Sarah Elizabeth Gardner, 3L

In its first case addressing damages that are recoverable by the United States under the Park System Resources Protection Act, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a vessel owner could not limit his liability to the value of the vessel and its cargo by relying on another statute, the Limitation Act. The court reasoned that considering the Resource Protection Act’s history, language, and purpose, the Limitation Act could not be applied to exonerate or limit a defendant’s liability for damages.

Background
The Limitation Act was passed in 1851 to facilitate shipbuilding by encouraging investors to invest in the shipping industry. The Act limits a vessel owner’s liability for any damages arising from a maritime accident to the value of the owner’s interest in the vessel and the value of its pending freight after the accident.1

The Park System Resources Protection Act (PSRPA) was enacted in 1990 to protect and preserve the resources of the United States. The PSRPA authorized the Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary) to hold liable any person or vessel that caused damage to or destroyed any living or non-living part of the National Park System. The person or vessel is responsible for response costs and damages,2 which the Secretary may use for resource restoration.3

On July 20, 1998, the commercial tug, ALLIE-B, and its barge, collided with and grounded on coral reefs near Ledbury Reef in Biscayne National Park off the coast of Florida. When the tug finally freed itself from the reef, it had caused a “crater-like blow hole in the ocean floor,” in addition to “destroying extensive tracts of coral reef, including hard and soft corals and reef framework.”4 The tug owner and the employer of the tug driver (together known as “Tug Allie”) filed a petition to limit liability for any damages caused by the tugboat and barge. Tug Allie claimed the Limitation Act limited their liability to the post-accident value of the tug and freight, which was approximately $1.2 million. The U.S. and Allied, the barge owner, joined together and responded to Tug Allie’s limitation claim with their own claim under the PSRPA for damages amounting to $3 million.5

After comparing the goals of the two statutes and finding them to be in direct conflict, the District Court found the Government’s claims under the PSRPA were not subject to limitation and that they could recover the full damages if proven.6 Tug Allie appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit claiming that the two statutes could be read harmoniously because the Limitation Act only limited damages recoverable under the PSRPA in relation to damages caused by a vessel. The government countered that the statutory language and the underlying intent created an irreconcilable conflict between the two laws. The government also claimed that because the PSRPA was the newer and more specific statute, the conflict must be resolved by applying the PSRPA and not the Limitation Act. In addressing the issue of harmony, the court reviewed the language of the two statutes and found three main conflicts existed.

Statutory Conflicts
According to the Eleventh Circuit, the first conflict between the two statutes concerned the amount of damages recoverable. Looking first at the PSRPA, the court noted nothing in its language suggests that damages awarded under this statute should be in any way limited or capped. The court found that the terms “response costs and damages” expressly allowed the government to recover all of its losses.7 In finding no language to the contrary, the court concluded, “Congress contemplated that the Government could seek full recovery . . . [for] injury to park lands.”8 The court then looked to the language of the Limitation Act and found that if it applied to the PSRPA, and a vessel destroyed park land, the government’s recoverable damages would be limited or not recoverable. This put the two statutes in direct conflict and therefore, the court concluded they could not be read harmoniously.

Further analysis of the two statutes showed that each was based on a different theory of liability. The court, analogizing the PSRPA to the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, found the PSRPA was a strict liability statute with only three defenses for avoiding liability, none of which Tug Allie could claim.9 They also noted that the legislative history suggested that the defenses were intended to be all-inclusive. On the other hand, the court found the Limitation Act was based on negligence, which allows for many defenses to be used. The court concluded that the two statutes could not be read together because if the Limitation Act was applied to the PSRPA, then all the available defenses to the Limitation Act would necessarily apply to the PSRPA.

The last conflict between the two statutes was the method of determining liability. The PSRPA considered the cause of the injuries in establishing liability and held the person or instrumentality liable for all damages without considering the value of the instrumentality causing the damage. Under the PSRPA, a judgment against a responsible party could be either in personam or in rem meaning that it applied to the defendant’s person or their property.10

The Limitation Act, however, limits a vessel’s liability through showing the unseaworthiness of the vessel or a lack of negligence or lack of knowledge on the owner’s part. Under the Limitation Act, no matter if the judgment was against the person (in personam) or the vessel (in rem), the amount of recoverable damages was limited to the value of the vessel with its cargo, effectively limiting damages to in rem.11 Therefore, the court found that the application of the Limitation Act to the PSRPA would render the in personam clause of the PSRPA completely meaningless.12

Tug Allie next argued that Congress’s silence on the applicability of the Limitation Act to the PSRPA proved that Congress intended for it to apply, calling the court’s attention to several statutes that specifically stated the Limitation Act was not applicable. Tug Allie reasoned that because the language of the PSRPA did not specify to the contrary, Congress meant for it to apply, thereby limiting Tug Allie’s liability to the value of the vessel. The court rejected Tug Allie’s logic, concluding that the Supreme Court has traditionally taken a “restrictive view” of the Limitation Act and finding that Congress’ silence alone was not sufficient to determine congressional intent.13

Prioritization
After considering all of the elements of statutory construction and finding that the statutes’ conflicts render them unharmonious, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether one implicitly overruled the other. In making this determination, the court applied the principle that, “if two statutes conflict, the more recent or more specific statute controls.”14 Being enacted 140 years after the Limitation Act, it was quite apparent the PSRPA was the more recent statute. In addition, considering the incidents that each statute covered, the PSRPA was found to be more narrowly tailored and the court found that it controlled.

Conclusion
The purpose of the PSRPA was to provide the government with a way to recover for the full restoration of park resources, whether on land or in water, that were damaged by third parties. The Limitation Act’s purpose was to provide an exemption from or a limitation on liability in order to encourage shipping. Under the Limitation Act, if a vessel and all its freight were destroyed while damaging or destroying resources in the National Park System, the government could not recover anything. Or if the value of the vessel and its freight were less than the amount of damage caused, then the government’s recovery would be limited to its value. Therefore, application of the Limitation Act would frustrate the very purpose the PSRPA was enacted to serve. The court expanded on this limitation to recovery for water damages, noting the application of the Limitation Act would “require assuming that Congress intended to create a statutory scheme that ensured full protection for park resources on land but only partial protection of our marine park resources.”15
After a lengthy examination of the statutory language, history, and purpose of each act, the court found that the Limitation Act did not apply to the PSRPA.

ENDNOTES
1. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a) (2001).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1(a), (b), § 19jj(c), (b) (2001).
3. Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States of America, 273 F.3d 936, 947 (11th Cir. 2001).
4. Id. at 939. See also In re Tug Allie-B, Inc, 114 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1302 n.1 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
5. Allied claimed $1 million in damages and the U.S. originally claimed $3 million but reduced their claim to $2 million.
6. Id. at 941. See also 16 U.S.C. § 19jj(b), (c) (2001).
7. Id. at 942.
8. Id.
9. The three defenses to liability are: (1) the destruction, loss of, or injury to the park system resource was caused solely by an act of God or an act of war; (2) such person acted with due care, and the destruction, loss of, or injury to the park system resource was caused solely by an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent of such person; or (3) the destruction, loss, or injury to the park system resource was caused by an activity authorized by Federal or State law. 16 U.S.C. § 19jj(c) (2001).
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1(c) (2001).
11. Tug Allie-B, 273 F.3d at 944.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 947.
14. Id. at 948.
15. Id.