Politics, Race, Fiscal Strain and
State Electoral Reforms After Election 2000

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Abstract

The challenging elections of 2000 triggered electoral reforms across many states, though the scope and depth of these reforms varied widely. While political scientists have begun to understand the correlates of race politics, and state policy making in general, much less attention has been paid to these relationships and electoral reforms. In this paper we examine the role of politics, ethnicity, and fiscal health in leading states to pass electoral reform legislation. Using state level data from 2001-2002, we find that electoral balance played a key role in the passage of electoral reforms. Specifically, states with a divided government were averse to reform their electoral laws. We also find an interaction between partisan control (Republican) and minority representation (Hispanic) and electoral reforms. Finally, fiscal and local constraints had a negligible impact. Overall, our findings suggest that the extent of electoral reforms was mainly shaped by concerns with the electoral balance and the potential electorate.

After the troubled 2000 elections many states focused on reforming their election systems. For example, in 2001 state legislatures passed 321 new laws covering issues such as voting equipment, voter intent, registration, and absentee ballots.[1] In 2002, 171 more laws were passed. However, this drive for election reform was not uniform throughout the states. While 33 states passed laws related to absentee votes, only 16 introduced laws on new voting equipment, 16 passed laws on recount procedures, and 10 introduced laws establishing a centralized registration database. Not all states attempted election reforms and among those that did launch reforms many focused on different areas.

Clearly, states' expectations of the federal government's leadership on electoral reform further prompted them to examine their electoral systems. In October 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which not only promised financial support to the states for undertaking certain reforms, including updating their equipment, but mandated compliance with certain national standards. A new round of state-level legislation followed the enactment of HAVA as states sought to meet deadlines for submitting a plan for compliance to be certified by a new independent U.S. Election Assistance Commission. By the end of 2003, 46 states had considered bills dealing with HAVA, but the extent of these reforms varied greatly from state to state. Only twenty-six states had passed relatively comprehensive HAVA compliance bills.[2]

Despite the expectations and intent of HAVA, states undertook quite dissimilar paths of electoral reform, both before and after HAVA. In part this may be the result of a greatly delayed leadership role from Washington. For example, the Senate only approved the four members of the HAVA-approved U.S. Election Assistance Commission in December of 2003, close to 10

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[1] These figures are reported by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) at www.ncsl.org.

[2] Refer to the NCSL's report at www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/taskfc/03billsum.htm.

months behind schedule. As a result of this delayed appointment, the distribution of federal reform funding was also greatly held up; and only $2 million of the promised $10 million was allocated for the operations of the Commission. Similarly, the 2004 fiscal year presidential budget proposal provided only $40 million of $800 million promised for electoral improvements at the state level under HAVA.[3]

In addition, HAVA legislation allows the states much discretion in their final implementation of the law, in and of itself promoting a differential path of reform while raising some concerns about the possible lack of consistency of state electoral legislation. For example, the much-maligned punch cards have actually not been banned by HAVA, but rather states can choose voluntarily to replace these systems with the help of federal funds.[4]

As a result, the passage and implementation of HAVA did not create a uniform set of electoral laws across the 50 states. Although under HAVA the states were expected to establish new legislation in several areas such as voter registration, voter intent, and the use of provisional ballots, how the states proceeded in these areas appears to have depended on state-level economic and political factors. Furthermore, widely publicized controversies over the reliability of electronic voting, voter eligibility, and possible voter intimidation, have continued well into the presidential election year 2004.[5] The potential partisan political role of top election

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[3] "Budgeting for Another Florida," *New York Times*, February 8, 2004.

[4] Quite notably, the 2004 elections will still find states such as Ohio and Missouri, among others, using punch cards. See "Election Reform 2004: What's Changed, What Hasn't, and Why?" at www.electionline.org.

[5] For examples see Brigid Schulte, "Jolted Over Electronic Voting," *Washington Post*, August 11, 2003; "How America Doesn't Vote," *New York Times*, February 15, 2004; Adam Cohen, "The Results are in and the Winner Is . . . or Maybe Not," *New York Times*, February 29, 2004; "Florida as the Next Florida," *New York Times*, March 14, 2004; "The Confusion Over Voter ID," *New York Times*, April 4, 2004;

administrators in the states has also continued to draw media attention.[6] In short, although a good deal of new legislation has been passed, no panacea has yet been applied to the ills that the state-level and HAVA electoral reforms were presumably intended to address after the 2000 election.

So the question remains, why did some states actively reform their electoral systems, engaging in early-on and costly reforms, while others did not? The goal of this paper is to explain variation in state election reform after the 2000 election, with an emphasis on the years 2001-2002, before HAVA, though we also examine the reforms after HAVA. In particular, were Democrat controlled states more likely to pass reforms that increased accessibility to vote? Did Republican controlled states tend to favor stricter requirement reforms, and even more so when in the presence of high concentrations of minorities? Were states under fiscal stress more reluctant to pass reforms?

In spite of the triggering event, we begin by conjecturing that state election reform was not driven simply by the current state of the election administration. On the one hand, the large literature on state policy making tells us that state legislatures have been responsive to an array of internal characteristics, including quite importantly political and electoral constraints (e.g., Barrilleaux 1997, Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Berry and Berry 1990, 1999; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Sabatier 1999). On the other hand, the literature on turnout and voter mobilization has revealed that expanding the electorate is not simply a random expansion of the voter pool but demographic, and sometimes partisan, shifts can occur (Brians and Grofman

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"Panel: Don't Use Diebold Touch-Screen Voting Machines," *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 22, 2004; and "Bad New Days for Voting Rights," *New York Times* [editorial], April 18, 2004.

[6] "Making Votes Count: When the Umpire Takes Sides," *New York Times*, March 29, 2004.

2001; Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Highton and Wolfinger 1998; Hill and Leighley 1996, 1999; Knack and White 2000; Martinez and Hill 1999; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This suggests that election administration can be a highly politicized policy area to reform. Furthermore, the last major national reform of voter eligibility and registration before 2000, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 – the so-called "motor voter" act – was widely interpreted in partisan political circles as having a pro-Democratic bias.[7] Thus, would-be election reformers at both the state and national levels after 2000 had reason to be cautious and strategic about adopting any new electoral reforms.

Building on the previous strands of literature, we hypothesize that state election reform has been shaped by five categories of factors: (1) base need for reform of the state's electoral system, (2) state partisan politics (party control and party balance), (3) state fiscal health and constraints, (4) the size of the mobilizable vote of major ethnic minorities, in particular African Americans and Hispanics, and (5) the interaction of partisan politics and minority presence. In contrast to some previous research on this subject (Greco 2003), we examine reform as a set of discrete areas, not as an overall index of reform. Specifically, we test our hypotheses in four key areas of reform in 2001-2002: new equipment, improved voter registration, provisional voting, and voter ID. These areas of reform constitute the most controversial aspects of election reform and take a central role in HAVA legislation.[8] But more importantly, the politics of the different areas is likely to differ, which is precisely at the core of what we want to test.

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[7] See, for example, the article by Kit Bond, Republican Senator from Missouri, "'Motor Voter' Out of Control," which appeared as an op ed article in the *Washington Post* on June 27, 2001 and was later widely republished, especially on the web.

[8] Other important but less controversial areas of reform had to do with absentee voting, in particular regarding requirements for oversees and military voting, voting standards, voting accessibility, and voting education programs, among others.

Studying electoral reforms after election 2000 provides us with a unique opportunity to test and expand our theories on state policy making to a distinct policy area that has not often been systematically studied, possibly because it is rare, and in which the policy outcome directly affects the potential electorate. Our paper elaborates next the theories and hypotheses behind states' electoral reform policy making. Following this, we describe the state-level data from 2001-2002, which we then use to test the hypotheses within a discrete choice framework. The analyses provide concrete confirmations of how political concerns with the potential electorate influenced the likelihood of states' electoral law reforms. In the final part of the paper we undertake a preliminary analysis into states' post-HAVA reforms.

Theoretical Issues

Understanding state election reform intersects research on state policy-making, party electoral strategies, and turnout and representation. We contend that states, and in particular state legislators, reacted to the external shock of the troubled 2000 election in accordance with internal state characteristics. Electoral reform policy-making brings to the forefront the potential to influence who the electorate will be, which directly depends on each state's characteristics. Because of this, and because the electoral reforms in 2001-2002 were focused in time as well as bounded by external timelines given by the federal government's expected and eventual actual passage of legislation late in 2002, we focus on internal state characteristics as explanations, as opposed to national or "neighboring states" explanations that are also present in policy diffusion studies, though we do test for some of the latter.[9]

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[9] The policy diffusion literature is vast. See Berry (1994), and Berry and Berry (1992) for overviews; see Walker (1969) and Gray (1974), for seminal works in this field. The main explanations for policy

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Hypothesis 1: Baseline Need. *States are more likely to adopt electoral reforms if they need to do so, that is their rules and practices have been identified as leading to a large residual vote, or more generally, to election-time problems.*

Previous research on state level policy-making has shown the need to control for baseline levels or demand for reform when explaining policy reforms and policy adoptions (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002; Berry and Berry 1992, 1994). The counting of votes debacle of the 2000 election in Florida raised the awareness in every state of the need to review their electoral technology and their rules for voter eligibility and ballot counting. For example, the quality of voting equipment, and whether particular groups or regions within the state were more likely to have inferior or older voting technologies, came under close scrutiny. In general, the condition of states' electoral laws prompted examination and most likely contributed to reforms.

For each area of electoral reform that we examine we gauge the *status quo ante* in order to take into account the baseline need for reform. For example, in accounting for whether states took initiatives to upgrade their voting equipment, we expect states that found themselves with voting technology that led to a large percentage of residual votes to take action to replace such technology.[10] Our baseline measure of the need for reform in voting equipment is the prevalence of certain types of voting technology.

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diffusion have been combinations of internal characteristics, external pressures and neighboring states' influences. However, the neighboring states explanations have been posited in policy adoptions that have taken place over an extended period, which is not the case in our study of electoral reforms, at least at this stage. See Appendix B for discussion of our model and results including controls for "neighbor" effects.

[10] "Residual votes," as the Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project has defined them, have three components: undervotes (unmarked ballots), overvotes (voting for more candidates than allowed for a given office), and uncounted ballots (whether because the ballots were mismarked or for some other reason).

The public and media discussion, as well as the legal proceedings after the year 2000 election in Florida, stimulated a substantial body of scientific literature on voting technology. This literature showed that punch card ballots and some other ballot forms and electoral procedures are likely to produce a larger percentage of residual votes than other systems. The Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project has estimated that between 4 and 6 million votes are typically lost in presidential elections, and that 1.5 to 2 million of those are due to faulty equipment and confusing ballots, 1.5 to 3 million due to registration mix-ups, up to 1 million due to polling place operations, and an unknown additional number due to the way absentee ballots are administered.[11]

The quality of voting equipment and its interaction with the ethnic and racial makeup of the electorate has also been the subject of a large amount of research. Whether or not Hispanic and black voters were in fact likely to live in precincts with inferior error-prone voting technology, after election 2000 there was a widespread belief that this was true (Knack and Kropf 2002). More to the point, the evidence seems clear that minorities are more likely to cast invalid ballots than are whites when they use punch card or centrally optically scanned ballots (Tomz and Van Houweling 2003).[12]

Hypothesis 2: Size of the Racial and Ethnic Minority Vote. *Because states with high proportions of ethnic minority voters are likely to have higher proportions of residual votes, we*

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[11] See Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project report, "Voting: What Is, What Could Be," www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/ABOUT/termlimit.htm. Also see Sinclair and Alvarez (2002) and Tomz and Van Houwelling (2003) for both evidence and summaries of the literature.

[12] When locally scanned ballots allow for the possibility of checking and correcting for overvotes or other invalid markings, the proportion of invalid ballots cast by minority voters does not differ from that of whites (Tomz and Van Houwelling 2003).

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expect states with higher proportions of minority voters to be more likely to upgrade their electoral technology, and more generally to enact electoral reforms.

If voting equipment were upgraded especially in areas where minority voters are concentrated, then the votes of minorities would be more likely to be counted than before. However, any elected official is likely to view potential minority group voters in a partisan way. The overwhelming majority of black voters prefer Democratic candidates. In the 2000 Presidential election, 90 percent of black voters voted for Albert Gore, and 2 percent for Ralph Nader. Whereas only an estimated 8 percent of black voters voted for George W. Bush, an estimated 33 percent of Hispanics did so (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2002: 98). Of course, among Latinos of Cuban origins a majority favors the Republican party over the Democratic party (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003).

Thus, when we take the partisan incentives into account, we hypothesize that Republican-led statehouses and legislatures were <u>less</u> likely to upgrade the voting equipment if there were a sizeable African American electorate in the state and <u>more</u> likely to do so if there were a sizeable Hispanic electorate. In contrast, Democrat-led statehouses and legislatures would be more likely to upgrade the voting equipment the greater the size of either (or both) the African American and Hispanic electorate.[13]

Hypothesis 3: Partisan Control and Electoral Reform. Electoral reform involves more than just voting technology. Some other areas of electoral reform also have a strong

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[13] Some of the provisions of HAVA divided the civil rights community. As reported by Edward Walsh in the *Washington Post* (October 17, 2002), "In the House, the Congressional Black Caucus endorsed the overall bill, saying provisional ballots and improved methods to verify a voter's registration will make it more difficult to challenge minority voters. But the Congressional Hispanic Caucus opposed it, contending that the identification requirements will disproportionately affect Latinos and depress Latino voting." Thus, the Republicans' strong commitment to voter ID may have run counter to their desire to build a Republican majority among Latino voters.

partisan valence. In the debates prior to the enactment of HAVA, Republicans demanded and ultimately achieved a strong Voter ID requirement, purportedly to reduce the incidence of fraudulent voting.[14] They also favored centralized voting registration lists.

Democrats, on the other hand, strongly favored provisional voting, whereby voters whose identity or registration was challenged at the polls on election day could submit a provisional ballot, which could be counted after the voter's eligibility had been validated. Democrats also favored election-day registration, so that newly mobilized voters would have a chance to vote. Advocates of minorities also favored less restrictive voter ID requirements as well as increasing access to the voting booth.[15]

In the end, there was something in the Help America Vote Act to address the concerns of both parties. As Senator Mitch McConnell was quoted as saying, "We both came into this process with our own biases."[16]

Therefore, we expect to find that during 2001 and 2002 Republican-controlled state legislatures and governorships were more likely than Democratic-controlled legislatures and governorships to enact improved registration and strong voter ID rules. At the same time Republicans would be less likely than Democrats to favor provisional ballots and new equipment laws.

Hypothesis 4: Divided Party Control and Interparty Competition. In situations of both divided party control and strong interparty competition, the risk is very great of shifting

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[14] "Conferees Reach a Pact on Election Reforms," *Washington Post*, October 5, 2002.

[15] Jim Drinkard, "Window of Opportunity Closing on Fixing Election System," *Washington Post*, September 16, 2002.

[16] See previous footnote.

control of the statehouse or the legislature as a result of voting reforms that may increase turnout, the mobilization of selective constituencies, or more accurate counting of votes.[17] Under these conditions, the competing parties are less likely to agree on a broad package of electoral reforms, some of which may favor one party, and some of which may favor the other. *Both close partisan balance and divided party control are likely, then, to lead to delay in the passage of comprehensive legislation whose electoral consequences are uncertain on balance*.

It is relevant to recall that during 2001-2002 the state legislatures were preoccupied with establishing new legislative districts after the 2000 census. In this context, legislators would be especially attuned to the partisan consequences of election reforms.

Hypotheses 5: Legislative Style. *We expect more professional legislatures to move early toward changing their electoral system than less professional legislatures.* Not only are more professional legislatures more likely to be innovative, but the more professional the staff and the more established the committee structure (two elements of legislative professionalism) the more able the legislature is to begin to address reforms. More professional legislature are more likely to be informed about innovations and options considered in other states, and to the extent that greater professionalism is associated with higher incumbency rates, legislators in more professional legislatures may be better able to calculate the costs and benefits of innovation in the electoral system (Berry, Berkman and Schneiderman 2000; Squire 1988).

Changing the rules concerning registering, voting and counting of ballots carries a risk to legislators. Some changes might follow the "law of unintended consequences," while also in many cases the *intended* consequences may not be palatable to incumbents. However, if a

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[17] In preliminary work, Greco (2003) finds that party competition is a key factor when explaining an aggregate average index of electoral reform by states in a model testing mainly for the effect of political factors.

substantial portion of the legislature is subject to term limits, then *ceteris paribus* the legislators are less personally at risk if they introduce reforms that they see as needed or beneficial to the state.[18] *We hypothesize, therefore, that legislatures with term limits are more likely to discount the risks of electoral reform, and therefore that legislatures with term limits were more likely to adopt electoral reforms during 2001 and 2002.*

Hypotheses 6: Fiscal Constraints. In situations of severe state revenue declines, balanced budget rules and standard fiscal management policies constrain state legislators from passing new laws that are financially straining. New voting equipment laws and improved registration (purging lists and centralizing registration) are examples of electoral reforms with costly price tags.

In general, the literature on state fiscal policy innovation, in particular from studies on tax innovation, has shown that states are less likely to enact costly legislation when their government's fiscal health deteriorates (Berry and Berry 1992). *Consequently, we hypothesize that states in better long-standing fiscal health were more likely to adopt potentially costly electoral reforms, while states facing short-term fiscal strain were more likely to delay passage of these reforms.*

Data and Methodology

To test our hypotheses on the explanations for electoral reforms we collected data on all state electoral reforms after the 2000 election in 4 critical areas: new voting equipment,

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[18] One useful reference on the broad interest on term limits, both academic and popular, is again the NCSL at www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/ABOUT/termlimit.htm.

improved registration, provisional ballots, and voter ID.[19] We also collected data on which states passed laws specifically targeted to comply with some of the requirements of HAVA, after HAVA was passed. Our dependent variable in subsequent analyses is then a discrete variable (1 or 0) indicating whether a state introduced a given type of electoral reform in 2001-2002 or a HAVA compliance law in 2002-2003.[20] To our knowledge, previous research on electoral reform after 2000 has only examined aggregate indexes of reform and not separately by reform area (see Greco 2003). These aggregate measures, accounting for the extent of reform and the number of bills, may not capture the political valence of each type of reform and may give undue weight to how bills are sectioned.

We conduct probit analyses predicting the probability that a state passed a certain class of electoral reform given an array of appropriate statistical controls. The independent variables are grouped into four categories of factors: political, racial-ethnic, institutional, and base level factors. See Appendix A for descriptive statistics and data source of the variables.

Political Factors. Political factors refer to the political environment in a state in terms of partisanship and the division of power in election year 2000. Our expectations are that party competition made electoral reforms in general less likely, and that partisan control mattered given the directionality or expected partisan valence of the reforms themselves.

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[19] The 4 types of reform have high visibility, broad potential repercussions for voters and politicians, and differential implications for the Republican and Democratic parties. Moreover, these areas became the centerpiece of HAVA legislation.

[20] We consider only "major" reforms, following the NCSL's interpretation of comprehensive reforms (see www.ncsl.org). For example, many states introduced legislation planning for new equipment but fewer states passed laws actually committing to new purchases. We also examined the summary text for each law to insure the directionality of the reform, that is, that for example, new voter ID laws meant in almost all cases *tighter* voter ID laws.

To assess party competition we include two variables: Divided Government and Party Competition 1988-1998. The first variable indicates whether a state had different parties holding the statehouse and the state legislature after the 2000 election (13 states).[21] The second is a Ranney-like index of party competition in the governorship and the legislature from the period 1988-1998. This measure, ranging from 1 for the most competitive to 0.5 for the least competitive, is an index of how closely competitive the two parties were between 1988-1998. To assess partisan control we include the variables Republican Control and Democratic Control. The first measure flags whether Republicans controlled both the state house and the state legislature (13 states), and similarly, the second measure flags control by the Democrats (8 states).[22]

Racial Factors. We conjectured above that states with higher percentages of minorities would be more likely to enact a reform, and we also conjectured that we would find partisan and specific minority interactions. There were a variety of possible indicators to choose from to capture the potential minority vote. After some analysis, we decided that the use of a combined percentage of minorities (black *plus* Hispanic) does not capture the empirical relationships as well as separate variables for each ethnic group.[23] Therefore we include as separate controls the variables Percent Black and Percent Hispanic. Regarding the interactions, we include the

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[21] A state legislature is considered to be held by one party if *both* chambers have a majority of the same party.

[22] With 13 states with a divided government, 13 states with Republican control and 8 states with Democratic control, the remaining 16 states are the omitted baseline.

[23] We also considered using the percent of the mobilizable African American and Hispanic population but decided against this since we lost observations for those states (3) for which there are no estimates on minority turnout (from US census Population survey estimates). In general, turnout, registration, the size of the mobilizable vote or just population measures of minorities are all highly correlated and any one of them should capture the main effects.

variables Percent Black *and* Republican Control, and Percent Hispanic *and* Republican

Control.[24]

S*tate Institutional Factors.* Institutional factors refer to characteristics of the state and

its legislative institutions that can affect the likelihood of passage of electoral reforms. In

particular, we include the variables Percent Debt, Fiscal Expenditure Change, Legislative

Professionalism, and Term Limits. Percent Debt is the percent that long standing debt represents

of the total general state revenues in fiscal year 2000-2001. We conjecture that states with

higher debt were, all else equal, less likely to pass costly reforms. The variable Fiscal

Expenditure Change is the expected percentage increase in expenditures between fiscal year

2001 and 2002. We hypothesize that states expecting immediate declines in spending were less

likely to incur further spending via costly new laws. The variable Legislative Professionalism is

an historical index that combines various evaluations of a state's legislature such as days of

operation, pay, etc.; and Term Limits indicates whether a state had term limits in 2000.

Base-level Factors. Base-level factors capture the *need* for reform by addressing the

status of electoral law in a given state before election 2000. For each class of electoral reforms

we attempted to find a measure (or a proxy) of how a state was doing in that dimension of

election law in 2000. For the technological reforms -- new voting equipment and improved

registration -- we include respectively the base levels of Percent Population with High Error

Voting Equipment in 2000, and Statewide Registration, both of which measure preexisting

technological conditions. The baseline for new equipment laws gives the percentage of total

state population who were voting using punch cards or electronic voting machines before

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[24] As will be discussed in the results section, we did not find interaction effects between Democratic
control and African American or Hispanic representation.

election 2000. These two voting systems have been found to produce the highest voting error rates (Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Report 2001). When accounting for the passage of laws on provisional ballots we control for late registration deadlines with the variable Late Registration, which indicates whether a state had registration deadlines of fewer than 10 days before an election.

For the election reforms dealing with voter requirements, improved registration, and voter ID, we use measures or proxies of voter requirements in place in 2000. The base level for improved registration laws is an indicator variable flagging whether a state had a statewide (not necessarily computerized) registration system in 2000. Last, the base level control for voter ID was Mandatory Voter ID, which identifies whether a state required voters to show a valid ID at the time of voting.

Results

Preliminary Breakdowns

Figures 1.a-d present a summary of the proportion of states that passed the four types of electoral laws that we study during 2001-2002, given various political and racial factors. Figures 1a and 1b show summaries for new voting equipment laws and provisional ballot laws, two types of electoral reforms that could enfranchise more voters and that might have been favored by Democrats. Figures 1c and 1d show summaries for improved registration and voter ID laws, two types of electoral reforms that could raise the hurdles for voting, and that might have been favored by Republicans. Each bar represents the proportion of states that passed an electoral reform given an indicated covariate. For example, in Figure 1a, while 30 percent of all states passed new voting equipment laws, if we restrict ourselves only to states under Republican

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control (13 states) then 38 percent passed new voting equipment laws, while if we restrict ourselves to states under Democrat control (8 states), 50 percent passed such laws.

(Figures 1a and 1b about here)

These preliminary breakdowns reveal a few patterns. Electoral balance, in particular the presence of a divided government, has a very strong depressant effect on the rates of passage of new equipment laws and provisional ballot laws (Figures 1a and 1b). Among states with a divided government (13), *none* of them passed new provisional ballot laws, while among all states 20 percent did. Similarly, among states with a divided government, only 8% passed new equipment laws, while among all states 30 percent did. In comparison, divided government had less of an effect on the rates of passage of improved registration and voter ID laws (Figures 1c and 1d). In general, the effect of divided government seems stronger on those reforms that can expand the size and composition of the electorate.

(Figures 1c and 1d about here)

In terms of partisanship, interestingly, one of the strongest correlates with reform across all four types is the interaction of party control and minority representation, specifically Hispanic representation. Among states with a large percentage of Hispanic population *and* Republican control (7 states), 42 percent passed new voting equipment laws and 57 percent passed provisional ballot laws, much higher rates than the overall rate of passage among all states. On the other hand, among these states, no voter ID laws were passed, while overall 20 percent of all states did so.

Although suggestive, these preliminary analyses, focusing mainly on political and racial factors, do not simultaneously control for all the covariates that we think should be controlled for

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when predicting passage of electoral reforms. In the next sections, we account not only for racial and political factors but also base level needs for reform and fiscal constraints.

Multivariate Analysis

For each electoral reform we estimate a discrete choice specification (probit) predicting the probability of passage given our hypothesized covariates. The results for all estimations are summarized as follows: Table 1 includes the coefficients and p-values for each probit model while Table 2 includes the predicted impact of each independent variable on the probability of passage, or a first differences analyses.[25] Since we have a complex specification, for robustness we also estimated reduced form specifications of the models without interaction terms and without baseline levels, and these are discussed in Appendix B. We organize the analyses of the four types of reform into two parts. First we examine reforms that dealt with electoral laws that that could potentially expand the electorate: new equipment and provisional ballots reforms. Then we examine reforms that dealt with voter requirements or "voter barriers" to voting: improved registration lists and voter ID.

Beginning with new equipment and provisional ballot reforms, the first two reforms in Tables 1, the fit of their models, the pseudo-R^2s of 0.26 and 0.40, suggest that the specifications are capturing systematic variation, while the baseline controls operate in the expected directions.[26] States with better equipment technology were less likely to improve upon it and states with later registration were less likely to pass provisional ballots.

(Table 1 about here)

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[25] In Table 2 we include the estimated change in the predicted probability of passage from changing each independent variable at a time, holding all other variables at selected modal values.

[26] Unlike with other empirical problems in political science, we do not have many other studies to use as benchmarks for the fit of the model.

Examining Table 1 makes clear that racial and political factors are key to understanding the passage of electorate-expanding reforms. In terms of racial representation, a higher percentage of blacks in the population has a negative impact on the passage of new equipment laws (p-value=0.06). On the other hand, the interaction of Hispanic percentage *and* Republican control has a strong positive effect on both new equipment and provisional ballot laws (p-values of 0.11 and 0.06). In particular, states were less likely to reform their voting equipment if the state was racially diverse, with a 2 s.d change, or a first differences change in the percentage of black population decreasing the chances of new equipment laws by over 28 percent, as seen in Table 2. However, if Hispanics were more numerous *and* Republicans were in control, both potentially expanding electorate reforms became more likely, by 57 percent for new equipment and 71 percent for provisional ballots (see Table 2). This clearly suggests the presence of strategic policy making on the part of Republicans seeking to expand their electoral base among Hispanics.

(Table 2 about here)

Among political factors, party competition, as opposed to party control, had a very strong and consistent negative effect on the passage of both new equipment and provisional ballot laws. States with historically high levels of party competition and states with contemporaneously a divided government were less likely to pass equipment laws (p-values of 0.01 and 0.14, respectively), with a 2 s.d change in the party competition index decreasing the chances of new equipment laws by close to 80 percent; and having a divided government decreasing the probability of passage by close to 50 percent. Similarly, party competition and divided government decreased the likelihood of passing new provisional ballot laws. In fact, as shown in the preliminary breakdown, divided government *perfectly* predicts non-reform in the area of

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provisional ballots, since all 13 states with a divided government failed to pass provisional ballot laws.

If we focus on the contribution of party control by itself (i.e., not in an interaction), quite notably neither of the coefficients for Republican or Democratic control of the statehouse and legislature achieves statistical significance across the two reforms. In the case of Democratic controlled states, contrary to our expectations, these states were no more likely than Republican states to pass electorate-expanding reforms.

Finally, turning to state institutional and fiscal factors, the only factor that achieves statistical significance is legislative professionalism. Having a more professional legislature increased the chances of passage of new equipment law (p-value= 0.08) by close to 47 percent. The expectation on fiscal expenditures is also close to being statistically significant in the new equipment laws model (p-value=.12), such that states that foresaw decreased spending (and decreased income) were less likely to enact costly electoral reforms, by over 30 percent.

In summary, for equipment and provisional ballot laws -- reforms with the potential to expand the electorate -- the largest effects are associated with party competition, racial composition *and* partisanship. In general, politically divided states were disinclined to pass legislation to mandate new equipment or provisional ballots, while states with a large Hispanic population *and* Republican control were disposed to pass such laws. States with high levels of minorities, in particular a large black population, were less likely to pass new equipment laws.

Our next set of electoral reforms concerns "voter barrier" electoral reforms: improved registration and voter ID. As seen in Table 1, the fit of the models, the pseudo-R^{2}'s of 0.38 and 0.42, suggest our specification is again capturing systematic variation. The effect of the baseline controls implies that states that already had a centralized registration system were less likely to

pass laws on improving their registration system (though p-value=0.8) whereas, not quite as expected, states that already had mandatory ID requirements were more likely to pass laws tightening ID requirements.[27]

The results in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that, as with electorate expanding reforms, racial and political factors are again critical to understanding voter barrier electoral reforms. Racial politics plays a particularly strong role when predicting improved registration laws, though in quite opposite and significant ways depending on the minority group. Specifically, we find that higher percentages of blacks in the population correspond to higher rates of passage of tighter registration systems (p-value=.03), and this effect gets compounded if Republicans are in control. While a 2 s.d change in the percentage of blacks in the population increases the probability of an improved registration law by 42 percent, if Republicans are in control the chances increase by 72 percent (see Table 2).

Quite importantly, the effect is just the reverse for Hispanics: having a higher percentage of Hispanics in the population decreases the probability of passing improved registration laws (p-value 0.09) and the effect gets compounded if Republicans are in control. A 2 s.d. increase in the percentage of Hispanics corresponds with a 23 percent decrease in the chances of passing an improved registration law, though if Republicans are in control the likelihood decreases by 72 percent.

More than with any other electoral reform, reforming registration laws triggers strong linkages between partisanship, in particular Republican, and the racial composition of a state. On the other hand, voter ID reforms, which can also impose further barriers to voting, also

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[27] This suggests that states that were already predisposed to restrict voter access were prompted by the 2000 election to restrict access even more.

display strong linkages between race and likelihood of passage, though in this case the directionality is the same for Black and Hispanic representation. In general, a higher percentage of minorities (black or Hispanic), and its interaction with Republican control, decrease the chances of passing tighter voter ID laws, though these effects do not achieve statistical significance in most cases.

Focusing next on political variables, party competition and partisanship have a very strong effect on registration laws, while mainly partisanship has a strong effect on voter ID. States with divided government were 72 percent less likely to pass tighter registration laws and states with historically higher levels of party competition were 57 percent less likely to do so. Furthermore, and for the first time in our specification, Democratic control has a negative and statistically significant impact by decreasing the chances of passage of improved registration by 74 percent. In the case of voter ID laws, it is mainly Republican control that has an impact on passage by increasing the chances by over 40 percent when there were low percentages of minorities and by closer to 10 percent when minorities are highly represented.

Last, none of the state fiscal and institutional variables achieves statistical significance at the 90 percent level. The variables that are closer to achieving statistical significance (p-value 0.13) are fiscal expenditures and legislative professionalism, with states that expected a worse financial situation being more likely to improve their registration systems, while, unexpectedly, more professionalized legislatures were less likely to improve them.

In general, voter barrier reforms were driven by partisan and party competition concerns, including racial and partisan factors working in interaction. In contrast to electorate expanding reforms, with voter barrier reforms partisanship became a more influential factor.

Overall, our analyses of electoral laws post election 2000 have revealed how influential state politics has been in shaping the new reforms. We have found consistent strong evidence that high party competition impedes electoral reform (*Hypothesis 4*), and consistent strong evidence of an interaction effect between Republican control and Hispanic population, with Republican controlled states' more disposed towards facilitating access to voting when the percentages of Hispanics is high (*Hypothesis 2*). The effect of racial composition by itself was mixed, as we expected to a certain extent (*Hypothesis 2*), while the effect of partisanship by itself was mainly realized with voter barrier reforms *(Hypothesis 3)*. Legislative style and fiscal constraints had notably a very minor impact on electoral reforms (*Hypothesis 5 and 6*), though previous electoral law efforts, as measured by the baselines, did help predict some of the reforms (*Hypothesis 1*).

HAVA and First Steps towards Federal Compliance

So far, we have concentrated on state electoral reforms that occurred in 2001-2002, since they were clearly state-initiated, varied from state to state, and provide a great opportunity to understand factors influencing state policy making. However, we can also examine the states' responses to Congress passing HAVA in October 2002, which mandated reforms across several important areas such as voting equipment, computerized registration, voter ID, provisional ballots, and absentee voting. By early 2004, 46 states had passed HAVA-related laws, though many of these fell short of being comprehensive. According to the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL), only 26 states had passed relatively comprehensive HAVA reforms in 2003. These comprehensive reforms are the ones that we study.

Table 3 presents probit estimations predicting the passage of a comprehensive HAVA related law in 2003, given the same set of factors included in the previous analyses. We estimate

two models, varying the base level used. The first model has as a base level the percent of population using error-prone voting technology, and the second model includes as well whether a state had already passed a new equipment law in 2001-2002.

(Table 3 about here)

Even though this analysis is preliminary, since states may adopt further HAVA-related legislation in the future, some observations can be made. First, the strongest and only statistically significant predictor among all factors is Republican control (p-values of 0.08 and 0.13), in particular among states with low percentages of black population, which have a 52 percent increase in the probability of passage. However, this partisan effect seems to be essentially a "main effect" since the interaction of Republican control with percentage black in the population does not achieve statistical significance (p-values of 0.17 and 0.24). Furthermore, the interaction with Hispanic population and Republican control is not included. This is simply because the model cannot be estimated when both interactions are included. What drives this is the fact that among the 12 states with Republican control, 10 of them passed HAVA comprehensive laws.

Quite interestingly, legislative professionalism has a negative impact on HAVA reform. This may be the result of several factors. More professionalized legislatures may correlate with legislatures that are more independent of federal guidance, as well as being legislatures with more legislative time and professional resources to enact new laws.

All in all, given our specification, broad HAVA reforms were mainly driven by partisanship: Republican states were more likely to pass overall HAVA reforms. These results suggest that overall the compromise of HAVA may have favored the Republicans at the state level.

Conclusion

The hotly contested 2000 election exposed major flaws of the electoral systems in many states, providing us with a historically unique opportunity to examine how these states responded. The goal of this paper was to examine the determinants of the passage of the state electoral reforms. Unlike previous researchers, we examined state electoral reform across an array of different legislative areas while testing for the effects of factors that also had previously not been addressed. We found that state legislatures took into consideration the electoral balance and the potential electorate when enacting electoral reforms, as opposed to responding simply to internal state needs for reform or being constrained by state fiscal health.

Our main objective was to understand the role of politics, in particular partisanship, electoral balance, race and ethnicity in these electoral reforms, after controlling for alternative explanations. Using state-level data from the period 2001-2002, before HAVA, we found that historical levels of party competition and divided government had a strong negative effect on passage. States with a tight electoral balance were more reluctant to enact any type of electoral reform, either those that could potentially expand or those that could potentially contract the electorate (3 out of the 4 reforms). Partisanship mattered, however, though mainly in conjunction with race and ethnicity: Republican-controlled states were more likely to favor or disfavor reforms in accordance to expected preferences of the Hispanic populations (in 3 of the 4 reform areas). When minority representation mattered by itself, it was correlated with reforms that made voting potentially more difficult (in 2 out of the 4 the reform areas). Finally, fiscal constraints and legislative style, such as professionalism and term limits, had essentially no impact on reform (1 out of the 4 reform areas).

Slightly over half of the states passed comprehensive laws to begin to comply with some of the requirements of HAVA. The only factor that significantly mattered in explaining comprehensive HAVA–related laws was partisanship: Republican controlled states, regardless of minority presence, were more likely to pass such laws. This suggests that in the end HAVA may have been a piece of legislation more tailored to Republican preferences, and less of a balanced compromise.

The picture that emerges from the first few years of post 2000 electoral reform is one of states, and state legislators, being highly risk-averse as well as strategic decision makers. Regardless of partisanship, legislators were reluctant to pass the bolder electoral reforms that could alter (expand or contract) the electorate if the state was politically competitive. On the other hand, Republican-led states were more likely to tailor reforms to the Hispanic electorate, and overall more likely to pass HAVA comprehensive reforms. From a policy perspective, the results suggest that large-scale state electoral reform, where the policy outcome directly affects the constituency of state level politicians, may require the federal government's prodding and lead, which is exactly what has happened with the passage of HAVA.

Finally, a note of caution is perhaps in order concerning the partisan implications of the HAVA reforms. On the one hand it would appear that Republican state leaders may think that HAVA favors their party and therefore that they passed appropriate enabling legislation to comply with HAVA. On the other hand we have noted clear evidence of foot-dragging by the *national* Republican leadership in providing the staffing of the Election Assistance Commission and the funding necessary to implement many of the most expensive reforms. Perhaps this reflects the fact that in Republican-dominated states, the dominant party can see advantages to proceeding with the reforms. But the country as a whole remains closely contested, with the

2004 presidential election just around the corner. So the national Republican Party may well want to proceed more cautiously in implementing voting reforms that risk tilting the national electoral vote even slightly toward the Democratic side.

Appendix B. Alternative Model Specifications and Robustness

Motivated by previous empirical findings and previous literature, we also tested for other model specifications. In particular, we tested for a specification that accounted for possible diffusion effects and regional effects.[28] Beginning with diffusion effects, we re-examined 2001-2002 state adoptions of electoral reforms including an indicator flagging whether a state had a geographic neighbor which adopted a given electoral reform in the previous year 2001(see Berry and Berry 1992). More specifically, we estimated a discrete event history model, where observations are now state-year, such that in 2001 all states are included, and for 2002 only those states that have yet not adopted still remain. The neighbor dummy indicating adoption by a neighbor can only be "on" for those states still remaining at risk of adoption in 2002. We estimated in this fashion models for each of the four electoral reforms. The neighbor indicator never achieves statistical significance, and moreover it switches signs depending on the model. For new equipment and provisional ballots the neighbor effect is positive (p-values 0.18 and 0.88, respectively), and for improved registration and voter ID reforms the neighbor effect is negative (p-values of 0.23 and 0.53, respectively). Not surprisingly, we did not find diffusion

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[28] We also tested for alternative specifications of economic conditions and legislative style, by estimating the model with measures of real per capita median income, and term limits. Neither term limits nor real per capita income had a statistical significant impact on any of the electoral reform models. Only income had a negative and significant impact on the passage of HAVA, without altering the main substantive influence of Republican control and passage of HAVA laws.

effects for a policy reform that has been greatly concentrated in time. At this time, states are more likely to be awaiting federal leadership than be influenced by neighbors' policy-making.

We also examined the effect of southern states, as is sometimes tested in state policy research, with the understanding that this geographic area may have a distinct history and culture that is not captured with our standard ideological or socio-economic controls. Including an indicator for southern states (10 states), does not achieve statistical significance in three of the models, and only achieves statistical significance for the model on improved registration lists, with southern states, all else equal, being less likely to tighten their registration databases. However, all substantive interpretations from the model as analyzed in Tables 1 and 2 remain unchanged. Our models are sufficiently full-specified, motivated by empirical and theoretical findings in state policy making to not need such aggregate regional specification.

We also checked for multicollinearity, overall and stemming from the baseline terms and the interaction terms. To assess multicollinearity overall we examined simple correlations among independent variables and variance inflation factors (VIF) from running linear regression models with the dependent variables assumed to be continuous. We found that from all the pair-wise correlations of the independent variables (over 100 combinations), only four are greater than 0.5: the interaction terms (Percent Black *and* Republican Control, and Percent Hispanic *and* Republican Control) have correlations around 0.65 among themselves and with Republican Control, while Percent Black and the base level for voter ID (Mandatory Voter ID) has a correlation of 0.51. On the other hand, if we examine the VIF for each electoral model (i.e. from

running linear regression models) no mean VIF factor exceeds 2.2, while no individual variable tolerance factor goes below 0.25.[29]

Although the simple diagnostics do not reveal signs of problems, we also considered reduced form specifications without the baselines, and then without the interaction terms. Appendix C (table) replicates the analysis from Table 1 except that the baselines are excluded. As can be seen, all the main substantive results remain intact without the baselines. We also re-estimated the models without the interactions and again the effects now from the main variables remain substantively the same in terms of direction and significance, with only one variable, Republican Control, losing statistical significance in the voter ID model.

All in all, with the restrictions of operating with a small number of observations, we believe we have captured as best as possible the appropriate specification given the problem studied and the theories behind it.

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[29] By tolerance factor we mean the variance that remains to be explained when each single independent variable is predicted with all the other independent variables (or $1 - R^2$ from the regression). Almost all tolerance factors are above 0.35. However, it is the interaction terms and their main effects that have lower tolerances.

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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics and Data Source

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Source	Description
Dependent Variables					
New Equipment 2001-02	50	0.30	0.46	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates state passed a new voting equipment law with state and/or expectations of fed funds.
Improved Registration 2001-02	50	0.34	0.47	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indcates state passed a law to improve lists database and/or purging systems
Provisional Ballot 2001-02	50	0.20	0.40	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates state passed law to create new proce-dures or to improve exisiting procedures.
Voter ID 2001-02	50	0.18	0.39	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates state passed law to clarify or tighten voter ID requirements.
HAVA Comprehensive 2003	50	0.52	0.50	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates the state passed a comprehensive HAVA law in 2003. Only Pennsylvania passed in 2002.
Independent Variables					
Percent Pop. with High Error Voting Technology	50	35.75	32.96	Election Data Services	Percentage of state's total population using punch cards or electronic voting machines.
Statewide Registration	50	0.24	0.43	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates state had in place a central statewide registration system by election 2000.
Late Registration Deadline	50	0.18	0.39	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates state had registration deadline of fewer than 10 days by election 2000.
Mandatory Voter ID	50	0.16	0.37	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates state required mandatory showing of voter ID by election 2000.
Percent Population Black or Hispanic in 2000	50	9.90	9.58	US Statistical Abstract 2001	Percentage of Resident Total Population which is Black or Hispanic/Latino in April 2000.
Republican Control	50	0.26	0.44	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates both chambers of state legislature are held by a majority of Republican seats after election 2000.
Divided Government 2000	50	0.26	0.44	National Conference of State Legisl.	'1' indicates state house and state legislature held by different parties after election 2000.
Party Competition 1988-1998	49	0.87	0.09	Jewell and Morehouse. *Political Parties and Election in American States*. 2001.	Ranney Index from 0.5 to 1 of party competition in the governorship and the legislature.
Percent Debt of Revenues 2001	50	58.23	30.07	US Statistical Abstract 2002	Percent of total state revenue that total cummulative debt represents in fiscal year 2000-2001.
Fiscal Expenditure Change 01-02	50	3.60	3.64	Fiscal Survey of the States 2002	Actual revenues 2001 minus expected revenues in 2002 divided by actual 2001 revenues, as a percentage.
Legislative Professionalism 1993	50	0.25	0.15	King. *Legislative Quarterly Studies.* 2000.	Index of state legislatures professionalism.

Appendix C. Reduced Form Probit Models Predicting Adoption of Electoral Reforms in 2001-2002

	Electorate Expanding Reforms				Voter Requirement Reforms			
	New Equipment		Provisional Ballots		Improved Registration		Voter ID	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Racial Factors								
% Black Population	-0.05	0.14	0.00	0.97	**0.08**	**0.03**	-0.02	0.58
% Hispanic Population	-0.03	0.54	-0.02	0.67	-0.05	0.25	-0.06	0.35
% Black *and* Republican Control	0.00	0.97	0.03	0.71	0.21	0.12	0.00	0.99
% Hispanic *and* Republican Control	**0.19**	**0.08**	**0.23**	**0.07**	**-0.29**	**0.08**	-0.48	0.20
Political Factors								
Republican Control	-1.26	0.25	-1.79	0.15	-0.88	0.52	**2.83**	**0.05**
Democratic Control	-1.39	0.24	-1.74	0.22	**-4.30**	**0.01**	0.68	0.59
Divided Government	**-2.30**	**0.07**	**Perfectly predicts "0"**		**-3.38**	**0.02**	**1.47**	**0.10**
Party Competition 1988-1998	**-15.46**	**0.01**	-8.37	0.13	**-13.42**	**0.02**	-1.86	0.68
Institutional & Fiscal Factors								
Percent Debt	0.00	0.83	0.01	0.72	0.00	0.62	-0.01	0.57
Fiscal Expenditure Change	-0.11	0.15	-0.14	0.21	0.16	0.09	-0.24	**0.05**
Legislative Professionalism Index	**4.78**	**0.07**	0.39	0.90	-5.07	0.12	1.07	0.69
Constant	13.36	0.01	7.06	0.13	12.67	0.02	1.03	0.81
	N=49 Pseudo R^2= 0.35		N=35 Pseudo R^2= 0.23		N=49 Pseudo R^2= 0.38		N=49 Pseudo R^2=0.28	
	LR chi2(10)=24.23		LR chi2(9)=9.41		LR chi2(10)=24.50		LR chi2(10)=13.38	

Note: Coefficients in bold achieve statistical significance at the 90% level or higher in two-tailed t-tests. Non-partisan Nebraska is not included in the analysis.

[a] Divided government perfectly predict "No" passage of provisional ballots, 13 observations are dropped, and the model estimated with remaining 36 obs.

Figure 1a. Percentage of States Legislating New Voting Equipment 2001-2002

Category	Percentage
All States (N=50)	30%
Republican Control (13)	38%
Democratic Control (8)	50%
Divided Government (13)	8%
"Other" States (16)	31%
High Party Competition (29)	21%
Above Median Minority Pct. (25)	28%
High Pct. Black Pop.*Repub. Control (6)	33%
High Pct. Latino Pop.*Repub. Control (7)	42%
High Pct. Black Pop.*Dem. Control (6)	50%
High Pct. Latino Pop.*Dem. Control (4)	50%

Definitions: Divided Government: Governor of one party, both houses of legislature other party. "Other": no single party control of both houses. High Party Competition 1988-1998 Ranney Index above median, 0.86. High Pct. Black population: above the median, 6.5%. High Pct. Hispanic population: above the median, 4.5%.

Figure 1b. Percentage of States Legislating Provisional Voting 2001-2002

Category	Percentage
All States (N=50)	20%
Republican Control (13)	31%
Democratic Control (8)	13%
Divided Government (13)	0%
"Other" States (16)	31%
High Party Competition (29)	21%
Above Median Minority Pct. (25)	20%
High Pct. Black Pop.*Repub. Control (6)	33%
High Pct. Latino Pop.*Repub. Control (7)	57%
High Pct. Black Pop.*Dem. Control (6)	17%
High Pct. Latino Pop.*Dem. Control (4)	0%

Figure 1c. Percentage of States Legislating Improved Registration Lists 2001-2002

Category	Percentage
All States (N=50)	34%
Republican Control (13)	38%
Democratic Control (8)	37%
Divided Government (13)	23%
"Other" States (16)	38%
High Party Competition (29)	24%
Above Median Minority Pct. (25)	28%
High Pct. Black Pop.*Repub. Control (6)	33%
High Pct. Latino Pop.*Repub. Control (7)	29%
High Pct. Black Pop.*Dem. Control (6)	50%
High Pct. Latino Pop.*Dem. Control (4)	25%

Figure 1d. Percentage of States Legislating Voter ID 2001-2002

Category	Percentage
All States (N=50)	18%
Republican Control (13)	22%
Democratic Control (8)	13%
Divided Government (13)	23%
"Other" States (16)	13%
High Party Competition (29)	6%
Above Median Minority Pct. (25)	20%
High Pct. Black Pop.*Repub. Control (6)	33%
High Pct. Latino Pop.*Repub. Control (7)	0%
High Pct. Black Pop.*Dem. Control (6)	17%
High Pct. Latino Pop.*Dem. Control (4)	25%

Table 1. Probit Models Predicting Adoption of Electoral Reforms in 2001-2002

	Electorate Expanding Reforms				Voter Requirement Reforms			
	New Equipment		Provisional Ballots		Improved Registration		Voter ID	
Variable	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Base Level								
% Pop. with High Error Voting Equipment	**0.02**	**0.10**	----	---	----	---	----	---
Late Date Registration	----	---	-1.01	0.28	----	---	----	---
Statewide Registration System	----	---	----	---	-0.18	0.79	----	---
Mandatory Voter ID	----	---	----	---			**4.20**	**0.09**
Racial Factors								
% Black Population	**-0.08**	**0.06**	-0.02	0.73	**0.08**	**0.03**	-0.14	0.11
% Hispanic Population	-0.04	0.39	-0.03	0.51	-0.05	0.26	-0.28	0.20
% Black *and* Republican Control	0.01	0.94	0.01	0.95	0.20	0.15	-0.19	0.31
% Hispanic *and* Republican Control	0.18	0.11	**0.24**	**0.06**	**-0.28**	**0.09**	-0.25	0.58
Political Factors								
Republican Control	-1.28	0.30	-1.57	0.22	-0.83	0.54	**3.13**	**0.06**
Democratic Control	-1.39	0.34	-1.30	0.37	**-4.19**	**0.02**	1.76	0.36
Divided Government	-2.09	0.14	**Perfectly predicts "0"** [a]		**-3.25**	**0.03**	0.58	0.61
Party Competition 1988-1998	**-16.89**	**0.01**	-6.77	0.24	**-13.08**	**0.02**	-1.74	0.76
Institutional & Fiscal Factors								
Percent Debt	0.00	0.98	0.00	0.83	0.00	0.63	-0.02	0.31
Fiscal Expenditure Change	-0.14	0.12	-0.16	0.17	0.15	0.13	-0.24	0.20
Legislative Professionalism Index	**5.59**	**0.08**	-0.10	0.97	-4.96	0.13	9.41	0.25
Constant	14.12	0.02	6.28	0.19	12.36	0.02	0.64	0.89
	N=49 Pseudo R^2= 0.40 LR chi2(10)=24.23		N=36 Pseudo R^2= 0.26 LR chi2(9)=10.75		N=49 Pseudo R^2= 0.38 LR chi2(10)=24.57		N=49 Pseudo R^2= 0.49 LR chi2(10)=21.65	

Note: Coefficients in bold achieve statistical significance at the 90% level or higher in two-tailed t-tests. Non-partisan Nebraska is not included in the analysis.

[a] Divided government perfectly predict "No" passage of provisional ballots, 13 observations are dropped, and the model estimated with remaining 36 obs.

Table 2. Effect of Changes of an Independent Variable on the Probability (P=1) of Passage of Electoral Reforms

Variable	Electorate Expanding Reforms		Voter Requirement Reforms	
	New Equipment	Provisional Ballots	Improved Registration	Voter ID
	Change in (P=1)	Change in (P=1)	Change in (P=1)	Change in (P=1)
Base Level	0.34　(0.21)	-0.25　(0.24)	-0.07　(0.17)	0.38　(0.35)
Percent Black				
-with No Republican control	**-0.45　(0.23)**	-0.10　(0.28)	**0.42　(0.19)**	-0.02　(0.09)
-with Republican control	-0.28　(0.34)	-0.0008　(0.32)	**0.72　(0.30)**	-0.48　(0.38)
Percent Hispanic				
-with No Republican control	-0.21　(0.25)	-0.17　(0.26)	-0.23　(0.21)	-0.04　(0.17)
-with Republican control	0.57　(0.35)	**0.71　(0.34)**	**-0.72　(0.29)**	-0.66　(0.46)
Republican Control				
-with low % Black	-0.36　(0.33)	-0.38　(0.31)	-0.17　(0.34)	**0.53　(0.31)**
-with high % Black	-0.19　(0.30)	-0.28　(0.36)	0.12　(0.19)	0.07　(0.24)
-with low % Hispanic	-0.35　(0.33)	-0.30　(0.27)	-0.15　(0.28)	**0.69　(0.31)**
-with high % Hispanic	0.43　(0.34)	0.57　(0.32)	**-0.73　(0.22)**	0.05　(0.31)
Democratic Control	-0.37　(0.37)	-0.31　(0.34)	**-0.74　(0.21)**	0.03　(0.14)
Divided Government	-0.48　(0.31)	**Perfectly predicts No**	**-0.72　(0.22)**	0.024　(0.10)
Party Competition 1988-1998	**-0.79　(0.20)**	-0.39　(0.31)	**-0.57　(0.22)**	-0.003　(0.07)
Percent Debt	0.005　(0.19)	0.088　(0.30)	0.06　(0.14)	-0.024　(0.09)
Fiscal Expenditure Change	-0.31　(0.20)	-0.37　(0.25)	0.22　(0.16)	-0.0003　(0.06)
Legislative Professionalism Index	**0.47　(0.25)**	-0.0098　(0.29)	-0.33　(0.25)	-0.003　(0.11)

Note: Changes in probabilites were estimated with CLARIFY (King, Tomz, XXX) with standard errors in parentheses. The estimates are obtained by changing one independent variable at a time (a 2 s.d change if continuous, from 0 to 1 if discrete) holding all other variables at their mean or median. Estimates in bold had 90 percent confidence intervals excluding "0." Probabilites are estimated based on results from Table 1.

Table 3. Probit Model Predicting HAVA Compliance Legislation in 2003

	HAVA Compliance Law				
	With (1) Baseline			With (2) Baselines	
Variable	Coefficient	P-value		Coefficient	P-value
Base Level					
Percent Pop. High Error Voting	0.01	0.24		0.01	0.35
New Equipment 2001-2002	----	---		0.59	0.29
Racial and Political Factors					
% Black Population	0.00	0.96		0.01	0.76
% Black *and* Republican Control	-0.19	0.17		-0.22	0.24
Political Factors					
Republican Control	**3.04**	**0.08**		3.39	0.13
Democratic Control	0.20	0.76		0.32	0.62
Divided Government	-0.09	0.87		-0.04	0.95
Party Competition 1988-1998	2.14	0.49		3.75	0.29
Institutional & Fiscal Factors					
Percent Debt	0.00	0.58		0.00	0.63
Fiscal Expenditure Change	-0.01	0.84		-0.01	0.83
Legislative Professionalism Index	-3.20	0.12		**-3.97**	**0.08**
Constant	-1.33	0.64		-2.84	0.38
	N=49	Pseudo R2= 0.30		N=49	Pseudo R2= 0.32
	LR chi2(10)=20.64			LR chi2(10)=21.80	

Note: Coefficients in bold achieve statistical significance at the 90% level or higher in two-tailed t-tests. Non-partisan Nebraska is not included in the analysis.