The Impact of Racial and Ethnic Group Preferences on Education Policy Outcomes

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Education equity is a subject that provokes normative debates, political strategizing and a plethora of academic research (see Thompson and Crampton 2002 for a review of this research). With its traditional reliance on local funding of schools, the United States' system of education provides for local control, matching public schools to local values. Yet, this reliance on local level funding also allowed for school systems across the country, and even within states, to have widely differing levels of financial support. Concerns over education equity became more predominant after the California Supreme Court ruled in 1971 that unequal funding levels violated both the state and national constitutions (Serrano v. Priest). The debate over education equity, however, remained mainly a state political issue when the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973 in *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez* decided that inequalities in school funding levels did not violate the U.S. Constitution (Meier 1991; Wood and Theobald 2003). Thus, since the 1970s, school funding issues, and particularly equity in school funding, has been a dominant issue in state politics.

Education equity is an illusive standard. Across-the-board equality in funding levels for school districts in a state would not guarantee equality in outcomes. White, middle class students' parents are often most able to provide books in the home; private music, dance and art lessons; trips to museums and other activities that constitute a private supplement to the public education of their children. Such amenities are not as widely available to poor or minority students. In fact, it is often estimated that adequate funding of education for students in poorer districts should be 40 percent higher to overcome such biases (Education Trust 2005). The costs of education also vary by other factors, as well. Rural districts have higher transportation costs, wealthier areas have higher payroll burdens, and some districts have more students with additional needs, such as for the disabled (Wood and Theobald 2003). Political realities also make education equity an illusive goal. Mintrom (1993) notes as state funding formulas are revamped to provide more funding to poorer school districts, residents of wealthier districts place pressure on state officials to allow them to use local resources to maintain higher levels of school spending.

Questions of financial equity may focus on different aspects of school districts. In many cases, the focus is on funding inequalities between wealthier and poorer districts. However, questions of equity also can be posed along racial lines. School districts with high levels of minority students also do not have the same level of financial resources as those with fewer minorities. The Education Trust (2005) calculates that on average the 25 percent of school districts in each state with the highest percentage of minority students receive 614 fewer dollars than the 25 percent of school districts with the fewest minority students. No wonder education is a top concern of many minority voters. Uhlaner and Garcia (2002) report that Latinos consistently place education as the top priority among problems facing the country or their community.

Political efforts for greater equity in public school finance come primarily from changes in state politics. States increasingly are playing a greater role in the financing of elementary and high school education. In earlier eras, states provided one-quarter of school financing. Today, states on average provide 45 percent of revenues but with

considerable variation from 7 percent in New Hampshire to 74 percent in New Mexico (Augenblick, Myers and Anderson 1997). The federal government provides only 8.5 percent of the funding for public schools (Education Trust 2005). An increase in state education funding or targeting of funds to poor or minority districts can reduce inequities across school districts. Equity also can be addressed by poorer districts imposing a higher tax rate, a factor a GAO report found to be most important for equalizing funding. However, to do so a poorer district may have to impose twice the tax burden as a wealthier district to garner the same level of financial support for its schools (Augenblick, Myers and Anderson 1997; GAO 1997)

State court cases have been one tactic for reform of state educational funding programs (see Roelke, Green and Zielewski 2004 for a history of these court cases). By 2002, 43 states had been subject to lawsuits, with existing educational finance systems overturned in 17 cases and upheld in 20 states (Wood and Theobald 2003). The effectiveness of these court decisions is highly debated in the research literature (for reviews of results see Burbridge 2002; Thompson and Crampton 2002, for an analysis that argues for effectiveness see Evans, Murray and Schwab 1997). Effectiveness of court decisions vary because it is up to the state legislatures to change policies. Varying factors may come into play: preferences of legislators and constituents, competition for funds from other state programs, and selection of type of policy to implement a program. For example, Wood and Theobald (2003) found judicial mandates increased educational equity overall by only a small margin, but more substantial effects were found in states with a more liberal public. Judicial mandates are not the only way that states have been led to reform education funding. Two states (Georgia and Oklahoma) instituted financial reforms even though the court decision upheld the existing state funding. Ohio's reform preceded the judicial decision, and Utah and Michigan passed reforms without any judicial action (Evans, Murray and Schwab 1997)

Analyzing Educational Equity: Research Design and Measurements

Questions of education financing and equity often are studied at the district level (for a review see Burbridge 2002, for an example see Wood and Theobald 2003). Yet, it is at the state level that political reforms are enacted to address equity questions. Because the reforms instituted to increase funding equity have been enacted at the state level, it is most appropriate to study the influence of these reforms with state-level data (Smith and Meier 1995). Thus it is ironic that there are relatively few cross-state studies that attempt to quantify and explain school funding equity (Augenblick, Myers and Anderson 1997). Those state-level analyses that do exist often ignore political factors (Burbridge 2002). Even the studies that do attempt to analyze political conditions use only surrogate measures of interest groups and public preferences. Demographic traits of constituencies are presumed to indicate various levels of support for education (Burbridge 2002; Garms 1986; Miller 1996). For example, greater support for state-level spending on education would come from parents while the elderly would be less incline to increase state funding for education (Miller 1996)

State aid to education comes in three types: 1) flat grants of equal sums based on per pupil basis (this was the traditional form but has declined in use in recent decades), 2) foundation grants to guarantee every district in state has a minimum threshold of funding,

usually by supplementing payments to districts with lower tax bases (currently the most popular form), and 3) full state funding which currently exists only in Hawaii, though changes in California, Florida, Wisconsin and Michigan approach this as level as well (Evans, Murray and Schwab 1997).

Racial diversity offers a compelling empirical framework to conceptualize measure and interpret state politics and policy (Hero and Tolbert 1996). We intend to model equity in state funding for school districts along racial lines. In doing so, we will use actual measures of the ideological and partisan preferences of the Anglo and minority residents of the states, a limited number of demographic factors that speak to other components of public preferences for educational spending, and the composition and ideological orientation of the state government. Thus, we have actual measures of public support and will demonstrate how these influence state government officials.

Public support for educational funding measures should vary by ideology. Liberals are more likely to highly value equity issues; conservatives may balance concerns of equity with preferences for local control (Wood and Theobald 2003). To date, studies of state support for education have used surrogate measures of public ideology: Burbrige (2002) used ADA Scores on members of Congress, Wood and Theobald (2003) used the Berry et al. (1998) surrogate measure of citizen ideology, and Miller (1996) used partisan voting patterns.

Our measures of citizen ideology and partisanship come from pooling the 1996, 1998 and 2000 media exit polls. The advantage of pooling the media exit polls (Voter News Service 1996, 1998, 2000) is the sheer number of cases, the relatively equal distribution of cases across all states, and the short-time span needed to pool a large number of state cases.[1] Combining the 1996, 1998 and 2000 exit polls produces a data set of 180,249 cases spread over the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The latter will be eliminated from the remaining analysis, reducing the total number of cases to 178,633. State sample sizes for the ideology question vary from 1,483 in Mississippi to 8,370 in California. (See Appendix A.)

Beginning in 1996, the media exit polls asked an ideology question in every state. Prior to that time, an ideology question was included in only some of the exit polls. The VNS ideology question asks "On most political matters, do you consider yourself:". Three categories are listed for responses: liberal, moderate, and conservative. Response categories were coded as (-1) liberal, (0) moderate and (1) conservative, so that positive values would indicate conservative positions and negative values would indicate liberal positions.

The exit polls elicit race and ethnicity with a question: "Are you: White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Other." In a handful of states, the exit polls ask a second question regarding Latino identification. The question wording varies by state and year, but as an example the question used in the 2000 California exit poll asked "Are you of Mexican or Hispanic descent?" In reporting its results for racial categories, the exit polls

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[1] Exit polls were administered in all 50 states in the presidential election years of 1996 and 2000. The 1998 exit polls were taken in the 42 states with senatorial or gubernatorial elections. States included in the 1998 exit polls were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.

merge answers to the first race/ethnic question with the Latino descent question. This produces a larger number of Latino respondents, but only in the handful of states in which the second question is asked. To maintain consistency across all 50 states, only the first race/ethnicity question is used to identify black, Latino, and Asian respondents.

Several states have a large number of respondents in the "other" category. In the original Hawaii survey a Native Hawaiian option is available, but the data provided to the ICPSR combines this category with the "other" category. Thus, a portion of the "other" category includes Native Hawaiian, but it is impossible to tell how large this proportion is. The same process is used in Alaska, where the survey category of "Eskimo/Aleut" is combined with "other." The 2000 exit polls for Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota included an American Indian category which is reported in the other category, as well.

The number of cases of racial and minority voters in the states is dependent on both the size of the state samples and the proportion of minority voters in a state. Thus, 925 African American respondents are available in the pooled Georgia exit polls, but only 17 in Hawaii and South Dakota. The median number of African Americans per state sample is 179. For Latinos, the largest sample of 716 is found in California, the smallest in West Virginia with 3, and the median is 31 cases per state. For Asians, the largest sample is in Hawaii with 612, the smallest in South Dakota with 3, and the median is 21 Asians per state sample.

The aggregated reliability scores for these racial breakdowns for opinions on ideology are quite high even with small sample sizes. O'Brien's aggregate reliability coefficient (1990, Jones and Norrander 1996) uses ANOVA components to compare the amount of within unit (here, states) versus across unit variance. Values of .60 to .69 for the coefficient indicate moderate levels of aggregate reliability, and values of .70 or more indicate high levels of aggregate reliability. As Table 1 indicates, the values of O'Brien's aggregate reliability coefficient exceed .60 with sample sizes of 25 for all three racial and ethnic groups.

*** Table 1 about here ***

We use the mean position on the three-point ideology and partisanship scales to represent the preferences of the Anglo population in each state. We measure the preferences of minority residents through an impact measure. To construct this measure, an intermediary variable measuring the state ideological mean without the group, is constructed. This is done by calculating a mean ideological position for each state with the group's members subtracted from the sample. This intermediary measure is then used to construct Group Impact by:

Group Impact = Overall State Ideological Mean - State Ideological Mean Without Group Present

This impact measure indicates how much a group's presence in a state alters the state's ideology. A negative value on the impact measure indicates that the group's presence in a state makes state ideology more liberal, while a positive value indicates that the group makes a state more conservative. A group's impact on state ideology is dependent on both the distinctiveness of its opinions and the size of the group in the state. Table 2 lists the range and distribution of the partisanship and ideology scores. Overall, most state fall on the conservative side with a mean of .15 from a possible range of -1 as

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liberal to +1 as conservative. Massachusetts has the most liberal citizenry (-.05), while Utah has the most conservative (.36). The ideological positions of whites in a state are fairly close to that of the entire citizenry. Whites are the most liberal in Hawaii (-.06) and the most conservative in Mississippi (.44). Blacks have the greatest impact on overall state ideology in Mississippi. The presences of blacks in Mississippi move the overall state ideological position from a very conservative mean of .44 to a less conservative mean of .31, for an impact score of -.13. Among minority groups, African Americans have the largest mean impact in ideology. The average impact of blacks on state ideology is -.03, a slight movement toward a more liberal public. This finding is indicative of the ideological cohesion within the African American electorate (Kinder and Winter 2001). The impact of Latinos on state ideology is smaller, with the greatest influence in the liberal direction found in Texas (-.05) to no change in state ideology in Rhode Island. While Latinos are more ideologically cohesive than Anglos, they are less so than blacks, which speaks to the significant diversity within the Latino community. Similarly, Asians have a small influence on overall state ideology, with the greatest influence in the liberal direction found in Texas (-.01). In Hawaii, where the rest of the state's population is quite liberal, Asian Americans make the overall state ideology move in the conservative direction (.05). Asian American voters also vary widely in national origin, nativity and immigrant generation status (Lai et al. 2001) which accounts for some of the ideological diversity within the population.

*** Table 2 about here ***

The values for partisanship show that the typical American state has a slight Democratic advantage (mean = -.03), that Hawaii has the most Democratic electorate (-.28) and Utah has the most Republican electorate (.29). Whites in Rhode Island are the most Democratic while whites in Mississippi are the most Republican. On average, white partisanship across the 50 states is slightly on the Republican side (mean = .06). Blacks have the greatest impact on state partisanship in Mississippi (moving the state mean .36 points in the Democratic direction) and the smallest effect in Vermont (.00). On average, blacks move state partisanship in the Democratic direction by a value of -.07. Hispanics have the greatest influence on partisanship in New Mexico (-.13), while Hispanics make the Florida electorate slightly more Republican (.01). Asians make the Hawaiian electorate more Democratic (-.10) and the Florida electorate more Republican (.01). Again the degree of minority group impact can be attributed, in part, to the degree of partisan cohesion making them more or less distinctive from the majority population. Blacks have enduring political preferences for the Democratic party as do some segments of the Latino population, particularly Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans (Tate 2003, Cain et al 1991). Cuban Americans are consistent in their support for Republicans and Asian Americans often do not identify strongly with either party (Garcia 2003, Cain et al. 1991, Lien et al. 2001).

Actual impact measures are available for between 20 and 45 states. However, a zero score can be substituted in for the remainder of the states. This zero score is appropriate because the size of the minority population in these states is too small for it to move the overall ideological or partisan position of the state electorate. Thus, all 50 states are available for analysis with the impact measure. In general, the impact

measure quantifies the political clout of a minority group by indicating its overall influence on state public opinion.

Because we have direct measures of citizen opinion, we expect fewer demographic variables to be important to our model. However, we tested a number of possible indicators. For state wealth, we tested both a measure of average wealth (per capital income in 2003) and distribution of wealth (Langer's 1999 gini coefficient). The latter proved not to influence the models, and so was dropped from the analysis.[2] We include a measure of the population size of a state (total population in 2000), with an expectation that greater equity might be found in more populous states. We also expected that equity might be greater in more urban states (% state population living in urban areas in 2000). We tested, but dropped due to a lack of influence, two measures of the age composition of the electorate (percent above 65, percent below 18). (See Appendix B for actual measures and data sources).

Our measures of the state government include the presence of minorities in the state legislature and an indicator of the ideological orientation of the legislative and executive branch. We have measures of the percent of African Americans and Latinos in state legislatures. Our measure of the ideological orientation of the two branches of the state government is the Berry et al. (1998) institutional ideology. Because policy changes in educational equity have unfolded over the past three decades, we average the Berry state measures from 1971 to 2002. We propose that it is through these indicators of the political composition of the state legislators that the preferences of the public are channeled into policy changes.

Our dependent variable is The Education Trust's (2005) measure of equity in funding for minority school districts. Their measure examines the differences in per pupil revenue for districts in the top and bottom quartiles for number of minority students (American Indian, Asian, Black, and Hispanic) in 2003. Their measure adjusts for cost of living and special need students in the districts. On average, The Education Trust finds that minority districts receive $614 fewer dollars than school districts with few minority students. In 30 states, minority districts receive fewer dollars, but in 19 states, minority districts receive more funding. The greatest deficits are in Wyoming at -$2416, North Dakota at -$2046 and New York at -1965. The most money is spent in minority districts in Alaska, $4173, and Massachusetts, $1794. Hawaii is excluded from the analysis because it has a single, state-wide school district.

Because we theorize that public sentiment influences equity in school funding through state institutions, we analyze the data with a path model (Asher 1976). We have three segments to our path model. The beginning segment includes our measures of public opinion and state demographic factors. The intermediary segment is the state institutions, and the final segment is state policy outcomes on funding equity based on the minority composition of school districts in the state. We include only statistically significant paths in our model and report the standardized path coefficients, which are the standardized coefficients from ordinary least squares regression. We indicate the overall fit of our model by adjusted R^2 reported in parentheses.

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[2] We test both the gini coefficient for the last available year, 1995, and a measure averaging the state values from 1976 to 1995. Neither proved significant when used in conjunction with the other independent variables.

Findings

Our path model and results are depicted in Figure 1. We demonstrate that representation of blacks and Latinos in state legislatures is the result of their size in the population. However, we also demonstrate that the opinion of minority residents influences their representation in state government. As black move the ideology of a state's electorate in the more liberal direction, a greater number of blacks are elected to the legislature, even controlling for the overall size of the black population. Interestingly, the mechanism driving Latino representation is their partisanship and not their ideology.

*** Figure 1 about here ***

The number of African Americans in state legislatures also is influenced by the opinions of whites in the states and the size of the state. In states where the white population is more liberal, a larger proportion of African Americans are found in the state legislature. This suggests that an alliance between blacks and white liberals remains an important component of state politics. More African Americans also are elected in the more populous states. The election of Latinos to the state legislature is actually greater in more rural states than in urban states. Our model does not show an influence of white public opinion on the presence of Latinos in state legislatures. However, it is possible that there is a link. Our measure of white partisanship has a link to Latino representatives which is statistically significant at the .12 level for the 49 states in the analysis.

The ideological orientation of state governments is determined, according to our model, by the ideology and partisanship of white residents of the states and the partisanship of African Americans and Asian Americans. State legislatures and governors are more liberal when the white population is more liberal and more Democratic. These two state government institutions also are more liberal when the African American and Asian American populations increase the Democratic orientation of the overall citizenry of the state. The influence of African Americans on the ideology of the state government can also be modeled with the level of African American representation in the state legislature or the ideological position of blacks in the state. However, while these two alternative variables are statistically significant when used in place of black partisanship, the overall fit of the model drops slightly (to adjusted $R^2 =$ .72 for black ideology and .70 for black legislators versus $R^2 =$ .74 for the model with African American partisanship).

We were unable to document a link between the opinion of Latinos or the presences of Latino representatives with the ideological orientation of the state government. The statistically significance level of the Latino partisanship impact measure is .99, for Latino impact on state ideology the significance level is .68, and for Latino presence in the state legislature it is .87. This lack of influence for Latinos on the ideological orientation of state government, we believe, is due to the small number of Latinos in state legislatures. Latinos constitute only 3 percent of the state legislators nationwide compared to 7 percent for African Americans. Even in states where Latinos comprise 5 percent of the population, these state legislatures average only 6 percent Latino legislators. In contrast, in states with at least 5 percent black residents, 12 percent of the legislators are African Americans. Latinos also have lower participation rates than

African Americans. These two components work against the influence of Latinos on state political institutions. Fraga and Ramirez (2004) also remind us that it is exceedingly difficult for Latino state legislators to successfully advance Latino-friendly agenda when they are part of the minority party. However, recent mobilization efforts targeted at the Latino community may alter these patterns.

The final component of our path model is to illustrate the influences on the level of funding equity for minority school districts in the states. Before proceeding to our main findings, we should note that Alaska is an outlier in funding for both minority and poor school districts. Its funding level of $4173 for minority districts places it at 3.97 standard deviations above the mean. Even though we logged our dependent variable to diminish the influence of extreme cases, Alaska still stands out. Thus, we include a dummy variable to represent this unique case.

The most important influence on the reduction of the funding gap for minority school districts in the state is the ideological orientation of it legislative and executive branch. The more liberal the state government the more education funds are targeted toward school districts with a high level of minority students. Thus, the political orientations of state governments play a significant role in educational funding decisions. The presence of African Americans in the state legislature also has a significant influence on the distribution of school funding across districts with varying levels of minority student populations.[3] The greater the number of African American legislators the greater the likelihood that school funding is increased in high minority school districts. Once again, however, we were unable to document a link between Latinos and state education funding.

Table 3 summarizes the direct, indirect and total effects of the various independent variables on funding levels for minority school districts. The ideological orientation of the state government has the strongest overall influence on funding differences between high and low minority school districts in each state. The opinions of white residents of the states, however, also are quite important. In fact if the combined influence of the ideological and partisan orientations of a state's white citizens is considered, it equals that of the government ideology. The effect for citizen opinion, however, is indirect and channeled through the government institutions. African Americans also are successful in altering state policies on funding of minority school district. This influence is the direct results of African Americans in state legislatures but also indirect influences from citizen partisanship and ideology. Asian partisanship also has a smaller, indirect influence on funding of minority school districts.

The final question investigated is the influence of funding equity on education outcomes, specifically graduation rates. Does increased equity in funding across districts diminish the gap between minority and white graduation rates in a state? To test this, graduation rates (averaged over 1997 to 2002) for blacks and Latinos were compared to that of whites in a state.   White graduation rates were subtracted from each of the

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[3] Once again, black ideology and black partisanship have similar influences to black legislators but the significance level is not as high. Substituting black ideology for black legislators has a significance level for black ideology at .12 and the overall equation has an adjusted R^2 of .26. Substituting black partisanship for black legislators has a significance level for black partisanship at .11 and the overall equation has an adjusted R^2 of .26. Using black legislators, the significance level for this variable is .09 and the adjusted R^2 for the equation is .27.

minority graduation rates, such that a lower score indicates a larger gap in graduation rates. These two measures of minority graduation rates were then correlated with the measure of educational equity. Results demonstrate that greater education equity increases the graduation rates of African Americans (r = .47, significance = .00, number = 36) but has no influence on the graduation rates of Latinos (r = -.07, significance = .74, number = 28).

Conclusions

While minority students in America still are more likely to be educated in school districts that have lower funding levels than districts with fewer minority students, states have taken different approaches to altering the financial support for minority school districts. Today, 20 states provide more funding to high minority school districts, while 30 states provide less funding to these districts in contrast to low minority areas of the state. We are able to show that variations in these funding patterns are strongly linked to the composition and orientation of the state governments, and indirectly to the opinions of the state's citizenry.

Both African Americans, and to a lesser extent, Asian Americans appear to have been successful in redirecting more funding to high minority school districts. We were unable, however, to document such an effect for a state's Latino population. These findings are consistent with research in the descriptive and substantive representation literature. For example Preuhs (2006) finds African American state legislators more responsive to constituent opinion and exert distinct influence on welfare policies. Tate (2003) finds black members of Congress are substantially different than their colleagues in terms of their voting patterns and sponsored legislation. Latino legislators support and initiate policy agendas that are far less indicative of co-ethnic political preferences. When there is a relationship between Latino opinion and policy, it is often indirect at best, mediated through partisanship (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Preuhs 2005).

Our next step is to further refine our current model by adding in the role of the state judiciary. We plan to model both the ideological orientation of state courts and the specific rulings on educational equity. Minority education in America has a number of other issue concerns beyond funding. Questions of quality and outcomes for minority education also are vital, and we intend to expand our project to include other indicators of the nature of education for all of America's children.

Appendix A: Number of Cases in Pooled 1996, 1998, 2000 State Exit Polls: Ideology

State	Total Number	Number Ideology	Black Ideology	Hispanic Ideology	Asian Ideology	Other Ideology
Alabama	2,279	2,506	525	8	9	23
Alaska	1,656	1,567	59	24	29	195
Arizona	3,579	3,314	110	208	33	193
Arkansas	2,827	2,560	239	16	6	15
Calif.	8,939	8,370	480	716	352	164
Colorado	3,645	3,391	74	240	31	52
Conn.	4,036	3,759	218	85	29	29
Delaware	1,963	1,843	237	15	17	17
Florida	5,558	5,128	522	323	33	37
Georgia	4,015	3,717	925	23	34	26
Hawaii	1,693	1,629	17	23	612	336
Idaho	2,720	2,630	24	61	7	37
Illinois	4,984	4,603	642	74	86	38
Indiana	3,825	3,468	222	23	18	13
Iowa	3,397	3,186	82	18	12	17
Kansas	2,840	2,663	93	53	12	21
Kentucky	4,077	3,713	207	8	12	20
Louis.	3,460	3,161	854	30	15	25
Maine	3,339	3,109	32	9	10	18
Maryland	3,032	2,860	569	64	47	36
Mass.	4,779	4,409	117	66	46	64
Michigan	4,979	4,480	572	61	18	59
Minn.	4,241	4,024	73	28	22	28
Miss.	1,581	1,483	410	4	12	4
Missouri	3,891	3,590	296	30	28	36
Montana	2,093	1,973	20	15	7	51
Nebraska	2,674	2,470	66	31	8	11
Nevada	3,302	3,066	219	136	79	56
N.Hamp.	3,797	3,562	39	16	14	24
N. Jersey	3,631	3,295	404	103	59	66
N.Mexico	2,892	2,614	82	628	22	215
N. York	6,385	5,802	526	324	101	76
N.Carolina	5,066	4,659	827	18	22	46
N.Dakota	2,429	2,337	19	5	4	22
Ohio	5,576	5,184	472	76	38	34
Oklahoma	2,600	2,455	112	20	20	146
Oregon	3,206	3,075	40	43	29	61
Penn.	4,816	4,370	301	23	28	22
R. Island	2,861	2,683	105	77	45	37
S.Carolina	3,180	2,883	671	15	14	17

State	Total Number	Number Ideology	Black Ideology	Hispanic Ideology	Asian Ideology	Other Ideology
S.Dakota	2,281	2,107	17	7	3	32
Tenn.	3,137	2,856	376	19	5	17
Texas	4,553	4,272	400	437	29	55
Utah	2,440	2,353	29	65	14	22
Vermont	2,914	2,767	36	13	5	19
Virginia	2,893	2,557	357	44	48	30
Wash.	5,240	4,920	119	96	87	143
W.Virginia	1,732	1,603	25	3	9	8
Wiscon.	4,305	4,053	150	56	15	45
Wyoming	2,796	2,666	36	54	15	49
National	178,633	165,745	13,047	4,531	2,250	2,807
Mean St. Size		3,315	261	91	45	56
Median St. Size		3,092	179	31	21	35

Appendix B: Data Sources:

Funding Gap – Minority Districts		The Education Trust "The Funding Gap 2005," Table 1, http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/31D276EF-72E1-458A-8C71-E3D262A4C91E/0/FundingGap2005.pdf.
Income Disparity	Gini coefficient 1995 and averaged from 1976 to 1995	Langer, 1999
Income	Per capital income in 2003	*Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2006*
Urban	% living in urban areas in 2000	*Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2006*
Population size	State population in 2000	*Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2006*
Black legislators	Percent of state legislative seats (upper and lower house) held by blacks in 2001	Bositis (2001) *Black Elected Officials: A Statistical Summary 2001*, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies
Hispanic legislators	Percent of state legislative seats (upper and lower house) held by Latinos in 2002	National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) Education Fund (2002), *2002 National Directory of Latino Elected Officials*
State government ideology	Yearly ideology of state government (legislatures and governors) averaged 1971 to 2002.	Berry et al., 1998 with updates from ICPSR website

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Table 1: O'Brien's Aggregate Reliability Coefficients for Varying State Sample Sizes

Ideology					
Group	Sample Size ≥ 20	Sample Size ≥ 25	Sample Size ≥ 30	Sample Size ≥ 40	Sample Size ≥ 50
Black	.78 (47)	.76 (45)	.76 (44)	.76 (38)	.76 (38)
Latino	.58 (34)	.64 (28)	.66 (27)	.69 (23)	.71 (22)
Asian	.62 (25)	.65 (22)	.72 (16)	.76 (11)	.76 (7)
Partisanship					
Black	.94 (47)	.94 (45)	.94 (43)	.93 (39)	.92 (37)
Latino	.87 (34)	.88 (29)	.88 (26)	.89 (23)	.89 (22)
Asian	.86 (23)	.87 (19)	.88 (15)	.91 (11)	.93 (8)

First number in each cell is O'Brien's aggregate reliability coefficient. Values above .60 signify moderate reliability. Values above .70 signify high reliability.   Numbers in parentheses are number of states with samples sizes of given magnitude.


Table 2: Distribution of State Values on Mean Ideology and Partisanship

Ideology					
Variable	Most Liberal	Most Cons.	Mean	St. Dev.	N of States
Entire State	-.05 (MA)	.36 (UT)	.15	.10	50
Whites	-.06 (HI)	.44 (MS)	.19	.12	50
Black Impact	-.13 (MS)	.00 (RI)	-.03	.03	45
Hispanic Impact	-.05 (TX)	.00 (RI)	-.01	.01	28
Asian Impact	-.01 (TX)	.05 (HI)	.00	.01	22
Partisanship					
	Most Dem.	Most Rep.			
Entire State	-.28 (HI)	.29 (UT)	-.03	.13	50
Whites	-.25 (RI)	.33 (MS)	.06	.13	50
Black Impact	-.36 (MS)	.00 (VT)	-.07	.08	45
Hispanic Impact	-.13 (NM)	.01 (FL)	-.02	.03	29
Asian Impact	-.10 (HI)	.01 (FL)	-.01	.02	20

Table 3: Direct, Indirect and Total Effects on Variations in Funding Differences Between High and Low Minority School Districts

Variable	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects
Government Ideology	.51		.51
Income	-.49		-.49
Urban	.32		.32
White Ideology		-.29	-.29
Alaska	.27		.27
White Party		-.26	-.26
Black Legislators	.22		.22
Black Party		-.18	-.18
Black %		.13	.13
Black Ideology		-.09	-.09
Asian Party		-.08	-.08
Population Size			.02

Figure 1: Path Model of School Funding By Minority Students

N = 49, Hawaii excluded. Entries are standardized path coefficients and adjusted R^2 inside parentheses.