leaders, and the retrospective record of the parties in office. Furthermore the main variance in voting behavior comes from the combined effects of social plus partisan identification, rather than from the latter alone. Nevertheless the final model does explain a substantial amount of variance in voting behavior for parties on the left and right, suggesting that if we can identify the basic social characteristics and party loyalties of electors, we can predict their voting choices with considerable confidence. Rational-choice institutionalism proved more persuasive than accounts based on societal modernization, since party attachments were similar, or even slightly higher, in post-industrial nations than in industrial societies.

Turnout

Do the rules also affect political mobilization and voter participation? Many attempts at mechanical fixes have been based on the assumption that voting turnout could be boosted either by ‘sticks’ (such as the introduction of compulsory voting laws) or by ‘carrots’ (for example, simpler facilities for electoral registration and postal voting for casting a ballot.) Rational choice institutionalism suggests that the incentives for citizen participation in elections can best be understood as a product of the electoral costs of registering and voting, the party choices available to electors, and the degree to which casting a ballot determines the composition of parliament and government. All other things being equal, turnout is expected to be higher in electoral arrangements that reduce voting costs, maximize party competition, and also maintain a strong link between voters’ preferences and the outcome for government. In contrast, cultural modernization theories emphasize that habitual and deeply rooted patterns of civic participation arise from overall societal levels of human development, social characteristics such as education, age, and class, and attitudes such as a sense of political efficacy and interest. In this latter perspective, habits of mass political participation will respond only sluggishly, if at all, to changes in electoral law or administration.

The results of this study analyzing the nations in the CSES dataset suggests that institutional rules do indeed matter: voting participation is maximized in elections using proportional representation, with small electoral districts, regular but relatively infrequent national contests, competitive party systems, and in presidential contests. These factors confirm the general pattern established in an earlier comparison of nations around the globe. In established democracies, the use of compulsory voting laws is associated with higher turnout, whereas this is not evident among the broader comparison of elections worldwide. Yet the pooled regression models indicated that, even after controlling for the institutional context, human development, social background, and cultural attitudes also remained important predictors of turnout. Therefore rather than a false dichotomy, between rule-based incentives and cultural habits, both these factors contribute towards understanding patterns of political participation, in a ‘nested’ model.

The consequences for political representation

The first part of the book considered how electoral rules influenced the strategies adopted by parties and the behavior of the mass electorate. The study went on to analyze the potential impact of rational-choice institutionalism and cultural modernization upon political representation.
Gender equality in legislative office

Agencies have advocated a range of positive action strategies designed to encourage more socially diverse legislative bodies. Opportunities for women may be influenced by electoral law, including the basic type of electoral system, the statutory and voluntary adoption of gender quotas, and the use of reserved seats for women, as well as by the predominant cultural values within any society. Rational choice institutionalism suggests that electoral laws determine the balance of incentives operating in the selection process, for example the use of statutory gender quotas creates legal or financial sanctions regulating the outcome, while multimember constituencies generate a potential electoral penalty if parties fail to present a socially-balanced collective list of candidates, including all major sectors of society. By contrast, cultural modernization accounts emphasize that sex discrimination reflects deep-rooted attitudes towards gender equality; so that where traditional cultural attitudes prevail in less developed societies then selectors will select men for public office. Moreover in traditional societies, parties may fail to introduce equal opportunity or positive action policies voluntarily, and they may refuse to comply with any statutory positive action laws and disregard any legal penalties against sex discrimination.

The evidence presented in this chapter provides further confirmation that the basic type of electoral system does indeed influence opportunities for women in elected office. Women are generally more successful in being nominated and elected under proportional electoral systems using party-ballots. In cultures where the public is broadly sympathetic towards the principles of gender equality, under PR parties have considerable incentives to develop a balanced ticket of legislative candidates, to avoid any electoral penalties from the appearance of sex discrimination against women. This electoral incentive is absent in candidate-ballots used in single member districts in majoritarian elections, where each local party can choose the default option of a male candidate without any collective responsibility for balancing the social profile of candidates at national level. The multivariate analysis comparing countries worldwide showed that the type of electoral system, the use of reserved seats, and the length of women’s suffrage were all associated with more women in parliament, although once these factors were introduced, the predominant religious culture (as a proxy for traditional or egalitarian attitudes towards gender equality in different societies) proved insignificant. The employment of voluntary gender quotas was extremely important in particular cases, using ‘pre-post’ comparisons, although their effects vary from party to party within each country according to detailed matters such as their level and implementation procedures. Party-ballots, in combination with positive action strategies, generate more opportunities for women in legislative bodies, producing parliaments that look more like the people they serve and overcoming cultural barriers through traditional attitudes.

Ethnic minorities

Can we deduce that similar consequences follow for the representation of ethnic minorities? Although a common strategy, considerable caution is needed before making such a leap. Consociational theories suggest that proportional electoral systems are most likely to facilitate accommodation between diverse ethnic groups, making them more suitable for transitional and consolidating democracies struggling to achieve legitimacy and stability in plural societies. Yet little direct evidence has compared the impact of electoral rules on the inclusion of ethnic minority parties in different countries, still less indications of general satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system among ethnic minority voters. The strategy used in this study compared relative levels of satisfaction with the political system among majority-minority populations, to see whether the majority-minority gap was reduced, or even reversed, under proportional PR party list systems, as consociational theory suggests. The findings indicate that a complex pattern is at work here, and the claim that PR party list systems are directly associated with higher levels of political support among ethnic minorities is not confirmed by this study. One reason could be that other contingent factors could determine this relationship, particularly the geographical dispersion of minority groups; the use of positive action strategies under majoritarian rules, such as reserved seats; other features of the broader political system including the degree of regional autonomy and decentralization; and also the role of political leaders in either mitigating or heightening ethnic tensions. Further research around these
complex issues is necessary to further disentangle these relationships and the broader meaning of ethnicity for party politics and voting behavior.\textsuperscript{18}

Constituency service

Moreover the legitimacy of legislative bodies is founded upon the democratic principles of political representation and accountability. Proponents of candidate-ballots used in majoritarian single member districts argue that these have the important advantage of allowing citizens to use elections to hold elected members individually responsible for their actions. Preferential ballots used with open-list PR and systems such as the Single Transferable Vote also share some of these characteristics. By contrast party-ballots used in closed list PR elections removes the ability of citizens to sanction or reward individual politicians. Rational politicians standing in party-ballots will logically focus upon collective campaigns, emphasizing the achievement of their party’s record or programmatic platform, since they all sink or swim together. Party ballots should therefore strengthen party discipline and cohesion; yet weaken the incentive for constituency service. By contrast candidate-ballots should provide greater incentives for incumbents to appeal on their personal record of constituency service and local representation. If true, citizens voting in candidate-ballots should be more knowledgeable about parliamentary candidates, and should have more contact with elected representatives, than those voting via party ballots.

Theoretically incentive-based models offer many plausible reasons why single member districts should have strong linkages between citizens and representatives, promoting contact, constituency service, and voter awareness about candidates. The results of this study suggest that the use of candidate-ballots does strengthen how far individual politicians emphasize personalistic over party appeals. This process potentially holds many important consequences for representative democracy, including for the strength of party discipline and cohesion in the legislature, the accountability and independence of members from the party leadership, and the primary activities and role priorities of elected members. With preferential ballots, voters can either opt for the party ticket or they can prioritize particular candidates within the list, and their effects depend upon how many citizens choose to exercise their preferential vote. Dual-ballots, with elections combining both single member and multimember districts, are an intermediate category falling somewhere polar types, and their effects depend upon the balance between single-member and multimember districts. By contrast party ballots, where citizens can only vote the party ticket rather than prioritizing any particular candidate on each list, generate stronger incentives for politicians to emphasize collective party and programmatic appeals in election campaigns. Reformers seeking to strengthen the responsiveness and accountability of legislators to local communities should consider adopting candidate-ballots. Alternatively those seeking to strengthen party discipline and cohesion in parliaments which are fragmented and factionalized should consider the adoption of party-ballots. Yet dual-ballot systems, where some members of parliament are elected from single member districts, as in Germany, Mexico, Japan, or New Zealand, combines some of the advantages of both systems. More cross-national research needs to be conducted on other rules that could plausibly effect this process, including the use of term limitations and the centralization of the candidate selection process.

The lessons for electoral engineering

We have demonstrated, as many others have long believed, that electoral systems represent some of the most powerful instrument available for institutional engineering, with far-reaching consequences for party systems, the composition of legislatures, and democratic representation.\textsuperscript{19} This book outlined the logic for three core expectations in rational choice institutionalism: namely that the electoral threshold would influence whether parties adopted bridging or bonding strategies; the ballot structure would shape how far parties adopt socially diverse or homogeneous lists of candidates; and the ballot structure would effect the emphasis on programmatic or particularistic campaigning. We also considered the evidence for certain propositions arising from cultural modernization theory, namely that patterns of political behavior and cultural attitudes surrounding these same phenomenon would be influenced by levels of societal development. This account has been examined and tested by classifying the rules, deducing the way that rational vote-seeking political actors respond, then examining the patterns
of behavior in the electorate.

It should be recognized that in considering the evidence surrounding these issues the research design used in this book, and the comparative framework, remain limited in many important ways. In the best of all possible worlds, we would be able to examine time-series case studies to understand how the process of electoral engineering works in more depth, especially more ‘before’ and ‘after’ natural experiments with rule reform. Moreover the cross-sectional research design is most limited when considering how far the electoral system can indeed be regarded as exogenous to party competition, although this is arguably less problematic when considering the logic of how the rules interact with voting behavior. In countries where the electoral system has existed for many decades then the impact of the rules upon patterns of party competition is a reasonable assumption. Where the electoral system is newer, then it becomes more contentious to assume that there is a simple one-directional causal arrow from the rules to party competition, and instead an interactive process seems more plausible, where party competition shapes the adoption of certain rules and then the rules serve to constrain patterns of party competition. Analytical models can try to examine this process but only time-series case-study analysis provides a truly satisfactory way of disentangling these complex pathways. Cross-national surveys of voting behavior would be extended to a wider range of countries and electoral systems, including contests in developing societies, to broaden the reliable generalizations that can be drawn from their study. Rather than deductive theories about the logic of campaign strategies, direct evidence would be examined and integrated with surveys of the electorate, such as patterns of campaign expenditure or content analysis of party political manifestos. A more comprehensive range of factors would be brought into models of electoral choice, including analyzing the importance of leadership popularity, evaluations of economic performance, and prospective policy platforms. This study has not sought to even consider many of the other important consequences believed to flow from the electoral rules and cultural modernization, whether questions concerning ‘strategic’ or ‘tactical’ voting, direct evidence for the ‘wasted’ vote syndrome, the role of campaign communications, and broader issues of political participation beyond the act of voting. All these strategies remain open to further work where the comparative study of voting behavior is analyzed using multi-level and multi-method research designs, using the burgeoning range of cross-national social and political surveys. Further modules of the CSES, as well as the development and availability of cross-national surveys such as the Afrobarometer and Asiabarometer, are bringing these issues into sharper focus for the research community. This book has sought to explore only part of the agenda concerning how the comparative study of electoral systems can be re-integrated with the mainstream study of voting behavior.

The results of the analysis serving to confirm the assumptions arising from rational choice institutionalism have important implications, not just for our theoretical understanding of these issues, but also for all those concerned with the public policy process and practical issues of constitutional reform. In many nations the rules of the electoral system, for many decades accepted as stable and immutable, indeed often bureaucratic and technical, have become increasingly politicized and contentious. The wave of constitution building following the surge of newer democracies in the early 1990s generated a series of negotiations about electoral laws that needed to be resolved before other constitutional issues could be agreed. After the first elections, far from being settled, the consolidation process in these nations has frequently seen continued adjustments in electoral regulations, such as in threshold levels, the use of electoral formula, and the size of legislative bodies20. More practical matters of electoral management have also risen in salience on the policy agenda of many national and international agencies, notably the issues of the prevention of electoral fraud, intimidation and corruption, voter registration, polling day administration, and ballot counting, campaign finance regulation, and ‘free and fair’ access to political broadcasting in transitional democracies21. Disentangling the effects of formal rules and cultural modernization is important, not only for the understanding this provides into the behavior of politicians, parties and citizens, but also because this gives insights into the possibilities and limits of electoral engineering.

How we interpret the findings in this analysis, and how they feed into the reform process in particular countries, is heavily contextual. Cultural modernization remains important for political
behavior, but the effect of social development upon the predominant political attitudes and values in any society is gradual, slow and incremental, and therefore this strategy is of limited use as an instrument of short-term reform in the policy process. By contrast, formal rules are amendment, by definition, whether by legislative initiative, bureaucratic decree, or procedural reform. Parliaments, executives and courts can alter the basic electoral rules, with far-reaching consequences. There is no single best ‘bespoke’ electoral system that suits all. Instead, as many have commonly observed, there are trade-off public goods. Majoritarian electoral systems systematically exaggerate the parliamentary lead for the party in first place, to secure a decisive outcome and government accountability, thereby excluding smaller parties from the division of spoils. By contrast, proportional electoral systems lower the hurdles for smaller parties, maximizing their inclusion into the legislature and ultimately into coalition governments. Any recommendations for electoral reform therefore have to relate to perceptions of the type of problems experienced by any political system.

In plural societies characterized by deeply divided social cleavages, for example, rational-choice institutionalism suggests that adopting majoritarian rules should encourage parties to widen their campaign appeals, thereby encouraging cross-cutting cleavages. Alternatively in polities characterized by weak linkages between parties and voters, where party competition is centrist and based around personalities, then this account predicts that the adoption of more proportional arrangements should counteract these tendencies, thereby widening party competition and voter choice.

In countries where legislators currently focus their time and energies on parliamentary debates or committee work, while neglecting constituency service, the theory predicts that electing at least some members via candidate-balloths would be one strategy that could change the priorities of parliamentarians. By contrast, in countries where there is an excessive focus on personalistic pork-barrel politics and clientalism, to the detriment of collective public goods, party discipline, and government effectiveness, then the theory suggests that the adoption of party-balloths could potentially alter parliamentary behavior.

And in most countries around the world women’s voices continue to be underrepresented in parliamentary elites. In this context, the use of positive action policies, and the adoption of more proportional electoral arrangements, could expand opportunities for women in public life, and thereby increase the diversity of representative bodies.

The logic of the arguments about why these effects occur is hardly novel, we admittedly lack direct proof of the strategic behavior of political actors, and often the study has probably merely confirmed what many have long suspected. Nevertheless the reasoning developed in the introductory framework, and the cross-national survey evidence presented in successive chapters, serves to increase our confidence that in general formal rules do have significant consequences for electoral behavior, as many have often believed and argued. The study of electoral systems may appear unduly technical and dry, far removed from the central passions of politics, but by determining the structure of the body politic in representative democracies, much else follows. The consequences of formal electoral rules are therefore important for basic issues of political representation and accountability, for patterns of participation and party competition, and for the effective health of democratic institutions around the world.


7 The alliterative phrase ‘quota queen’ was first used in a Wall Street Journal op-ed (4/30/93) by Clint Bolick but was quickly picked up by other news media, despite the fact that Lani Guinier advocated PR in multimember districts, not racial quotas. For her argument, see Lani Guinier. 1994. *The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy*. New York: Free Press.


14 http://www.umich.edu/~nes/cses/studyres/module2/module2.htm


http://www.afrobarometer.org/abseries.html


21 See, for example, the Ace project at www.idea.int.


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