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Water Log 27.3, November, 2007

A Synopsis of Supplemental Rules B, C and D for Admiralty or Maritime Claims

J. Ralph White*

This paper was originally included in the written materials for the National Sea Grant Law Center’s Admiralty and Maritime Law Update, held on September 14, 2007 at the University of Mississippi.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the special remedies that may be sought in certain admiralty and maritime causes of action pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A party may gain some extremely powerful remedies through the use of Supplemental Rules B, C, and D. Each of these rules provides for judicial seizure of some form of the defendant’s property until the controversy has been adjudicated. The property may in some cases be sold to satisfy a judgment against its owner, or an in rem judgment against a vessel or other property. This paper presents a “nuts and bolts” overview and is not, and was not intended to be, a comprehensive treatment of the subject of the Supplemental Admiralty Rules.

Ways In Which Admiralty Jurisdiction Arises

Admiralty jurisdiction usually arises from two types of actions: actions dealing with contracts and actions dealing with torts.

      For admiralty jurisdiction to exist in suits involving contracts, the contract (and hence the transaction it pertains to) itself must be maritime in nature. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1 (1870). This raises the question: what does the subject matter of the contract have to be for it to be maritime in nature? The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a contract to repair a vessel is maritime in nature. North Pacific Steamship Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Railway & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119 (1919). In Hall Brothers the Court was faced with the question of whether a maritime contract exists when a ship is taken out of waters for a lengthy period to conduct extensive repairs. Id. at 123, 124. The Court held that a maritime contract did exist even though the ship was removed from the water, noting that the contract was for the repair of the vessel (as opposed to a contract for the construction of a ship which is not maritime in nature). Id. at 128, 129.

      Courts have held that if the subject matter of a contract “relates to a ship in its use as such, or to commerce or to navigation on navigable waters, or to transportation by sea or to maritime employment it is fairly said to constitute a maritime contract.” Maritima Petroleo E Engenharia LTDA v. Ocean Rig 1 AS, 78 F.Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Two notable exceptions to this rule are that neither a contract to build a vessel nor a contract to supply material for the construction of a ship are maritime in nature. People’s Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. 393 (1857).

      For admiralty jurisdiction to exist in a suit involving a tort, the test has traditionally been “locality plus.” If a claim arises on a vessel on the high seas or on navigable water, and it has what Professor Frank L. Maraist at Louisiana State University calls “salty flavor,” then it is a maritime tort. The Admiralty Extension Act extended this to “all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage be done or consummated on land.” Norfolk Southern Railway v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23-24 (2004). With regards to the “plus” part of the test, the Supreme Court has held that the activity that caused the tort has to have a potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce, and the general character of the activity that gave rise to the incident must show a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1990). That is “salty flavor.” This part of the test is commonly referred to as having a maritime nexus.

      An example of the existence of a maritime nexus can be found in the case of Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 530 (1995). In that case a dredge was driving pilings in the Chicago River and caused a leak in a tunnel underneath the riverbed. The Court reasoned that this tort (damage caused by a vessel to an underwater structure) could potentially disrupt maritime commerce in that the damage actually altered the flow of the river itself. The Court explained that this altered waterway could result in a disruption of the navigational use of the river while the damage was repaired. Id. at 538, 539. The Court then determined that the activity was substantially related to a traditional maritime activity.

Pleading Rules B, C, and D

A party that wishes to bring a claim that is maritime in nature may be allowed to benefit from certain rules found within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Sup­plemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims), which specifically govern admiralty and maritime claims. However, in order to be able to access these special rules, the claim itself must be identified as being an admiralty claim. The proper way to identify a claim as such is through the use of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) thereby triggering the Supplemental Admiralty Rules. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law: Practitioner Treatise Series Volume 1 386 (4th ed. 2003). It is important to note that Rule 9(h) is not needed to identify an admiralty claim when it can only be considered as such; in such a case the Supplemental Rules will automatically be applicable. Id. at 387.

      The proper way to use Rule 9(h) to identify an admiralty claim in a pleading is to state that admiralty jurisdiction exists. However if there are other jurisdictional bases for the claim, then the pleader must also list within the pleading an identifying statement to the effect of: “this is an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h).” Schoenbaum at 387, 388. If the previous statement (or something to that effect) is not made then the plaintiff’s claim may be treated as being non-maritime. Smith v. Pinell, 597 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1979); T.N.T. Marine Servs., Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards and Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1983).

      By bringing an admiralty case under Rule 9(h) the plaintiff will be able to seek special remedies that would not otherwise be available. These remedies include: Rule B, attachment, and Rule C, arrest. These remedies can be used to enforce a variety of claims, some of which are: cargo claims, mortgage foreclosures, claims for seamen’s wages, collision damage, supplies, repairs, pilotage, salvage, towage, wharfage, stevedoring, breach of charter party, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. Schoenbaum at 389.

Rule B >In personam Actions: Attachment and Garnishment”

Rule B – “In personam Actions: Attachment and Gar­ nishment,” allows a plaintiff to gain personal jurisdiction over a defendant who cannot be found within a particular federal district through the attachment of his property or garnishment of a debt owed to him. Stevedoring Serv. of America v. Ancora Transp., N.V., 941 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1991). In 1825 The Supreme Court approved of the practice of maritime attachment. Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. 473 (1825). Recovery is limited to the value of the vessel or property attached in the suit. Orbis Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. TEC Marine Lines, Ltd., 692 F.Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

      Maritime attachment serves two purposes: it allows the plaintiff to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant through his property; and it guarantees the satisfaction of claims, at least up to the value of the property. Western Bulk Carriers (Australia) v. P.S. Intl., Ltd., 762 F.Supp. 1302, 1306 (S.D. Ohio 1991). In Western the court laid out four pre-requisites that must be satisfied in order for the plaintiff to obtain a writ of maritime attachment. These four pre-requisites are: “(1) the plaintiff has an in personam claim against the defendant which is cognizable in admiralty; (2) the defendant cannot be found within the district in which the action is commenced; (3) property belonging to the defendant is present or will soon be present in the district; and (4) there is no statutory or general maritime law prohibition to the attachment.” Id.

      Attachment of property in the hands of a garnishee will only pertain to those assets that are in the possession of the garnishee at the time of service; and it will not apply to any property acquired after that date. Union Planters Natl. Bank v. World Energy Sys. Assoc., 816 F.2d 1092, 1098 (6th Cir. 1987).

      The plaintiff must adhere to the following process in order to invoke Rule B: first he must file a verified complaint which shows that the plaintiff has a prima facie case against the defendant which is maritime in nature. Second, the plaintiff must show (via affidavit) that the defendant cannot be found within the district. Schoenbaum at 393. The complaint, affidavits, and any documents filed with the complaint must be reviewed by a District Judge, who, if the pleading and affidavit are in order, will direct the clerk to issue the writ of attachment.

      “The order will issue when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that he has a maritime claim against the defendant in the amount sued for, and the defendant is not present in the district.” Schoenbaum at 395. Once the clerk delivers this order and process to the U.S. Marshal it will be served along with copies of the complaint and affidavit. Id. at 396.

      Both Rules B and C to allow the plaintiff to by-pass the pre-seizure judicial review by a District Judge if he files a “Certification of Exigent Circumstances.” In such cases, the Clerk of Court shall conduct the review and issue the order in the place of a District Judge. Id. at 394. Two examples of exigent circumstances are that no judge is available for the review, or the ship is about to leave the jurisdiction of the court. 15 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce No. 3 (July 1984). “This exception is intended to be very rare85every effort to secure judicial review, including conducting a hearing by telephone, should be pursued before resorting to the exigent circumstances procedure.” Id.

      At times it may be necessary for the Clerk of Court to issue supplemental process to enforce the court’s attachment order. The reason for this is that additional time may be needed to properly identify the garnishee (which may be difficult in cases involving intangible property). Schoenbaum at 396.

      Rule B is only applicable in the event that the plaintiff is unable to locate the defendant within the district. In order to determine whether the defendant is within the district the courts have created a two prong test. Schoenbaum at 397. According to the Fifth Circuit, the defendant must be found within the district in terms of both jurisdiction and service of process. LaBanca v. Ostermunchner, 664 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1981). The first prong of this test is the standard minimum contacts test that the Supreme Court handed down in International Shoe v. Washington, 26 U.S. 310 (1945). The second and more crucial prong is that the defendant (or his agent) must be present within the district for the purposes of receiving service of process. If both prongs of this test are satisfied then attachment under Rule B is improper and would be invalid. LaBanca at 67, 68. Should the defendant decide to try and avoid having his property attached, he may enter a special appearance before the court and argue that he has satisfied the two prong test found in LaBanca. Bonite Offshore II v. Italmare, S.P.A., 1983 AMC 538 (E.D.Va. 1982). Alternatively, it seems the defendant can defeat the attachment by waiving service of process and entering an in personam appearance. Schoenbaum at 398. The attachment will only reach the defendant’s property in the hands of a garnishee at the time of the attachment. Reiber Int’l Ltd. v. Cargo Carrier (Kacz-Co.) Ltd., 759 F.2d 262 (2nd Cir. 1985).

      According to Schoenbaum various types of property can be attached. Among these types of property are: “goods, chattels, or credits and effects in the possession of the garnishees.” Schoenbaum at 399. The property can be either tangible or intangible. Rule B(1)(a); Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263 (2nd Cir. 2002). A vessel itself can be attached under Rule B, as ships are considered “effects” and a lien against them is not required for attachment. Frontier Acceptance Corp. v. United Freight Forwarding Co., 286 F.Supp. 367 (D.N.J. 1968). “Rule B also specifically preserves a plaintiff’s right to use state property seizure procedures. State law may be used cumulatively with maritime attachment or alternatively.” Schoenbaum at 399. Rule B(1)(e); Rule 64, FRCP; see also Cordoba Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Maro Shipping Ltd., 494 F.Supp. 183 (D.Conn. 1980).

Rule C “In rem Actions: Special Provisions”

By bringing a maritime claim under Rule 9(h) the claimant gains the benefit of an extremely powerful remedy in the form of Supplemental Rule C – “In rem Actions: Special Provisions.” By seeking this remedy the claimant will have to bring an action in rem against a vessel or other maritime property. Schoenbaum at 400. This type of action involves the plaintiff naming the vessel herself as a defendant, and subsequently seizing the vessel to satisfy his claim. According to Schoenbaum, “an in rem action may be brought only by a plaintiff who possesses a maritime lien; thus, in rem process may be asserted only against the specific property that is the subject of the lien.” Id. at 401. Furthermore, since this is an in rem action it may only be brought in a federal court. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954).

      There are a number of different claims that may give rise to a lien against the vessel herself. Some of these claims are: “supplies ordered by a charterer; collision damage by a vessel under the control of a compulsory pilot; or damage caused by the master or crew of a vessel under bareboat charter.” Schoenbaum at 401.

      In order for a plaintiff to gain access to such a powerful remedy he must show the court that he has a maritime lien against the vessel. Once this has been accomplished the court will issue a warrant to arrest the vessel and foreclose (execute) on the lien. GEA Power Cooling Sys., Inc. v. M/V Nurnberg Atlantic, 748 F.Supp. 303, 304 (E.D.Pa. 1990). “The in rem process may be used to foreclose a maritime lien arising under a statute, such as the Ship Mortgage Act (46 U.S.C. A7 911 et seq.) or the Federal Maritime Lien Act (46 U.S.C. A7 971 et seq.), as well as arising under the general maritime law.” Schoenbaum at 406.

      The U.S. is probably the only nation that requires the existence of a maritime lien in order for a vessel to be arrested. Id. at 401. When a vessel is arrested for an in rem action the vessel itself is often the only contact that the ship owner has with the jurisdiction. Id. at 402. “Notice in an in rem action must be reasonably carried out to alert any known competing claimant.” Ehorn v. Sunken Vessel Known as “Rosinco”, 294 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2002).

      Schoenbaum outlines the process for using Rule C to arrest a vessel. The first thing that the plaintiff must file is a complaint and affidavit with the federal district court where the vessel is located or will be found during the course of the action. The affidavit must state that the plaintiff has a valid lien against the vessel. It is not necessary to provide the ship owner with notice of the impending seizure of the vessel. The only expense that is usually incurred by the plaintiff in having the vessel arrested is that he will usually be required to advance costs to the U.S. Marshal’s office to cover the Marshal’s costs of seizing and maintaining the vessel. It is important to consult the local rules of the district court where the suit will be filed in this regard. It may also be necessary or helpful to call the Marshal’s office for their assistance before filing suit. Of course, the plaintiffs must also pay the federal court filing fee. Schoenbaum A7 21-3.

      One of the greatest benefits (for the plaintiff) of arresting a ship is that the ship owner will have to post bond to obtain her release unless the plaintiff consents to the ship’s release. Id. Should a ship owner wish to recover its expenses in regaining its property as a result of a wrongful arrest he must show that the plaintiff acted in bad faith or with malice. Ocean Ship Supply, Ltd. v. MV Leah, 729 F.2d 971, 974 (4th Cir. 1984).

      The in rem complaint must “describe the property which is the subject of the action; allege that a maritime lien exists and the grounds therefor; state the circumstances giving rise to the claim with such particularity that a prima facie case of liability is evident; and state that the property is within the jurisdiction of the court.” Schoenbaum at 408. Upon receiving the complaint and affidavit a District Judge must review the complaint and affidavit and “[i]f the conditions for an in rem action appear to exist, the court must issue an order directing the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the vessel or other property85” Rule C (3)(9)(i) FRCP. In the event that the ship owner does not post bond or fails to appear in court to contest the seizure, judgment may be entered against the vessel and she may be sold at auction. Auctioning off a vessel under Rule C is the process by which the plaintiff executes the maritime lien that he has against the vessel. By executing his lien, the plaintiff has effectively extinguished all other existing liens against the vessel “regardless of whether the other lien holders had actual notice of the admiralty proceedings.” Tamblyn v. River Bend Marine, Inc., 837 F.2d 447, 448 (11th Cir. 1988).

      In order to protect against an inadequate judgment, a plaintiff may simultaneously bring actions against both the vessel (in rem) and vessel owner (in personam) unless prohibited by law. By pursuing this course of action a plaintiff can obtain a deficiency judgment against the ship owner for the amount of damages that were not covered by the sale of the vessel. This assumes, of course, that the vessel owner is subject to in personam jurisdiction in the venue where the vessel is seized. Bollinger & Boyd Barge Service, Inc. v. Motor Vessel, Captain Claude Bass, 576 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1978).

Rule D “Possessory, Petitory, and Partition Actions”

The Special Rules for Admiralty Claims afford a certain level of protection for the interests of the defendant (as well as an important remedy for the plaintiff) in actions governed by Rule D, which provides a possessory action, and serves the plaintiff in much the same way as the common law remedy of replevin. A plaintiff seeking to assert a legal title to the vessel may do so through the application of a petitory suit under Rule D. “A petitory suit is defined as one seeking to try title to a vessel independently of possession.” Silver v. Sloop Silver Cloud, 259 F.Supp. 187, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). However, the court went on to say that it would be insufficient for the plaintiff to merely assert an equitable interest in the res. Id.

      Sloop Silver Cloud describes a petitory action for possession (under Rule D) as “A possessory action 85 where a party entitled to possession of a vessel seeks to recover that vessel. It is brought to reinstate an owner of a vessel who alleges wrongful deprivation of property.” Id. Another way in which a Rule D possessory action can be brought, is by a charterer of a vessel who seeks to have the owner of same redeliver the vessel. The Nellie T., 235 Fed. 117 (C.A.2 1916).

      Rule D can be employed to partition a vessel. This is sometimes necessary when two or more co-owners of a vessel can neither decide on how to use it nor reach an equitable sales agreement over the vessel. Schoenbaum at 412. The Supreme Court has stated that courts do have the power to use Rule D for purpose of partitioning a vessel. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 561 (1954).

      A Rule D action is commenced by a complaint and warrant of arrest of the vessel and notice to adverse parties. After Rule D has been utilized to bring the vessel into the custody of the court, release of the vessel may be obtained only by order of the court upon giving such security as the court may require. Rule E(5)(d). Furthermore, should the district court elect to release the vessel or other property, it does not lose jurisdiction over it if it leaves the district. Eliot v. M/V Lois B., 980 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1993).

Maritime Liens

As stated earlier, in order for the plaintiff to utilize Rule C, he must show the court that he has a valid lien against the vessel. “A true maritime lien may be defined as (a) a privileged claim, (b) upon maritime property, (c) for services rendered to it or damage caused by it, (d) accruing from the moment when the claim attaches, (e) traveling with the property unconditionally, and (f) enforced by means of an action in rem.” Alex L. Parks & Edward V. Cattrell, Jr., The Law of Tug, Tow, and Pilotage 785 (3d ed. 1994). It is important to note that a vessel owner may not be held to be personally liable for a debt that was incurred by the vessel; the reason for this is that the courts consider the vessel to be a “juristic person” that is held liable in rem. The China, 74 U.S. 53 (1868).

      The Supreme Court has stated that the vessel is liable in rem for the negligent acts of anyone who is lawfully in possession of her, whether that person is acting in the capacity as owner or charterer. The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464 (1901). A maritime lien can attach only when proper services have been rendered to the vessel while she is in the lawful possession and control of anyone operating her. Yet any services rendered to the vessel while held by a U.S. Marshal will not give rise to a maritime lien. Parks at 786, 787.

        Also, it should be noted that under the Federal Maritime Lien Act, public vessels are not subject to maritime liens. 46 U.S.C. A7 31342(b). The Eleventh Circuit upheld this statute in the case of Bonnani Ship Supply v. U.S., 959 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1992). However, the plaintiff may still proceed with an in personam action against the government. Parks at 787. Foreign governments that own vessels, have similar protection arising under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 U.S.C. A7 1605.

      There are many different types of liens, which may provide for the arrest of the vessel. Either maritime contracts or maritime torts can give rise to a maritime lien against a vessel. Some of the various maritime contracts that can give rise to a maritime lien are contracts for “seamen’s wages, supplies, repairs, or the furnishing of other necessities such as towage, pilotage, wharfage, and steverdore services, charter parties, contracts of affreightment, and salvage.” Parks at 789. “Maritime liens are not limited to vessels alone, but also apply to cargo being carried as well. Charter parties and contracts of affreightment, salvage, general average, and claims for unpaid freight all give rise to liens against the cargo of a vessel in appropriate circumstances.” Id. at 793.

      The seamen’s wage lien is considered sacred by the Supreme Court, which stated, “so long as a plank of the ship remains, the sailor is entitled, against all other persons, to the proceeds as security for his wages.” The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113 (1898). However, a seaman does not have a lien against the vessel if a person who was not lawfully in possession of the vessel hired him. The Gen. McPherson, 100 F. 860 (D. Wash. 1900).

      The Fifth Circuit has held that a person who advances money to pay seamen’s wages is entitled to a maritime lien of the same rank as a wage claim. Bank of New Orleans v. Tracy Marie, 580 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1978). However, for this to be the case several qualifications must be fulfilled. First, the person who advances the payment to the seaman must show that he has advanced the payment to the specified seaman and in the specified amount. In re Good Ship Appledore, 122 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D.Me. 1991). Next, the person who has advanced the payment must show the court that he has an agency relationship with the vessel owner. Finally, the one who has advanced the payment must show that the expected profits will come from the vessel herself and not from some other agreement with the owner. First Natl. Bank v. Lightning Power, 851 F.2d 1543 (5th Cir. 1988).

      With regards to supplies, repairs, and other general necessaries that a vessel may need, Parks states that “the present state of the law is not far from the point where any service which is ‘convenient, useful and at times necessary’ may qualify as a lien under the Federal Maritime Lien Act and its re-codification.” Parks at 805 (paraphrasing Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, The Law of Admiralty 685 (2d ed. 1975)). Some examples of what the court has deemed as “services” that will give rise to a lien are as follows: supplying radar equipment to a vessel, Layton Indus v. Gladiator, 263 F.Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1967); repairs, materials, and dockage given to a vessel, Miami River Boat Yard v. 60 Ft. Houseboat, 390 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968); and furnishing necessaries to a space charterer of a vessel by a stevedore (where the owner was aware that the services were being rendered and did not object), Jan C. Uiterwyk v. Mare Arabico, 459 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1978).

      Among the items that courts have deemed as “necessaries” that will give rise to a lien are fuel and oil supplied to a vessel. Gerard Const. v. Virginia, 480 F.Supp. 488 (W.D. Pa. 1979). Containers that are leased to a carrier are held to be necessaries from which a lien may arise. Farrell Ocean Services, Inc. v. Cosmos, 1983 AMC 1483 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Interestingly, if a plaintiff decides to release a defendant’s vessel from attachment, the courts will consider this to be a necessary, due to the fact that it allows the vessel to continue engaging in business. Chi Shun Hua Steel Co. v. Crest Tankers, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 18 (D.N.H. 1989).

      Seamen may also bring a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo on a vessel in the event that they have been injured due to the vessel being unseaworthy. The courts have stated without doubt that a seaman may exert a maritime lien against a vessel for indemnity suffered through the unseaworthiness of the vessel. The Imperator, 288 F. 372 (C.A. 5 1923). The courts have said that “the scope of the ancient maritime lien was unquestionably broadened when liability to seamen for injuries arising on account of unseaworthiness85was recognized.” Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 741 (C.A.S.C. 1975). As to what unseaworthy means, the court has sometimes described it as a place on the ship where it is considered unsafe to work. Id. (citing Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347, 353 (4th Cir. 1968)).

      An additional type of lien that is extremely important in the realm of admiralty law is that of the ship mortgage. Congress passed the Ship Mortgage Act with the purpose of giving the holders of ship mortgages precedence in the lien process over all but preferred maritime liens. 46 U.S.C. A7A7 911 – 984. Section 953(b) of Title 46 reads as follows: “[u]pon the sale of any mortgaged vessel by order of a district court of the United States in any suit in rem in admiralty for the enforcement of a preferred mortgage lien thereon, all preexisting claims in the vessel, including any possessory common-law lien of which a lienor is deprived under the provisions of subsection L [A7 952 of this title] shall be held terminated and shall thereafter attach, in like amount and in accordance with their respective priorities, to the proceeds of the sale; except that the preferred mortgage lien shall have priority over all claims against the vessel, except (1) preferred maritime liens, and (2) expenses and fees allowed and costs taxed, by the court.”

      For a discussion of the priority of maritime liens and ship mortgage liens, please review Schoenbaum, A7A7 9-5 and 9-6.

Conclusion
This paper is intended only to present an overview of the topics covered. Anyone attempting to seize his or her first vessel is cautioned to do his or her “homework” first, and review the Federal Rules and cases and statutory law and the local rules carefully. Please note the Rule E applies generally to in rem and quasi in rem actions. Rule A defines the scope of the admiralty rules. Rule F pertains to limitation of liability actions, and Rule G pertains to forfeiture actions. Good luck!

* Founding partner, White Law Firm, New Orleans, Louisiana and Oxford, Mississippi. Mr. White extends special thanks to Mark A. DeVrient, 3L, University of Mississippi School of Law, who spent many hours assisting in the preparation of this paper.

University of Mississippi