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Fuesting v. Lafayette Parish, 470 F.3d 576 (5th Cir. 2006)
Allyson L. Vaughn, 3L, University of Mississippi School of Law
Background
Around sunset on July 3, 2001, Michael Fuesting’s small pleasure boat collided with a sunken shrimp boat owned by Keith Griffin, resulting in substantial injury to Fuesting. The allision occurred near the bank of the Vermilion River in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana.
Approximately eight years prior to the incident Griffin reached an agreement with Alfred and Joyce Hatch to dock his shrimp boat along their dock. The boat became so deteriorated over the years that half of the ship was submerged in the riverbed while the rest remained visible above the waterline.
After the Lafayette Parish Bayou Vermilion District (the District) received complaints from numerous citizens regarding this eyesore, they obtained permission from Griffin to refloat and remove the boat. In 2001 the District attempted to remove the ship but failed. Neither the District nor the boat’s owner ever marked the submerged boat with buoys or lights.
Fuesting brought suit against the District alleging it was a responsible party under the Wreck Act1 and was negligent in removing the vessel. Fuesting claimed that the District was an operator of the shrimp boat because it undertook the task of removing it from the river.
The Wreck Act
The provisions of the Wreck Act apply to owners, lessees, and operators of sunken crafts. The Act places the burden on these individuals to immediately mark a wrecked and sunken vessel in a navigable channel with buoy or beacon and a light. These marks must remain on the vessel unless a waiver is obtained by the U.S. Coast Guard or the vessel is removed. The owner or operator must make immediate efforts to remove the sunken ship from navigable waterways.
The Lower Court Decision
The U.S. District Court for the Western Division of Louisiana granted summary judgment for the District on all claims. The court found that Fuesting did not present enough evidence to support a finding that the District was an operator of the vessel under the Wreck Act. While the court found that the District might be liable for its negligence in removing the ship under general maritime law,2 it later determined that the District was protected by La.Rev.Stat. § 9:2798.1(B), which grants statutory immunity to public entities for “policymaking or discretionary acts.” The District qualifies as a public entity. According to the lower court, the action of removing the vessel arose from discretionary acts. Fuesting appealed this judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit rejected the district court’s narrow application of the term “operator” under the Wreck Act. The Court turned to previous cases to support the finding that Congress intended to “ensure that navigable waterways remained free of obstructions, including sunken vessels.”3 Furthermore, towing vessels can violate the Wreck Act and have responsibility for the removal of a sunken vessel.
The Court rejected the District’s claim that a towage contract did not exist because there was no language of towing in the liability release agreement between Griffin and the District; in admiralty law, oral contracts are valid. The court also rejected the lower court’s finding that even if a towing contract existed, the District was not an “operator” under the Wreck Act because the towing attempt failed. This finding was contrary to the Congressional intent of the Wreck Act to allow for recovery by the government from numerous sources and to expand the pool of persons responsible for keeping the waterways navigable. The court held that “an entity that enters a towing contract but subsequently fails to tow the vessel as far as intended does not escape operator status because of its failure.”4
The Court of Appeals also rejected the lower court’s finding that the District was protected under La.Rev.Stat. § 9:2798.1(B).The appeals court examined the threshold question of whether a state statute limiting the liability of a municipal entity prevents a cause of action arising under admiralty law. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Workman v. City of New York that admiralty law is not replaced by local law because that would undermine the uniformity desired in maritime law; furthermore, municipalities do not have the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity that is enjoyed by the states.5 The exception to this general rule applies when the municipality acts as “an arm of the State, as delineated by the Supreme Court’s precedents.”6
The Court of Appeals remanded to the district court to decide if the Workman principle applies, because the District’s status as a public entity along with satisfying the criteria of Louisiana law does not create immunity from suit.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held that the granting of immunity solely based on Louisiana’s governmental immunity statute was incorrect. The lower court also incorrectly found that the District was not an operator under the Wreck Act. Because of these errors, the Court of Appeals remanded to the lower court for new proceedings.
.Endnotes
1. 33 U.S.C. § 409.
2.The court found negligence could exist against the District according to Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
3.Fuesting, 470 F.3d at 580 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. United States, 557 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1977)).
4. Id. at 580.
5. Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
6. N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham County, 126 S.Ct. 1689 (2006).
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