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Lemon v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 1999 WL 161328 (Miss. 1999).
 

Kristen M. Fletcher, J.D., LL.M.

Stacy Prewitt, 2L

A Mississippi landowner recently struck a blow to Mississippi's quick-take statute which was deemed unconstitutional by the Mississippi Supreme Court in March. Fred Lemon, owner of two lots on Highway 90 in Ocean Springs that were the subject of a road-widening project of the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC), took legal action claiming that the statute that authorized the MTC to take possession violated his constitutional rights.

Generally, a quick-take statute authorizes a government agency to "take" private property for a public purpose if compensation is paid to the owner. The quick-take statute expedites acquisition of the property, making the process easier for the agency taking the land. The purpose of the Mississippi quick-take statute was "to enhance the State's highway program by providing the highway department access to the needed right-of-way as quickly as practicable consistent with the legitimate interests of the landowner."1 The Mississippi quick-take statute provides that when the MTC "finds it necessary to condemn property,"2 it files a complaint and declaration of taking in the circuit or county court where the property is located, deposits the fair market value to the court, and serves summons on the landowner. Upon proof of service of process, title and right to immediate possession of the land vests in the MTC.3 After the title has vested in the MTC, the statute provides the landowner a hearing to determine questions of title to the land, interest taken and area taken.4

On August 15, 1997, the MTC used the quick-take statute to take Lemon's properties for a highway project to widen portions of Highway 90. The MTC properly filed Declarations of Taking and served process on Lemon on August 22. Pursuant to the statute, the trial court granted the MTC immediate right and title to the property on August 28. Lemon was denied his appeals motions but the Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal to determine the statute's constitutionality.
 

Due Process

Observing that "it is . . . [textbook] law that our state and federal constitutions prohibit laws which permit deprivation of property without prior notice or hearing,"5 the state Supreme Court determined that even though the quick-take statute does provide for predeprivation notice and a postdeprivation hearing, the ultimate issue is whether the postdeprivation remedy is enough to satisfy due process. Lemon asserted that the statutory notice is inadequate because upon delivery, the MTC is entitled to immediate possession. He argued that a landowner should be entitled to a hearing before the property is taken in order to be heard on questions of public use, validity of the taking and other issues. The MTC countered that such a hearing was not necessary because quick action was necessary and reasonable in this case6 and because the trial court retains discretion after title vests in the MTC to dismiss and rescind all prior orders if a property owner seriously challenges any issue in the condemnation process.

Noting that the issue of procedural due process and the adequacy of postdeprivation hearings has been a frequent subject in the federal courts, the Mississippi Supreme Court followed U.S. Supreme Court precedent and determined that "regardless of the adequacy of the statute's post-deprivation remedies, the statute must provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property."7 The Court reasoned that in this case, granting the landowner a hearing before the taking of property was not impossible but merely inconvenient for the MTC. In addition, the deprivation suffered by the landowner was predictable and could be avoided. It concluded that "in situations where the State feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation . . . remedy to compensate for the taking."8
 

Determination of Public Use

Lemon additionally argued that the statute illegally bypasses the Mississippi Constitution Article 3, Section 17 requirement of a judicial determination of public use. Instead, it authorizes MTC to make the public use determination. The MTC responded that the postdeprivation judicial determination satisfies this requirement. The Court found that Section 17 mandates the determination of public use for the purpose of eminent domain is a judicial question and must be proven by the condemning authority whenever the private property is taken. In this case, Section 17 requires this judicial question to be answered in a predeprivation hearing, not a postdeprivation hearing as provided in the quick-take statute.
 

Separation of Powers

Lastly, Lemon challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated the separation of powers provisions of the Mississippi Constitution. The Court quickly discharged this argument as Lemon failed to raise the issue at trial.
 

Conclusion

Lemon's action brought to light the fact that Mississippi's quick-take statute failed to rise to the proper level of constitutional protection and ultimately, the action leaves the MTC with more detailed and time-consuming procedures for eminent domain proceedings.
 

ENDNOTES

1. Hudspeth v. State Highway Commission, 534 So.2d 210, 213 (Miss. 1988).

2. Miss. Code Ann. § 65-1-303(1) (Supp. 1998).

3. Id. at § 65-1-305(1) (emphasis added).

4. Id. at § 65-1-313.

5. Lemon v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 1999 WL 161328, *6 (Miss. 1999).

6. The necessity in the present case was the need to alleviate traffic on Highway 90. Before MTC may receive bidding on construction contracts or move utilities, it must have title to the property and the quick-take statute allows for private property to be acquired quickly in order to prevent landowners from delaying highway projects by extensive court proceedings. Id. at *3.

7. Id. at *7.

8. Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990)).
 
 

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