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## Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies

*Steven B. Wolinetz*

Imagine two different kinds of political party. One is a skeletal organization, intermittently active. Constituency associations exist throughout the country, but most of the time the party outside of Parliament is barely visible. However, this changes dramatically when an election has been called. Then, the party turns into a well-oiled machine, distributing literature, organizing rallies, and getting voters to the polls on election day. This flurry of activity ceases as soon as the last ballot has been counted. The only other time that the party organization is visible is when nominations or the party leadership are at stake. Candidate organizations recruit members to elect delegates to nominating meetings and for a few weeks the party is more like an arena for competition than a cohesive machine. But new members drop away almost as soon as they are enlisted and, except for a small office staff, the party outside of Parliament returns to its dormant state.

The second party operates at several different levels, and possesses not only a national office, but regional and local organizations. Local sections hold regular meetings. There is a detailed party programme, drafted by the central office and parliamentary caucus staff, debated vociferously by party members and adopted by a party congress. The party outside Parliament is active not only during election campaigns but also in between. However, the party organizes only a small percentage of its voters as members and many of these rarely attend meetings. Election campaigns are run by a small team, in and around the leader and the central office, and most members rarely do more than attend an occasional rally or display a party poster in their front windows.

The first party corresponds to one of the two large Canadian national parties (Liberals, and in better times, Progressive Conservatives) and would typically be termed a *cadre party*, or perhaps an *elite-centred party*. The second is modelled on the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) but also resembles the Christian Democrats (CDA) or Liberals (VVD). The organizational form is that of a *mass party* but,

as Ruud Koole (1992, 1994) has pointed out, the level of activity is reminiscent of a *cadre party*.

The existence of these two different kinds of parties, as well as a plethora of others, points to a problem in the parties literature: parties exist in a variety of different forms, but we have few effective ways of classifying them. Some of the schema which we use to classify political parties are nearly a half-century old. Age is not necessarily a disadvantage (it should facilitate comparison), but the claim that substantial changes have occurred in the ways in which parties are organized or approach voters has been a persistent theme in the literature. Moreover, new parties have been established in some previously frozen party systems. Some, such as Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia, built on the basis of a ownership of TV networks, their advertising arm, and a successful soccer team, are very different from the parties which they seek to replace. Categories devised to characterize parties in one time or place may not be suitable to differentiate them in another.

Of course, these schemata are not our only tools. Political scientists have devised new types to cope with change. Kirchheimer's (1966) *catch-all party* entered our vocabulary in the 1960s. More recently, Panebianco (1988) has proposed the *electoral professional party*, a variant more precisely defined in organizational terms, Poguntke (1987, 1993) the *new politics party*, Katz and Mair (1995) the *cartel party*, and more recently, Hopkin and Paolucci (1999), the *business firm party*. However, this practice has advantages and disadvantages. A profusion of categories can confuse as well as clarify. Even if proponents carefully specify their categories, definitions are often stretched as others use them. The catch-all party has become a generic description of present-day parties, but its characteristics are not always well-defined. Even if they were, there is another problem: these types focus primarily on Western Europe. But transitions to democracy have greatly increased the number of parties which might be included in comparative studies. Categories devised primarily to compare Western European parties most of which developed and continue to operate in parliamentary systems may not be suitable for comparing parties in mixed parliamentary-presidential systems or presidential systems.

There are good reasons for re-examining existing classifications and seeing if others can be developed. However, reworking categories is a complex process, requiring further research and interaction between theory and data. This is a preliminary effort, focusing primarily on parties in established liberal democracies. The first half of this chapter examines the adequacy of existing categories in light of the literature. The second considers ways in which contemporary parties might be compared.

### CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN THE COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

That students of political parties have problems classifying them may seem surprising. The comparative study of political parties is nearly one hundred years old. We know a good deal about a wide range of political parties, and have little trouble locating many on left-right spectra. There are also well-known classifications, such as Duverger's (1954) distinction between *cadre* and *mass* political parties, or Neumann's (1956) distinction between *parties of individual representation* and *parties of democratic (mass) integration*. However, students of political parties have typically worked as much *around* as *with* classificatory schemes, employing them where they are useful, and ignoring or omitting them when they are not. This has been possible both because of the ways in which the comparative literature has developed and the ways in which research has proceeded. Several facets of this are worth exploring.

First, the comparative study of political parties has been primarily a West European venture in which the other parties which researchers knew most about those in the United States—were sufficiently different for them to be walled off into a separate literature. Only occasional efforts have been made to include Canadian, Australian, or New Zealand parties in the discussion (see, for example, Epstein 1967) or to engage in broader comparison (see, for instance, Gunther and Diamond 2001). Attempts such as Janda (1980) to collect or analyse data on parties in very different settings are unusual. The Western European emphasis has had a number of consequences. One is that political scientists could work within a well-defined subset of relatively comparable cases. Another is that specialists did not have to preoccupy themselves with alternate classifications or dimensions on which parties might be arrayed: most Western European parties could be located on left-right spectra or linked to well-known ideological families to which they belonged.

Second, until recently, more attention has been paid to party systems than parties, their organization, or the ways in which they should be classified. To be sure, studies of individual parties often considered internal politics and organization, but the systematic study of party organization is a relatively recent phenomenon. Parties were often treated as single actors in which the complexities of party structure and internal party life played no role (Daalder 1983). It is only recently that political scientists have begun to pay more attention to parties as organizations. Major studies are under way, and we are learning more about how parties are organized (see Katz and Mair 1992a, 1994), as well as ways in which different facets of party organization might be distinguished (Katz and Mair 1993). However, these have not yet produced any new classification of parties.

Third, students of parties have shown a persistent fascination with change. This is reflected in older debates on whether an end of ideology had occurred,

the galvanizing effects which Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis had, arguments about the decline of political parties (see Daalder 1992, and Chapter 2 above), concern about the possible thawing of frozen party alignments, and arguments about the evolution of party organization. The debate between Epstein (1967) and Duverger (1954) on the evolution of party organization whether the mass party ('contagion from the left') was the wave of the future, as Duverger had asserted, or whether more capital-intensive approaches ('contagion from the right') would be the norm is a notable example. Fascination with change has skewed analytical capacities: we are better equipped to characterize the ways in which certain parties have changed or evolved than to compare differences and similarities among parties existing coterminously. Nor have parties across the spectrum been systematically studied. We typically pay more attention to parties of the left than parties of the right. However, any deficiencies which this might cause are mitigated by the assumption that parties are converging: it is frequently presumed that parties competing in the same systems, responding to the same financial and electoral regimes and the same technological imperatives, are becoming more and more alike.

Let us examine the classifications we use in light of these comments. Aside from types, such as Poguntke's (1993) new politics party, mooted to characterize particular subsets of parties, there are two distinct clusters in the literature. One is a set of distinctions descended from Duverger's *Political Parties*, the other a typology building on Neumann (1956) in the conclusion of an edited volume on *Modern Political Parties*. The first builds on Duverger's distinction between cadre and mass parties, sometimes expressed as elite-centred versus mass membership parties (Ware 1987a). The second extends Neumann's original distinction between parties of individual representation and parties of democratic integration into a broader longitudinal typology: here, the first addition was Kirchheimer's (1966) claim that parties of mass integration were transforming themselves into catch-all parties. The most recent renovation has been from Katz and Mair (1995). Reconstructing the typology based on parties' relationship with the state, they posit transition from elite parties (Duverger's cadre party, Neumann's party of individual representation) to mass parties, catch-all parties, and a new type, cartel parties, so dependent on state subsidies that they have become part of the state.

Duverger and Neumann treated the same parties in different ways. Duverger (1954) hoped to prepare the way for an eventual general theory of political parties by examining and synthesizing what was known about the parties of his time; he differentiated among cadre, mass, communist (cell) and fascist (militia) parties, each with their own distinctive organizational structure, class basis, and needs. In contrast, Neumann (1956) distinguished among parties of individual representation, parties of democratic integration, and parties of total integration. Because they take account of the same liberal

democratic and anti-democratic parties existing in pre- and post-war Europe, the two schema are similar. The principal difference is that Neumann emphasizes parties' functions while Duverger concentrates on their organizational features and tries to relate differences in party organization to party origins, class bases, and organizational needs. Nevertheless, the two schema have suffered different fates: Duverger's scheme has been reduced to two categories (the cell and militia types are no longer relevant), detached from its original theoretical underpinning, collapsed to one or two dimensions (membership, organizational articulation, and complexity), and survives largely as a descriptive categorization. In contrast, Neumann's distinction, stripped of its totalitarian category, has provided the basis for the extended longitudinal typology described above.

### CADRE VERSUS MASS PARTIES

The distinction between cadre and mass parties derives from Duverger's *Political Parties* (1954), and before that from Max Weber's comments on the growing professionalization of party politics. Cadre parties are loosely structured, elite-centred, parties with minimal organization outside of the legislature, while mass parties have highly developed organizations which aspire to enlist a large percentage of their voters as party members. Rooted in the literature, the distinction is well understood and readily measurable by examining the ratio of party members to voters and comparing the extent and activity of extra-parliamentary organization.

Duverger's distinction was originally part of a broader theory about party origins, organizational forms, the class bases of parties, and organizational needs, parts of which have now been discarded. The loose informal organization of the cadre party, based on closed caucuses of prominent individuals, was sufficient to raise funds, mobilize resources, and ensure the representation of the middle and upper classes. In contrast, members of the working class, outside the political system, had to organize intensively in order to raise funds and mobilize their principal resource, numbers. Duverger regarded the mass party (based on sections and branches) as a more modern or superior form of organization to loosely organized cadre parties (based on closed caucuses of locally prominent individuals), and argued that mass parties would predominate over archaic cadre parties. These suppositions, however, are now more widely accepted as a theory of how Western European parties developed than as a statement of their present situation.

Duverger's distinction survives, detached from its original theoretical origins. We typically use the term cadre party to describe both loosely organized parties and parties without large memberships. Whether this provides a measure sufficiently refined to distinguish among contemporary political parties is

open to question. The cadre parties which Duverger studied were clearly different from mass parties on the left. The latter were intensely organized and well-articulated structures, while the former barely existed outside the caucus. Parties today are rarely as loosely organized or poorly articulated as the Third and Fourth Republic parties which served as Duverger's prototype for the cadre party. Parties of the right and centre in France, for example, have been supplanted by the better organized Gaullists, now the Rally for the Republic (RPR), and the Union of Democrats for France (UDF), an umbrella organization of several smaller clubs. The component parties of the latter, such as the Parti Republicain, fit the cadre type, but the RPR poses greater difficulties: the RPR organizes a large membership, but without the participation which we would normally expect in a mass party (Criddle 1987). As such, it is neither a cadre party nor a mass party. Nor is the Parti Socialiste (PS) a typical mass party. When it was organized in 1971, the PS employed a factional structure to incorporate divergent clubs and tendencies on the non-communist left. Factions have persisted, though not necessarily with the active participation which characterized the 1970s (Sferza, Chapter 7 below). Moreover, the proportion of voters who were members has never been high.

French parties are not the only source of difficulty. Recent research has shown that most political parties, for legal or other reasons, have some kind of formal organization and a membership base, large or small. If many former cadre parties have well-defined organizational structures, and former mass parties have difficulty in enrolling as large a proportion of their supporters as members as they once did (Katz and Mair 1992a), then the distinction between cadre and mass parties becomes blurred. Koole (1992, 1994) has argued that Dutch political parties should be considered *modern cadre parties* because the percentage of their supporters whom they enlist as members is small, and the parties are primarily vehicles for active members. Koole (1994: 299) lists the characteristics of the modern cadre party as:

- (1) predominance of the professional leadership groups (especially the parliamentary party), but with a high degree of accountability to the lower strata in the party;
- (2) a low member/voter ratio, although members remain important as a source of finance, as a means of recruiting candidates for political office and as the bodies who are required simply to maintain the party in working order;
- (3) a strong and broad-ranging orientation toward voters, but with a strategy which is neither catch-all, on the one hand, nor focusing on a *classe gardee* on the other;
- (4) the maintenance of the structure of a mass party (with vertical organizational ties), not only to maintain a specific image, but also to guarantee a certain degree of internal democracy; and

- (5) the reliance for financial resources on a combination of both public subsidies and the fees and donations of members.

This is useful in differentiating contemporary Dutch parties from earlier cadre or mass parties, but raises questions about how we should classify other parties which also differ from nineteenth- or early twentieth-century cadre parties. Canadian parties, for example, differ considerably from contemporary Dutch parties: both national and provincial parties have highly disciplined and invariably cohesive caucuses, dominated in government and (most of the time) opposition by their leaders. However, extra-parliamentary organization is minimal and virtually invisible except when an election has been called or is anticipated, or a leadership convention is under way. The principal parties have no fixed membership, and anyone can join up to the actual selection of candidates or delegates. Until recently, leaders were selected by special party convention rather than the caucus as in the Westminster model. However, several provincial parties have adopted balloting systems which allow anyone who declares themselves an adherent of the party to vote by telephone or at special polling places.

Lack of permanent mass organization does not present problems. When elections are called, parties particularly if they are likely to gain a majority—can count on a bevy of workers to canvass potential voters, distribute literature, or drive voters to the polls. Once the election is over, this organization disintegrates as rapidly as it emerged, leaving elected officers and skeletal staffs to mop up, report on finances, enforce party rules, and, if possible, maintain an office. In contrast, the parliamentary caucus and their staff are active whether they are in government or in opposition. Typically, the leader and caucus are the only visible manifestation of the party between elections.

Intermittently active, the Canadian parties might also be characterized as modern cadre parties, but they are clearly different from the Dutch parties described above. Ironically, members and prospective members of Canadian parties are more involved in nomination processes and leadership selection than their counterparts in the Dutch parties. However, lines of accountability are more confused than these populist elements suggest. Policy conventions are infrequent and inconsequential. Leaders declare party policy during election campaigns, but do not necessarily feel bound by manifestos once elected. In office, the leader is usually unassailable. Promises may be kept or ignored. Although party members may secure leadership reviews at specified intervals, once selected party leaders are in charge. However, leaders' survival depend on maintaining the support of caucuses which did not select them. Challenges usually occur when parties are in opposition; if they do not resign of their own accord, leaders are more likely to be dumped by legislative caucuses or factions within the party than by decisions of party members.<sup>2</sup>

Difficulties in distinguishing among cadre and modern cadre parties and other types are not confined to the Canadian case. Fitting in American parties is equally difficult. The extent of state and local organization varies considerably (Mayhew 1986), and national parties are little more than frameworks for internal competition. The national committees, once described as committees without power (Cotter and Hennessy 1964), have become more involved in House and Senate election campaigns, but are still not the only actors in the field: candidates, particularly incumbents, rely heavily on their own organizations, and Political Action Committees (PACs) rival the national committees as fundraisers. Even so, the Republican National Committee, which pioneered greater national party involvement, is sometimes described as a super-PAC. To further complicate matters, primary elections deprive party leaders of control over nominations. Parties provide candidates with labels or banners under which competition takes place, but do not monopolize or even perform many of the functions attributed to them in the literature. American parties are frameworks for candidate-centred factional competition and are best described as cadre parties. However, they are different not only from Duverger's classical cadre parties, but also the 'modern' Canadian and Dutch variants described earlier.

Contemporary French parties present further problems. Although the French Socialist Party shares many characteristics of the *modern cadre party* (Sferza, Chapter 7 below), its internal factionalism is not specified among Koole's (1994) criteria. However, even if we were to consider this a special case, or subsume factionalism under a different scheme, we still need to know whether other contemporary parties should be classified under the same rubric. Parties of the right and centre in France fit some of Koole's criteria, but are far more centred on their leaders. Jacques Chirac's RPR, for example, has the form of a mass organization, but has neither of the elements of accountability or internal democracy which Koole specifies. Embracing three smaller parties in an umbrella-like structure, the Union of Democrats for France (UDF) defies easy classification. So do parties created largely as personal vehicles, such as Berlusconi's Forza Italia. Although we might want to classify many of these as cadre parties, if we are to test hypotheses, or classify likes with likes, we need to be able to specify different variants of this type.

Ware (1987a) has tried to deal with this problem by refining Duverger's distinction, and distinguishing between *elite-centred* and *mass membership parties*. Elite-centred parties, such as the British Conservatives or the Gaullists, can have large memberships, but their core characteristic is domination by a relatively small group at the centre. In contrast, membership-based political parties are ones in which members are more than a workforce and have some voice or ownership in the party. Thus, it is not size of membership which makes a difference, but rather the degree to which they are expected to participate. Both large and small parties for example, Greens and other parties

on the left—could be membership-based. We can take Ware's distinction either as a restatement of Duverger which is how he puts it (see Ware 1987a: 5–12) or as the addition of a second dimension, extent of membership involvement, to the primary dimension, size of active membership. This provides a basis for a four-cell table, distinguishing older or 'classic' forms of cadre and mass parties, and their more modern equivalents, Koole's modern cadre party, and leader-centred parties with large memberships (Table 6.1). This could provide also a basis for further classification, but we need to know where the cut-off points are, how to classify parties, and what difference this makes.'

This two-dimensional classification is an improvement over the standard distinction between cadre and mass parties. Arraying parties on two dimensions enables us to distinguish among 'classic' cadre parties (the UDF in France, Canadian parties, the Republicans and Democrats in the United States), Koole's 'modern' cadre party, 'leader-centred' cadre parties, and 'classical' mass parties. Nevertheless, problems remain: party memberships have been declining throughout Europe both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of parties' electorates (Mair and Biezen, 2001). Although variation in the proportion of voters who are party members persists, the decline in the 1990s, evident in most the European countries, suggests that there will be very few parties with large memberships and that most cases will crowd into upper cells of the table. Alternatively, we may have to rethink what we mean by party membership. As it is, the parties in the upper left-hand cell, dubbed 'classic' cadre parties, include disparate kinds of parties: American and Canadian parties, segments of the public active either in primary elections or nominating meetings, are very

TABLE 6.1. *Cadre vs. mass party distinction: a revised version*

No. of members	Extent of members involvement	
	Low	High
Low	'Classic' cadre party <i>Examples:</i> UDF (France) Liberals (Canada) Progressive Conservatives (Canada) Republicans (US) Democrats (US)	Modern cadre party <i>Examples:</i> PvdA, CDA, VVD (Netherlands) Labour (UK) SPD, CDU (Germany) PS (France)
High	Leader-centred party <i>Examples:</i> RPR (France) Conservatives (UK)	Mass party <i>Examples:</i> SAP (Sweden) PDS/PCI (Italy)

Source: Adapted from Ware (1987a: 5-12).

different than French parties, such as Giscard's Republicans. Difficulties such as these might be resolved by adding an 'intermittently active' or medium category to the horizontal dimension (levels of political activity), but the classificatory scheme would still be largely descriptive. Nor do we have any theory explaining why different parties might have emerged as 'classic', 'modern', or 'leader-centred' cadre parties.

It is useful to consider what the cadre versus mass distinction, and Ware's reworking of it, does and does not measure. The distinction originated as a summary description of what were once very major differences in organizational forms, styles, and approaches to the electorate. What has survived is largely a measure of the size of membership and a very approximate estimate about the extent of organization. Both are important, but neither encompasses all that we might want to know about party structure or organization. Not included are the complexity of party organization (for example, the degree to which the party is organized on different levels), the presence or absence of multiple centres of power, factional or coalitional structure, relationship to other organizations, or the ways in which parties assemble resources, conduct election campaigns, or present themselves to the public. Any of these could provide a basis for differentiating political parties.

#### PARTIES OF MASS INTEGRATION, CATCH-ALL PARTIES, AND BEYOND

In contrast to Duverger's (1954) distinction, Neumann's typology has provided the basis for an extended historical typology. We have already seen how Kirchheimer (1966) and more recently Katz and Mair (1995) have built on Neumann (1956) and, to a certain extent, Duverger. At a minimum, the distinction between elite, mass, catch-all, and cartel parties provides a useful device for examining the ways in which certain kinds of parties may have changed. Whether it provides any help in distinguishing among contemporary parties is open to question. We can examine the matter by considering Kirchheimer's argument, Panebianco's restatement, and the latest addition, the cartel party.

Kirchheimer's (1966) argued that a major transformation of Western European parties and party systems was under way: parties of mass integration were transforming themselves into ideologically bland catch-all parties. Bowing to the law of the political market, parties were abandoning previous efforts at the 'the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses', downplaying or abandoning ideology, bidding for the support of interest groups, emphasizing the qualities of their leaders, and seeking support wherever it could be found. Although not all parties would follow this course, Kirchheimer claimed that the success of one catch-all party would force other

parties to imitate it, producing a transformation of Western European party systems.

Although doubts can be raised about the extent of transformation and its impact on party systems (Wolinetz 1979, 1991), the catch-all thesis has become a metaphor for describing changes in political parties and the ways in which they approach the electorate. Used to distinguish contemporary parties from former parties of mass integration, the catch-all party is an effective device. Used to distinguish among contemporary political parties, the catch-all party is as blunt an instrument as Kirchheimer feared it would be a vehicle of representation. Kirchheimer died before he could complete his essay and was not trying to build a typology, but rather characterize changes which he saw occurring in many but not all parties. The catch-all party is imperfectly operationalized (Dittrich 1983), and its characterization is exaggerated and incomplete (Smith 1989); in some respects, we have a better idea of what it is not-a party of mass integration-than what it is. Depending on how Kirchheimer is interpreted, the catch-all party can be translated as a highly opportunistic vote-seeking party, a leader-centred party, a party tied to interest groups, or all of the above. Whether or not it retains a mass membership or how such a party might differ from parties in the United States or Canada is uncertain. Nor are we sure whether the term describes a strategy or orientation (Wolinetz 1979), or an organizational form in which members have been marginalized and campaign professionals have assumed a more dominant role,<sup>4</sup> or some combination of these. Kirchheimer argued that not all parties would be forced to undergo this transformation; some might remain as mass parties, defending the interests of a particular group or class. However, not all parties were originally mass parties or parties of mass integration. Although such parties might be labelled cadre parties, we not only need schema for classifying them, but also some way of taking account of other changes which may have occurred.

#### *Panebianco's Respecification*

Panebianco (1988) tries to resolve ambiguities in the specification of the catch-all party by translating Kirchheimer's characterization into organizational terms. The crucial transformation becomes a change from the *mass-bureaucratic party* to an *electoral professional party*. Both are defined as ideal-types. The mass-bureaucratic party, equivalent to Duverger's mass party or Neumann's party of mass integration, is characterized by the central role of a representative or elected bureaucracy, emphases on membership, collegial internal leadership, financing through interest groups, and stress on ideology. In contrast, the electoral-professional party is characterized by the centrality of professionals, its electoral orientation and weak vertical ties to its membership, the prominent role of elected representatives, financing

TABLE 6.2. *Panebianco's distinction between mass-bureaucratic and electoral-professional parties*

Mass-bureaucratic parties	Electoral-professional parties
Central role of the bureaucracy (political-administrative tasks)	Central role of the professionals (specialized tasks)
Membership party, strong vertical organizational ties, appeal to the 'electorate of belonging'	Electoral party, weak vertical ties, appeal to the 'opinion electorate'
Pre-eminence of internal leaders, collegial leadership	Pre-eminence of the public representatives, personalized leadership
Financing through membership and collateral activities (party cooperatives, trade unions, etc.)	Financing through interest groups and public funds
Stress on ideology, central role of believers within the organization	Stress on issues and leadership, central role of careerists and representatives within the organization

Source: In Panebianco (1988: 264).

through organized interests or government subsidies, and its stress on issues and interests rather than ideology.

By defining ideal types and laying out specific dimensions, Panebianco provides a basis for arraying parties on each and considering the extent, if any, to which they fit either type. This is an important step, but it is insufficiently developed to permit full comparison of contemporary parties. Throughout his book, Panebianco emphasizes the importance of party origin and develops a number of different genetic types, which he argues will follow different paths of development. However, his suppositions about change, injected in the final chapter, take little account of the genetic types government parties, opposition parties, charismatic parties, such as the French Gaullists-developed in the earlier chapters of the book. This is surprising. Although Panebianco does argue that rates of change and the extent of transformation will vary, his final chapter does not consider the possibility that parties might change in ways which would produce either significantly distinct types or, failing that, different variants of the electoral-professional party. Instead, like Kirchheimer, and many others, he assumes that homogenizing trends are under way. This is particularly striking in light of his emphasis on the distinctiveness of party types. It is not clear, for example, why parties which started out as charismatic parties, such as the RPR in France, should end up as electoral-professional parties rather than as a more distinct leader-centred type. The same could be said of parties of the extreme right such as the Front National in France or the Danish or Norwegian Progress Parties: although it is conceivable that such parties might evolve into mainstream parties dominated by electoral-professionals, it is

equally possible that they might either continue as leader-centred parties. Nor is it clear how Panebianco would treat the National Liberals (FPO) in Austria, which has been transformed by Jorg Haider from a small cadre party to a larger charismatic vehicle. As Ware (1996: 104) points out, Panebianco does not consider the very different ways in which parties might adapt to the pressures of electoral competition.<sup>5</sup> Instead, it is presumed that parties, whatever their genetic origins and initial differences, will succumb to the temptation to become an electoral-professional party.

### *The Cartel Party*

The latest extension to Neumann's typology is Katz and Mair's (1995) addition of the *cartel party*. The cartel party is a new type, defined by its relation to the state. Competing for votes on the basis of their leaders and the effectiveness of their policies, catch-all parties find themselves increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of the electorates who have detached themselves from previous political moorings (Mair 1997: ch. 2). Unable to rely on the loyalty of members, who have become more distant, parties allot themselves larger and larger subventions and become dependent on state subsidies for their support. In contrast to more entrepreneurially oriented catch-all parties, cartel parties appeal to an even broader or more diffuse electorate, engage primarily in capital-intensive campaigns, emphasize their managerial skills and efficiency, are loosely organized, and remote from their members, who are barely distinct from non-members. Even more important, rather than competing in order to win and bidding for support wherever it can be found, cartel parties are content to ensure their access to the state by sharing power with others. In Katz and Mair's view, cartel parties have ceased to operate as brokers between civil society and the state (the *modus operandi* of catch-all parties) and have instead become agents of the state.

Katz and Mair's assertions are interesting but problematic. The central argument is that state support has changed the overall orientation and direction of political parties. However, other than noting that almost all parties have at one time or another governed or joined coalitions, they give very little evidence of ways in which parties' behaviour may have changed because of increased state support. Nevertheless, it is easy to acknowledge that certain parties have been more anxious to govern than to win elections. More important for our purposes is that the catch-all party has been redefined in a less exaggerated or stereotypical fashion than Kirchheimer did (see Katz and Mair 1995: table 1), and that a number of dimensions have been specified on which parties might be classified. Although some are characteristics of the time period (such as the proportion of the electorate enfranchised or the dispersion of politically relevant resources), others (such as nature of party

work, sources of revenue, relations between members and leaders, and the role of members) can be used to differentiate parties.

Even though Katz and Mair have been quite explicit in their specification of each party type, there are difficulties in using either the cartel type alone or the typology as whole as a way of differentiating contemporary political parties. The typology posits a broad transformation from elite and mass parties to catch-all and now cartel parties. Taken as such, it is useful in distinguishing contemporary parties from their predecessors. Less certain is whether all or even most parties have now become catch-all or cartel parties, existing coterminously, or have evolved into cartel parties. Katz and Mair argue that the cartel party is not the end point of party development, but rather that its style is likely to generate its own response in the form of anti-party sentiment and parties capable of mobilizing it. This makes room for anti-establishment parties, such as Poguntke's (1993) new politics party, as well as extreme right populist parties, but leaves open the question of whether all established parties have become so alike that there is no point in distinguishing among them.

Thus far, our analysis has done more to demonstrate the limitations of existing schemata than to develop new bases of classification. This is a problem which we will consider in the next section.

### NEW BASES FOR CLASSIFICATION? VOTE-SEEKING, OFFICE-SEEKING, AND POLICY-SEEKING PARTIES

Criticizing existing schemata is easier than developing new ones. In this section, I will consider directions which students of political parties might follow if they are to develop more meaningful classificatory schemes. The discussion is meant to be more heuristic than definitive. Ultimately, classificatory schemata derive from research and application. If they are to be useful, such schemata must not only distinguish among different types of political parties, but do so in ways which reflect questions we are interested in. The latter implies that there is no one universally valid scheme, but rather that the utility of a schema depends in part on what we want to know and that a classification useful for one purpose may not be useful for another. The scheme mooted below distinguishes among *vote-seeking*, *policy-seeking*, and *office-seeking* political parties. In this section, I will argue that such a distinction is useful both because it reflects facets of parties' or factions' behaviour and preferences, and can also be related to party structure and organization.

In the literature on coalition formation, distinctions among policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking parties have been introduced to account for coalitions not readily explained by previous models (Strom 1990a). A policy-seeking party is one which gives primary emphasis to pursuit of policy goals, a vote-seeking party is one whose principal aim is to maximize votes and win

elections, while an office-seeking party is primarily interested in securing the benefits of office getting its leaders into government, enjoying access to patronage, etc.-even if this means sharing power with others or pursuing strategies which fail to maximize its share of the vote. Although in practice no party will be exclusively policy-seeking, vote-seeking, or office-seeking, the scheme pinpoints orientations which can be related to other characteristics of parties and the social, economic, geographical, and institutional environments in which they operate. This scheme also provides us with categories which are widely applicable and not tied to any one geographic area or subset of parties.

The distinction between policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking parties is borrowed from Strom's (1990b) analyses of the circumstances under which parties enter or support minority governments. Although they have been used by Harmel and Janda (1994) to analyse party change, these categories are more common in formal modeling and theories of coalition formation and have only recently been used in empirical research.<sup>6</sup> Each orientation is a separate dimension on which parties can either be high or low. However, the dimensions are neither mutually exclusive nor entirely independent of each other. Although parties in electoral competition must pursue votes in order to win office and carry out programmes, parties giving higher priority to one orientation will typically be lower on at least one of the other two. Following Strom, we can array the three foci or orientations as points of a triangle and plot parties according to the relative priority which they give to each (Figure 6.1).<sup>7</sup> Parties emphasizing policy-seeking would be located in the lower left-hand corner, parties emphasizing office-seeking at the lower right, and parties which emphasize vote-seeking at the peak. If a party were equally disposed toward all three orientations, it would be plotted at the centre of the triangle.

#### *The Policy-Seeking Party*

The policy-seeking party corresponds to a civics book image of what many people think that parties should be like in a liberal democracy. Policy-seeking parties are issue-oriented and, quite simply, give priority to their policies. They vary widely. Included in this rubric are not only parties with well-defined programmes and/or well-articulated ideologies, but also single-issue and protest parties. Policies may either be logically constrained or a loosely connected agglomeration of demands. Policy-seeking parties run the gamut from former parties of mass integration (as long as these had clearly defined ideological or policy goals) and some of their modern descendants to parties articulating green or environmental issues. If they have well-defined goals, new-right parties can be included as well; like their counterparts on the left, they seek to *redefine* the political agenda in order to bring about changes in a




FIG. 6.1. *Primary emphases or orientations of political parties*

number of areas. The main characteristic would be that the party more often than not gave greater priority to articulation or defence of its policies than to either the maximization of votes or securing office. We would expect such a party to have an active though not necessarily large membership interested in some or all of its goals. Examples would include most Northern European social democratic parties, many liberal and some Christian democratic parties, as well as green, left-libertarian, and some new-right parties.

#### *The Vote-Seeking Party*

A vote-seeking party is different from a policy-seeking party. Here, the primary emphasis is on winning elections: policies and positions are not locked in. Instead, they are regularly manipulated in order to maximize support. Such a party would be a classic Downsian party. If it were operating either in a heterogeneous society, and/or under a winner-take-all system of elections, a vote-seeking party would probably have a coalitional structure, broad enough to embrace different social groups and give the party a chance of winning a majority. In a multi-party system, the equivalent would be a catch-all or electoral-professional party, trying to maximize support from a broad, though not necessarily all-inclusive portion of the electorate.

A vote-seeking party should be organized to win office at all or almost all levels (local, regional or provincial, national) in which elections take place, but is likely to maintain only the minimum degree of organization required to

recruit and select candidates and get them elected. In the past this might have required a labour-intensive campaign organization. Today, such a party might rely on private or government funds to finance capital-intensive campaigns run by campaign professionals and marketing agencies. An organized membership, if there was one, would be kept at arm's length: although members might have voice on the selection of candidates, they would have little say on party policy. All in all, we might expect a thinly staffed organization, made up primarily of party professionals, candidates, and would-be candidates, but capable of adding volunteers when and if they were needed to conduct election campaigns. Levels of activity would vary considerably, rising when nominations were being made or elections contested and falling sharply if they were not.

Examples of vote-seeking parties include the intermittently active Canadian parties, whose policy commitments can vary from election to election, depending on the predilections of the leader; American parties, because of their skeletal organization and lack of fixed programmatic content (parties are largely electoral vehicles into which specific content is poured depending on the outcome of nomination contests); leader-centred parties such as the Gaullists in France, with no fixed ideological orientation (the RPR under Chirac has taken very different positions in successive presidential elections); and classical catch-all parties such as the German Christian Democratic Union. In addition, because they benefit from assembling broad coalitions in order to compete for a single indivisible office, parties in presidential systems might be tempted to take this form.

#### *The Office-Seeking Party*

The office-seeking party is the third type. Here, the primary emphasis is on securing government office, even if it is at the expense of policy goals or maximizing votes. Office-seeking parties seek either to hold power alone, or more realistically (in the context of the systems in which they operate) to share power with others—either for the purposes of survival (one implication of the cartel party model), or to act as a stabilizer or balance within the system or, more likely, to gain access to patronage. An office-seeking party should avoid policy commitments which might make it undesirable as a coalition partner and eschew electoral strategies, such as attacking prospective partners too fiercely, which would make coalitions impossible. The aim defined in the context of a well-established party system would be to win enough votes to ensure inclusion in coalitions.

Office-seeking parties can exist in different forms. One would be a party, large or small, built atop patron-client networks, whose operation required it to maintain a continuous flow of benefits. Another might be a small party in a multi-party system, anxious to be included in coalitions for the prestige that

this might entail. Like its counterparts, an office-seeking party is likely to be organized to contest elections at different levels of government. However, such a party is unlikely to attract or retain political activists whose primary concern is policy. Instead, its principal participants are likely to be office-holders or office-seekers. The larger the party is, the more likely it is to be divided into factions competing for the resources which the party can command. Examples of office-seeking parties include parties participating regularly in coalitions in consociational systems or governing coalitions in one-party dominant systems. Examples of the former include the Christian Historical Union (CHU) in the Netherlands—one of the parties which merged to form the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the mainstream Belgian political parties, all of which are generally more concerned with being in office than pursuing any particular policy agenda. Examples of the latter include the smaller parties in the pre-1993 Italian party system, such as the Liberals (PLI), or the Republicans (PRI), or on a larger scale, the former Christian Democrats (DC) or Socialists (PSI). Ensuring a continuing flow of benefits, large and small, became these parties' *raison d'être*; for many elements in these parties, winning elections or controlling office was a means to maintaining position. Ironically, the Italian Christian Democrats did this by sharing power with others in centre-left or five-party coalitions (*penta-partito*), but ultimately lost power when the system of which they were architects became untenable.

The utility of such a scheme depends on our ability to find indicators for key terms or orientations and the degree to which we can use these to pose and test hypotheses about what difference this makes. We will consider the difficulty of operationalization below, and then show how these distinctions could be used to test hypotheses about the extent to which trends toward homogenization, widely assumed in the literature, have actually taken place.

#### *Problems of Operationalization*

The three categories discussed previously are polar types, to which parties in electoral competition are unlikely to conform completely. Although it is conceivable that a policy-seeking party might compete in elections solely to put forward its positions, most policy-seeking parties are interested in winning sufficient votes to win seats in the legislature. Similarly, vote-seeking parties often put forward policies in order to win office, and office-seeking parties must seek votes in order to gain access to the state. Moreover, parties may be divided internally, with different factions or tendencies pursuing different objectives. In practice, most parties will display elements of at least two of the three orientations. Nevertheless, once a party is well-established and its practices and modes of operation are institutionalized, differences in emphases and priorities should be visible. In policy-seeking parties, programmatic concerns should

be apparent in the ways in which the party determines its positions, contests elections, and behaves in office. Operational measures might include the proportion of time devoted to policy discussion at party congresses, the emphases placed on policy during election campaigns, and the attention given to policy by elected representatives. Other indicators might include the presence or absence of party research bureaux or other infrastructure (for example, policy committees) for the development and articulation of policy, or party members' views about what they think their party ought to be doing. We would expect a policy-seeking party to exhibit considerable preoccupation with policy on most of the above indicators.

Vote-seeking parties should score differently than policy- or office-seeking parties. Here the central preoccupation is maximizing votes. Although such a party would typically have policies, these might change frequently, with the party maintaining only the minimum degree of Downsian consistency needed to avoid alienating supporters or followers. In election campaigns, the emphasis will be on techniques designed to win votes rather than on specific policies, which will change from election to election. As Kirchheimer suggested, devices employed may involve bidding for the support of specific interests, emphasizing leaders, or otherwise packaging the party so that it will maximize votes. The devices available to parties have broadened considerably since Kirchheimer wrote in 1966: these now include media spots, negative advertising, telemarketing, and continuous polling to monitor the effects of different strategies.

Because vote-seeking parties may also emphasize policies from time to time, measuring such an orientation is difficult, but not impossible. Nevertheless, preoccupation with policy should either be minimal or else confined to the party leadership or the party in government—that is, compartmentalized. In the former instance, open policy discussions would be *pro forma* or perfunctory (perhaps be confined to exultatory speeches), while in the latter instance, policy would be manipulated in order to maximize support. In the case of a vote-seeking party, we would expect considerable emphasis on maximizing support, even at the expense of consistency. In extreme cases, this might be indicated by frequent and sharp reversals of policy positions, de-emphasizing or blurring positions, and aggressive pursuit of votes. However, vote-seeking should not be measured solely by campaign tactics. How strategy is determined and what is taken into account are also important.

Office-seeking is the most difficult of the three orientations to operationalize. All parties contesting elections could be considered office-seeking, but we know that the goals and purposes of seeking elective office can vary: some parties want to win the seats or offices being contested, while others hope either to bring forward a point of view or lay the groundwork for future victories. An office-seeking party should be more preoccupied with gaining

TABLE 6.3. *Policy-, vote-, and office-seeking parties: operational measures*

Possible indicators	Parties		
	Policy-seeking	Vote-seeking	Office-seeking
<i>Internal policy debate</i>			
of time spent at party meetings	High	Low	Low
character of debate	Intense, protracted, issue-focused	<i>Pro forma</i> , diffuse, unfocused	<i>Pro forma</i> , diffuse, unfocused
extent and level of involvement	Extensive; most levels of party involved	Confined to leadership or policy committee; compartmentalized	Confined to leadership or policy committee; compartmentalized
<i>Consistency of policy positions assumed</i>	High	Medium to low, prone to change depending on leader's directions, electoral opportunity structure	Medium to low
<i>Election campaigns</i>			
prominence of policy	High	Varies	Low
determination of strategy	Follows from policies	Policies developed to fit strategy, maximize votes	Varies, preference for low-risk strategies
use of new electoral techniques	Low to medium	High	Low to medium
<i>Infrastructure to support policies</i> (e.g. research bureaux, think-tanks, affiliated organizations)	Present	Either minimal or at disposal of leaders, office-holders	Either minimal or at disposal of leaders, office-holders

office—either seats in Parliament or portfolios in government than maximizing votes or putting forward policies. Indicators might include resorting to low-risk strategies (in effect satisficing), the orientation of leaders and hangers-on, or parties' use of patronage. Regular or continuous participation in government would *not* be an adequate indicator of an office-seeking party because vote-seeking or policy-seeking parties might also be frequent participants in government.

Operationalizing each of these orientations is difficult. Any assessment of party orientations must be based either on repetitive behaviour or attitudes

which can be tapped and replicated using similar research instruments. This assumes that orientations and behaviour are (a) relatively stable and (b) rooted in party structures and practices. However, the orientation and direction of some parties may very well be an area of dispute, changing whenever new leaders assume power or different factions gain control. Ultimately, the extent to which the orientation of parties changes over time must be the subject of empirical research. Nevertheless, unless the party's formal and informal structures are weakly institutionalized for example if the party is little more than a vehicle for individual leaders (Ross Perot's Reform Party, Berlusconi's Forza Italia) or a framework for factional conflict (in some respects, American parties) we should not expect sudden or frequent changes in party orientation or direction. On the contrary, as anyone who has been involved in processes of internal reform can attest, attempts to bring about changes usually meet resistance, and entrenched habits and practices are likely to continue.

Numerous examples illustrate the slowness with which parties change. The cases of the British Labour and Conservative Parties are instructive: prior to the 1970s, both combined elements of vote-seeking and policy-seeking. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Labour and Conservatives not only departed from the post-war consensus on the desirability of a welfare state and a managed economy, but also became more overtly policy-oriented. Under pressure from militant factions on its left, Labour assumed hard-left positions which cost it support in the 1980s. However, neither the shift to the left nor Labour's eventual return to the political centre took place without considerable internal strife. Throughout the post-war period, Labour had been divided between its left and right wings, but despite the split, the right or social democratic wing dominated the leadership and controlled key party bodies, such as the Annual Conference, the National Executive Committee, and the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). In the 1970s, economic decline and disputes over European Community membership shifted the balance towards the left, who were making concerted efforts to gain control of constituency associations. Internal disagreements intensified throughout the decade, but changes in party positions and orientations did not occur until 1980. Labour was defeated by Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives in 1979. James Callaghan resigned the leadership and had been replaced by Michael Foot, a long-time adherent of the left. At a special party meeting in 1980, the left won mandatory reselection of MPs and the election of the party leader by an electoral college of MPs, trade unions, and constituency associations rather than the Parliamentary Labour Party. This provoked the exit of part of the right and the formation of the Social Democratic Party. Labour emerged from the process positioned further to the left and far more policy-oriented than it had been before.

The road back to the political centre was no easier. Changes begun by Neil Kinnock in 1983 and continued under John Smith who sought to move the

party 'one heaven further'-were only completed when Tony Blair assumed the leadership after Smith's death in 1994. After four successive election defeats, Labour was anxious to return to power. Under Blair, Labour abandoned clause IV of the party constitution (Labour's long-standing commitment to public ownership of the means of production), and marketed itself as 'The New Labour Party'. *New Labour* is a vote-seeking party. Former left-wingers, such as Tony Benn, remain, but their radical impulses have been brought under control.

The Conservatives' shift to the right was less tortuous: shifts tentatively initiated by Edward Heath became more permanent when Margaret Thatcher ousted him in 1975. However, despite Thatcher's deep convictions, the party's shift to the right was not immediate. Thatcher's first Cabinets included centrists such as Sir William Whitelaw. Only when she had consolidated her hold on the party were 'wets' marginalized within the party. Like Labour in the 1980s, Conservatives became more overtly policy-oriented. However, commitment to Thatcher's new-right agenda did not keep the Conservatives from governing. Although their popular vote never climbed above 42-3 per cent, the Conservatives won parliamentary majorities in successive elections. Only in 1997 did internal divisions and competition from the newly recast Labour Party consign them to the opposition. In both the Labour and Conservative Parties, the need to keep the party together and the weight of existing organization and practices prohibited rapid changes in orientation or style. The same was true of processes of programmatic renewal in the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) in the 1980s and early 1990s (Wolinetz 1993).

The 'stickiness' of programmatic change in policy-seeking parties contrasts sharply with the experience of American and Canadian parties in which selection of a new leader or candidate can result in substantial changes in posture. However, the underlying orientation of vote-seeking parties is not nearly as malleable as the positions which such parties assume. In the United States, the occasional nomination of candidates with policy positions outside the 'mainstream' a Barry Goldwater or George McGovern-typically results in electoral defeat and reversion to middle positions the next time around. In Canada, the travails of the Progressive Conservative Party (PCs) in the 1990s are equally telling: before 1993, the PCs had a parliamentary majority. However, reactions against former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and competition from both the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party reduced the PCs to two seats in the 1993 general election. Defeat forced the PCs to regroup and reorganize. Efforts were made to make the party more policy-oriented. However, supporters were more enthusiastic about having policies than specifying what they should be. Ultimately, party positions for the 1997 parliamentary election were determined by the party leader, Jean Charest. Despite his own leanings, Charest took the party to the right on economic issues in order to compete with the Reform Party. Charest won twenty seats and

restored his party to official party status in the Canadian House of Commons. Ironically, though, most of the MPs elected with him were well to the left of official party positions on most issues. The election over, Charest indicated that, although the platform was binding, party positions could evolve over time. In this instance, the vote-seeking orientation was relatively fixed despite the rapidity with which policy changes could be executed. Nevertheless, there seem to be limits to vote-seeking without consideration of policy. Although badly hurt by competition from the Reform Party, and the exit of its right wing and western support, Progressive Conservatives have persistently refused attempts by the Reform Party and its successor, the Canadian Alliance, to unite the right." One reason for this is that few Progressive Conservatives regard themselves as part of the right. The parties orientation has typically been centrist, if not red Tory, a Canadian equivalent of one-nation ('wet') conservatism in Britain.

These examples suggest that changes in the underlying orientation of parties is infrequent. In most instances, the modes and mores the internal political culture of a party inhibit rapid change in party orientation. However, this does not mean that fundamental changes cannot occur because a leader or faction insists on them or because crises or galvanizing events encourage change. In practice, both leadership and circumstances play a role: successive defeats made the British Labour Party more prepared for Tony Blair's reconstruction. In the Netherlands, years in opposition made the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) more open to change. Nor are processes preparing parties for change necessarily confined to the electoral arena. In Spain, democratization and electoral opportunity facilitated the remaking of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) in the late 1970s.

The foregoing analysis suggests that party orientations whether a party is policy-seeking, vote-seeking, or office-seeking, or more likely some combination of two or more of these—are durable features of political parties and unlikely to change without consistent and durable efforts by an individual or group to re-make or re-orient the party. Systematically operationalizing such orientations will be difficult but possible. However, classifying parties as policy-seeking, vote-seeking, or office-seeking is not an end in itself. Although having one more classification might be useful for taxonomic purposes, the real value of any classificatory scheme depends on its utility in developing and testing propositions about either the circumstances under which certain phenomena (in this case, types of political parties) are likely to exist or, alternatively, what difference they make. Earlier, we argued that classifications such as Duverger's distinction between cadre and mass parties had lost their utility not only because they failed to classify adequately, but also because they had become detached from their theoretical origins. If classificatory schemes, whether those suggested above, or others which might be developed, are to be useful, connecting them to theories and propositions about parties

is essential. Developing new theory is beyond the scope of this chapter, but suggesting the ways in which such classifications might be used is not. In the section which follows, we will examine the ways in which distinguishing among policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking might be used to refine our suppositions about the ways in which Western European systems have changed and to compare parties in different historical or geographic contexts.

#### PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTIES

Let us return to our earlier discussion. There, I had argued that the categories used to characterize change in Western European political parties were imprecise and posited a uni-directional pattern of change: all or most significant parties according to Kirchheimer or Panebianco were becoming catch-all or electoral-professional parties; all or almost all are now cartel parties according to Katz and Mair. One limitation of this mode of analysis was that it made little allowance for alternate models for contemporary political parties. Parties, it has been argued, were unable to sustain former modes of operation as parties of mass integration or elite-centred parties. However, the only variations posited in the ways in which they might change were differences in the speed of transformation.

Using the more general dimensions of policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking, it is possible to posit different patterns of transformation. The vote-seeking party corresponds to a catch-all or electoral-professional party, while the cartel party is one variant of an office-seeking party. Let us suppose that the *programmatic party* is a variant of a policy-seeking party and consider the possibility that at least some parties might emerge as programmatic parties, either because they never made the transformation to catch-all or cartel parties, or alternatively because programmatic emphases were a plausible response to the competitive environment in which they found themselves. To do this it is useful to return to arguments about catch-all parties and problems which they face.

The starting-point of our analysis is that contemporary parties are organizations under stress. Sources of this stress have been discussed in the literature. Parties which were once accustomed to the regular support of 'electorates of belonging' find that both the relative size and loyalty of these electorates have shrunk, and electronic media deny parties control over the political agenda. In addition, parties find it increasingly difficult to offer selective incentives which would help them to attract and retain members; interest groups and single-issue movements are able to offer more direct channels of influence and action (Panebianco 1988; Pizzorno 1981). Parties can respond to these problems in different ways. The dominant supposition, particularly

for former parties of mass integration, is transformation towards a new form, the catch-all party, or as reformulated by Panebianco, the electoral-professional party. The changes have been mentioned earlier, but it is useful to restate them here: orientation towards 'opinion electorates' rather than electorates of belonging; emphasis on issues or personalities rather than ideology; campaign professionals supersede both members and representative bureaucrats; increased reliance on interest groups or government for financial support, and in general terms the transformation of parties which previously emphasized representative or 'expressive functions' and often defended well-defined policies into opportunistic, vote-seeking parties, distant from their supporters. (Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988)

Kirchheimer viewed the catch-all party as a highly successful electoral machine, sufficiently adept at winning votes that it would force its competitors to adopt similar ploys. We have since come to see it differently. Panebianco (1988), Smith (1989), and Mair (1997: ch. 2) characterize the catch-all party as a highly vulnerable entity: without a large electorate of belonging, the catch-all party has no secure bases of support. Voters who support it in one election can desert it in another. However, this is only part of the problem. Catch-all parties have largely abandoned the expressive or emotively representative functions of parties for a politics of brokerage and governing. In doing so, they leave opportunities open to others protest or alternative politics parties, new social movements who are better able to mobilize discontent or provide the solidarity incentives which electoral-professional parties are unable to supply. Reflecting this, Katz and Mair (1995) posited a further transformation, into cartel parties which use their control of the state to protect themselves from the vagaries of the electorate.

Cartel parties are equally vulnerable. Close to, if not a part of the state, cartel parties are responsible not only for the successes of state policy, but also shortcomings and failures numerous in a period of shrinking resources. Although ostensibly insulated from voters' wrath by state subsidies and their ability to join coalitions, cartel parties are nevertheless exposed to competition from parties freer to take more purely oppositional stances. These include new politics parties, new-right protest parties, and occasionally, parties in the centre, such as Democrats '66, less complicit in government policy. Although the victories of such parties may be temporary, the threat of losses can generate internal pressures which force parties to modify their strategies.

The vulnerability of both catch-all and cartel parties has considerable significance for our analysis. Susceptible to some losses whether they emphasize representative and expressive functions, or bid for as wide an electorate as possible, or assume responsibility for public policy, parties may find themselves pulled in conflicting directions. Challenged by new competition, parties might respond by re-emphasizing policy and programmes in order to reaffirm support of key groups, or by emphasizing their leader and adopting more

sophisticated campaign techniques, or by ensuring further access to patronage or state subsidies. Depending on where the party started out from, we have a shift towards one of the three orientations discussed earlier: policy-seeking, vote-seeking, or office-seeking.

Each can be plotted on the triangle in Figure 6.1 according to the ways in which they deflect, resolve, or fail to resolve these pressures (see Figure 6.2). Toward the lower left corner are programmatic and other policy-seeking parties. In the upper corner are parties whose primary emphasis is winning elections and holding office alone. Included would be catch-all or electoral professional parties, as well as parties in many adversarial systems. In the lower right corner we would find classical patronage-oriented parties, whose principal *raison d'être* was to gain office in order to win personal benefit, as well as more recent converts (for example, Blondel's party patrimonial, Chapter 9 below), and cartel parties which have shied away from all-out competition.

What determines a party's positioning? Our point of departure was that parties were under stress and pulled in conflicting directions. But some parties are more subject to these stresses and strains than others. Parties operating in systems in which there is little expectation that they fulfil expressive roles or articulate programmes—for example, the mainstream Canadian parties until recently—may feel very little pull to move towards the lower left-hand corner. The same may be true of parties without large memberships or in which leadership is insulated from members' pressures. Nevertheless, many




FIG. 6.2. *Vote-seeking, policy-seeking, and office-seeking political parties*

parties do try to enrol members. Even if they are not enlisted as troops in modern election campaigns, parties can use members to demonstrate that they have support, to maintain a presence in society, or to establish a base from which future candidates can be recruited (Scarrow 1994, 1996). However, enrolling members has a cost. As I have posited, electorates of belonging have shrunk, and parties may have difficulty enlisting members solely on the basis of solidarity. Selective incentives, such as the prospect of office, may be sufficient to attract some individuals, but in order to enrol a larger membership, parties may have to offer members a voice on programmes and policies. However, the more they do this, the more difficult it may be for parties to evolve as purely vote-seeking (for example, catch-all party or electoral-professional party) or office-seeking parties (for example, cartel party). Under such circumstances, programmes may serve as a glue or perhaps more accurately as a set of elastic bands, of varying strengths which hold the party together. De-emphasizing or scrapping programmes or policies in order to win more votes may cause some of these bands to break. So too could sacrificing policies in order to join or maintain coalitions. Rather than sacrificing members or risking a split, parties may choose to emphasize programmes rather than either maximizing votes or opportunities to govern.

Emphasizing programmes, of course, is not the only way in which politicians can reconcile conflicting pressures. Alternate solutions might be to disengage members, reducing them to the largely demonstrative cheerleading roles envisaged by Katz and Mair (1992c) as a characteristic of the catch-all party, or to convert the party into a party of office-holders. The latter is said to be characteristic of many Southern European socialist parties, which have largely abandoned ideological commitments. Alternatively, the orientation of a party may be a source of internal contention, as was the case in both the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) and the British Labour Party in the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that many social democratic parties in the 1980s were engaged in processes of programmatic review and programmatic renewal (Paterson and Gillespie 1993) suggests at a minimum that programmes are important for party leaders and party activists. However, this may be a point of contention within parties.

Using the distinction between policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking parties introduces an element of play into discussions about transformation and change in Western European parties. Rather than assuming one homogenizing trend which all or most parties follow, we have argued that parties can respond differently to the pressures said to lead to the emergence of catch-all and more recently cartel parties. How parties respond will depend in large measure on their internal characteristics, the competitive environment in which they operate, and decisions which their leaders and followers make.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have argued that existing classifications for political parties are inadequate and suggested ways in which alternate classifications might be developed. These include classifying parties according to membership size and activity, or distinguishing parties according to whether they are policy-seeking, vote-seeking, or office-seeking. I have also argued against assuming that parties undergo uniform or uni-directional patterns of change and have stated that some (but not all) Western European parties may have transformed themselves into programmatic parties rather than catch-all or cartel parties. Our analysis has been tentative and preliminary, designed to break through two different log-jams. One was to escape the uni-directional or homogenizing thrust of models of change prevalent in the Western European parties literature. The other was to suggest ways in which a broader cross-national study of political parties might be facilitated. Throughout the discussion, I have mentioned many dimensions of analysis (for example, facets of party structure) which might be also be considered. However, no variables or categories are sacrosanct. Ultimately, the variables and dimensions pursued and the typologies and frameworks which we use must depend on the questions posed. The principal point is that we need to rethink our categories and classifications in light of a broader terrain of research and that now is a good time to do it (see also Gunther and Diamond 2001).

Schemata such as the one which I have suggested (classifying parties as policy-seeking, vote-seeking, or office-seeking) facilitate drawing comparisons among parties in different parts of the world. Transitions to democracy in other parts of the world mean that we can no longer confine the comparative analysis to Western Europe, with occasional forays into North America. A broader comparative study of political parties, the circumstances in which they operate, and what difference they make, requires us to consider parties in a much wider range of systems and contexts. However, extant categories provide us with little purchase for such a study. A brief look at parties in Latin America demonstrates the point. A history of coups and periods of authoritarian rule has meant that Latin Americanists have not devoted much attention to political parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). When they have, they have typically argued that mass parties are rare and that *personalismo* is the norm. If forced to do so, we would probably classify most Latin American parties as cadre parties. Unfortunately, this would tell us very little either about what kind of cadre parties were the norm, how they varied, or why cadre parties were the dominant form of party organization. As it stands now, we lack not only data, but also categories around which it could be collected. This makes hypothesis-testing and theory-building impossible. Latin American specialists might argue that *personalismo* reflected prevailing cultural norms. That may indeed be the case, but it would still be useful to know whether

certain kinds of parties loosely organized vote-seeking parties, structures which were more typically networks than tightly organized entities—were more typical in presidential systems, in which the desire to capture a single indivisible office brought divergent groups together (forgetting principles and policies in the process). In a different vein, we know that in some parts of the world patron-client relationships have either substituted for political parties, or have been built up within them. Unfortunately, although we know something about the circumstances under which *clientelismo* is likely to occur, we know very little about the circumstances under which the distribution of patronage will become the dominant activity of political parties.

Some political scientists may be sceptical about moving beyond the comfortable nexus of Western European parties, fearing that all that will be discovered is that parties elsewhere are different. This has all too often been the result of European-American comparisons or those few studies which have ventured into other parts of the world (e.g. Lawson 1980). Nevertheless, the European cases are not as homogeneous as we sometimes make them out to be there are important differences between Southern and Northern European systems, and between parties in the British isles and the continent. And transitions to democracy and the spread of competitive politics to countries in other parts of the world provide us with an unprecedented opportunity to study the emergence of parties and party systems in settings very different from late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe. Although comparing individual parties which have developed in radically different settings may not be useful, there is a good deal to be learnt from considering the circumstances under which different types of parties emerge and survive. For example, we may find that certain party systems sustain a variety of different types or orientations, while in others vote-seeking or office-seeking were predominant. This, for example, has been the case in the Canadian party system despite the sustained presence of a policy-seeking party, the New Democratic Party, to the left of the larger established parties. The prevalence of one type might reflect competitive dynamics, cultural factors, institutions, the electoral system, or simply the kinds of parties which got entrenched first. Other facets which might be considered are party structure and organization, age of party organizations, the availability and uses of patronage, and the characteristics of the society or economy. Whatever the case, we would be better positioned to develop and test hypotheses than we are now.<sup>9</sup>

## NOTES

1. See e.g. Beyme (1985); Ware (1987a); Katz and Mair (1994); Scarrow (1994, 1996).
2. See Perlin (1988); Carty (1988); Carty *et al.* (1992: 10-16); Courtney (1995).

3. Unfortunately, Ware does not elaborate on any of these points in either his 1987b volume or his 1996 book. The latter, intended primarily as a text book, pays greater attention to the debate between Duverger and Epstein than to the merits and demerits of Duverger's classification (Ware 1996: 95ff.).
4. Panebianco (1988); Mair (1997: ch. 2); Katz and Mair (1994, 1995).
5. Ware (1996: 102-4) argues also that Panebianco's classifications are 'overtheorized' and based on too narrow a range of cases. Although Panebianco is widely cited, there have been surprisingly few books or articles written on the basis of his work. This may reflect the difficulty of applying his classifications.
6. Miiller and Strum (1999a) is a notable exception.
7. My usage is somewhat different than Strom's (1990a). Strom's primary concern is to build an integrated model of party behaviour which can explain outcomes (the formation of minority governments) not readily explained by existing models, and for that he uses the literature on coalition formation and spatial models of party positioning to deduce the organizational forms from which such behaviour might flow. In contrast, I have drawn on traits of actual parties to elaborate the characteristics of each type or orientation.
8. The Canadian Alliance (formally the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance) was the product of such efforts. Frustrated by Reform's inability to win seats outside the Canadian west (i.e. in Ontario and the provinces to east), Reform Party leader Preston Manning pressed for the unification of the right. Although rejected by most Progressive Conservatives, Reform's efforts resulted in the reconstitution of the party as the Canadian Alliance (or Alliance).
9. One example of this is Harmel and Janda (1994). The authors use Strom's (1990b) schema, augmented by a fourth category, the democracy-seeking party, to develop propositions under which parties, pursuing different goals, are likely to embrace or avoid major changes.