Few, if any, would deny that political parties are integral to representative democracy as we know it. And yet since the 1960s it has become increasingly commonplace to encounter references in academic literature, journalistic comment, and polemical assertion alike to the 'decline of party', a contention usually predicated on the view that parties are 'failing' in a variety of respects. We have now reviewed in some detail the contemporary state of political parties in advanced industrial democracies with respect to their standing in the electorate, their organizational development and strength, and their functional performance. It is time, therefore, to summarize as far as possible the complexity of these findings and to reflect on their implications for democracy. For the sake of comparability, this summary analysis sticks to the national cases covered by this study, and excludes the case of the European Union (EU).

### Summary of Findings

#### Party Legitimacy

Table 15.1 summarizes the evidence provided by our country experts in respect of party standing in the electorate. Recall that we stated in the Introduction to this book that we did not presume all of the indicators to be simple and unambiguous measures of partisan strength in the electorate: we recognize, for instance, that falling turnout and the erosion of partisan sentiment could be explained by temporary, non-partisan causes like a period of ideological convergence between the major parties in a political system. Nevertheless, it remains possible that each of these measures could, under appropriate conditions, provide valid indicators of the decline or otherwise of party legitimacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>TNV</th>
<th>ENEP</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Partisan Identification</th>
<th>Absolute Membership</th>
<th>Relative Membership</th>
<th>Anti-Party Sentiment</th>
<th>Dealignment + APS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Fluctuates</td>
<td>Up ('74)</td>
<td>Fluctuates</td>
<td>Down ('74)</td>
<td>Down ('64)</td>
<td>Down ('64)</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Fluctuates</td>
<td>Up ('87)</td>
<td>Down ('87)</td>
<td>Down ('84)</td>
<td>Down ('83)</td>
<td>Down ('83)</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Up ('81)</td>
<td>Up ('68)</td>
<td>Down ('91)</td>
<td>Down ('80)</td>
<td>Down ('80)</td>
<td>Down ('80)</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Up ('67)</td>
<td>Up ('71)</td>
<td>Up ('64)</td>
<td>Down ('81)</td>
<td>Down ('70)</td>
<td>Down ('70)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Up ('91)</td>
<td>Up ('88)</td>
<td>Down ('98)</td>
<td>Down ('80)</td>
<td>Down ('91)</td>
<td>Down ('91)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Up ('73)</td>
<td>Up ('73)</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Down ('90)</td>
<td>Down ('90)</td>
<td>Down ('90)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Up ('91)</td>
<td>Fluctuates</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Down ('85)</td>
<td>Down ('90)</td>
<td>Down ('90)</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Down ('86)</td>
<td>Down ('82)</td>
<td>Fluctuates</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Down ('82)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Fluctuates</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Down ('72)</td>
<td>Down ('93)</td>
<td>Down ('93)</td>
<td>Down ('93)</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Up ('84)</td>
<td>Up ('93)</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Down ('54)</td>
<td>Down ('54)</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Up ('84)</td>
<td>Down ('84)</td>
<td>Down ('84)</td>
<td>Down ('72)</td>
<td>Down ('72)</td>
<td>Down ('72)</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>12 Up, 3 Stable or fluctuating, 1 Down</td>
<td>13 Up, 2 Stable or fluctuating, 1 Down</td>
<td>12 Down, 4 Stable or fluctuating, 1 Down</td>
<td>13 Down</td>
<td>14 Down, 1 Up</td>
<td>15 Down, 1 Up</td>
<td>2 Critical, 13 Significant, 1 Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the first year from which significant change is evident. 'Stable' and 'fluctuates' both imply a time-series which lacks a clear trend, but the former implies less volatility over time than the latter.

*Refers to % of strong partisan identifiers; †Refers to trend in West Germany; ‡Refers to French parliamentary rather than presidential elections, since this enables us to gauge change from 1960, the latter only having commenced in 1965; §Refers, where relevant, to US Presidential rather than Congressional elections, since these tend to be regarded as most important by American voters, and show marked variations in ENP, volatility, and turnover. **Party membership** does not exist in the USA as it does in most European polities. This 'M&E' figure is based on survey indicators of those donating to party campaigns and claiming to belong to a 'party group' (see Table 11.7). †This is based on McAllister's contentions in chapter 13 that although National Party membership appears to have gone up since the 1960s, the party operates a very loose system of counting members, including past members who have not renewed subscriptions, note 13.8 provides survey evidence which supports the contention that the M&E ratio has declined in Australia. ‡TNV refers to 'total net volatility'; †APS refers to 'anti-party sentiment'.
certain circumstances, tap the declining 'partyness' of society, and it is therefore important to see if we find evidence of consistent developments across a number of them. This would strongly suggest that party penetration of society had indeed eroded in a multifaceted and enduring fashion.\(^1\)

The first indicator of party legitimacy reported in Table 15.1 is electoral volatility. This is total net volatility (the Pedersen Index) and, although we recognize the capacity of this measure to fluctuate in a manner contingent on the dynamics of party competition, it is immediately apparent that in most of the countries comprising our study (12 out of 16) the level of electoral volatility has indeed increased over time. The only case of declining volatility is that of Spain, which does not surprise us greatly in view of the fact that this is the sole example of a recently transitional democracy in the sample; it is to be expected that the early years of democratization and party system formation will be volatile, but that volatility will reduce thereafter as the party system consolidates into a stable competitive pattern. Indeed, it will become apparent, as we anticipated in the Introduction, that Spain is in many ways an ‘outlier’ in our sample of advanced industrial societies. This strongly suggests that these findings are shaped by a country’s stage of democratic development rather than by the ‘contagious’ influence of neighbouring states, though we will be in a better position to confirm this after the findings of the second volume associated with this project (dealing with parties in transitional democracies) are known. The second measure we have examined is the effective number of parties in a system, a classic indicator of party system fragmentation. As with volatility, although we recognize the possibility that a system may become more fragmented without necessarily implying the weakening legitimacy of parties, it is nevertheless interesting to observe that the effective number of parties has grown in most of our systems (13 out of 16) since 1960: again, Spain is the only contrary case.

Electoral turnout, like electoral volatility and party system fragmentation, is once again a variable which may fluctuate over time for quite contingent reasons; nevertheless, it is striking that electoral participation has dropped in twelve of our sixteen cases, a development that would seem quite damning for parties which historically played a crucial role in mobilizing the masses. For Wattenberg this implies ‘that there is less of a market for the parties’ product and that party systems around the advanced industrialized world have fallen upon hard times’ (Wattenberg 2000: 76). We are not yet entirely convinced that the latter half of this statement is an appropriate interpretation of declining electoral turnout, however. As Wattenberg himself says, research suggests that turnout can vary according to ideological differences between parties; the more convergent parties are, the less the voters are likely to feel it vital that they should vote. In view of this, evidence that ideological differences between left and right have generally diminished (Caul and Gray 2000) should not be overlooked as a possible factor in the apparent decline of electoral turnout around the world. Whether this means that party systems have ‘fallen upon hard times’ is questionable though: at most, we might say that a certain model of party—the mass party—is in decline as some of the old political cleavages and identities associated with its emergence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries erode or diminish, a point made long ago by Kirchheimer (1966). Clearly, we now find ourselves in the midst of a period in which different models of party predominate, but this does not mean that such parties do not remain central to modern democracy in various ways, as we shall see in due course. Neither does it necessarily imply anything pathological for democracy as a whole. Nevertheless, although we cannot yet be sure that it will prove an enduring phenomenon, we would accept that parties currently seem less able to mobilize mass participation than hitherto across the world’s advanced industrial democracies.

The remaining indicators that we review are generally less ambiguous measures of party penetration of society. First, and in many ways most importantly, is subjective partisan attachment. Wherever possible, this is measured by the classic party identification variables pioneered by the American Voter researchers at the University of Michigan in the 1950s (Campbell et al. 1960), though the precise wording varies from country to country. Table 15.1 concentrates on the proportion of voters claiming strong partisan affinities, and we see that this has declined in all thirteen countries for which our contributors have uncovered data. Note too that in eleven cases for which we have information we find a combination of weakening partisan identification and increased volatility, which is not surprising since we would expect voting behaviour to become less stable as people’s partisan loyalties wane. It is hard to question the notion that party membership is a valid way of gauging party penetration of society, which makes the evidence very striking, for this is down almost everywhere too, both in terms of absolute numbers and relative to the size of the electorate. Once again, the only place where party memberships seem to have climbed is Spain.

Finally, our country experts sought out survey-based evidence of anti-party sentiment. There is, of course, no direct consistency across countries of the type of survey instruments reviewed here, but it was important to our research objectives to know if there were significant levels of citizen dissatisfaction with parties in the countries reviewed. In two cases—Italy and Belgium—the level of popular dissatisfaction recorded is certainly more than merely ‘significant’ and has to be understood as part and parcel of a full-blown crisis of the political system. In all other cases bar one, there is evidence of a significant level of dissatisfaction with, or cynicism towards, parties; what is more (although not all of our authors have managed to track this in a systematic fashion because of the unavailability of measuring instruments which are consistent across time), in some cases this dissatisfaction seems to have grown. Once again, the main exception to the rule is Spain; in addition, Vowles reports a slight increase in

---

\(^1\) Note that no attempt is made to summarize ‘electoral hesitancy’ in Table 15.1. While some of the case-studies in this book refer to developments in electoral hesitancy, most do not due to lack of data. It is therefore rather difficult to draw general conclusions about such an indicator.
general trust in parties in the aftermath of the electoral reform of 1996 (see Table 14.3).

In summary, then, while parties in crisis are certainly the exception rather than the rule, it is undeniable that their popular standing has been weakened in most Western democracies. This should not lead us automatically to assume that parties and party politicians are viewed with active hostility by many citizens, though the well-known phenomenon of partisan dealignment has undeniably served to weaken party penetration of society and to leave the average voter more indifferent towards parties than his or her counterpart of forty years ago. It may be important, however, that in fourteen out of the fifteen countries for which we have data, partisan dealignment (as indicated by the erosion of partisan identification) coincides with definite evidence of significant (and usually increasing) levels of anti-party sentiment (see final column of Table 15.1). Circumstantially at least (though this can only be confirmed by detailed individual-level analysis with data which are not always available) this suggests that there may well be significant minorities in most of the countries examined who are more than merely 'dealigned' in the sense of lacking an underlying partisan affinity: they are also actively critical of parties in their countries. This has more profound implications for party legitimacy. Even so, it is interesting to discover that even in such countries, where people are asked whether parties are still important or necessary to the political system (as in Britain and France), they are overwhelmingly inclined to answer 'yes'. On balance, then, we are inclined to believe that the problems parties in advanced industrial democracies now face in terms of popular legitimacy are probably chronic but rarely acute.

**Party organizational strength**

The data on party organizations have often been patchier than for party legitimacy, though great strides have been taken by researchers in rectifying this over the past decade. Even so, our contributors have not always been able to gather long time-series data on party resources going all the way back to the 1960s. The attempt to summarize their findings here therefore draws on the interpretation and narrative of the chapters (and occasionally on secondary sources), as well as on the formal data tables found therein. To give one example, the conclusion that French parties are wealthier now than in the 1960s depends largely on Andrew Knapp's judgement (expressed in Chapter 5) that, despite the traditional secrecy of party funding in the country until the 1990s, it is clear that spending on campaigns and staffing must have grown very significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, a development compounded (and no doubt facilitated) by the advent of state funding in 1988. Table 15.2 attempts to summarize our overall findings in respect of two key types of party resource for which we have data in most countries: income and paid labour. Again, where possible, we attempt to give some indication of the year or the period when changes started to become apparent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Central staffing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Up ('83)</td>
<td>Down ('92)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Down ('92)</td>
<td>Down ('92)</td>
<td>2 Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Up ('72)</td>
<td>Up ('72)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Up ('88)</td>
<td>Data unavailable</td>
<td>1 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Up ('71)</td>
<td>Up ('71)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Up ('70s)</td>
<td>Up ('68)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Up ('66)</td>
<td>Up ('65)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Up ('75)</td>
<td>Up ('30)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Up ('73)</td>
<td>Up ('75)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Up ('67)</td>
<td>Up ('70)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Up ('81)</td>
<td>Up ('75)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Up ('86)</td>
<td>Data unavailable</td>
<td>1 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Up ('60s)</td>
<td>Up ('80s)</td>
<td>2 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Up ('84)</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>1 Up, 1 Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Up ('83)</td>
<td>Data unavailable</td>
<td>1 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Data unavailable</td>
<td>Up ('70)</td>
<td>1 Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>14 Up, 1 Down</td>
<td>11 Up, 1 Down, 1 Stable</td>
<td>25 Up, 2 Down, 1 Stable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Not surprisingly, financial and staffing trends tend to covary. In fourteen of the fifteen cases for which we have evidence, the average incomes of parties have increased in real terms; in eleven out of twelve cases for which we have been able to uncover time-series on central party staffing levels, these seem to have grown. Thus, it should be said that these findings need to be set in the context of other variables for which it is harder to gather systematic data, but which are less positive for parties' organizational strength. Thus, we know that in many places local party organizations are far less healthy than central party headquarters due to factors like the decline of membership activism: this is evident in the UK, Italy, the USA, and NZ. But we have focused especially on central party resources since these are presumed to have become more important with the advent of televisual, capital-intensive and professionalized forms of political communication and campaigning.

For the same reason, the erosion of party-controlled press and publications which has occurred in a number of cases has probably not been as significant as it might initially seem. This is all the more true in view of the qualitative professionalization which many parties have undergone, and which complements the changes in quantitative resourcing (Farrell and Webb 2000; Webb and Fisher 2001). Thus, it is important to bear in mind that quantitative decline in resources need not always imply the qualitative weakening of party organizational capacity.
The changes which we have witnessed in party organizations are reflected in the well-known heuristic interpretations of party development which have been developed over the years, especially the electoral-professional and cartel party models. Whereas the former of these (Panebianco 1988) emphasizes the professionalization of party staffing, the latter (Katz and Mair 1995) is notable for explaining the financial maintenance of parties in terms of the growth of state funding. In addition, each model discusses the general shift in internal power relations within parties, with the ‘parliamentary’ face of organizations, and especially those parts which are intimately associated with the leadership, becoming more dominant. This is part and parcel of a shift away from parties’ mass traditions (particularly symbolic in the case of the left-of-centre parties with their origins as ‘social encapsulators’) in which emphasis was placed upon the importance of large, activist memberships as sources of labour, finance, and communicatory linkage.

In essence, it is clear overall that the erosion of party legitimacy in the electorate does not tend to coincide with a consequent erosion of party organizational strength. On the whole parties have adapted and survived as organizations, remodelling themselves to the needs of an era in which patterns of linkage and communication between parties and social groups have been transformed.

Systemic functionality

In many ways it is intrinsically more difficult to measure parties’ functional performance and it is certainly not a dimension of analysis that is susceptible to easy summary in tabular form. However, a reasonably clear sense of our country experts’ general views does emerge. The summary which follows starts with those functions to which parties remain most central.

Notwithstanding the views of commentators like Dalton and Wattenberg (2000: 276), we feel that the one function which parties continue to dominate, at least in parliamentary democracies, is that of political recruitment. Indeed, in many instances this role has even been extended over the past 30 years as party politicization of local government has occurred in a number of countries. Moreover, political recruitment is not just a matter of finding candidates for national and local elective office, for parties in most countries maintain control over important—sometimes vast—reservoirs of patronage, from the British quangocracy to the Italian system of lotizzazione. Thus, recruitment of candidates for representative and related governmental functions remains virtually inconceivable without political parties. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that even here parties face challenges and difficulties. First, the reputations of parties have sometimes founded because of their complicity in the seeder side of political recruitment. It is not necessarily that citizens would prefer less party-dominated systems of political recruitment, but in a number of countries (most obviously Belgium and Italy) they have become deeply cynical about the corruption which attends some of these patronage networks. Second, in North America parties remain the gatekeepers of political recruitment, but they do not necessarily control the much more candidate-centred systems of politics practised there: in effect, it seems that politicians use the parties as much as the contrary. As Ken Carty makes plain in his chapter, this seems to be almost as true of Canada, a parliamentary system, as it is of the USA, a presidential system. Perhaps this should not surprise us, for it is not only the race for the presidency which is candidate-centred in the US, but congressional elections too (Wattenberg 1991). It should be noted that to a lesser, though not insignificant, extent evidence is accumulating that candidate-centred forms of politics are spreading to other parliamentary systems (Poguntke and Webb, forthcoming), which suggests the possibility of a growing challenge to party as conduits of political recruitment.

In respect of governance our country experts considered two main questions, the first of which was whether party government was challenged by alternative models of bureaucratic power, corporatism, or individual candidate-centred government. On the whole, there seems to be agreement that parties remain central to the provision of national governance almost everywhere, despite the various constraints under which they operate. Bureaucratic power is a perennial feature of the modern state, of course, and has often been at its strongest in the context of weak ‘immobilist’ government, as in postwar Italy or Fourth Republic France. Recent research suggests that formally accountable political executives may be best understood as arbiters between the party organizations from which they emerge and state bureaucracies: for instance, professional bureaucrats are especially conscious of the need for the state to fulfil certain domestic and international functions, and consequently pressurize the government in their role as ‘institutional guardians of these responsibilities’; on the other hand, where these commitments may be in tension with partisan mandates, parliamentary and grass roots followers exert a countervailing pressure on governments to be true to their electoral pledges. The evidence suggests that partisan influences on policy emerge as significant in most countries: paradoxically, they tend to be strongest where party domination of patronage is lowest, in countries such as the UK, Germany, and France, but weaker in ‘partitocratic’ systems like Italy and Belgium (Cotta 2000). In any case, neither this finding nor the evidence of this book suggests that parties are becoming ‘less loyal to their policy commitments’ (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000: 267).

Corporatism represents a significant challenge to party government only in the Netherlands, where functionally decentralized forms of public administration have pushed the parties towards ‘an implementing rather than a decision-making role’, according to Kris Deschouwer. Elsewhere, corporatism has been practised in a way that cements parties’ role in government rather than challenges it; thus, its erosion in Belgium and Scandinavia is a double-edged sword for parties, since it at once renders them more autonomous of actors such as trade unions while reducing control over them. Candidate-centred politics, as we have already noted, is probably becoming more pronounced in a number of countries, though only in presidential systems such as the USA or France does it have the capacity to represent a serious challenge to party in respect of the governing function.
France, some presidential candidates have barely been ‘party’ candidates in any meaningful sense, but have relied on loose and fluid organizations whose chief purpose seems to have been support for their political careers: this appears especially true of centrists like Valery Giscard-d’Estaing or Raymond Barre. Even so, the semi-presidential nature of the French political system ensures that the head of state is not the true head of government (at least in the domain of domestic policy) unless he enjoys the support of a disciplined parliamentary majority: in the context of ‘cohabitation’, it is the prime minister who controls parliament and therefore the domestic governmental agenda. This underlines the continuing relevance of party government even in the French context (Duverger 1980). The USA is the paradigm case of candidate-centred politics, of course, though it is interesting to observe that even here, John Green notes ‘partisan government’ has emerged in sharper relief since the 1960s as the behavioural cohesion of congressional parties has grown. It should be added that a further alternative to party government which has grown in significance is direct democracy: long since practised at state level in the USA, this has become more common around the world, particularly Germany at Land level and Italy at national level. Even so, in none of the countries surveyed in this book does direct legislation account for a particularly large proportion of the laws enacted; it can hardly, therefore, be considered a serious rival to party government even in the USA, this has become more common around the world, particularly Germany at Land level and Italy at national level. Even so, in none of the countries surveyed in this book does direct legislation account for a particularly large proportion of the laws enacted; it can hardly, therefore, be considered a serious rival to party government as yet.

But do parties really ‘make a difference’ to policy outcomes? Deschouwer emphasizes that small states such as the Low Countries and the Scandinavian politics are particularly constrained by the growing presence of the EU. In addition, recent research conducted by others (Klingemann et al. 1994; Caul and Gray 2000) suggests that parties are now less distinct from one another in terms of left-right ideology than was the case in 1960. One would suppose that this principally follows the decline of class politics, though it may have been further exacerbated by the developing internationalization of economic activities in the advanced industrial world. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the constraints which are undoubtedly imposed by European integration, economic globalization, and demographic change, or in some cases by endogenous factors such as lack of legislative party cohesion, most of our country experts agree that party effects can still be readily discerned and count for a lot, a point for which is there is ample secondary corroboration; notwithstanding a degree of left-right convergence in the 1960s and early 1970s, real ideological differences do persist, and overall there is ‘a remarkably high congruence between the themes stressed in party election programs and the subsequent policies enacted by the parties that get into government’ (Klingemann et al. 1994: 268). Indeed, in some countries the capacity for party effects in government may even have grown-most obviously in the case of Italy with the first alternations in power since 1945 occurring during the last decade.

Overall, therefore, our view is that there is no real case for concluding that parties’ centrality to national governmental processes and outcomes has been declining. Indeed, one wonders if this is not a prime instance of an area where Sorauf’s (1964) contention, alluded to in the book’s Introduction, that parties have never really dominated all of the functions usually claimed for them, is most appropriate. That is, under peace-time circumstances in liberal democracies, parties have surely always been hemmed in by a variety of constraints emanating from both their domestic and international environments. In the absence of any compelling systematic evidence that parties’ scope for autonomous action has diminished we would argue that there most probably never was a Golden Age of party government, and that it is therefore a misconception to speak in terms of ‘party decline’ in this respect. Parties have always acted under a variety of constraints, but have nevertheless been central to key policy-making networks. It is doubtful that anything fundamental has altered in these terms, with the partial exception of the growing impact of the EU in a European context.

The articulation and aggregation of interests constitutes a category of representative functions in which we see evidence of yet greater challenges to party. Almost everywhere, contributors confirmed that parties’ capacity to perform the articulation function has been challenged to some extent by the rise of interest group activity and new social movements. In an era in which fewer citizens are linked to parties by virtue of their social group identities, they are more likely to become involved in political activity in respect of particular issues which concern them. However, while conceding this to be the case, we feel it should nevertheless be set in the context of the following points. First, it should not be overlooked that parties do retain some capacity to articulate group interests. Moreover, some of our contributors also pointed out that interest-group activity did not always represent a direct challenge to party, but rather a complement to it: thus, parties and unions have often joined forces to articulate group demands in places like Scandinavia and New Zealand. This is clearly true also in respect of the emergence of Green parties since the 1970s. Finally, individual-level research suggests that the rise of single-issue group activity may even serve as a stimulant rather than an obstacle to partisan identity and involvement (Aarts 1995: 251).

The aggregation function is particularly interesting. Do parties succeed in bundling together the demands of their various support constituencies in a coherent and stable fashion? The answer is broadly ‘yes, but the job has become harder’. In presidential and candidate-centred political systems this function is more likely to be performed by individual politicians rather than parties per se, though John Green notes that even in the USA, parties play an important role in aggregating interests. In parliamentary democracies, our contributors generally report that parties are still central to this function, and indeed, it is not difficult to see why: the aggregating of demands into more or less coherent programmes for governmental action cannot be done by interest groups, social movements or the media—it is a task that simply has to be undertaken by parties competing for elective office, or be left to unelected bureaucrats. This is unlikely to be a role to which many state functionaries, even the most elevated and self-confident among them, are well suited, nor one which they usually seek.
In the case of one country, Italy, Luciano Bardi reports that parties’ aggregative capacity has probably increased in recent years with the emergence of broad coalitions of left and right. It is more common, however, for our authors to report that the aggregation function has become a more challenging and complicated task for parties. In some cases, this is due to the fact that parties seeking to adopt catch-all strategies after 1960 set themselves the task of aggregating a broader array of social group interests than hitherto: this was certainly true of centre-left parties that shifted from simpler class mobilizational strategies. Beyond this, however, the task of aggregation has become intrinsically more complex because of social changes which have generated incompatible demands from different components of the support base, and/or because of the emergence of new issue cleavages. This is most obvious in cases where cleavages that threaten national unity have emerged (as in Canada or Belgium), but it is not an insignificant problem in a number of other advanced industrial societies that have become more socially heterogeneous since the 1960s. In particular, the emergence of new issue agendas relating to gender, ethnicity, regionalism, environmentalism, and European integration has undoubtedly complicated the vital task of aggregation for the major parties.

Even so, parties do remain absolutely central to the aggregation function. A salutary illustration of why this is so is provided by Simon Hix’s chapter on the EU, a case which is an exception to the rule. Without democratically accountable parties aggregating demands at the European level, the EU lacks democratic legitimacy. Interests are articulated at this level principally through interest groups and national governments rather than parties, and aggregation is performed by national governments and the European Commission. Neither of these agents is directly accountable to the electorate at the EU level. Consequently, they have no incentive to expose a programme for EU-wide governmental action to a European electorate, and policy action is often rendered ‘invisible’; citizens have little or no sense of a programme of European government on which they have an opportunity to express their judgement. By contrast, in national political systems the process by which parties aggregate policy demands and generate rival programmes for governmental action is all too clear; citizens may or may not choose to participate directly in this process as party activists, but through the media they can follow it in as much detail as they wish and opportunities for debate and voting on programmes exist both within and between parties (in national elections). That is, democratic parties render publicly visible the process by which a plethora of group demands are aggregated into more or less coherent and manageable policy programmes. That the EU lacks such a mechanism probably goes some way to explaining the widespread perception of ‘democratic deficit’ which afflicts it. To be sure, this is not to suggest that the adoption of a system of parliamentary democracy and party government at the EU level is the only way around this problem, though some critics would clearly advocate such a model (Leonard 1997); a highly candidate-centred system focusing on the direct election of a European ‘president’ is an alternative way of achieving the same effect (as Hix argues in his chapter). But this is not our concern in this book: the point is simply that the EU example serves to illustrate the importance of the aggregation role played by parties in parliamentary democracies.

Parties have clearly been undermined since 1960 by the spread of non-partisan forms of political communication and education, especially television. The media have clearly assumed a greater role in performing the political communication function and also in assisting interest groups to publicize their demands. Few would deny that citizens rely far more on non-partisan forms of media for political information and comment than hitherto. Seldom now, as we have seen, do major parties in Europe continue to run their own press organs, accepting instead the need to compete for favourable coverage in the independent (through admittedly sometimes apartisan) media. This implies that the agenda-setting capacity of political parties has most probably been squeezed, and it certainly means that the most authoritative source of a citizen’s political information is apt to be critical of any and all parties. This is likely to damage the popular status of parties as a whole. An example of the way in which the style of media treatment of party politics affects the public perception of parties can be provided by the coverage of election campaigns. It is apparent from research conducted in the USA and Britain that this focuses increasingly on the conduct of campaigns rather than substantive issues of policy or leadership. For instance, in 1992, 57 per cent of the major terrestrial television networks’ news broadcasts on the British election campaign focused on party strategies and the electoral process; by 1997 this had risen to 64 per cent. The print media’s concentration on the campaign rather than the issues was even greater (Norris et al. 1999: 73, 79). Essentially similar findings hold in respect of the 2001 election (Deacon et al. 2001: 107). There is something doubly dangerous about this for party legitimacy. First, it carries the potential to leave citizens frustrated with politics in general, since the media’s obsession with the process of politics clearly runs contrary to the public’s own preferred agenda of substantive issue concerns (Norris et al. 1999: 127). Second, the intimate and constant exposes of party strategies and news management techniques leave little to the public imagination, and surely serve to foster a growing-and possibly exaggerated-cynicism about parties and politicians. Not that parties are entirely blameless in this: while they can hardly be faulted for losing control of the agenda-setting process, there is evidence that the growing inclination to adopt ‘negative’ styles of political communication has further soured public perceptions of elite-level politics, and may even have served to depress election turnout (Ansolobehere and Iyengar 1995).

The area in which party performance seems most obviously flawed is the fostering of political participation. It is certainly the respect in which parties seem most likely to attract criticism, as noted in the book’s Introduction. Clearly, the evidence we have already reviewed in respect of declining party membership and activism, and (more problematically since it is more likely to prove transitory) falling electoral turnout, points to an obvious weakening of party performance. A variety of reasons explaining membership decline have emerged in the literature and are
neatly summed up by Scarrow (1996) as either ‘supply-side’ (stemming from the social changes which make citizens more reluctant to join parties) or ‘demand-side’ (reflecting the organizational and strategic reasons why party strategists might no longer seek to recruit members) in nature. In general, the supply-side explanations are far more convincing, primarily since there is no good evidence that parties no longer actually want members. The main supply-side factors accounting for the decline of party-oriented participation parallel those on which we have already touched in the discussion of weakening party penetration of society: at the heart of much of this is the decline of the class and denominational cleavages which underpinned social group identities. Of course, parties are reflexive institutions and have often responded to developments such as the decline of membership activism by enhancing the participatory incentives available to their members (for instance, through new rights of candidate or leadership selection, and sometimes through greater involvement in policy making). Thus, the opportunities for political influence through party membership are probably as great as they ever have been, but citizens generally seem less inclined to avail themselves of such opportunities.

To sum up this review of the systemic functions performed by parties, we have seen that parties remain central to democratic political systems, especially in respect of governance and recruitment and, albeit more problematically, aggregation. The challenges they face in respect of articulation, communication, and participation have pushed parties into more marginal, though by no means insignificant, roles within Western political systems. These are all functions in which parties are now more obliged to share the stage with other actors, principally single-issue groups and the mass media. Such changes reflect the nature of advanced industrial society, which is more affluent, leisured, privatist, and cognitively mobilized (through the joint impact of education and the communications revolution) than the industrialized democratic world of 40 years ago. As a consequence, citizens are less closely bound to parties through old social group identities and less dependent on parties for their cognitive cues about public affairs. But what does this mean for democracy more generally? Are parties failing democracy?

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

On the face of it the results of our research suggest a mixed picture in terms of parties’ democratic performance: some things they do well, some less well, some things they are central to, others they are more marginal to. But it is possible to be clearer than this about the implications of our findings for democracy. For ‘democracy’ is not a monolith but a contested concept, subject to rival interpretations, and conclusions about parties are inevitably shaped by normative and theoretical perspectives on democracy.

Taking a cue from Ware (1987) we can identify three core elements to democracy. These receive differing emphases in the various treatments of the subject, and the different weight accorded to each element inevitably affects perceptions of party performance. Ware refers to the first democratic element as interest optimization. For a political system to be democratic, he suggests (Ware 1987: 8), ‘rules or procedures employed must bring about results that optimally promote or defend the interests of the largest number of people in the relevant arena’. From this perspective, there have broadly been three approaches to the role of parties in fostering democracy, all of them focussing implicitly on the articulation and aggregation of interests. None of them are likely to take a very positive view of party performance, given what we have discovered in this book.

First, there are ‘market liberals’ who are hostile to parties on the normative grounds that political agencies should interfere with market processes as little as possible. Strictly interpreted, this view is not widespread and therefore cannot be regarded as a serious threat to party legitimacy in advanced industrial democracies. At the risk of appearing complacent, we would suggest it can be dismissed as essentially irrelevant to an understanding of the status and functioning of contemporary political parties. Second, there are pluralists (Truman 1951; Dahl 1961) who are not intrinsically hostile to parties as agencies of representative democracy, but who see them as largely secondary to interest groups. As we have seen, there is a good deal of evidence which points to the burgeoning role of interest groups as articulators of demands, a development seemingly consistent with the pluralist perspective. Yet our evidence suggests that the classical pluralist approach tends to under-emphasize the continuing importance of parties to the tasks of aggregation and governance. Indeed, pluralists themselves have observed and noted the problems caused by an explosion of interest articulation which is unmatched by commensurate rise in a political system’s aggregative capacity (Crozier et al. 1975), though this is not to say that they are convinced that parties are capable of fulfilling that need. Aggregation is a function which features highly in the concerns of the third group of ‘interest optimizers’, those who like Arrow (1951) argue that the electoral process is destined to be flawed in so far as it tends to produce voting ‘paradoxes’ and ‘cycles’. This leads to the conclusion that it is virtually impossible to satisfy people’s wants in an optimal way, unless policy is made in homogeneous and consensual communities (which advanced industrial societies are not), or in pure two-party contexts: the latter scenario simplifies programmatic choice to a binary decision-making process and thereby avoids the well-known problem of ‘cyclical majorities’, which arises when three or more alternatives are available. Strictly speaking, this is a requirement which relates to party systems rather than to parties as such, but in any case it is easy to observe that all contemporary advanced industrial democracies fail such a test: even the USA, the nearest thing to pure two-partism, does not always guarantee voters a straightforward choice between two candidates, even for presidential office. Thus, from the perspective of interest optimization, parties may generally be regarded as either
particular sense of 'interest aggregation', based on the pursuit of shared popular healthy democracy. It can be seen that the civic orientationist has in mind a very Rousseauean vein, that parties are inimical since they tend to articulate and foster however.

ary political parties are unlikely to fare well by the civic democrat's standards, its institutions. Implicitly, too, the aggregation of demands into a general will which expresses the public interest is important to this approach. Contemporary political parties are unlikely to fare well by the civic democrat's standards, however.

On normative grounds radical civic orientationists have usually argued, in Rousseauean vein, that parties are inimical since they tend to articulate and foster narrow group interests to the detriment of the wider community: this is very different to the view of pluralists, who regard pursuit of groups interests as central to healthy democracy. It can be seen that the civic orientationist has in mind a very particular sense of 'interest aggregation', based on the pursuit of shared popular conceptions of the common good, and is most unlikely to see modern parties as satisfying requirements. Of course, this is equally true of parties at any point in time during the past century, so it should be noted that one could hardly speak in terms of 'party decline' when adopting such an approach. Moreover, insofar as parties do, or ever did, play a role in political education, there would be an obvious danger that this would consist largely of indoctrinating narrowly defined group interests. This is significant because it seems likely from some of the evidence emerging from this book and elsewhere that the educative impact of parties has generally shrunk with the decline of the mass party. As Duverger implied, political education was a classic function of the mass party, which he likened to a school with pupils (Duverger 1954: 63). But, especially in the case of class-left parties, 'political education' would have been conceived largely in terms of ideologies related to group interests. Furthermore, although it is possible to point to the increased participatory rights which many parties have offered their members, it is unlikely this would be sufficient to impress civic democrats; for them, parties can only offer an impoverished notion of participation, even if evidence of membership and turnout decline is disregarded. From the civic visionary's perspective, then, political parties are at best irrelevant, at worst downright pathological. The only way around this is to adopt a far less demanding notion of 'civic orientation', according to which any kind of community consciousness, including group identity based on region, class, religion, or ethnicity, qualifies. This hardly helps, however, given the demise of the mass party. In short, it is hard to rate party performance highly from a civic orientationist perspective.

A similarly damning conclusion about parties is likely to emerge for any writer giving primary emphasis to the second element of democracy, which Ware refers to as the civic orientation. From this perspective, democracy is not fully realized until citizens express their shared interests as members of the same community, a theme which goes back at least as far as Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Participation in the democratic process is vital to the political education of citizens if they are to develop this civic orientation. Advocates have therefore often placed political participation and education high on their criteria for evaluating democracy and its institutions. Implicitly, too, the aggregation of demands into a general will which expresses the public interest is important to this approach. Contemporary political parties are unlikely to fare well by the civic democrat's standards, however.

On normative grounds radical civic orientationists have usually argued, in Rousseauean vein, that parties are inimical since they tend to articulate and foster narrow group interests to the detriment of the wider community: this is very different to the view of pluralists, who regard pursuit of groups interests as central to healthy democracy. It can be seen that the civic orientationist has in mind a very particular sense of 'interest aggregation', based on the pursuit of shared popular conceptions of the common good, and is most unlikely to see modern parties as satisfying requirements. Of course, this is equally true of parties at any point in time during the past century, so it should be noted that one could hardly speak in terms of 'party decline' when adopting such an approach. Moreover, insofar as parties do, or ever did, play a role in political education, there would be an obvious danger that this would consist largely of indoctrinating narrowly defined group interests. This is significant because it seems likely from some of the evidence emerging from this book and elsewhere that the educative impact of parties has generally shrunk with the decline of the mass party. As Duverger implied, political education was a classic function of the mass party, which he likened to a school with pupils (Duverger 1954: 63). But, especially in the case of class-left parties, 'political education' would have been conceived largely in terms of ideologies related to group interests. Furthermore, although it is possible to point to the increased participatory rights which many parties have offered their members, it is unlikely this would be sufficient to impress civic democrats; for them, parties can only offer an impoverished notion of participation, even if evidence of membership and turnout decline is disregarded. From the civic visionary's perspective, then, political parties are at best irrelevant, at worst downright pathological. The only way around this is to adopt a far less demanding notion of 'civic orientation', according to which any kind of community consciousness, including group identity based on region, class, religion, or ethnicity, qualifies. This hardly helps, however, given the demise of the mass party. In short, it is hard to rate party performance highly from a civic orientationist perspective.

A similarly damning conclusion about parties is likely to emerge for any writer giving primary emphasis to the second element of democracy, which Ware refers to as the civic orientation. From this perspective, democracy is not fully realized until citizens express their shared interests as members of the same community, a theme which goes back at least as far as Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Participation in the democratic process is vital to the political education of citizens if they are to develop this civic orientation. Advocates have therefore often placed political participation and education high on their criteria for evaluating democracy and its institutions. Implicitly, too, the aggregation of demands into a general will which expresses the public interest is important to this approach. Contemporary political parties are unlikely to fare well by the civic democrat's standards, however.

On normative grounds radical civic orientationists have usually argued, in Rousseauean vein, that parties are inimical since they tend to articulate and foster narrow group interests to the detriment of the wider community: this is very different to the view of pluralists, who regard pursuit of groups interests as central to healthy democracy. It can be seen that the civic orientationist has in mind a very particular sense of 'interest aggregation', based on the pursuit of shared popular conceptions of the common good, and is most unlikely to see modern parties as satisfying requirements. Of course, this is equally true of parties at any point in time during the past century, so it should be noted that one could hardly speak in terms of 'party decline' when adopting such an approach. Moreover, insofar as parties do, or ever did, play a role in political education, there would be an obvious danger that this would consist largely of indoctrinating narrowly defined group interests. This is significant because it seems likely from some of the evidence emerging from this book and elsewhere that the educative impact of parties has generally shrunk with the decline of the mass party. As Duverger implied, political education was a classic function of the mass party, which he likened to a school with pupils (Duverger 1954: 63). But, especially in the case of class-left parties, 'political education' would have been conceived largely in terms of ideologies related to group interests. Furthermore, although it is possible to point to the increased participatory rights which many parties have offered their members, it is unlikely this would be sufficient to impress civic democrats; for them, parties can only offer an impoverished notion of participation, even if evidence of membership and turnout decline is disregarded. From the civic visionary's perspective, then, political parties are at best irrelevant, at worst downright pathological. The only way around this is to adopt a far less demanding notion of 'civic orientation', according to which any kind of community consciousness, including group identity based on region, class, religion, or ethnicity, qualifies. This hardly helps, however, given the demise of the mass party. In short, it is hard to rate party performance highly from a civic orientationist perspective.

On normative grounds radical civic orientationists have usually argued, in Rousseauean vein, that parties are inimical since they tend to articulate and foster narrow group interests to the detriment of the wider community: this is very different to the view of pluralists, who regard pursuit of groups interests as central to healthy democracy. It can be seen that the civic orientationist has in mind a very particular sense of 'interest aggregation', based on the pursuit of shared popular conceptions of the common good, and is most unlikely to see modern parties as satisfying requirements. Of course, this is equally true of parties at any point in time during the past century, so it should be noted that one could hardly speak in terms of 'party decline' when adopting such an approach. Moreover, insofar as parties do, or ever did, play a role in political education, there would be an obvious danger that this would consist largely of indoctrinating narrowly defined group interests. This is significant because it seems likely from some of the evidence emerging from this book and elsewhere that the educative impact of parties has generally shrunk with the decline of the mass party. As Duverger implied, political education was a classic function of the mass party, which he likened to a school with pupils (Duverger 1954: 63). But, especially in the case of class-left parties, 'political education' would have been conceived largely in terms of ideologies related to group interests. Furthermore, although it is possible to point to the increased participatory rights which many parties have offered their members, it is unlikely this would be sufficient to impress civic democrats; for them, parties can only offer an impoverished notion of participation, even if evidence of membership and turnout decline is disregarded. From the civic visionary's perspective, then, political parties are at best irrelevant, at worst downright pathological. The only way around this is to adopt a far less demanding notion of 'civic orientation', according to which any kind of community consciousness, including group identity based on region, class, religion, or ethnicity, qualifies. This hardly helps, however, given the demise of the mass party. In short, it is hard to rate party performance highly from a civic orientationist perspective.
hitherto, given that the first alternations in power between left and right since 1945 have occurred in the past few years.

A further requirement of the popular control perspective is internally democratic parties: if parties are to be mechanisms of popular control, then it follows logically that they should not be overly elitist organizations. This is interesting, for the gradual replacement of mass parties by electoralist organizations (be they catch-all, electoral-professional, or cartel in nature) seems to imply the possibility that parties have become more top-down over time. Yet it is far from certain that this is in fact the case: we have already noted how parties have often responded to the decline of membership by offering new participatory rights in internal decision-making processes. Three of the contributors to this volume have investigated this issue systematically in previous research and concluded that ‘grass-roots party members (and even non-member supporters sometimes) commonly play a significant role in selecting legislative candidates and in legitimizing election programmes, though party elites generally retain vetoes over candidate selection and enjoy considerable autonomy in shaping party policy’ (Scarrow et al. 2000: 149).

The final requirement of popular control is that parties should have sufficient control of the state in order to implement their policies once in power. This takes us back to our findings on governance and recruitment, which are overwhelmingly reassuring in this respect: if there is one function which parties dominate it is recruitment, and we have noted relatively little evidence that bureaucratic power or corporatism represent serious impediments to partisan influence on government, though it is true that they cannot do so as significant potential constraints. Broadly speaking, though, we have good grounds for being confident that party penetration of the state is broadly sufficient to ensure the implementation of party programmes.

Overall, the evidence of this book in relation to the functions of governance, recruitment, and aggregation is sufficient to convince us that parties remain central to the ways in which contemporary advanced industrial democracies assure a meaningful degree of popular choice and control in public affairs. It is surely from this perspective on democratic theory, then, that observers are least likely to regard parties as failing, though it is clear that these organizations have evident shortcomings when it comes to the more demanding criteria of optimizing interests and instilling civic orientations among citizens.

**CONCLUSION: PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC REFORM**

Many observers will view parties—implicitly at least—as important mechanisms of democratic choice and control. This is not to suggest, however, that everything is rosy in the garden of party politics. Given the erosion of cleavage politics and the consequent weakening of social group identities, parties maintain more of an ‘arms-length’ relationship with societies than in the heyday of the mass party. Moreover, the high expectations that many citizens have of the state in respect of the scope of problem-resolution, and the hyper-critical nature of political coverage by the mass media in many countries, both make it unlikely that we will witness a strong revival in partisan orientations among voters. This does not mean that parties can afford to be complacent about the way in which citizens regard them, however, and they should clearly be prepared to make reforms where these might address important problems relating to their democratic functioning and popular legitimacy. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that parties are already generally sensitive to the need to monitor their functioning and legitimacy and do not shy away from reform where they believe it to be necessary. The scope for practical reform is necessarily limited, however: in particular, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to conceive of reforms that would achieve the ideals of the civic visionary, or which would get around the well-known problems of interest optimization.

However, from the popular control perspective, reform is possible and has been attempted, evidence of which is apparent in a number of ways. For instance, there are now few advanced industrial countries still lacking detailed frameworks of legal regulation for party politics. One of the most recent to develop such a framework was the UK (Webb 2001). This is increasingly important given the likelihood that popular distrust of parties stems in part from the widespread perception that they are self-interested, unduly privileged, and inclined to corruption. Nothing is more likely to generate a sense of cynicism about party elites than the feeling that politicians are narrowly utilitarian and prepared to exploit their positions for partisan or personal advantage. This point incorporates, but takes us well beyond, the domain of the patronage scandals associated with political recruitment. Indeed, it is not hard to think of a wide variety of examples over the past few years; national parties in Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, and Britain, not to mention a host of less celebrated local party elites in these and other countries, have all been tainted. Moreover, it is possible that party legitimacy has been eroded through perceptions of self-interest even when parties have not been involved in any illegitimate activity. This is a point made well by Katz and Mair (1995) in respect of their concept of the ‘cartel party’, which holds that leading parties, whether currently in government or not, effectively collude to establish institutional rules of the game favouring their dominant position within the system. In particular, they exploit the resources available from the state (such as financial subventions or subsidies in kind) in order to ensure their organizational survival and even growth. This leaves us with a paradox which may exacerbate the problems of waning popular legitimacy:

On the ground, and in terms of their representative role, parties appear to be less relevant and to be losing some of their key functions. In public office, on the other hand, and in terms of their linkage to the state, they appear to be more privileged than ever. (Mair 1995: 54)
This may indeed be a risk, but given the organizational need which parties have for state resources in order to function, it is most unlikely that such support will be withdrawn or substantially reduced (except in critical cases, such as Italy, where it becomes apparent that parties have blatantly exploited the state in a corrupt and self-serving fashion). In any case, there is an alternative risk to non-support by the state, which may be even more corrosive of party legitimacy: this is the danger of parties' over-dependence on particular interests for funding, a situation which can easily breed (perceptions of) 'sleazy' links between parties and certain social actors. In any case, it may be argued that state support for parties is justified in order to prevent free-riding by citizens who do not otherwise contribute to party politics, but who benefit just the same from the operation of a party system without which democracy could not function. Realistically then, there is unlikely to be any retreat from the principle of state support for political parties in democratic societies. On the other hand, it is important to craft the form that state support takes with certain considerations in mind. In particular, it is essential that parties should never be allowed to become so 'fat' on state-derived income that they lack incentives to recruit active members and raise additional income through them; thus, it is important for systems of state funding to reward parties which recruit successfully. Moreover, the price to be paid for such support is a degree of state intervention to regulate parties' internal affairs; for instance, it is particularly important to render transparent the sources of party income. Such regulation is not a panacea which will prevent all irregular or corrupt behaviour by parties, but it is surely a sine qua non of public confidence in them. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that regulatory frameworks are increasingly the norm in advanced industrial societies.

A further area in which reform should be considered is that of participatory linkage. Although mass participation in politics does not carry quite the same weight from the perspective of popular control that it does from that of civic orientation, it is by no means unimportant: as we have seen, if parties are to be mechanisms of popular control, they should not be too elitist and should enact democratically formulated party policies when placed in office by the electorate. There is no doubt that governing parties will be buffeted by events and sometimes constrained by the countervailing pressures imposed by state bureaucracies, but there should at least be a broad correspondence between the programmes that a party formulates and those which it enacts in office. Hence the need for a degree of intra-party democracy. As we have seen, many parties have already trodden this path, and have sought to introduce participatory incentives for members over the past twenty years, not necessarily because they were motivated by the sheer desire to enhance popular control, but sometimes in direct response to concerns about their waning legitimacy. Thus, the main German parties have all reacted to evidence of dealignment, 'parteienverbissenheit' and a growing popular preference for 'unconventional' forms of political behaviour, by creating more opportunities for intra-party democracy and citizen involvement in government decision-making (Scarrow 1997, 1999).

An important point to emphasize here is that the scope of such reforms need not be and should not be restricted to parties themselves; participatory linkage and popular control can primarily be enhanced by reforms whose scope falls outside the domain of parties in the strictest sense, though such reforms are very likely to impact on parties. The German reforms illustrate this to some extent since they incorporate the direct election of mayors and the introduction of citizen-initiated ballot propositions and referenda. Indeed, it is possible to be more ambitious still in prescribing ways of enhancing citizen participation, for instance through the introduction of devices such as 'voter juries' (Fishkin 1991; Adonis and Mulgan 1994), and the possibilities of much greater citizen feedback generated by the advance of communications technology. But it is interesting to note that, while proponents of direct democracy have often been bold and imaginative in their visions, few have previously emphasized the continuing relevance that parties would have, even under such a scenario. Budge, however, has argued persuasively that the introduction of even radically more participatory models of democracy would remain absolutely contingent on precisely the sorts of linkage which parties have traditionally supplied in representative democracies. For him, 'any feasible form of direct democracy would also be run by parties'. This is largely so because of the complexity of policy detail with which citizens would be confronted across a broad range of issues; in the face of this, ordinary voters-no less than legislators in contemporary parliaments—would require parties to organize and lead debates. Thus:

. . . it is simply unrealistic to think that democracy could function without groupings resembling political parties . . . Mediating institutions, above all parties, facilitate rather than impede policy decisions and must be recognized as doing that under democracy in whatever form it occurs. (Budge 1996: 175)

If Budge is right then the introduction or extension of direct democracy across advanced industrial democracies could be expected to enhance responsiveness by party governments to electorates that they would be obliged to consult more regularly on the impact of specific policies. Note too that the role they would play in organizing and leading debate (and in responding to the outcomes of such debate) implies that parties could be central to the revival of participatory linkage without necessarily even recruiting more members. The essential message is that parties would remain at the hub of an enhanced mechanism of participatory linkage, and that such a mechanism holds out the prospect of revived party legitimacy given the redefined sense of purpose they could achieve under it. If achieved, such a vision may well appeal to those who view democracy in terms of the civic orientation it encourages in citizens as well as to those who see it more straightforwardly in terms of popular control.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to get carried away with the prospects or potential of reform. Its impact is likely to be limited for a number of reasons. First, it
should be borne in mind that parties already have often responded to their changing social and political environments by reforming themselves and the legal contexts in which they operate; yet as we have seen, it has rendered them immune neither to corrupt activity nor to a degree of popular disenchantment. Second, it should also be remembered that popular frustration with parties is likely to stem in part from the perception that they are ineffective in government. We know that in fact parties do make a significant difference to governing outputs in most systems, but they nevertheless face real constraints, especially in smaller countries which are highly susceptible to the workings of the international economy and transnational actors like the EU. This poses particular problems of accountable party government for such countries for which it is hard to see a way around. Third, the impact of any reforms which are designed to enhance participatory linkages between state and citizen will almost inevitably be limited by the degree of socio-economic equality within the societies concerned. The detail of this argument is too complex to enter into here, but it has been well rehearsed and established elsewhere. As Held (1996: 322) says:

A democratic state and civil society are incompatible with powerful sets of social relations and organizations which can, by virtue of the very basis of their operations, systematically distort democratic outcomes. At issue here is, among other things, the curtailment of the citizen will almost inevitably be limited by the degree of socio-economic equality within the societies concerned. The detail of this argument is too complex to enter into here, but it has been well rehearsed and established elsewhere. As Held (1996: 322) says:

The political and economic risks attached to any concerted attempt by a government to take on such social and economic interests present formidable obstacles. Indeed, the continuing presence of social and economic inequality may help to explain why levels of political participation and civic orientation are not higher in places where direct democracy is already well institutionalized, such as the USA.

So we conclude this book on a cautious but upbeat note. Parties are perhaps not all they might be and neither are the societies in which they operate. Nor is it realistic to suppose that either will be transformed radically in the foreseeable future. This notwithstanding, however, parties continue to perform vital tasks with a relatively high degree of effectiveness and are central mechanisms of popular choice and control. If they did not exist in the advanced industrial democratic world, somebody would undoubtedly have to invent them.

REFERENCES


Index

American Political Science Association (APS A) (1950) 1
American-style primary election 374
Andeweg, R. B. 159, 171
anti-cartel parties 57
anti-communism 139
anti-establishment parties 206
anti-fascist organizations 122, 130
anti-party candidates 193
norms 2
organizations 194
sentiment 7, 18-19, 57, 115, 193-4, 284, 352, 367
tradition in the United States 320
anti-Socialist tabloid campaigns 235
anti-superdump protest groups 221
anti-system parties 49, 161
Arrow, K. J. 451
articulation and aggregation of interests 447
‘artificial majorities’ 333
Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) 409
Attina, F. 280
Auckland 420
Australia 5, 379-80, 405
federal structure 403
preferential vote electoral system 399
Australian parties 379-80, 382, 393, 402, 405
political behaviour 380, 384
voters 387, 398
‘Australian Democrats’ membership 389
Australian Education Council 404
Australian Election Study 393
Australian Election Survey data 395
Austria 286, 384
Aznar, Jose Maria 249
baby-boomers 139
Bagshott, Walter 401
Balearic Islands 259
Bank of Italy 64
Bardi, L. 47, 448
Bartolini, S. 412