

**The Etiology of Class Bias in the American States\***

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\*With apologies to Patterson and Caldeira (1984)

## Abstract

In this paper, we use a dynamic model to examine the determinants of class bias across the American states from 1992 to 2004. Specifically, we test the relative importance of state socioeconomic environment, the rules of the game, and mobilization factors peculiar to each state in each election year. We find evidence that changes in mobilization efforts, socioeconomic environment, and certain institutional barriers do indeed influence changes in class bias across election years. Our study also illustrates the importance of studying class bias dynamically.

Political scientists have long been interested in identifying those factors that influence the decision to vote. One consistent finding from this literature is that income is an enduring and relatively strong predictor of an individual's propensity to vote (Kleppner 1982; Leighley and Nagler 1992a; Piven and Cloward 1988, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, among others). The strong, positive relationship between income and vote has the potential to result in an electorate unrepresentative—at least in terms of social class—of the actual population. In other words, as individuals with less income vote in smaller percentages than individuals with higher incomes, the electorate becomes over-representative of higher income voters; thus, creating class bias (Hill and Leighley 1992).

Many scholars have attributed the declining turnout in U.S. elections since the 1960s to a specific decline in turnout among the poor (Bennett 1991; Burnham 1982, 1987; Kleppner 1982; Piven and Cloward 1989, 2000; Reiter 1979; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). However, this assertion is not without its critics (Cavanagh 1981/1982; Leighley and Nagler 1992b; Shields and Goidel 1997; Teixeira 1987). Leighley and Nagler (1992b), in particular, suggest that voters have remained “the same” over time. They find no substantial evidence that class bias in the electorate has increased since the 1960s and thus rule out the possibility that declining overall turnout is a result of declining turnout among the poor. Shields and Goidel (1997) found similar results when examining congressional elections. Poor citizens consistently vote in lower percentages than their wealthy counterparts, however the marginal impact of income on voter turnout does not appear to increase over time (for a counter argument, see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

While scholars continue to disagree over whether class bias is increasing or decreasing in the American electorate, even the critics concede the instability of class bias may be best witnessed from one election cycle to the next with no consistent pattern over time (Leighley and Nagler 1992b; Shields and Goidel 1997). The marginal impact of income on voter turnout may not display a pattern of overall increase or decrease in either presidential or mid-term elections, but there does appear to be an ebb-and-flow to class bias, with some election years seeing markedly higher biases than others. Evidence of peaks and valleys in class bias introduces the possibility that election and/or campaign specific factors may indeed be driving the turnout of the poor relative to the rich (Leighley and Nagler 1992b; Shields and Goidel 1997). The literature, however, has not adequately examined this possibility.

Studies of the determinants of class bias have been few and far between (Avery and Peffley 2005; Hill and Leighley 1994, 1996). Theoretically, the studies agree that mobilization institutions have a great potential to influence participation among the poor. Hill and Leighley (1994, 1996) and Avery and Peffley (2005) find registration restrictiveness decreases turnout rates for the poorest American citizens. Furthermore, Hill and Leighley (1994) find evidence that campaign spending and elite ideology play a role in voter mobilization. The relationships between different mobilization institutions and turnout illuminate the possibility that state-specific conditions have the ability to encourage greater participation among specific segments of the population.

The studies examining the determinants of class bias in the electorate are important contributions to the field of participation. However, they also have certain limitations. By narrowing the study of class bias to a specific year, for instance, are unable to examine the

dynamic nature of bias over time (Avery and Peffley 2005; Hill and Leighley 1994). In other words, these studies do not address whether changes in mobilizing forces actually influence changes in bias. Hill and Leighley (1996) provide some relief for this limitation by examining voter turnout among the poor across multiple elections. However, their study focuses on the determinants of voter turnout among different income classifications, rather than the proportional representation of the poor in the electorate, and does not actually look at *changes* in class bias over time. As interesting as Hill and Leighley's work in this area is, we are still left without an adequate explanation of what causes class bias to increase or decrease in the states (or even if there are significant increases or decreases in the states). Thus, while the literature to date has been informative, there is more to learn about the sources of class bias.

And there can be little doubt class bias is a concept worthy of understanding. The literature to date has generally pointed in one direction: class bias matters. Logically, class bias is only a problem if non-voters differ systematically in their policy preferences than voters and if these differences lead to unrepresentative policies. One of the most striking differences in policy preference among low and high-income citizens comes in the realm of welfare policy. Low-income citizens consistently support welfare policy liberalism at higher levels than their wealthier counterparts (Gilens 1999; Page and Shapiro 1992). Furthermore, wealthy citizens have been the strongest opponents of welfare (Gilens 1999). Typical redistributive policies do not benefit middle to high-income citizens to the extent that they benefit the poor. In fact, the middle to upper class citizenry often bears a financial burden to pay for these programs through tax dollars. Therefore, a lack of substantial support for welfare policies among wealthy citizens is, to a large extent, expected.

In their seminal work, Piven and Cloward (1989) suggest candidates and parties reward their electoral constituencies with enactments of favorable public policies. They argue the substantial decline in voter turnout among the poor has had disastrous consequences for the development of welfare policies and programs in the United States. Basically, as the electorate has become disproportionately representative of welfare opponents, candidates and parties have gained an incentive to limit welfare liberalism. Hill and Leighley (1992) conducted the first systematic test of Piven and Cloward's assertion and found evidence that states with greater class biases spent less on welfare per capita and gave smaller benefits to welfare recipients than their peers. Recent studies have confirmed Hill and Leighley's findings by demonstrating bias' effects on welfare policy spending, benefits, and rules (Avery and Peffley 2005; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; but for contrary findings, see Soss et al. 2001).

### **A Model of Class Bias**

In this paper we examine the sources of class bias in the states in presidential elections from 1992-2004. The model we test considers a number of alternative sources of class bias in the states. At its core, our model suggests that class bias is a function of socioeconomic determinants, the rules of the game, and mobilization factors peculiar to each state in each election year. Ultimately, we are interested in discerning the sources of class bias; that is in arriving at supportable causal statements. To that end, we complement a traditional descriptive analysis with a dynamic model that focuses on how *changes* in socioeconomic factors, rules of the game, and agents of mobilization influence *changes* in class bias.

## **Socioeconomic Factors.**

Our primary interest in examining socioeconomic influences is to control for factors that are related to turnout but that are also related to income. Our concern here is that an observed level of class bias in voter turnout based on income could also be picking up the influence of factors such as level of education and race, both of which are important determinants of turnout but are also related to income. Our expectation is that class bias increases as the relationship between education and income increases, since education itself is a powerful determinant of turnout. When the relationship between education and income is fairly weak, we expect to see lower levels of class bias, as income should not be as strongly related to voter turnout. In effect, what we are saying is that when education is not closely tied to income, the relationship between income and turnout will tend to reflect just the economic aspects of class, and class bias should be lower. And, of course, we expect to see higher levels of class bias as the relationship between education and income increases, since this will increase the relationship between income and turnout. The same logic can be applied to race. As the relationship between race and income increases, class bias should also increase.

Our socioeconomic linkage variables are measured using the same census data used for calculating class bias. For the education and income linkage we took the value of Spearman's rho (both variables are ordinal) between the income and education variables for each state in each year. Because the race variable is nominal in nature (white, black, other), we took the value of Cramer's V as an indicator of the linkage between race and income for each state in each year.

## Rules of the Game

There is a long and important tradition of examining the impact of voter registration requirements, along with other structural factors, on rates of voter turnout in the U.S. (Brians and Groffman 2001; Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Timpone 1998; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) and in other countries (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Jackman 1987; Powell 1986). One of the findings to emerge from this literature, and especially from the U.S. studies, is that restrictive voter registration requirements suppress turnout. When viewed from a rational actor perspective, it certainly makes sense that anything that increases the costs of voting will lead to lower levels of turnout (Downs 1957). Of most relevance for this study is the finding that the impact of increases in the cost of voting appears to be greatest among those who already have a relatively low rate of voter turnout, lower SES voters (Brians and Groffman 2001; Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Timpone 1998; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Though the SES basis for this effect varies in degree across studies, there is a general consensus that the poor and uneducated bear the greatest burden of taxing registration requirements. The implication of this finding for class bias should be very clear: if onerous registration requirements have greater influence on low SES voters, then we should see increases in class bias as the difficulty of registering increases, and decreases in class bias as registration requirements ease (but see Berinsky 2005).

We use three measures of registration requirements: the number of days prior to the election that registration closes, whether the state allows mail registration <sup>1</sup> (0=no, 1=yes), and

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<sup>1</sup> The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993 mandated that all states allow for voter registration by mail. However, full implementation during presidential elections did not taken



the number of circumstances (up to nine) that qualify voters for absentee registration.<sup>2</sup> We expect that increases in the closing date lead to increases in class bias, while increases in the availability of mail and absentee registration lead to decreases in class bias.

### **Political Mobilization**

Another means of reducing the costs of participation beyond the legal requirements for registration is the process of political mobilization. Rosenstone and Hansen describe mobilization as “...the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce other people to participate (1993: 25).” The basic idea here is that political actors of all stripes have a vested interest in inducing potential supporters to turn out to vote. To the extent that these efforts are successful, overall turnout should be higher where mobilization efforts are strongest. Given that high SES individuals already have a relatively high probability of voting, our expectation is that mobilization efforts are most effective at convincing marginal voters—those with relatively low SES—to vote. Therefore we anticipate a negative relationship between levels of the mobilization variables and class bias: as the values of the mobilization variables increase, class bias should decrease. That said, however, we must recognize that there is evidence of targeted mobilization strategies that are intended to convince partisans, who are already likely to vote, to turn out to vote (Goldstein and Ridout 2002).

**Unions.** Labor unions have long been known for their prowess in mobilizing members to political participation. In Radcliff’s (2001) analysis the impact of union density in the states, as

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place until the 2004 election (there were still five states that hadn’t implemented this provision in 1996, and one state that hadn’t by 2000).

<sup>2</sup>Data for all of these registration requirements are taken from *The Book of the States* (Council of State Governments, Lexington, Kentucky).

well as union membership at the individual level finds significant empirical support for this assumption. Most directly relevant for this analysis is that Radcliff finds that the mobilization effects of unions extend well beyond their members and influence the level of participation for the electorate at large. We anticipate that the union density in the states has a negative influence on class bias. As union membership increases, union members and lower SES voters are expected to be mobilized, and class bias should decrease. Our measure of union density is the percent of the non-agricultural wage and salary employees who are union members.<sup>3</sup>

**Liberal Elites.** One of the findings to emerge from Hill and Leighley's (1996) analysis of class mobilization was that liberal control of state government was significantly tied to turnout but only among the relatively poor, and only during presidential election years. Hill and Leighley suggest that the relationship between liberal control of state government and lower class turnout can be explained by the appeal of liberal policies to lower class voters. These policies generate greater interest in the election and perhaps also a greater sense of stake in the outcome, thus increasing turnout among lower class voters. We think an equally plausible explanation is that liberal political interests (primarily Democrats) have a greater stake in mobilizing the poor than do conservative political interests (primarily Republicans). Therefore, where there are more liberals in control of the offices of power, there should be a more resources invested in mobilizing the poor. Hence, as liberal control of government increases, class bias should decrease.

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<sup>3</sup>These data are taken from the Current Population Survey and are made available by Barry Hirsch, David Macpherson, and Wayne Vroman at [www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats](http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats) .

The measure of liberal control of government used here is Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson's (1998) measure of government ideology.<sup>4</sup> Berry et al. create a complicated but theoretically plausible measure of government ideology by weighting roll-call voting measures for parties in the states' congressional delegations by the share of state legislative seats held by those parties and by party control of the governorship. As this measure combines both party control and party ideology, it should serve as a good indicator of the concept of liberal party control, as developed by Hill and Leighley (1996). Since high values of this variable indicate greater liberal control, we expect that class bias should decrease as liberal control increases.

**Political Campaigns.** Perhaps the most important source of political mobilization is political campaigns. While the two major parties may try to mobilize different constituencies, there can be no argument with the assumption that one of the most important functions of political campaigns is to get out the vote. Inherent in most descriptions of get-out-the-vote efforts is the idea of direct mobilization via canvassing methods such as phone calls, door knocking, rides to the polls, and literature drops. While these methods of direct mobilization are no doubt important, there are less direct ways in which political campaigns might mobilize voters. We assume that the sound and the fury of political campaigns, especially competitive campaigns, generate more interest among the electorate and generally reduce information costs. Whether through campaign advertising or media coverage of the campaigns, we assume that campaigns are important vehicles for generating information, information that in some cases will make the difference between voting and not voting. We also assume that these mobilization

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<sup>4</sup>Unfortunately, the most recent update to the Berry et al. measure of government ideology only goes up to 2002, so we used the 2002 data as our measure of state government ideology in the during the 2004 presidential election.

effects will be most pronounced among low SES voters, as they are most in need of additional information and least inclined to vote in the first place.

We use several measures of campaign activity, some focused on presidential campaigns and some on Senate and gubernatorial campaigns. For presidential campaigns we develop an overall measure of campaign intensity, based on the number of presidential candidate appearances in the states in the fall of the election year and the amount of national party monetary transfers to the states during the election cycle.<sup>4</sup> We took the z-scores of these two measures and averaged them to get an overall measure of presidential campaign intensity in the states.<sup>5</sup>

Another important consideration for presidential campaigns, especially in the 1990s, is the performance of third-party candidates. While third party candidates no doubt draw from the two major parties it is possible that they also attract unaffiliated voters whose likelihood of turning out to vote is normally fairly low (but see Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996). Even if third parties do not draw primarily from the ranks of marginal voters, another possibility is that

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<sup>4</sup>The candidate appearance data for 1988-1996 are taken from Shaw (1999), and the data for 2000 and 2004 were used in Shaw's media market level analysis of campaign effects (2006) and were generously provided to us in a format that enabled us to use them for our state-level analysis. The national party monetary transfers were obtained from the Federal Election Commission ([www.fec.gov](http://www.fec.gov)). The raw spending data were per capitalized by voting age population and expressed in real (1982-1984=100) dollars.

<sup>5</sup>A couple of things are worth mentioning at this point. First, we had hoped to be able to include presidential campaign media buys as part of our measure of campaign intensity. However, we were not able to find data for 2004 that were comparable to the data we had for 1992-2000. Still, when the analysis is conducted just for 1992-2000 and the ad buys are included in the campaign measure, the results are not significantly different than using just the appearances and expenditure data for the same time period. Second, we tried alternative measures of campaign intensity, such as margin of victory and a simple dummy variable identifying "battleground" states and none of the results were as strong as the intensity variable we use here.

their standing in the states has an impact on the level of competition and influences turnout among lower SES voters indirectly through increased campaign efforts by the major parties. We measure third party performance as the percent of the presidential vote going to candidates other than Democratic and Republican candidates.

Of course, we also expect that gubernatorial and senate campaigns will influence class bias by stimulating turnout among lower SES voters at a greater rate than high SES voters. We use a couple of different variables to capture these effects. First, we use separate dummy variables for whether the state was holding a Senate or gubernatorial election.<sup>6</sup> However, since the vast majority of these elections are non-competitive, we also include separate dummy variables to indicate if the state held a gubernatorial or Senate election in which the margin of victory was ten percentage points or less. We expect that class bias in the states will decrease when they hold Senate and gubernatorial elections and that this effect will be even stronger when they hold competitive Senate and gubernatorial elections.

### **Analysis**

We begin the analysis with an examination of the pattern of class bias from 1992-2004. The measure of class bias we use here is derived from the original measure developed by Hill and Leighley (1992), the only difference being that we used different income levels to identify upper and lower SES individuals.<sup>7</sup> As with Hill and Leighley we measure class bias as the ratio of representation of the poor to representation of the wealthy. For representation of the wealthy

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<sup>6</sup>Though most states hold their gubernatorial elections during midterm election years, eleven states hold them during presidential election years.

percentage of a state's voting population that has household incomes greater than \$75,000 by the percentage of a state's adult population in the same income classification; and for the poor we divide the percentage of a state's electorate with income less than \$20,000 by the percentage of a state's population below that income level. Finally, we divide the representation of the wealthy in the electorate by the representation of the poor in electorate to arrive at a measure of class bias. Essentially, the measure of bias is an index where values greater than 1.0 indicate an electorate biased toward the wealthy and values below 1.0 indicate an electorate biased toward the poor.<sup>8</sup>

We are ultimately interested in putting ourselves on solid footing for making causal inferences about the sources of class bias in the states. This requires a dynamic model that focuses on how *changes* in the independent variables are related to *changes* in the dependent variables. This is where we are headed. First, however, we will provide what we call a descriptive analysis of class bias. By this we mean that we will use a more traditional modeling strategy by which we examine how the *levels* of the independent variables are related to the *levels* of the dependent variable. While this doesn't put us on as sound a footing for making

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<sup>7</sup>This seems reasonable to us given that income levels have grown appreciably between since the Hill and Leighley's work first appeared. Even with this change, however, the correlation between our measure of class bias and Hill and Leighley's for the same years is .83.

<sup>8</sup>We ran into a problem with the value of class bias for Nevada in 2000. For reasons we are at a loss to explain, the value of class bias for Nevada went from 1.65 in 1996, to 4.27 in 2000, and back down to 1.98 in 2004. Given that the highest value for class bias in the rest of the data set was on 2.71, we are inclined to view the outcome for Nevada in 2000 as unrealistic and likely due to measurement error, perhaps with the Census survey. To avoid having to drop this case from the analysis, we simulated the "correct" level for Nevada by regressing the 2000 value of bias for all other states on their bias values for 1996 and 2004 and then using those slopes to estimate the value of class bias for Nevada in 2000 (1.77) based on its 1996 and 2004 levels of bias.

causal statements, it does provide a picture of which type of states have higher or lower levels of class bias.

One of the first issues to address is whether there is meaningful variation in state-level class bias from one election cycle to the next. One possibility is that bias is a long-term state-level characteristic that doesn't change much from election-to-election. Another possibility—one that we view as less likely—is that class bias is a highly unreliable concept in the states and varies greatly, perhaps even randomly, from year-to-year. Neither of these outcomes would augur well for a satisfying analysis. Happily, as Figure 1 illustrates, the truth lies somewhere in between. Across the years from 1992-2004 there is a moderately strong relationship between the current value of class bias and its value during the previous presidential election ( $r = .51$ ). To be sure, there are a couple of cases in which states fall significantly of the diagonal, but the overall picture is that while there is movement from year-to-year, there is also a fairly high level of stability. The key question for us is whether the variation that does exist is systematic in nature, and hence amenable to “explanation,” or whether it reflects random variation that is less amenable to such explanation. The answer to this question, of course, lies in the multivariate analysis.

### **Descriptive Model**

The descriptive analysis is presented in Table 1. Here we see a number of things that comport with our expectations, as well as a couple of things that do not. First, as expected, there are significant relationships in the anticipated direction between closing dates, union membership, presidential campaign intensity, support for third parties (marginal significance), gubernatorial elections and the levels of class bias in the states. States that have early closing dates, that are relatively ignored by the presidential campaigns, where third party candidates do

not do very well, where union membership is relatively low, and that held gubernatorial elections are states with relatively high levels of class bias. Of these variables, the relationship between closing dates and class bias stands out as particularly strong. In addition to these effects, there is also a significant and strong relationship between the education and income linkage and class bias. As expected, the level of class bias is higher in those states where the relationship between education and income is relatively strong and lower in those states where that relationship is weaker.

At the same time, time however, there is an unexpected strong negative relationship between the race and income linkage and class bias. The slope for this relationship suggests that class bias is higher in those states where the relationship between race and income is weak lower where the relationship between race and income is stronger. This is contrary to our expectations and difficult to reconcile with a plausible argument. Finally, there are a number of null findings as well: government ideology, Senate elections, electoral competition, and mail and absentee registration bear no relationship to class bias.

### **A Dynamic Model**

The analysis presented in Table 1 describes the factors that are influential to levels of class bias. While most of these relationships make sense, the static nature of the design limits our ability to speak with confidence about which factors cause changes in class bias. The model presented in Table 2 provides one form of dynamic analysis that is well suited for making causal inferences with pooled cross sectional data. In this model, the dependent variable is the *change* in class bias from the previous election year, the independent variables are expressed as change



in their values from the previous election period<sup>9</sup>, and a lagged value of class bias is included to control for possible regression to the mean effects. This design allows us to speak with more confidence about the causal influences on class bias. As a general rule, this type of analysis sets the bar fairly high, in part because variation in both the dependent and independent variable tends to be more restricted than in a static design.

The results in Table 2 are somewhat different from those in Table 1, though not dramatically so. A number of slopes are statistically significant and in the anticipated direction. First, changes in the connection between education and income are positively and substantially related to class bias, indicating that when education becomes more closely tied to income we can expect to see an increase in the level of class bias. Among indicators of voter registration requirements, only a change in the availability of mail registration is associated with changes in class bias; as states moved from no mail registration to having mail registration class bias declines by a value of .09. Among campaign variables, presidential campaign intensity and third party votes had the anticipated impact on changes in class bias; as presidential campaign intensity and third party votes increase, class bias decreases. The impact of third party votes is particularly substantial.

Two noticeable differences between Tables 1 and 2 are the change in levels of significance for the race and income linkage, the closing date, and union membership. Most important of these two discrepancies is the change in significance for the closing date and union membership, since they were strongly related and in the anticipated direction in the descriptive

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<sup>9</sup> The only exception to this is the variable measuring the presence of a gubernatorial election. Since the same eleven states held gubernatorial elections in all four presidential election years, there is no change in the value of this variable from one year to the next. Therefore, the dummy for holding a gubernatorial election is included. We are still able to control for change in competitive gubernatorial elections, however.

model. One possibility is that because these variables are highly stable over time, a dynamic model is unlikely to detect a causal relationship with changes in class bias. Still, while they are highly stable (especially union membership), they do exhibit change over time and that change should be related to changes in class bias. The other possibility is that while levels of closing dates and union membership are related to the level of class bias, *changes* in these variables simply have no effect, presumably because they do not cause class bias. While this conclusion might be a bit uncomfortable, given the rich research tradition supporting closing dates and unions as important influences on participation (but see Berinsky 2005), the results of this analysis point in that direction.

Finally, we turn to our statistical controls, the lagged value of class bias and the year dummy variables. As one might expect, the potential impact for this variable is quite substantial. The slope for the lagged value of class bias indicates a regression to the mean effect. The negative relationship means that states with relatively high levels of class bias in the previous election cycle are likely to see the greatest declines in bias in the next election cycle. The year dummy variables indicate significant decline in class bias in 1996, 2000 and 2004, relative to the baseline of 1992.

### **Conclusions**

The study of class bias is of great importance not just because of the normative implications of under representation but also because of its influence on policy making across the American states. Scholars have shown time and time again that class bias in state electorates has important consequences for policy liberalism, particularly in the area of redistribution (Avery and Peffley 2005; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-

Andersson 1995). Our analysis has added to the class bias discussion in several important ways. First and foremost, we witnessed the ebb and flow of class bias across state electorates over the last two decades. We have also shown that while there is substantial stability in class bias in the states, there is also significant systematic variation in the states from one election cycle to the next. And the findings from our analysis suggest that changes in bias are driven changes in other state-level factors.

Our analysis has also shown one important impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The NVRA required states to allow for voter registration by mail. State adoption of mail registration has reduced the disproportionate representation of the wealthy in the electorate. While this offers some encouragement that creating more open registration systems could reduce class bias, that sentiment must be tempered by the fact that closing dates and absentee rules had no impact. Campaign activities also influenced the relative representation of the poor in the electorate. States characterized by increasing support for third party candidates as well as increased intensity of presidential campaign activities saw marked reductions in class bias from one election year to the next. And the sources of income distribution also influence class bias. In states where the distribution of income grows more dependent on education, we see increases in class bias.

Finally, our study illuminates the importance of studying class bias dynamically. Previous studies were able to link institutional and political factors to class bias using static data (Avery and Peffley 2004; Hill and Leighley 1994). However, the same studies were unable to speak to changes in class bias over time. It is telling that in our own analysis a somewhat different portrait of class bias emerged from the static design (including a strong counter-intuitive

relationship between the race linkage to income and class bias) than from the dynamic model.

And while it might have been tempting to infer causality from the static design, we are in a better position to do so with the dynamic model.

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Table 1: A Descriptive Model of Class Bias in the American States, 1992-2004

<b>Dependent Variable: Class Bias</b>	b	s.e.	z-score	Potential Impact
Education/Income Link	1.234	0.416	2.97**	0.426
Race/Income Link	-1.230	0.431	-2.85**	-0.402
Closing Date	0.011	0.002	6.61**	0.534
Mail Registration	-0.016	0.036	-0.43	-0.016
Absentee Rules	0.003	0.004	0.79	0.030
Union Membership	-0.007	0.002	-3.32**	-0.189
Government Ideology	-0.001	0.001	-1.19	-0.125
Presidential Campaigns	-0.038	0.023	-1.65*	-0.156
%Pres. Third Party Vote	-0.003	0.002	-1.3#	-0.088
Senate Election	0.037	0.043	0.85	0.037
Gubernatorial Election	-0.090	0.049	-1.83*	-0.090
Competitive Senate Election	-0.064	0.052	-1.24	-0.064
Competitive Gubernatorial Election	-0.006	0.066	-0.09	-0.006
1996	0.105	0.032	3.35**	0.105
2000	0.040	0.035	1.14	0.040
2004	0.022	0.030	0.73	0.022
Constant	1.374	0.201	6.84**	
N	200			
R <sup>2</sup>	.296			
X <sup>2</sup>	1913.7			

Potential impact is the range of the independent variable multiplied times the slope.

\*\*p ≤ .01 \*p ≤ .05 #p ≤ .10 (one-tailed tests)

Table 2: Dynamic Model of Class Bias in the American States, 1992-2004

<b>Dependent Variable: Change in Class Bias</b>	b	s.e.	z-score	Potential Impact
Lagged Bias	-0.504	0.174	-2.9**	-0.97891
ΔEducation/Income Link	1.257	0.264	4.75**	0.344143
ΔRace/Income Link	0.352	0.574	0.61	0.104798
ΔClosing Date	0.004	0.006	0.72	0.194658
ΔMail Registration	-0.093	0.047	-1.98*	-0.18579
ΔAbsentee Rules	0.000	0.004	-0.01	-0.00102
ΔUnion Membership	-0.005	0.016	-0.29	-0.03373
ΔGov't Ideology	0.001	0.001	0.95	0.093999
ΔPresidential Campaigns	-0.044	0.027	-1.63#	-0.24693
Δ%Pres. Third Party Vote	-0.017	0.004	-4.03**	-0.83617
ΔSenate Election	0.022	0.024	0.92	0.044957
Gubernatorial Election	-0.058	0.055	-1.06	-0.05777
ΔCompetitive Senate Election	-0.024	0.035	-0.69	-0.0482
ΔCompetitive Gubernatorial Election	-0.045	0.044	-1.01	-0.08919
1996	-0.233	0.119	-1.96*	-0.23328
2000	-0.365	0.106	-3.44**	-0.36499
2004	-0.319	0.099	-3.22**	-0.3189
Constant	1.100	0.306	3.6**	
N	200			
R <sup>2</sup>	.384			
X <sup>2</sup>	249.1			

Potential impact is the range of the independent variable multiplied times the slope.

\*\*p ≤ .01 \*p ≤ .05 #p ≤ .10 (one-tailed tests)

Figure 1: The Stability of Class Bias in the American States in Presidential Elections from 1992 to 2004

