What's on the Table? The Content of State Policy Agendas

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Abstract

While national policy agendas have evolved away from material issues to focus more on postmaterial concerns, much less is known about state legislative agendas. In this paper, we utilize new data
to describe the content of state legislative agendas from 1995 to 1999. We then examine why some states
allocate more agenda space to post-material policies than others. We find that states with larger and
wealthier economies and greater representation by Democrats in the legislature allocate relatively more
agenda space to post-material policies. We also find that the relative size of the population of interest
organizations registered to lobby on post-material policies does not have a significant effect on the
relative content of policy agendas. Representation of post-material policies in state agendas, while
generally less dominant than in national agendas, originates, then, predominantly from the state's
economy and the political choices of its citizens.

What's on the Table? The Content of State Policy Agendas

Political scientists have tried to understand the content of public policy agendas at least since Schattschneider (1960, 68) claimed that "he who determines what politics is about runs the country, because...the choice of conflicts allocates power." Such efforts are important given that the content of national policy agendas vary considerably over time, perhaps illustrating fundamental shifts in the concerns of citizens or at least changes in the ability of some to have their grievances and/or aspirations addressed by decision-makers. Indeed, recent evidence from studies of the national policy agenda suggests that this power is increasingly being allocated to new, post-material policy areas, such as issues associated with environmental and welfare concerns, at the expense of older materially-oriented policies, such as those concerned with taxes and transportation. Berry (1999), for instance, reported from a sample of Congressional hearings that post-material agenda issues increased from 35.60 percent of the total agenda in 1963 to 71.20 percent of the agenda in 1991. Similarly, Baumgartner and Gold (2002) found that the proportion of post-material policies considered in the Supreme Court and in Congressional hearings increased at a nearly linear rate between the late 1940s and the 1990s.

Surprisingly, much less is known about how this national trend is reflected in the evolution of state legislative agendas, which leaves us with a number of questions. It is unclear whether the growth of post-material issues on the agendas of national institutions reflects a general shift that encompasses all levels of government or only the national level. In particular, does the trend reach the state level and how do the American states vary in their attention to material and post-material issues? That is, do issue agendas vary over space as well as over time? Further, we do not know if the public policy agendas before the states *lead* or *lag* national policy agendas. Have the states maintained their role as policy laboratories or are the states no longer at the cutting edge of American policy-making? And what is the relationship between material and post-material agendas? Does attention to one type of policies diminish attention to the other? And perhaps most importantly of all, why do policy agendas change over space or

time? The single policy arena of the national government, of course, makes it difficult to study the causal roots of changes in policy agendas, although significant progress has been made recently (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002). Still, the variation provided by the 50 policy arenas of the American states constitutes a fruitful context within which to assess hypotheses about changes in the content of policy agendas. For all of these reasons, then, attention to the policy agendas of the states merits investigation.

We examine state policy agendas in this paper in the second half of the 1990s with a special focus on the distribution of attention to material and post-material policies. We begin by describing state policy agendas. We find that state policy agendas are highly heterogeneous. We then present and empirically assess several different explanations of this heterogeneity, including hypotheses attentive to variations in state economies, institutions, populations of organized interests, and citizen demographics. We conclude that the balance of issues considered by state legislatures is largely a function of state economies and the ballot choices citizens make in state elections.

The Content of State Policy Agendas

Wayne Francis (1967) was one of the first political scientists to examine differences among the content of states' policy agendas. His analysis, based on the responses of 898 state representatives in 1966, found that material issues typically dominated state legislative agendas; 68.00 percent of the issues addressed material policies, such as those concerned with finance, highways, local governments, and taxes. But only 32.34 percent of the issues noted by the respondent legislators addressed post-material policies, such as legislative issues concerned with the environment, education, women, and civil rights. This distribution of issues between post-material and material policies on state agendas was, then, nearly identical to the balance of content observed during the same time period on the national policy agenda. Berry (1999), for instance, found that 64.40 percent of the issues considered in a sample of Congressional hearings in 1967 addressed material policies. This evidence suggests that the distributions of post-material and material policies on state and national agendas during the 1960s were similar.

Most studies of national policy agendas, however, suggest that they are now dominated by post-

material policies (Baumgartner and Gold 2002; Berry 1999). Have state policy agendas changed in a comparable manner? To answer this question, we examined the content of state legislative agendas from 1995 through 1999 using bill count data, which have proved to be valid if rough indicators of policy agendas (Wilkerson, Feeley, Schiereck, and Sue 2002). The bill count data were collected from the "State Full Text of Bills" database on Nexis Academic Universe. The database is maintained by LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc, and is available for a fee at http://www.nexis.com. The database contains bill text files for all bills considered by each statehouse in a calendar year and provides a separate listing for each revised version of a bill in the database. Each bill is assigned a set of subject codes at the time of consideration. More specifically, these subject codes were used to distinguish post-material from material policies, the definitions of which are based on those used by Baumgartner and Gold (2002) and Berry (1999). In particular, post-material policies include all bills related to civil rights, education, environment, health, religion, sports, welfare and women. Material policies include bills addressing issues of agriculture, banking, communication, construction, local government, insurance, law, taxes, manufacturing, military, police/fire, transportation, utilities, and small business.

Three issues concerning our bill count measure merit comment. First, we do not believe that the search terms provide a comprehensive count of all of the bills associated with a given topic. Many bills, including proposed legislation on the topic of abortion, might have religious content in the eyes of some legislators and organizations. And general tax or spending bills tap a host of topics of concern to many legislators. We still believe, however, that the measure has value. But rather than a comprehensive count of bills, it taps *variations* in legislative activity across states and across time. Simply put, biases in the

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¹ For example, Alabama House Bill 175, which appropriated \$4,564,831 to the Department of Public Health in 1997, was listed five times in the database: an introductory version, three revisions, and the enacted bill.

² The search terms were as follows: Agriculture (agriculture), Finance (banking, real estate), Communications (media, telecommunications), Construction (construction), Education (education), Health (health), Insurance (insurance), Law (legal), Local Government (municipality, public employees), Police and Fire (police, fire), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Natural Resources (gas, oil, minerals), Transportation (highways, transit, airports), Utilities (utilities), Sport (sports and recreation), Tax (tax), Small Business (retail), Military (military), Environment (environment), Religion (Church), Civil Rights (), and Welfare (social services, charities).

³ The bill counts reported here are not the same as the number of bills considered by state legislatures. A bill may have included none of our subject codes. Also, a bill may have been assigned several of our subject codes.

individual search terms are constant across states and time. Indeed, after reviewing the issue counts, we are quite confident that they serve well in tapping this variation over time and across states. States with substantial natural resources, for example, generated much higher bill counts than those without "natural gas," "oil," or "minerals." Second, however, some of the subject codes obviously provide more valid representations of issue agendas than others. The most problematic is perhaps manufacturing. The "manufacturing" subject code extracted relatively few bills when it is obvious that manufacturing interests are incredibly diverse and certainly include more than just bills mentioning our single search term. Still, the manufacturing bill count distinguishes clearly between states with large manufacturing sectors from those with little manufacturing. And third, some bills are coded more than once if they were revised as they moved through the legislative process. We view this aspect of the coding scheme as appropriate for our purpose since this means that the bill counts are weighted by legislative attention.

The total number of bills and the proportion of bills focusing on post-material concerns for every year between 1995 through 1999 for each state for which data were available are reported in tables 1 and 2, respectively. The bill counts for each state-year for the disaggregated categories from which the values for material and post-material categories reported in tables 1 and 2 were constructed are reported in appendices 1 through 5.⁴ The national averages for total numbers of bills considered in the state legislatures and the proportion of bills devoted to post-material concerns are reported in figure 1.⁵ It is clear that state legislative agendas are getting more crowded. The total number of bills addressing our subject codes considered in the average state legislatures almost doubled from 1,227.40 in 1995 to 2,442.96 in 1999. At the same time, the proportion of bills representing post-material issues has crept up slightly from 28.67 percent in 1995 to 33.93 percent in 1998, only to decline slightly to 30.70 percent in

⁴ The appendices should also include a women's issues category. However, all of these counts were zero.

⁵ The averages are for 48 states for 1995; Kentucky and South Dakota's data was not reported by LexisNexis for that year. The averages of the remaining years are based on 50 states. As seen in the appendices, even most biennial legislatures that did not meet in even numbered years considered a few bills in special sessions. Still, there is clearly some cycling in the attention measures with even years, in which biennial legislatures do not meet in regular session, generating somewhat smaller bill counts

1999. The fact that the number of bill counts has increased so markedly over this period means that this modest growth in the proportion of post-materialist bills has not crowded out bills addressing more traditional material concerns. Indeed, the average state has seen more of both types of bills.⁶

Overall, then, the relative content of state policy agendas in terms of attention to material and post-material concerns is about the same as it was nearly forty years ago. We find that post-material issues represented 30.26 percent of the average state agenda from 1995-1999, a result that is very close to the figure reported by Francis (1967) for 1966. This similarity is all the more remarkable given that Francis relied on survey responses from state legislators while our data represent actual bill counts using key words. Assuming, of course, that the two measures are indeed comparable, this means that that the policy attention of the states, taken together, has not changed in terms of greater attention to post-material policies in the same manner as has policy attention at the national level.

Still, the key attribute of the data is the significant variance in the content of policy agendas among the states and over time, as seen in table 2. The rank orders of the states in the proportion of post-material bills considered by legislatures in 1997, 1998, and 1999 are reported in table 3 for ease of presentation. In 1999, for example, Tennessee (43.88 percent) considered the highest proportion of post-material legislation and North Dakota the lowest (21.28 percent). The relative attention given to post-material policies ranged from a low in Mississippi, which allocated only 18.23 percent of its agenda to post-material policies in 1995, to a high of 46.68 in North Carolina that same year. Moreover, interstate variance is relatively constant through out this period. The annual standard deviation averaged 5.28 percentage points throughout this period, from a low of 4.98 percent in 1999 to a high of 5.60 percent in 1995. This indicates that the proportion of post-material policies on state agendas ranged between states by a similar amount between 1995 and 1999. In contrast, the inter-year change within states is much

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⁶ Indeed, the number of materially oriented bills in 1997, 1998, and 1999 was regressed on the proportion of bills addressing post-material concerns (n=135 state, years), the estimate for the proportion measures was incorrectly signed if some substitution effect were occurring, and the r-square generated from the model was only 0.03.

⁷ The values in this paragraph are based on 44 states – all those for which we have non-zero values in any of the five years of bill count data; Kentucky, South Dakota, North Dakota, Arkansas, Nevada, and Oregon are not included.

more variable. Vermont is a good example, as seen in table 3. It was ranked only 25th in 1997 in terms of the proportion of its agenda addressing post-material legislation, but was ranked 6th in 1999. Between 1995 and 1999, the standard deviation from the mean proportion of post-material policies within states ranged from a low in New York of 1.05 percentage points to a high in North Carolina of nearly 6.76 percentage points. This indicates that New York's agenda was comprised of a very similar proportion of post-material policies between 1995 and 1999, ranging between 27.94 and 31.01 percent. In contrast, the proportion of post-material policies on North Carolina's agenda widely varied through the same period, from a low of 26.26 percent to a high of 46.68. The average standard deviation between 1995 and 1999 was 5.58 percentage points, indicating that the average proportion of post-material policies on a state's agenda varied much more than New York, but significantly less than North Carolina.

This evidence indicates that the evolution of post-material policies on national policy agendas has proceeded in a manner quite different than its evolution on state agendas. Where post-material policies now represent the majority of issues considered by national institutions, such policies still represent a minority of issues considered in nearly every statehouse. Instead, states seem to be about as focused now on material policies as they were when Francis (1967) drew his sample in 1966, and the proportion of post-material policies considered by state legislatures is growing only very slowly. In nearly all cases, post-material policies still constitute a minority of issues considered by statehouses. But there is also considerable variation within states over time and among the states within any given year. We can now take advantage of this variation to assess several outstanding hypotheses that are often used to explain why some policy agendas are more focused on post-material policies than others.

Explaining Attention to Post-Material Policies

Hypotheses and Measures

The American and comparative politics literatures provide us with four standard hypotheses that are often employed to account for differences in the extent to which governments allocate their scarce agenda space to post-material policies. These hypotheses address, respectively, differences among

governments in the prosperity of their economies, ideological and demographic differences among their citizens, the role of organized interests in setting policy agendas, and patterns of political control. The temporal – and, to a lesser extent, the cross-sectional – variations we have observed among the states in terms of their attention to post-material policies should provide a solid opportunity to evaluate these hypotheses empirically. We test these expectations by examining the relationships of the variables cited by each of the hypotheses and the legislative agendas of 48 states during 1997 and 1999.⁸ Our dependent variable is the annual proportion of post-material bills considered in statehouses as described earlier.

The first hypothesis was developed by Inglehart (1971), who proposed that countries evolve away from attention to material policies and toward more attention to post-material policies as their economies expand and they become more prosperous. Inglehart (1971) argued that as economies grow, increasing proportions of the public will experience economic prosperity, which in turn reduces their concerns about material welfare and leads them to be more interested in post-material issues. The broad expectation derived from this work – that the relative ascendancy of post-material policies will be positively related to national economic size and health - has been replicated in numerous studies (Inglehart and Abramson 1999; 1994). Duch and Taylor (1993) revised this hypothesis somewhat by refocusing it on individuallevel wealth. They argued that citizens become more focused on post-material policies as they become wealthier. However, they found little support for this version of the hypothesis. Camobreco and Barnello (2003), in one of the few applications in the American states, found more support for a postindustrial explanation of female state legislative representation than a post-materialist one. However, they used college education to measure post-industrialism rather than as a measure of post-materialism, as is more conventional in the comparative politics literature. Together, these hypotheses suggest that the American states should allocate relatively more agenda attention to bills addressing post-material concerns as their economies grow and as their citizens become wealthier.

We measure two aspects of state economies associated with this conjecture. The first is the

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⁸ Data from Nebraska and Nevada are not used in subsequent analyses because of missing data.

absolute size of the economy, under the expectation that larger economies will have more slack with which to address post-material concerns. State economic size is measured by the standardized annual estimate of gross state product (GSP), which ranges from -0.79 (Vermont in 1997) to 4.99 (California in 1999). Between 1997 and 1999, average GSP grew by \$121 million, from \$1.68 billion to \$1.89 billion. Although this average is inflated by the substantially larger growth rates observed in the California, New York and Texas economies, nearly every state economy grew during this era of the Clinton economic boom. The second economic measure – per capita GSP – addresses the pure wealth effect more directly. Over the three year period, mean per capita GSP ranged between 29.57 in 1997 to 32.31 in 1999. We expect that the proportion of state legislative agendas devoted to post-material policies will increase as state economies become larger and their citizens become more prosperous.

The second hypothesis addresses the preferences of citizens for attention to post-material policies that are more reflective of tastes than of economic wealth per se. In particular, both liberal and highly educated citizens are widely believed to prefer that their governments address issues associated with post-material policies than are conservative and less educated citizens (Lowe and Rudig 1986, 514). Liberal individuals are thought to be more willing to support government interventions of the type associated with post-material issues than are conservatives. Similarly, highly educated citizens are thought to be more aware of, and consequently more focused on, post-material issues than are less educated citizens. These expectations have been tested by analyzing citizen preferences on a variety of issues. Dunlap (1975), for instance, found that liberal citizens are more concerned about environmental degradation, one type of post-material policy, than are conservative citizens. Similarly, Duch and Taylor (1993) found that highly educated citizens were more likely to want their government to focus on post-material policies than less educated citizens. The broad expectation from this work is that state governments will increase their agenda focus on post-material policies as their citizens become more educated or more liberal.

We measure the effects of citizens' preferences on legislative agendas with two different variables. To assess how citizen ideology influences relative attention to post-material policies, we use

the updated Erickson, Wright, and McIver (1993) measure of public opinion liberalism from McIver, Wright, and Erickson (2001). Mean public opinion liberalism was generally unchanged between 1997 and 1999, suggesting that there was little temporal variation in ideology. Over the three year period, mean opinion liberalism was -0.13 with a standard deviation of 0.10 and ranging from -0.43 (South Dakota in 1999) to 0.17 (Vermont in 1999). Looking more closely at the states, there also was little variance within specific states during this time period, with the exception of Hawaii and Kansas, which exhibited an unusually large level of inter-year variation in ideology. Still, most of the variation in ideology is cross-sectional for the period we examine. We expect that the proportion of post-material issues on state agendas will increase with opinion liberalism.

To test the effect of education on the content of state policy agendas, we use an estimate from the Current Population Survey of the proportion of citizens in a state with a college education. Between 1997 and 1999, the mean proportion of citizens with a college education increased modestly from 15.20 percent to 16.30 percent. Arkansas consistently had the smallest proportion of citizens with a college education, ranging from 9.70 percent in 1997 to 11.20 percent in 1999. In contrast, over 20.00 percent of citizens in Virginia and Massachusetts had college degrees. While the number of people with a college education trends upward between 1997 and 1999, this evidence indicates that the mean education attainment is more starkly different across the states or that cross-sectional variation is dominant. We expect that states with more highly educated residents will have a proportionally larger number of post-material issues on their legislative agendas than states with less educated residents.

The third hypothesis about the evolution of post-material policies is related to organized interests. Berry (1999, 34-5) argued that citizen groups "see government as having a primary responsibility for enhancing equality, expanding rights, protecting the environment, supporting the traditional nuclear family, and policing corporations so that they are more socially responsible." In contrast, Berry argues, corporate, labor, and other organized interests want government to focus more on traditional material policies. He contends that government agendas will be responsive to the shifting proportions of these

types of organizations. In particular, he contends that legislators will fill their agendas with more post-material issues as the proportion of citizen groups that lobby government grows. Berry (1999) finds indirect support for his theory in evidence that both the number of testifying citizen groups and post-material policies have increased in samples of Congressional hearings from 1963, 1979 and 1991.

Others, however, have questioned both the necessity and the direction of causality implied by this hypothesis. In terms of direction, both the hollow core and population ecology models of interest system density (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, Salisbury1993; Gray and Lowery 1996) suggest that organized interests respond to policy agendas rather than determining them as suggested by the standard version of this hypothesis. In either case, however, the broad expectation generated from the literature on organized interests is that state governments will focus relatively more on post-material policies as the proportion of interest organizations registered to lobby on post-material policies increases. More critically still, others have suggested that, because legislators have more than sufficient interest to represent their constituents, organized interests may not be needed as intermediaries (Denzau and Munger 1986). If true, then their lobbying presence may be unrelated to the content of legislative agendas.

To test whether the composition of populations of organized interests determine (or respond to) the content of state policy agendas, we use a variant of a measure of the diversity of state interest communities built on Gray and Lowery's (1996) lobby registration data. Lobby registration lists were gathered by mail or web page from state agencies responsible for their maintenance and then used to code organizations by their interest content. Organizations lobbying on post-material areas were identified with the same subject criteria used to identify material and post-material legislation. Organizations that

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⁹ In an empirical assessment of the competing expectations, Lowery, Gray, Fellowes and Anderson (2004) examined several alternative specifications of the causal process underlying the demand for lobbying using 1995, 1997, and 1999 measures of the size of legislative agendas. When the 1995 and/or 1999 measures of legislative agendas were included in the models, the results for the 1997 agenda variables were correctly signed and significant and neither the 1995 nor 1999 measures were significant. Indeed, the latter were wrongly signed in most cases. They interpret these results to mean that the contemporaneous relationship between interest density and policy demand assumed by the ESA model is more valid than the leading relationship implied by the traditional version of this hypothesis.

¹⁰ Previous work indicates that the stringency of state lobbying registration requirements has little impact on the density (Lowery and Gray 1997; 1994) and diversity (Gray and Lowery 1998) of state interest communities.

lobby transportation policy, for instance, were coded as material registrants, whereas organizations that lobby on women's issues were coded as post-material registrants. Between 1997 and 1999, the mean proportion of registered interest organizations that were registered to lobby on post-material issues modestly increased from 30.70 percent of all groups to 31.20 percent; a number that corresponds closely with the mean proportion of post-material issues on state agendas during this period. Variance in this proportion of registrants among the states was largely static between 1997 and 1999. There also was very little variance within individual states during this period. Both directional versions of this hypothesis would lead us to expect that states with more organizations registered to lobby on post-material policies will be more likely to have legislative agendas that are relatively more focused on post-material policies than states with fewer registrants lobbying on post-material policies.

The fourth hypothesis addresses the role of political parties in the states. A number of scholars have found evidence that political parties matter a great deal in the states(Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993; Alt and Lowry 2000). Others, however, have generated less supportive results (Smith 1997; McAtee, Yackee, and Lowery 2003). Almost all of these findings have examined public policy outputs rather than the content of legislative agendas per se. Still, this research suggests that state Democratic parties may be more inclined to sponsor bills related to post-material policy than are Republican parties. Although both Democrats and Republicans are concerned with material policies, if for different sets of constituents, Republicans usually eschew many post-material policies, such as those concerned with the environment and welfare, and instead will place particular stress on selective material issues, like taxes and the regulatory concerns of small business. Elling (1979) found, however, that state parties are more likely to be able to fulfill their legislative mandates in the absence of competition from the other party. This suggests that Democrats may be more successful at placing post-material policies on legislative agendas when they face less competition from Republicans, and that Republicans will be more successful at filling policy agendas with material issues when they face less competition from Democrats.

To test the effect of political parties on legislative agendas, we measure the annual proportion of

Democrats in each statehouse (Smith 1997); note that this measure combines both chambers and is not a pure measure of party control. Between 1997 and 1999, Democrats retained a modest majority over Republicans, ranging from a mean proportion of 51.40 percent in 1997 to 51.60 percent in 1999. There was more variance within states during this period, ranging from a low standard deviation of 0.00 in Minnesota, New York, and Utah, where there was no change in the total seat share of the legislatures over the three year period, to a high of 0.05 percentage points in New Hampshire. We expect that states with a high proportion of Democrats in their statehouses will have more post-material issues on their agendas than states with a lower proportion of Democrats in their statehouse.

Results

We expect that state agendas evolve away from emphasizing material policies toward greater relative attention to post-material policies when their state economies are larger and growing, when their citizens are more liberal and highly educated, when the proportion of organized interests registered to lobby post-material policies increases, and when Democrats retain a higher share of legislative seats. We test these hypotheses with two estimation techniques on 1997 and 1999 data. We focus on these two years both because we have complete lobby registration data for both and because all state legislatures were in session. The first set of tests employs a saturated least squares dummy variable specification for the years 1997 and 1999 with dummies for both states and years. We do not, however, report the coefficients for these controls given their lack of substantive meaning. This is, however, an extremely conservative estimation technique for our purposes given that much of the variance on several of our independent variables is cross-sectional in nature. Because much of this variance will be accounted for by the state dummies, this is an exceptionally rigorous test of our hypotheses. Indeed, it could be too rigorous. Given that the variance in our measures is largely cross-sectional we may lose all empirical purchase on the variance relevant to the hypotheses in the state dummy variables. Still, should one or more of the independent variables cited by our hypotheses survive such a test, we should be quite confident about their relationship to the relative attention accorded post-material policies. In a more

realistic assessment, however, we also test the models using a partial least squares dummy variable approach employing a dummy for year and panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1996; Dielman 1989; Beck 2001) with the states defined as panels.

The results for the saturated LSDV models, excluding the estimates for the year and state dummies, are presented in the first five columns of table 4 and provide little support for all but one of our hypotheses. The coefficients for aggregate and per capita GSP in the partial model in column one are incorrectly signed and of small magnitude. This pattern of incorrect signs is replicated in the full model in column five. In this case, however, the magnitude of the per capita GSP measures is not so small. Indeed, it would have been significant at the 0.05 level had two-tailed tests been employed. This suggests that the proportion of legislative agendas devoted to post-material policies falls, all other things equal, as state economies become larger and their citizens wealthier. The estimates for the opinion liberalism and the proportion of the citizenry with higher education variables, as seen in the second and fifth columns, have a similar pattern. They are incorrectly signed, suggesting that the proportion of post-material policies declines in better educated and more liberal environments. But only the estimate for public opinion liberalism in the full model is sizable relative to its standard error. Indeed, it would have been significant at the 0.10 level had two-tailed tests been employed. The estimates for the proportion of postmaterial registrations are also negative, contrary to expectations, in columns three and five, suggesting that relative attention to post-material issues declines as the relative size of the interest community attentive to such issues increases. Neither of these estimates, however, was of discernible magnitude.

The sole exception to these null and contrary results, as seen in columns four and five, are those for the party variable – the proportion of legislative seats held by Democrats. When employed as the sole independent variable, the party representation estimate was positive as expected and significant at the 0.05 level. The estimate in the full model was also positively signed, indicating that the relative number of post-material bills increases with Democratic representation, and was discernibly different from zero at the 0.01 level. In the end, however, we are not especially surprised by the general pattern of null,

contrary, and weak results. As noted earlier, the saturated LSDV model is extremely conservative given the cross-sectional pattern of variance in our data. Despite this limitation, however, it is noteworthy that these results provide at least some support for our hypothesis on Democratic Party representation.

Much stronger support for several of the hypotheses is provided by the partial LSDV models with year dummy and panel corrected standard errors as seen in the last five columns of table 4. As seen in column six, the estimates for the size (aggregate GSP) and wealth (per capita GSP) of state economies were both positive as expected and significant at the 0.01 level when these were employed as the only independent variables. As seen in column ten, both are also signed as expected and significant – in this case at the 0.05 level – in the full model. Both the college education and opinion liberalism estimates reported in column seven are positively signed and statistically significant, indicating that states with a more highly educated and liberal citizenry are likely to consider legislative agendas with a greater relative proportion of post-material bills. But while retaining their expected signs, neither is discernibly different from zero in the full model reported in column ten. The results for the organized interest hypothesis reported in columns eight and ten are positive as expected, but neither was larger than its standard error. Finally, the estimates for the proportion of Democrats in state legislatures, as seen in columns nine and ten, are again signed in a manner that is consistent with our expectations and significant at the 0.01 level. But while this second set of results provided support for both the state size and wealth hypotheses and the party control hypothesis, it must also be noted that these three variables – in combination with the unreported year dummy – accounted for very little of the variance in relative legislative attention to bills with post-material content. The R-square value of the final model was only 0.081. While size, wealth, and party may matter, our specification obviously remains incomplete.

Conclusion

Our analysis was designed to probe the sources of variation in the prevalence of post-material policies on state agendas using several standard hypotheses tested previously at the national level. To do so, we generated new data on the content of state legislative agendas that should prove useful to a number

of scholars and any number of research projects. For our purposes, we found that states were much less focused on post-material issues during the second half of the 1990s than their national counterparts.

Instead, the majority of the content of nearly every state legislative agenda remained material policies, such as taxes and transportation. States, much more than the national government, focus their attention on material rather than post-material policies. Although post-material issues comprise at least a quarter of the agenda in nearly every state, states have collectively not followed the lead set by national institutions.

Nonetheless, some states are relatively more attentive to post-material policies than others. So why are some more focused on post-material policies than other states? We addressed this question by examining a number of the standard hypotheses employed in analysis of national level variation in attention to material and post-material policies. Our strongest results indicate that attention to postmaterial policies rises with greater representation by Democrats in state legislatures. Less consistent support – in the sense of depending on the specific estimation technique employed – was found for the hypothesis about the size and wealth of state economies. In contrast, much weaker support was found for the standard hypotheses about the roles of education and opinion liberalism in influencing the content of state legislative agendas, although both variables surely have some relationship to Democratic Party representation. And we found no evidence to suggest that the composition of the community of organized interests in a state determines (or responds to) the content of state legislative agendas. The null findings for the effects of organized interests relative to the modest effects observed for public opinion liberalism reinforce our earlier findings (Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, McAtee, 2004) that the density of organized interests has only a small effect on the strong relationship between opinion liberalism and policy liberalism in the states. So, at least on the kinds of policies we studied, state lawmakers respond far more to the views of the public than to the preferences of lobbyists. In sum, state size and wealth, and the choices citizens make in terms of political party representation, influences to at least a modest degree the content of legislative agendas in terms of the balance placed on material and post-material issues.

There are, of course, a number of caveats that must be noted. Three deserve special note. First,

the results for the partial LSDV models with panel corrected standard errors – while supportive of several of our hypotheses – were remarkably weak in the sense of explained variance. This suggests that the hypotheses we have examined do not provide a complete account of the content of legislative agendas. We are as yet a long way from having a fully specified model accounting for the relative attention to postmaterial policies on the part of state legislatures. At the same time, however, the constrained variation on both the dependent and independent variables found in the states suggests that our test should have provided an appropriate challenge for the hypotheses. That several were not provided empirical support may say more about the quality of the hypotheses than about our specification per se. Second, our finding that the content of legislative agendas is influenced by citizens' political choices in a manner consistent with democratic theory says little or nothing about the eventual success or failure of those agendas. It could well be that material organized interests are successful in stopping or at least delaying passage of post-material legislation when votes are actually counted. Still, the necessary first step toward passage of any legislation is getting an issue on the table, which is not an inconsiderable accomplishment in its own right (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002). And third, we have followed other scholars (i.e. Wilkerson et al) in employing bill count data to map legislative agendas. However, we have also pointed out the strengths and weakness of such measures. In brief, they are useful measures for mapping variation in agendas over time and space. But they may be less useful in terms of identifying the absolute level of attention given to different kinds of issues in the legislative process. Indeed, some labeling of bill topics may be entirely misleading, as is the case with President Bush's Clean Skies Initiative and other related proposals. So, no absolute interpretation should be applied to our bill count data.

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Figure 1: Average Number of Bills in 22 State Policy Areas and Average Proportion of Post-Material Bills in State Legislatures, 1995-1999




Table 1: The Number of Bills in 22 State Policy Areas, 1995-1999

State	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	State	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Alabama	231	1432	1908	1329	1839	Montana	331	129	1956	261	2603
Alaska	214	568	451	821	464	Nebraska	360	844	763	1257	1003
Arizona	246	1220	1706	2046	2027	Nevada	243		1366		1830
Arkansas	372		1799		1863	New Hampshire	434	911	735	1377	1159
California	8666	10618	9490	11848	9362	New Jersey	4915	4131	5234	3944	5437
Colorado	828	1087	795	1118	1165	New Mexico	153	530	1027	652	1243
Connecticut	1315	1226	2237	1835	2617	New York	5838	6545	7495	6877	7834
Delaware	379	827	402	981	566	North Carolina	452	1213	2046	2550	1780
Florida	2236	5587	2599	3838	2776	North Dakota	235		903		1297
Georgia	686	1850	1944	3660	1868	Ohio	1129	1891	1083	2006	1324
Hawaii	1846	3930	3207	6157	3454	Oklahoma	947	3760	4189	5187	3726
Idaho	165	623	651	633	589	Oregon	377		2870		3443
Illinois	2340	4041	3657	4679	4212	Pennsylvania	2286	3627	2386	3456	2265
Indiana	263	863	1544	1284	2335	Rhode Island	1051	2460	2004	3978	2648
Iowa	671	682	846	668	1237	South Carolina	652	1446	1240	1990	1566
Kansas	528	1539	1162	2080	1220	South Dakota		312	368	597	616
Kentucky		1241	208	2044	197	Tennessee	398	966	1201	2999	2247
Louisiana	1997	1167	3794	1837	4506	Texas	3241	265	5635	185	6783
Maine	287	309	1030	478	1692	Utah	223	1006	1230	1213	998
Maryland	309	1719	2431	2267	2129	Vermont	308	679	574	980	802
Massachusetts	582	785	364	644	514	Virginia	4324	3849	6385	5034	7600
Michigan	1970	3744	2546	4095	2574	Washington	1360	2801	3536	5312	3670
Minnesota	2204	3813	3733	5363	3383	West Virginia	133	1020	1171	1466	1368
Mississippi	181	2444	2887	3211	3009	Wisconsin	636	1137	625	1181	629
Missouri	289	1253	1800	2024	2194	Wyoming	84	132	476	362	485
US Mean:	1227.39	2004.82	2193.78	2560.95	2442.96						

Note: Cell entries represent the total number of unique bills on state legislative agendas consideredin 22 policy areas.

Table 2: The Proportion of Post-Material Issues on State Policy Agendas, 1995-1999

State	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	State	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Alabama	34.63	27.23	30.66	34.54	30.40	Montana	34.14	37.21	30.98	26.44	28.08
Alaska	25.70	29.05	28.82	33.86	34.70	Nebraska	25.00	23.58	25.56	27.68	23.83
Arizona	41.06	29.26	33.06	33.04	34.04	Nevada	20.16		24.96		24.59
Arkansas	26.08		25.57		28.23	New Hampshire	34.56	34.47	36.60	40.23	43.83
California	31.19	28.46	34.21	35.36	34.62	New Jersey	33.39	32.34	38.73	35.62	38.73
Colorado	32.85	28.52	38.11	36.14	31.59	New Mexico	29.41	39.06	33.20	31.29	28.88
Connecticut	31.71	28.79	31.87	33.90	34.58	New York	29.14	30.19	27.94	29.29	31.01
Delaware	30.61	28.66	29.85	33.64	33.39	North Carolina	46.68	37.18	37.19	26.27	31.91
Florida	40.65	40.65	39.21	42.83	34.19	North Dakota	22.13		20.04		21.28
Georgia	19.53	22.05	33.85	35.66	32.87	Ohio	25.24	24.85	23.08	25.47	27.57
Hawaii	29.14	30.89	34.02	37.37	36.97	Oklahoma	22.81	25.51	26.14	31.46	24.96
Idaho	20.61	19.10	20.43	30.49	21.73	Oregon	24.67		28.12		27.62
Illinois	26.20	25.74	27.18	40.41	26.99	Pennsylvania	26.86	27.46	31.22	29.92	32.10
Indiana	29.28	27.81	27.53	31.70	34.30	Rhode Island	27.40	28.46	29.89	32.65	32.74
Iowa	23.70	21.11	22.70	27.25	25.06	South Carolina	29.91	31.54	39.92	38.79	33.08
Kansas	21.40	23.33	27.88	30.58	29.43	South Dakota		25.32	24.18	30.32	22.89
Kentucky		31.43	38.94	34.30	38.58	Tennessee	30.90	38.51	44.80	44.58	43.88
Louisiana	29.09	25.96	27.41	20.74	29.94	Texas	27.34	19.62	30.45	30.27	31.51
Maine	32.40	32.36	31.07	35.56	31.03	Utah	27.80	32.60	27.56	31.57	26.35
Maryland	21.68	28.91	29.45	31.45	31.24	Vermont	27.60	27.54	29.97	33.88	35.79
Massachusetts	24.91	26.75	23.63	27.48	22.57	Virginia	31.06	29.93	35.88	37.33	35.63
Michigan	28.43	34.62	30.68	42.56	34.58	Washington	27.79	28.31	33.77	40.30	30.93
Minnesota	32.89	30.82	31.48	38.86	32.43	West Virginia	33.83	28.92	28.35	33.02	27.85
Mississippi	18.23	21.77	25.91	31.33	28.25	Wisconsin	31.45	30.26	33.12	35.31	28.62
Missouri	22.84	25.54	24.22	25.74	25.11	Wyoming	32.14	15.91	18.28	24.03	24.54
US Mean:	28.67	.28.64	30.15	33.06	.30.70						

Note: Cell entries represent the proportion of post-material policies on state legislative agendas.

Table 3: Rank Order of States by Post-Material Proportion, 1997-1999

	1997	1998	1999		1997	1998	1999
Tennessee	1	1	1	Rhode Island	26	25	18
South Carolina	2	8	16	Delaware	27	22	15
Florida	3	2	13	Maryland	28	29	24
Kentucky	4	18	4	Alaska	29	21	8
New Jersey	5	13	3	West Virginia	30	24	36
Colorado	6	11	22	Oregon	31		37
North Carolina	7	42	21	New York	32	37	26
New Hampshire	8	6	2	Kansas	33	32	30
Virginia	9	10	7	Utah	34	27	40
California	10	15	9	Indiana	35	26	12
Hawaii	11	9	5	Louisiana	36	46	29
Georgia	12	12	17	Illinois	37	4	39
Washington	13	5	27	Oklahoma	38	28	43
New Mexico	14	31	31	Mississippi	39	30	33
Wisconsin	15	16	32	Arkansas	40		34
Arizona	16	23	14	Nebraska	41	38	46
Connecticut	17	19	10	Nevada	42		44
Minnesota	18	7	19	Missouri	43	43	41
Pennsylvania	19	36	20	South Dakota	44	34	47
Maine	20	14	25	Massachusetts	45	39	48
Montana	21	41	35	Ohio	46	44	38
Michigan	22	3	11	Iowa	47	40	42
Alabama	23	17	28	Idaho	48	33	49
Texas	24	35	23	North Dakota	49		50
Vermont	25	20	6	Wyoming	50	45	45

Note: Cell entries represent the rank order of states by the proportion of bills in 22 policy guilds that matched post-material search terms. 1= Highest Proportion of post-material bills; 50 = Lowest Proportion of post-material bills.

Table 4: Tests of Post-Materialism Hypotheses, 1997 & 1999

Independent]	Dependent Va	ariable: Propoi	rtion Post-Ma	terial Agend	a		
Variable		Least Square	s Dummy Va	riable Model	S]	Panel Correc	ted Standard	Error Models	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Gross State	-0.010				-0.006	0.007 ***				0.006 **
Product	0.039				0.038	0.002				0.003
Per Capita	-0.005				-0.009	0.002 ***				0.002 **
GSP	0.004				0.004	0.001				0.001
Public Opinion		-0.071			-0.109		0.061 *			0.020
Liberalism		0.059			0.058		0.041			0.036
College Educ.		-0.364			-0.287		0.146 **			0.010
Proportion		0.312			0.300		0.082			0.159
Post-Material			-0.149		-0.012			0.052		0.055
Interests Prop.			0.174		0.169			0.105		0.094
Democratic				0.252 **	0.432 ***				0.047 ***	0.050 ***
Legislative Prop.				0.135	0.145				0.004	0.006
Constant	0.418	0.335	0.342	0.133	0.242	0.258	0.290	0.288	0.282	0.217
R-Square	0.909	0.910	0.906	0.912	0.927	0.055	0.034	0.005	0.020	0.081
n	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96

 $^{***=}p<0.01; \ **=p<0.05; \ *=p<0.10, one-tailed tests. \ The values below the coefficients are standard errors.$

Appendix 1: 1995 Bill Counts Based on Key Word Searches

State	AG	BK	CR	CM	CN	ED	EN	GT	HT	IN	LW	MN	MI	PF	RN	RS	SP	TX	TR	UT	WL	SB
Alabama	1	20	0	2	22	11	11	8	23	14	0	2	2	9	1	0	30	57	8	6	4	0
Alaska	2	21	0	7	20	4	14	11	22	18	1	1	8	1	0	11	5	31	15	11	10	1
Arizona	2	19	3	2	18	14	29	8	38	20	1	4	5	1	0	0	2	46	7	10	15	2
Arkansas	4	45	2	11	27	14	33	23	37	38	0	3	6	10	0	1	7	91	14	2	4	0
California	81	914	16	180	858	317	1266	188	913	1019	37	51	190	274	8	0	67	1605	196	361	116	9
Colorado	24	57	3	23	47	33	82	20	101	159	4	3	13	16	0	2	14	159	16	11	39	2
Connecticut	14	123	1	34	110	47	187	30	143	147	2	1	3	29	0	0	12	284	38	71	27	12
Delaware	6	27	3	3	15	14	49	9	36	54	0	2	5	14	1	0	8	77	38	11	5	2
Florida	8	163	6	52	186	116	323	31	350	301	6	4	45	56	0	6	71	380	36	50	43	3
Georgia	6	48	2	16	34	23	37	73	53	84	8	1	8	11	1	0	5	220	21	20	13	2
Hawaii	66	222	4	82	161	68	182	34	210	289	0	2	11	27	2	5	32	302	54	52	40	1
Idaho	3	11	0	3	17	5	13	16	11	21	1	0	6	1	0	0	0	47	3	2	5	0
Illinois	22	253	2	83	134	91	178	109	273	259	9	5	30	115	1	20	21	557	71	58	47	2
Indiana	5	24	0	2	23	9	28	12	34	36	3	0	4	10	0	0	1	47	9	8	5	3
Iowa	19	96	0	33	19	19	52	36	69	65	0	0	6	16	1	0	3	194	6	22	15	0
Kansas	15	74	0	12	28	14	19	19	58	63	3	1	7	10	0	0	11	147	11	18	11	7
Kentucky	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Louisiana	14	209	0	25	74	45	153	195	307	362	17	6	36	57	0	2	18	356	36	23	58	4
Maine	7	34	0	7	10	7	40	6	32	43	0	1	4	3	0	0	2	55	8	16	12	0
Maryland	2	47	0	7	32	9	8	10	33	45	1	1	5	16	0	0	4	72	4	0	13	0
Massachusetts	5	72	1	6	29	10	38	36	79	105	2	2	8	20	1	0	5	138	5	8	11	1
Michigan	24	281	2	15	130	44	312	109	161	165	1	3	16	46	0	7	9	551	34	28	32	0
Minnesota	72	208	5	76	175	94	266	92	298	257	3	5	8	34	0	1	37	438	53	55	25	2
Mississippi	6	19	0	4	12	5	10	8	13	16	3	1	4	1	0	1	2	59	9	5	3	0
Missouri	4	35	0	6	17	11	17	15	29	43	0	3	7	11	0	0	3	59	10	13	6	0
Montana	9	22	0	3	19	10	53	9	41	51	4	0	1	5	0	2	0	70	12	10	9	1
Nebraska	12	45	2	8	18	21	23	18	30	40	0	0	6	2	0	0	1	102	14	4	13	1
Nevada	2	43	0	3	22	6	12	5	19	27	0	0	1	12	0	0	4	57	9	13	8	0
New Hampshire	0	50	0	13	32	20	62	3	54	63	0	2	5	10	0	0	3	75	11	20	11	0
New Jersey	53	462	25	67	385	168	764	224	556	617	2	42	95	195	1	2	39	868	83	152	88	27
New Mexico	1	19	0	4	16	9	18	6	17	12	2	0	1	4	0	1	1	32	7	3	0	0
New York	73	555	6	88	275	138	833	252	580	649	1	25	62	225	0	1	49	1714	68	145	95	4
North Carolina	2	34	3	8	42	28	104	11	59	33	0	5	2	6	3	0	6	62	24	12	8	0
North Dakota	7	38	0	9	12	7	5	8	35	40	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	51	11	4	3	0
Ohio	17	126	1	30	101	49	53	67	104	104	8	2	51	61	0	0	19	223	33	12	59	9
Oklahoma	20	105	1	27	52	43	48	78	98	134	2	3	26	17	3	1	8	206	39	16	15	5
Oregon	5	47	0	11	45	11	43	11	33	41	1	1	2	7	0	0	1	82	14	16	5	1
Pennsylvania	21	218	6	49	128	85	193	56	221	270	11	14	62	114	2	1	17	610	59	53	90	6
Rhode Island	22	99	5	45	69	39	93	15	115	159	2	33	4	36	0	1	7	214	16	36	29	12
South Carolina	0	38	0	43	46	36	93 70	9	74	96	0	33 7	15	15	1	0	9	180	34	13	5	0
	0	0		0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
South Dakota Tennessee	8	48	0	14	23	11	17	0 6	83	60	1	1	3	16	0	0	3	64	10	0 21	8	0
Texas	53	387	9	60	183	115	182	58	408	444	18	3	5 53	128	4	13	63	759	72	117	105	7
1 exas Utah								3					33 4				7					0
	6	22	0	6	28	6	23		16	21	0	0		1	0	1		60	3	6	10	1
Vermont	5	27	0	8	19	12	28	4	42	38	0	0	4	6	0	0	1	85	18	8	2	
Virginia	38	452	1	86	483	122	397	124	503	406	28	11	88	120	9	7	84	846	165	108	227	19
Washington	43	114	4	28	138	29	133	53	161	152	1	1	27	21	2	2	13	316	33	48	36	5
West Virginia	2	14	0	1	4	4	13	9	21	17	0	1	3	3	0	1	0	23	5	4	7	1
Wisconsin	13	70	0	4	42	12	49	7	107	86	0	4	10	10	0	0	9	142	29	18	23	1
Wyoming	2	8	0	3	3	1	10	1	13	12	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	24	0	3	2	0

Appendix 2: 1996 Bill Counts Based on Key Word Searches

State	AG	BK	CR	CM	CN	ED	EN	GT	НТ	IN	LW	MN	MI	PF	RN	RS	SP	TX	TR	UT	WL	SB
Alabama	8	129	6	18	83	61	44	80	105	153	8	9	43	44	2	1	127	422	30	12	45	2
Alaska	3	52	0	17	43	7	59	26	66	69	1	1	24	13	0	22	10	76	39	14	23	3
Arizona	15	134	7	40	103	52	122	28	104	105	13	14	24	23	0	0	8	282	43	35	64	1
Arkansas	1	3	0	1	1	3	7	2	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	19	2	1	5	0
California	186	1320	21	339	785	553	1108	376	921	951	51	102	346	606	3	19	144	1536	340	616	272	20
Colorado	22	94	0	33	47	57	69	27	153	175	18	7	9	12	0	0	18	258	32	37	13	6
Connecticut	3	146	0	47	84	33	132	40	150	152	3	12	5	28	0	0	5	274	16	54	33	7
Delaware	8	57	4	12	52	24	96	26	83	104	0	2	11	30	1	0	18	144	11	131	11	2
Florida	46	513	20	129	473	308	690	78	928	819	6	13	131	158	2	15	172	670	111	131	151	13
Georgia	21	143	3	48	96	67	108	140	166	220	21	6	29	37	2	3	20	529	78	69	42	2
Hawaii	127	464	5	136	300	146	398	70	500	563	0	8	32	62	8	10	88	665	148	116	69	5
Idaho	19	60	0	13	55	21	36	51	45	67	0	6	21	2	0	0	2	181	18	11	15	0
Illinois	39	469	2	159	243	147	321	181	463	421	24	6	49	192	1	41	33	951	119	96	73	6
Indiana	6	82	1	27	45	49	76	35	91	101	5	0	3	29	0	0	8	239	24	16	15	10
Iowa	13	102	1	24	46	20	38	21	64	70	1	1	3	10	2	0	12	204	22	21	7	0
Kansas	38	221	0	48	81	51	69	62	177	209	11	2	33	18	0	0	26	375	32	37	36	13
Kentucky	24	112	2	23	97	50	96	64	156	182	1	14	9	21	0	0	43	204	55	43	43	2
Louisiana	8	108	10	10	31	27	75	37	78	97	0	14	27	22	0	0	68	453	36	3	45	0
Maine	18	33	0	8	12	11	35	11	48	43	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	60	6	14	6	0
Maryland	22	157	1	49	167	50	83	50	273	259	8	7	28	64	0	0	55	337	35	29	35	10
Massachusetts	5	91	1	13	45	20	55	51	111	131	2	2	11	29	1	0	5	171	11	11	17	10
Michigan	78	645	2	39	274	85	782	261	349	297	2	5	48	93	0	12	14	548	83	59	64	4
Minnesota	118	411	13	149	294	167	369	155	490	398	6	14	17	57	0	1	83	771	141	98	53	6
Mississippi	36	195	6	27	112	58	112	119	228	252	6	22	64	53	2	1	65	835	128	47	61	3
Missouri	19	104	0	47	64	35	72	38	168	222	5	14	17	31	0	0	16	273	36	49	29	14
Montana	3	8	0	2	10	7	18	2	18	20	1	14	4	5	0	0	0	273	2	1	5	0
Nebraska	19	87	5	17	52	42	44	44	68	77	0	1	15	10	0	1	8	274	29	11	32	7
Nevada	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
New Hampshire	0	97	0	22	61	38	135	7	114	145	0	3	13	16	0	0	6	149	30	54	21	0
New Jersey	26	418	15	65	266	86	611	187	477	533	0	24	78	180	1	0	38	792	72	115	108	30
New Mexico	4	21	0	19	32	35	59	6	79	54	0	2	3	7	0	1	23	104	58	10	11	2
New York	111	918	7	141	431	195	549	470	993	503	1	41	116	377	0	2	72	1078	131	224	160	6
North Carolina	16	93	8	11	100	45	258	48	100	114	1	12	2	9	3	0	10	264	66	24	27	0
North Dakota	5	10	0	4	3	1	1	7	12	9	0	0	0	1	0	0	10	19	1	3	0	0
Ohio	25	239	2	49	159	88	102	114	160	156	10	2	83	113	0	0	30	371	51	30	88	16
Oklahoma	89	379	3	80	180	124	226	322	491	586	8	7	80	105	3	9	48	759	134	52	64	8
	0	0	0	0	8	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	3	0	0	0
Oregon	53	367	12	70	231	117	322	96	381	435	15	22	88	156	2	3	33	861	124	90	129	10
Pennsylvania Rhode Island	54	216	9	93	144	85	196	43	329	344	4	71	10	85	0	6	26	575	35	63	55	16
South Carolina	4	92	5	19	100	87	146	18	148	217	0	10	28	30	2	2	44	343	73	41	24	4
South Caronna South Dakota	3	35	0	13	7	36	6	10	30	42	0	10	3	0	0	0	44	101	9	13	3	5
			8									3										1
Tennessee Texas	13 1	105	0	29 4	42	39	46 2	11 2	180	130 35	1	0	6	21 7	3	0	58	163 142	31	36 2	38	0
Utah		11				6		20	33	35 85	1	-	1	7	1	-	5	252	4		5	
	60	87	0	23	85	33	72		116	93	3	4	7		1	0	45		30	11	61	4
Vermont	10	63	0	18	39	24	68	13	86		0	0	8	12	0	0	2	191	29	14	7	1
Virginia	43	402	5	80	345	130	327	125	391	422	9	18	71	121	1	5	97	805	130	82	201	31
Washington	89	176	8	64	285	60	293	110	323	281	1	14	63	53	2	5	20	679	77	99	87	7
West Virginia	19	71	1	13	66	16	115	77	120	147	0	11	25	15	0	0	6	229	24	28	37	0
Wisconsin	16	143	0	10	75	23	95	9	168	152	1	7	14	19	2	0	19	256	43	41	37	3
Wyoming	3	31	0	3	17	4	12	5	4	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	42	2	3	1	1

Appendix 3: 1997 Bill Counts Based on Key Word Searches

State	AG	BK	CR	CM	CN	ED	EN	GT	НТ	IN	LW	MN	MI	PF	RN	RS	SP	TX	TR	UT	WL	SB
Alabama	14	153	4	49	146	66	87	81	180	173	2	14	54	72	0	0	210	474	62	27	38	2
Alaska	6	38	0	12	35	16	54	22	49	39	6	0	17	3	0	15	7	70	53	5	4	0
Arizona	24	163	2	40	119	54	177	57	220	170	11	51	33	27	0	0	23	379	32	36	88	0
Arkansas	11	159	13	75	96	102	148	148	137	251	5	5	30	87	0	0	33	395	55	20	27	2
California	172	926	68	215	720	439	994	249	1409	1036	6	88	285	341	5	2	90	1657	253	253	242	40
Colorado	5	79	4	35	55	36	60	34	153	161	7	0	17	11	0	2	26	21	28	33	24	4
Connecticut	6	212	5	64	117	101	234	65	324	330	0	8	11	48	0	2	17	523	45	83	32	10
Delaware	2	38	1	17	29	12	47	12	40	48	1	1	13	21	1	2	14	69	12	15	5	2
Florida	28	216	8	61	175	151	216	28	408	319	0	3	51	46	0	6	136	525	48	62	100	12
Georgia	23	148	5	52	89	72	135	97	157	174	39	2	41	50	2	5	192	446	56	54	95	10
Hawaii	79	315	1	61	281	117	363	54	448	445	0	13	65	31	1	5	109	578	134	53	52	2
Idaho	7	77	0	12	37	19	52	57	43	73	0	2	16	14	0	0	0	189	18	16	19	0
Illinois	54	421	1	170	258	128	278	189	468	396	9	22	59	167	0	24	56	717	82	77	63	18
Indiana	7	145	1	41	87	72	159	47	156	143	9	4	30	65	0	0	13	425	63	49	24	4
Iowa	27	114	0	23	44	25	47	22	96	98	1	0	7	9	0	0	8	266	18	25	16	0
Kansas	16	157	0	24	44	56	69	57	158	176	4	0	34	9	0	2	16	263	6	32	25	14
Kentucky	2	17	2	1	20	11	18	9	17	22	0	3	1	3	1	1	19	34	4	10	13	0
Louisiana	35	387	12	90	196	61	228	261	532	691	42	20	56	116	0	1	93	649	131	78	114	1
Maine	18	126	0	24	47	40	117	30	138	137	1	6	6	6	0	0	0	230	27	49	25	3
Maryland	29	309	3	30	190	49	128	70	434	386	9	1	7	94	1	1	33	496	40	46	68	7
Massachusetts	0	17	0	10	30	5	34	19	30	37	0	4	3	12	0	0	2	121	11	14	15	0
Michigan	50	395	1	44	138	62	441	147	210	146	1	3	24	54	0	12	6	632	71	38	61	10
Minnesota	114	373	11	134	349	231	307	130	428	343	0	13	26	89	0	0	115	764	94	127	83	2
Mississippi	57	134	2	22	179	82	166	134	319	370	14	39	51	66	3	3	118	804	201	59	58	6
Missouri	27	126	0	53	82	56	105	68	214	271	2	24	35	45	0	0	16	488	49	71	45	23
Montana	36	190	0	36	181	57	196	73	255	275	28	15	24	24	0	7	11	376	46	36	87	3
Nebraska	15	75	3	35	33	50	47	34	68	83	0	4	10	8	0	0	10	235	16	17	17	3
Nevada	24	186	2	34	128	29	90	28	156	160	0	0	15	51	1	0	35	273	57	66	28	3
New Hampshire	5	82	0	26	36	48	90	6	98	95	1	2	6	7	1	0	5	135	22	41	27	2
New Jersey	31	613	25	108	376	133	924	280	743	779	0	33	119	239	3	2	44	314	118	158	155	37
New Mexico	15	76	23	22	71	64	94	31	132	84	3	2	13	16	0	3	23	199	121	28	26	2
New York	81	698	2	125	319	151	993	393	768	854	0	43	76	264	0	2	62	2232	144	163	118	7
North Carolina	25	177	7	57	146	56	405	393 41	222	186	2	11	16	204	0	2	42	439	100	57	29	5
North Dakota	44	149	0	29	43	27	14		109		0	11	7	8	0	0	7	238	31			1
Ohio	34	136	1	30	105	54	46	37 39	94	116 94	2	2	40	62	0	0	9	234	30	18 17	24 46	8
	70		8		216	151	207	353	603	684	13	8	102	108	0	21	49	833	138	57	77	1
Oklahoma		405	7	85												0						8
Oregon	46	318		82	264	102	318 230	92	298	301 251	4	14	28	59	0		16	632 590	129	86	66 93	
Pennsylvania	62	219	6	40	149	87		56	287		4	14	42	87		2 5	41		82	34		4
Rhode Island	33	172	3	55	99	56	134	39	301	273		41	21	70	0		61	495	43	52	44	
South Carolina	6	98	2	16	70	76	124	27	136	173	1	4	8	13	0	0	141	272	36	20	16	1
South Dakota	10	49	0	14	12	17	29	1	37	60	0	3	6	6	0	0	0	97	20	1	6	0
Tennessee	7	124	6	32	75	49	59	11	181	110	3	6	5	32	3	1	204	182	38	35	36	2
Texas	76	544	7	4	277	222	237	2	936	990	21	9	74	191	9	16	109	1223	227	258	196	7
Utah	62	127	0	23	127	36	106	20	128	120	8	3	8	3	0	2	31	315	55	18	38	0
Vermont	10	58	0	18	32	18	49	8	97	104	0	0	6	7	0	0	2	110	23	26	6	0
Virginia	63	733	15	80	617	231	650	169	720	709	21	16	160	239	7	10	242	867	237	122	426	51
Washington	77	368	21	64	330	106	361	102	489	270	6	8	109	69	4	8	97	747	51	113	116	20
West Virginia	18	90	0	13	82	25	101	77	143	137	3	4	39	14	1	1	21	289	44	22	41	6
Wisconsin	6	50	1	10	27	24	34	9	104	77	0	3	18	11	0	1	19	166	20	18	25	2
Wyoming	14	89	0	3	30	23	23	5	32	41	7	0	1	8	0	0	1	160	10	18	8	3

Appendix 4: 1998 Bill Counts Based on Key Word Searches

State	AG	BK	CR	CM	CN	ED	EN	GT	HT	IN	LW	MN	MI	PF	RN	RS	SP	TX	TR	UT	WL	SB
Alabama	44	141	0	11	125	55	50	11	129	107	1	1	30	48	7	0	170	316	26	8	48	1
Alaska	10	79	0	1	63	32	80	52	95	74	6	0	36	22	0	23	22	120	46	11	49	0
Arizona	15	177	17	8	155	99	204	100	216	191	0	46	17	29	0	0	27	498	93	40	113	1
Arkansas	2	3	0	0	2	0	1	0	3	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	23	0	0	2	0
California	302	1222	115	27	583	848	853	481	1339	1019	17	123	496	703	11	18	158	1517	561	529	866	60
Colorado	11	57	2	0	95	36	112	10	135	144	3	4	17	12	0	0	31	262	66	31	88	2
Connecticut	16	219	9	6	141	82	206	23	206	214	4	49	15	45	0	5	5	316	63	89	114	8
Delaware	8	90	2	2	61	33	115	12	103	121	1	1	21	49	1	0	27	183	54	44	49	4
Florida	49	279	7	5	286	205	356	63	520	442	9	7	61	68	0	5	206	697	114	90	350	19
Georgia	60	278	17	6	188	148	286	46	322	319	47	8	58	99	3	5	350	930	183	108	179	20
Hawaii	185	590	4	14	490	242	592	102	902	828	1	15	91	84	5	20	196	948	342	132	360	14
Idaho	9	75	0	0	34	26	57	7	63	84	0	1	13	7	0	1	10	174	19	16	37	0
Illinois	73	592	1	6	383	229	435	54	701	578	15	23	73	233	0	31	64	399	167	133	461	28
Indiana	18	101	0	8	61	54	97	14	197	152	4	5	16	62	0	0	13	343	46	37	46	10
Iowa	28	77	0	1	47	30	36	13	75	68	0	1	7	5	1	3	5	183	35	18	35	0
Kansas	39	290	1	1	84	105	111	20	298	289	10	0	64	25	0	3	59	511	33	59	62	16
Kentucky	14	183	4	7	211	79	186	49	243	309	1	32	36	46	6	2	83	334	36	75	100	8
Louisiana	22	103	6	1	88	45	66	31	117	136	1	28	11	44	3	2	97	784	183	16	47	6
Maine	8	45	0	2	14	23	51	16	81	56	0	3	6	6	0	0	0	96	14	42	15	0
Maryland	34	232	6	0	153	66	93	20	423	400	3	5	16	110	1	0	31	434	99	46	93	2
Massachusetts	1	52	0	1	46	8	82	6	73	82	0	9	11	24	0	0	10	185	29	20	4	1
Michigan	108	556	2	4	304	126	959	40	446	300	4	6	47	117	0	18	21	629	141	64	189	14
Minnesota	169	665	15	44	586	410	508	154	666	484	5	27	27	101	0	0	169	545	266	202	316	4
Mississippi	46	242	2	6	203	115	168	44	375	359	26	45	66	77	2	0	238	906	127	51	106	7
Missouri	27	181	2	0	97	67	145	15	201	278	20	39	7	49	2	0	16	649	55	93	88	11
Montana	6	18	0	1	20	4	39	11	21	32	0	39 1	5	3	0	0	0	80	8	7	5	0
Nebraska	35	113	3	10	77	77	100	19	113	141	0	4	19	15	0	0	16	421	24	22	39	9
Nevada	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0
New Hampshire	13	128	0	3	63	107	178	7	202	191	10	10	11	20	1	0	7	233	51	79	59	4
New Jersey	22	286	23	2	273	161	515	53	523	472	0	22	90	162	5	4	31	783	211	124	147	35
1 1		33	23	3	49		49	47	72		0			7						20	39	0
New Mexico New York	11 140	1062	2		477	36 313	493	148	389	46 416	2	4 80	16 129	420	0	0 2	6	185 1153	27 578	219	730	9
North Carolina	50	262	8	28 19	246	77	175	46	217	267	2	20	25	420	0	2	87 57	694	117	85	136	5
North Dakota	6	8	0	0	0	1	2	1	11	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	14	0	2	130	0
Ohio	51	267	1	1	189	93	49	31	204	182	9	3		119	3	0	29	413	108	39	132	15
	117	577	8	9	342	195	204	174	865	916	11	14	68 148	139	3	17		783	218	83	286	7
Oklahoma																	71					0
Oregon	0	1	0	0	0 232	0	5	0	0	0 381	0	0	0	0	0 2	0 2	0	1	171	0	0	8
Pennsylvania	114 83	313 318	15 7	14	228	150 137	124 179	23	462	589	17	23 94	61	136	0	7	92	861 935	171 90	66	189	
Rhode Island				6				17	651		6		46	146			138			100	187	14
South Carolina	19	161	13	0	113	114	95	13	217	243	3	8	30	34	1	0	245	484	72	34	87	4
South Dakota	13	88	0	0	48	31	47	10	83	70	2	0	16	21	0	0	0	136	11	1	20	0
Tennessee	38	291	21	9	199	135	124	15	417	241	3	12	19	68	3	4	502	443	216	91	135	13
Texas	3	18	0	0	4	6	3	2	37	30	2	0	2	2	0	0	5	48	11	5	5	2
Utah	67	78	0	0	105	31	94	25	132	145	5	3	4	14	0	0	50	290	64	27	76	3
Vermont	15	90	0	1	66	39	105	1	162	166	0	0	14	13	0	0	7	179	49	54	19	0
Virginia	50	392	11	10	396	228	488	22	625	560	11	16	130	141	2	6	217	1101	199	102	308	19
Washington	143	546	33	11	527	158	616	73	793	388	9	14	156	129	14	8	118	579	400	160	409	28
West Virginia	16	117	1	3	98	43	159	8	179	194	4	11	45	35	2	2	21	373	19	52	79	5
Wisconsin	9	120	2	5	61	39	89	34	167	115	0	9	22	25	0	1	42	271	52	38	78	2
Wyoming	17	23	0	0	50	16	30	6	17	22	1	4	8	2	0	1	0	131	2	8	24	C

Appendix 5: 1999 Bill Counts Based on Key Word Searches

State	AG	BK	CR	CM	CN	ED	EN	GT	HT	IN	LW	MN	MI	PF	RN	RS	SP	TX	TR	UT	WL	SB
Alabama	13	192	12	109	117	94	65	92	137	133	10	9	22	69	0	0	203	473	14	25	48	2
Alaska	3	41	0	11	30	31	74	12	38	25	0	0	17	13	4	11	4	76	35	29	10	0
Arizona	19	190	16	84	142	75	202	66	294	186	0	44	22	35	1	0	27	427	50	65	75	7
Arkansas	22	129	10	56	99	89	115	175	236	206	7	3	15	45	1	0	37	474	50	45	38	11
California	184	696	53	261	749	508	996	377	1409	1137	11	46	195	397	5	15	67	1444	283	278	203	48
Colorado	10	98	4	44	85	39	76	27	196	151	4	0	15	15	0	0	27	282	28	30	26	8
Connecticut	10	211	10	70	197	100	278	82	481	384	2	13	29	78	0	1	11	521	26	79	25	9
Delaware	8	43	1	21	42	32	64	19	60	49	0	3	4	22	1	0	13	140	6	14	18	6
Florida	40	272	4	73	200	120	267	56	407	387	14	9	60	44	0	0	77	521	71	59	74	21
Georgia	27	125	4	59	127	72	123	106	169	152	21	4	21	68	0	0	195	433	45	66	51	0
Hawaii	124	406	5	87	278	215	303	42	605	408	0	9	68	52	6	16	105	509	106	66	38	6
Idaho	21	54	0	10	50	18	38	50	49	65	0	5	16	7	0	0	2	147	25	11	21	0
Illinois	56	315	10	292	264	111	315	261	577	435	12	9	39	204	1	45	55	919	92	121	68	11
Indiana	16	162	4	38	83	138	209	66	274	295	0	2	14	87	1	0	128	643	58	65	47	5
Iowa	66	162	0	49	73	67	60	35	131	115	3	0	10	11	0	0	35	339	24	40	17	0
Kansas	37	125	2	37	49	64	56	43	158	154	4	1	17	15	0	7	53	295	24	35	26	18
Kentucky	5	10	0	0	15	11	24	13	23	26	0	3	4	3	1	0	8	28	8	5	9	1
Louisiana	18	435	25	121	216	126	314	274	609	774	41	37	67	245	8	13	129	678	158	57	138	23
Maine	24	186	0	46	74	69	165	33	244	220	0	12	18	15	0	0	7	398	31	101	40	9
Maryland	14	202	1	74	154	55	110	65	418	328	0	4	29	56	0	0	36	419	39	79	45	1
Massachusetts	2	38	0	17	39	6	49	25	48	53	0	5	11	15	0	0	4	168	17	7	9	1
Michigan	68	310	2	70	124	78	444	87	235	147	2	3	39	60	5	2	74	680	55	32	52	5
Minnesota	93	289	1	104	266	279	245	130	431	317	0	17	24	66	0	0	59	784	92	99	82	5
Mississippi	39	208	4	36	164	84	165	184	283	316	24	35	56	60	0	1	240	742	198	86	74	10
Missouri	38	143	0	30	108	99	111	93	253	272	5	23	20	63	0	1	30	711	48	79	58	9
Montana	70	225	0	62	247	43	340	92	259	289	9	12	40	33	0	12	1	593	103	84	88	1
Nebraska	33	76	2	56	73	54	63	45	95	103	0	2	21	11	0	0	12	278	41	13	13	12
Nevada	15	204	4	61	250	40	129	75	196	266	0	14	44	54	4	1	17	289	54	53	60	0
New Hampshire		74	0	43	62	125	195	12	143	130	0	3	16	25	3	0	7	174	36	62	35	8
New Jersey	31	535	51	127	414	252	836	215	771	726	1	38	132	258	5	7	52	437	146	212	139	52
New Mexico	24	85	7	53	118	97	68	45	132	125	6	14	20	13	0	4	31	282	47	42	24	6
New York	108	734	2	144	390	257	1136	453	826	883	2	39	115	305	0	1	73	1901	127	194	135	9
North Carolina	22	153	3	47	132	44	182	54	264	247	4	17	17	15	0	0	27	372	98	31	48	3
North Dakota	88	210	1	76	52	46	32	47	149	148	2	5	2	5	0	2	17	335	23	26	31	0
Ohio	26	121	2	62	111	51	82	50	148	89	4	4	48	58	0	0	13	301	39	27	69	19
Oklahoma	92	363	6	97	241	122	162	260	483	569	6	8	50	92	0	16	35	819	138	36	122	9
	38	258	11	78	393	133	360	121	344	337	4	2	35	47	0	0	35	857	180	138	68	4
Oregon	74	178	10	50	155	109	208	59	263	224	12	16	43	97	1	8	52	518	49	47	84	8
Pennsylvania	45	204	19	93	209	81	206	54	403	356	2	59	15	97	2	1	83	550		44	73	14
Rhode Island South Carolina	43 7	128	7	32	92	71	149	43	137	132	5		42	38		0	115	424	38 49	46	38	4
South Carolina South Dakota	42	32	0	32 44	92 29	14	25	43 6	85	132 96	3	6 0	42 6	38 5	1	0	115	424 171	34	46 7	38 7	0
																3	393	392				17
Tennessee Texas	18	198	26	82	101	84 252	63 278	23	335 999	217 870	0 44	13 30	14 140	49 140	4		393	1329	90	250	81	27
	150	662	8	203	383	252		174							-	25 0			219	250	267	
Utah	45	99	0	30	99	42	68	7	118	111	4	0	6	15	0		30	240	43	29	5	7
Vermont	17	49	9	19	43	57	64	20	110	100	1	4	25	20	0	0	42	147	36	31	5	3
Virginia	91	638	44	180	751	364	718	304	713	890	18	25	165	245	0	12	319	1018	324	194	550	37
Washington	69	315	20	126	383	128	321	143	479	303	0	27	102	107	5	0	75	748	75	127	107	10
West Virginia	10	93	0	24	102	36	157	97	131	140	3	10	44	43	0	4	12	312	54	48	45	3
Wisconsin	9	49	3	18	38	23	40	7	77	74	0	4	25	14	0	1	21	176	20	11	16	3
Wyoming	14	33	0	15	55	17	39	9	50	56	2	4	5	15	0	0	1	124	14	20	12	0