RACE, CLASS, AND STATE PROVISION:

Social Groups as Actors and Objects in the Policy Process

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Abstract: This paper assesses the degree to which social diversity is associated with state policy choices across a range of social policies. We expand the concept of social diversity to encompass two forms of racial/ethnic diversity, as well as class/income-based diversity. Using comparative data across all fifty states, we test for positive associations between measures of social diversity and state provision of social policy benefits as would be predicted by theories of median voter theory, and theories of group representation. In contrast, we also test for negative associations between social diversity and state provision predicted by theories of racial threat and representation bias. Reconciling (to some degree) these conflicting theories, we find curvilinear associations in which the influence of social diversity on social provision depends on whether a state has low, moderate or high proportions of African-Americans, proportions of Latinos and/or levels of income inequality. Finally, we test whether these relationships change when measures of the degree of class- or race-based bias in political participation are included. Indeed we find that for some relationships (e.g., Latinos and immigration policy) participation affects policy outcomes, while for others (e.g., African-Americans and welfare policy) it is the mere existence of the social group – regardless of their level of participation – that is associated with state policy choices. With growing levels of both income inequality and racial diversity, in the United States, understanding how social groups influence the policy process both as objects (e.g. target populations) and active agents is becoming even more critical.

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Introduction

Notions of social citizenship underlie political debates over a host of policy debates –

determining who gets what, when, where, and how from government prompts us to draw

distinctions between the deserving and undeserving, as well as between "us" and "them," in

society. Thus, social diversity among a nation's citizens may influence how and where these

distinctions are drawn, which is likely to have an impact on the generosity of social provision

(e.g., social welfare programs and policies). And, in an already diverse nation, such as the

United States, it is possible that this dynamic could have increasing significance due to

concurrent upswings in both minority diversity and income inequality.

We examine the relationship between social diversity and social provision across the fifty

US states. Capitalizing on variation in states' racial composition and income inequality, we

examine states' responses to recent federal devolution of policymaking authority. In particular,

we examine states' policy choices for three devolved policy areas related to social provision:

immigrant benefits, welfare (TANF), and children's health insurance (S-CHIP). We expect that

compositional characteristics of the state (as measured by levels of social diversity) will be

associated with each of these choices. However, since each of these policy areas is associated

(rightly or wrongly) with a particular target group (e.g., Latinos and immigration policy), we

expect that the form of social diversity most salient for each policy area will vary. Specifically,

we expect that the proportion Latinos will be most highly associated with immigrant benefits, the

proportion African-American with TANF policy, and the level of income inequality with states'

SCHIP policy choices.

Using comparative data across all fifty states, we test for positive associations between

these measures of social diversity and state provision of social policy benefits as would be

predicted by theories of political power and median voter theory. In contrast, we test for

negative associations between social diversity and state provision predicted by theories of racial

threat and representation bias. Reconciling (to some degree) these conflicting theories, we find

curvilinear associations in which the magnitude and direction of influence of social diversity on

social provision depends on whether a state has low, moderate or high proportions of minorities

and/or middle-class families.

Finally, we expect that these relationships between social diversity and social provision

will depend on the degree to which the social group viewed as the policy's "target population" is

seen as "actors" or "objects" in the policymaking process. This hypothesis is tested by asking

whether the associations found between states' social composition and their policy outcomes are

mediated by the class- or race-based bias in political participation at the mass or elite levels.

Indeed, we find that for some relationships (e.g., Latinos and immigration policy) participation

may alter policy outcomes, while for others (e.g., African-Americans and welfare policy) it

appears that the mere existence of the social group – regardless of their level of participation – is

associated with state policy choices.

Social Diversity: Minority Diversity and Income Inequality

Our definition of social diversity encompasses both race- and class-based diversity. For

race-based diversity, we consider the proportion African-American, as well as Latino in the state.

Theoretical perspectives on minority diversity predict both negative (e.g., racial threat) and

positive (e.g., political power) relationships between diversity and social provision. For class-

based diversity, we use a measure of state income inequality, which measures the distance

between the upper and lower income residents of the state. For class-based forms of social

diversity, income inequality is expected to be positively associated with provision under the

median voter theory, while negatively associated in theories of representation bias in American politics. We discuss these theories and our hypotheses in greater detail below.

Minority Diversity: A number of researchers have identified racial context as a key determinant of states' stringent and less generous welfare policy choices. Racial composition of a state has also been found to influence the level of AFDC benefits, with higher levels of African Americans associated with lower AFDC benefits (Orr 1976; Hero 1998; Howard 1999; Plotnick and Winters 1985, Wright 1976). Others have found that the racial composition of the current recipient population influences the generosity (Brown 1995; Wright 1976; Gilens 1999) and harshness (Soss et al. 2001) of welfare policies. These findings are consistent with the racial threat hypothesis, which articulates how an increasing numbers of a minority group may lead those of the majority group to feel threatened because of the increased intensity of inter-group competition, leading to negative feelings towards minorities.

In contrast, it is also plausible that minority diversity is associated with more generous social provision since larger proportions of minority group members may collectively hold significant political power or be seen as important constituents, and thus be able to secure concessions from the government. A handful of studies have found empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis in the area of redistributive policies. For example, African American representation was found to be positively related to a range of measures of welfare generosity, including AFDC inclusion rates (Fording 1997; Fording 2001) and redistributive policy roll call votes in state legislatures (Herring 1990).

To reconcile these conflicting findings regarding the direction of association between minority diversity and social provision, recent work has identified a curvilinear association in which the proportion of minorities in the states or local area moderates the relationship between

minority diversity and a range of outcomes (Keiser, Mueser, and Choi 2004; Branton and Jones 1999; Fording 1997; Taylor 1998). One possible interpretation of the initial downward slope of the curvilinear relationship (in which the policy is less generous as the proportion of minorities rises) is that as the proportion of minorities in the state increases, there is more inter-group contact there is less prejudice about the minority group which leads to policies that are more beneficial to everyone. Then, a possible interpretation of the upward slope of the curvilinear relationship (once a threshold level of minority presence is established) is that as the proportion of minorities increases, the minority group gains more political representation (or at least strength as voters/constituents) which leads to policies that are more beneficial for them. We expect to find a similar curvilinear association as predicted in Hypothesis 1 below.

> **Hypothesis 1:** *Minority diversity will be associated with social provision in a curvilinear (U-shaped) pattern [See Figure 1]*

Income Inequality. A fundamental assumption of democratic theory is that the state is responsive to the needs and preferences of its citizens. Thus, the provision of social benefits should align with the preferences of the median voter (Downs 1985). So as income inequality rises, the income of the median voter falls further below the mean resulting in an increase in the median voter's material interests in redistribution (Brady 2004; Lenz 2004; Meltzer and Richard 1981). In this situation, we would expect to see an increase in redistribution or more generous social provision as the level of inequality increases. The underlying assumption in this as well as related theories is that increasing income inequality leads to negative reactions, which motivate demands among less privileged groups (Brady 2004). Supporting this, Husted and Kenny (1997) found evidence of higher welfare expenditures in states that had higher levels of income

inequality. Similarly, Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) find evidence for increasing levels of

redistribution across OECD countries with increases in market-generated income inequality.

Yet, another plausible hypothesis is that income inequality would lead to less generous

social provision. Theoretical expectations exist that predict both that increasing levels of

inequality will reinforce political inequalities such as voting differentials and contribution gaps

across groups. Theories of bias in representation often note that as income inequality increases,

economic resources are (by definition) more unequally distributed so that more affluent citizens

have relatively more resources available for political participation, lobbying, and advocacy

(Brady 2004). In addition, political inequalities may attenuate the ability of less advantaged

groups to have their policy preferences realized. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (2004) highlight

the various ways in which disparities in income, education, and other individual level resources

are related to inequalities in political participation and voice. In fact, recent studies have shown

that politician's actions correspond more closely to the preferences of more privileged

constituents (Bartels 2002; Gilens 2003; Jacobs and Page 2005). And specific to the case at hand,

two studies investigating state redistributive policies find that higher levels of income inequality

are associated with lower AFDC benefits and less redistribution (Jacobs and Waldman 1983;

Barrilleaux and Davis 2003).

Like for minority diversity, we expect that the validity of the median voter versus

representative bias hypotheses to be reconciled by modeling a curvilinear association in which

the median voter (positive) relationship is evident under lower levels of income inequality, while

higher levels of income inequality exhibit a negative relationship consistent with representation

bias. This expectation is reflected in Hypothesis 2 below.

> **Hypothesis 2:** *Income inequality will be associated with social provision in a curvilinear (upside down U-shaped) pattern [See Figure 1]*

Variation across Policy Areas

We also examine whether these relationship vary across forms of social provision. Since different forms of social provision may elicit different stereotypes, discussion of problems and goals, and characterization of the target population (Stone 1998), we expect to see variation in the ways that social diversity matter for social provision. One key factor is the degree of "racialization" or social construction of the perceived recipients of the policy in question (Gilens 1998; Johnson 2001; Hurwitz and Peffley 1998; Schneider and Ingram 1993). For example, we might expect less evidence of the "racial threat hypothesis" in less racialized policy areas.

Supporting this assertion, Howard (2007) found different relationships between states' racial composition and their policy choices across various social benefit programs. Most relevant to our hypotheses, he identified a strong relationship for TANF and no relationships for states' SCHIP policies. This null finding for SCHIP is not surprising since the political discourse over SCHIP emerged post-welfare reform and focused on the needs of low-income working families. Reframing the program as distinct from the more stigmatized Medicaid program, SCHIP is more likely to elicit discussion of poverty, low-income workers, and the working poor – as opposed to more racialized stereotypes of welfare recipients. Thus, we expect that class-based diversity (specifically income inequality) will be the form of social diversity salient for SCHIP, while racial diversity will be more salient for the other two policy areas.

In addition, we draw a distinction between two forms of social provision that are both quite racialized: immigrant benefits and welfare (TANF). Due to the focus of immigrant policy on Mexican-Americans, we expect that the proportion Latino will be most salient for immigrant benefit policies. In contrast, the proportion of African-Americans is often found to be

particularly salient for welfare policies such as TANF (e.g., Soss et al 2001). Thus, our third

hypothesis predicts different relationships across the three policy areas:

> **Hypothesis 3:** *The relationship between social diversity and social provision will vary across policy areas and forms of social diversity with the most salient relationships found for: % Latino and immigrant benefits, % African-American and TANF benefits, and income inequality and SCHIP.*

Social Groups as "Objects" versus "Agents"

A key element impacting how social diversity relates to social provision is the social

construction of the particular group in question (e.g., Latinos, African-Americans, the poor).

When groups hold political power they may be seen as "agents" of policymaking while less

powerful groups are often viewed as passive "objects" of policymaking. Fording (2003)

empirically examined this distinction in a model including both measures of composition (object

status) and representation (agent status) of African Americans. He found that although the

percentage of the AFDC caseload that is African American has a strong negative relationship

with the adoption of harsher state waivers, the measure for African American political

representation has a positive relationship suggesting a potential moderating effect. Similarly,

scholars have examined mobilization of various segments of the population around issues of

social benefits, with higher levels of mobilization of affected populations resulting in more

generous benefits (Avery and Peveley 2005; Fellows and Rowe 2004; Hill and Leighley 1992;

Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Anderson 1995; Ringquist et al. 1997; Allen and Campbell 1994;

Campbell, 2003). We consider both elite representation and mass participation as forms of

political participation with the potential to transform social groups into agents of policymaking.

> **Hypothesis 4:** *The relationship between social diversity and social provision depends on the degree to which the minorities and/or the poor are active participants in the political process – with greater provision associated with more participation.*

Analytic Strategy

We test these four hypotheses using comparative data on the fifty US states. We capitalize on the recent devolution of authority for much of social provision from the federal to state governments. In particular, we focus on three forms of social provision that have been recently devolved: immigrant benefits, welfare/TANF, and children's health insurance (SCHIP). For each, we developed composite scores standardized so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one. The Immigrant Benefits Score measures the number of federal programs in which the state elects to extend to legal immigrants. This sum ranges from zero to five (Medicaid, TANF, Food Stamps, SSI, and SCHIP) with an average of 1.47 programs (SD=1.58). The TANF Score equally weights two elements of states' TANF (welfare) policies: the average eligibility level for a family of three (M=$9,205, SD=$3,465) and (reverse-coded for generosity to be higher) the number of restrictive/punitive TANF penalties (e.g., family caps) enacted by the state (M=1.26, SD=.99). Similarly, the SCHIP Score equally weights two aspects of state policy: the eligibility level for a family of three (M=$33,482, SD=$6,081) and the provisions that states have adopted to ease the enrollment process (e.g., phone versus in-person enrollment; M=4.65, SD=.88).

We include three measures of social diversity: (1) Proportion of Latinos (M=6.89, SD=8.57), (2) Proportion of African-Americans (M=10.22, SD=9.61), and (3) Income inequality measured as the market gini multiplied by 100 (M=350, SD=891). For all three forms of social provision, we model the policy generosity as a function of all three types of social diversity and include a squared term for each to capture curvilinear relationships. Thus, we report an F-test that is the joint-F for both coefficients (e.g., % Latino and % Latino squared). In addition, we control for two key determinants of state policy generosity: citizen ideology as measured by

Berry et al (1999, M=48.15, SD=14.70) and Per capita income in $1,000 (M=2.92, SD=2.65).

Descriptive statistics for these variables, as well as others in the analyses are in Table 1.

The second set of analyses test whether these relationships vary under different levels of

political participation. We examine political participation at both the mass and elite levels. First,

at the mass level, we use data from the November supplement to the Current Population Survey

in 1996, 2000, and 2004 to estimate the average "bias" in voting between groups. For racial

bias, we compute a ratio that compares the proportion of Whites voting to the proportion of non-

Whites. The average ratio is 1.60 (SD=.48). For class-based bias, we use a measure of income

bias as calculated by Avery and Pevely (M=172.29, SD=20.4). At the elite level, we consider

over- or under-representation by minority legislators by calculating the difference between the

proportion of legislators and the proportion of the public that are Latino (M=-2.68, SD=3.63) and

African American (M=-.68, SD=3.64). For income bias at the elite level, we use a measure of

interest group capture developed by Thomas and Hrebner (1999) that ranges from 1 to 4

(M=2.66, SD=.75) with greater values indicating more dominance of interest groups (which are

more likely to represent the wealthy) over the state government. These mass and elite

participation measures are modeled as moderating variables (e.g., interaction terms) with the

social diversity measures.

Findings

First, we examine bivariate correlations among the social diversity measures and the

social provision measures. As shown in Table 2, the proportion Latino is associated with more

generous immigrant benefits, while the proportion African American is correlated with less

generous immigrant and TANF provision. Income inequality is not correlated with any of the

measures of social provision and none of the measure of social diversity are associated with the generosity of state SCHIP policy.

These relationships are further examined in the multivariate analyses presented in Table 3. As expected, the proportion African American was related to the generosity of TANF benefits in a primarily negative (with a slight curve upon very high proportions of African Americans) relationship. In addition, the proportion of African-Americans was not significantly associated with S-CHIP policy. Contrary to our expectation, we find that the proportion of African Americans is also related to the generosity of immigrant benefits in a similar (but less extreme) relationship. These three relationships are depicted in Figure 2, which plots predicted probabilities for all three policy areas by the proportion African-American in the state. All other variables in the model (ideology, per capita income, % Latino, and income inequality) are set at their mean value.

Similarly, the proportion Latino is associated with the generosity of immigrant and TANF policies – and not with significantly with S-CHIP policy. However, as the predicted probabilities in Figure 3 illustrate (with coefficients in Table 3), we find more of a curvilinear association with quite generous policies in the few states with more than 20 percent Latino. The same "upward curve" is not seen in the states with particularly high proportions of African-Americans. And, as illustrated in Figure 4 (with coefficients in Table 3), income inequality is not associated with policy generosity for any of the three policy areas.

In the second set of analyses (Tables 4 through 7) we turned our attention to whether the relationship between social diversity and social benefit policy varies under different levels of mass and elite political participation. For minority diversity we consider interactions between the racial composition variables and two participation measures: levels of voting among the

public (results in Table 4) and representation of minorities by legislators of their same

race/ethnicity (results in Table 5). For both measures of participation, the relationship between

the proportion Latino in the state and the generosity of immigrant benefits is moderated by levels

of political participation. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 5 and 6 in which the

relationship between proportion Latino and the odds of generous immigrant benefits is plotted

for states with high versus low vote bias and high versus low levels of Latino representation.[1]

Both figures illustrate a positive relationship under more active participation (low vote bias

and/or high level of Latino representation). Under lower levels of participation, the predicted

values are either flat and low (in the case of high vote bias) or negative (in the case of low levels

of Latino representation).

In addition, for SCHIP policy the degree of race-based bias in voting moderated the

association between proportion African-Americans and policy generosity. Figure 7 illustrates

this relationship in which predicted SCHIP policy is negative as the proportion of African-

Americans increases (similar relationship seen for other two policy areas) under high vote bias.

However, under low vote bias, the SCHIP policy is not related to the proportion African-

American in the state.

For income inequality, two alternative measures of political participation are used. First,

the ratio of voter turnout between wealthy and poorer Americans (Table 6) and secondly the

level of interest group power over the state government (Table 7). Indeed, we find that the

relationship between income inequality and SCHIP benefits (which we had hypothesized to be

present by did not find in the direct associations) was found to be moderated by the level of

income bias in voting. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 8. For interest group capture, we

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[1] For both figures, high is defined as one standard deviation above the mean and low defined as one standard deviation below the mean.

found a similar effect for income inequality and TANF benefits (illustrated in Figure 9). In states with low interest group capture, high levels of income inequality with more generous TANF policies (as would be expected by the median voter theory). However, this was not seen under conditions of high interest group capture.

Conclusions

This paper examines the relationship between states' social diversity and the generosity of the social benefits provided in the state. We attempted to reconcile conflicting theories about how social diversity may impact social provision. Considering racial diversity, we found similar patterns for both the proportion African-American and the proportion Latino in the state. Both forms of minority diversity exhibited an initial downward slope (less generous provision) for immigrant benefits and TANF policy. This is consistent with the racial threat hypothesis that posits negative social provision as a response to increasing diversity. Also as expected, this was found for the two policy areas most racialized and not for S-CHIP (a policy area framed in a less racialized way).

Interestingly, this negative relationship flattened a bit in states with very high levels of African-American (greater than about 25 percent). However, in the handful of states with similarly high proportions of Latinos, a more dramatic increase in policy generosity was seen. This is consistent with the political power hypothesis in which larger demographic groups can maximize political clout by sheer volume of votes/citizens. Our findings suggest that this effect is more true for Latinos than African-Americans. Supporting the role of Latino political power, the positive association between percent Latinos and immigrant benefits was found to be even greater (with little to no initial down-swing) in states with low levels of vote bias (between minorities and white) and in states with high levels of representation by Latino legislators.

Although a similar interaction was found for vote bias as a moderating factor impacting the

association between African-Americans and SCHIP policy, the predicted values illustrate how

low vote bias predicts a neutral relationship (as would be expected for this less racialized policy),

while high vote bias would predict an initial negative association (as was seen for the other two

policy areas) with a bit more upswing at the highest levels.

　　　　We tested two conflicting hypotheses for how income inequality may relate to social

provision: median voter (predicting a positive association) and representation bias (predicting a

negative association). Neither was found in the direct effect analyses – with income inequality

not related to any of the three forms of social provision. However, in two cases, income

inequality was associated with social provision once we accounted for the moderating effect of

political participation. At the mass level, bias in voting between the rich and poor moderated the

SCHIP findings. In particular, in states with low vote bias we found evidence to support the

median voter relationship under low levels of income inequality and the income bias relationship

under particularly high levels of income inequality. This was consistent with our hypothesis.

However, under high vote bias, we find the opposite pattern with an initially negative associated

and some upswing under very high levels of inequality. At the elite level, we found a

moderating effect for interest group capture (of the legislature) for the relationship between

income inequality and TANF policy. With high interest group capture, we found a neutral

relationship (same as the direct effect). However, for the states with low interest group capture a

more positive relationship was predicted – consistent with the median voter hypothesis.

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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Policy Variables (2005)				
Immig. Score	0.00	1.00	-0.93	2.24
Immig. Benefits	1.47	1.58	0.00	5.00
TANF Score	0.00	0.78	-1.48	1.37
TANF Eligibility	9204.75	3465.20	2707.76	16929.46
TANF Penalties	1.26	0.99	0.00	3.00
SCHIP Score	0.00	0.78	-2.31	1.98
SCHIP Eligibility	33481.91	6081.31	16874.87	48194.20
SCHIP Ease of Enrollment Scale	4.65	0.88	3.00	7.00
Social Diversity Variables (1998)				
% AA	10.22	9.61	0.40	36.50
% Latino	6.89	8.57	0.60	40.70
Income Inequality (market gini)	3.50	8.91	0.50	63.60
Political Participation Variables (2000)				
Race Bias in Voting	1.60	0.48	1.09	3.65
AA Legislators (ratio to pop)	-2.68	3.63	-14.80	3.30
LAT Legislators (ratio to pop)	-3.63	2.89	-14.80	-0.60
Income Bias in Voting	172.29	20.04	129.10	216.87
Interest Group Capture	2.66	0.75	1.00	4.00
Other Political Variables (Avg. 1998-2004)				
Citizen Ideology	48.15	14.70	20.44	80.57
Per capita income	29173.31	2653.04	25040.43	36205.29

Notes: N=50 States

Table 2

Correlations Among Social Diversity and Social Provision Variables

	% AA	% Lat	Inc Ineq	Immig.	TANF	SCHIP
Social Diversity						
% African Amer	1.00					
% Latino	-0.14	1.00				
Income Inequality	0.30 *	0.19	1.00			
Social Provision						
Immig.	-0.26 *	0.35 *	-0.10	1.00		
TANF	-0.55 *	0.03	-0.10	0.26 *	1.00	
SCHIP	0.09	0.17	0.07	0.27 *	0.04	1.00

Notes: N=50; * = p<.10

Table 3

Multivariate Relationships among Social Diversity and Social Provision

	Immigrant Benefits		TANF Benefits		SCHIP Benefits	
	B	**Joint F**	**B**	**Joint F**	**B**	**Joint F**
Citizen Ideology	0.047		0.017		0.012	
	(0.023)		(0.008)		(0.011)	
Per capita income	0.463		0.065		0.113	
	(0.171)		(0.063)		(0.082)	
% AA	0.099		-0.115		-0.019	
	(0.138)	5.08*	(0.046)	10.40***	(0.059)	0.270
% AA ^ 2	-0.007		0.002		0.001	
	(0.005)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
% Latino	-0.071		-0.115		-0.234	
	(0.128)	6.97**	(0.050)	2.72*	(0.065)	0.540
% Latino ^ 2	0.004		0.003		0.001	
	(0.003)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Income Inequality	-4.443		-1.316		0.046	
	(2.877)	3.510	(1.180)	0.850	(1.521)	0.040
Income Inequality ^ 2	4.338		1.350		-0.029	
	(2.890)		(1.180)		(1.527)	
r2	0.186		0.486		0.146	

Notes: N =50 States; Cell entries are coeffients from ordered logit regression (in the case of immigrant benefits) and OLS regression for the other two policy areas, with standard errors in parenthesis underneath; F statistics are from tests of joint significance for each social diversity variables and that variables squared

Table 4

Interactions between Racial Composition and Race-based Bias in Voting

	Immigrant Benefits		TANF Benefits		SCHIP Benefits	
	B	Joint F	B	Joint F	B	Joint F
Citizen Ideology	0.052		0.015		0.017	
	(0.024)		(0.009)		(0.011)	
Per capita income	0.485		0.060		0.148	
	(0.001)		(0.073)		(0.090)	
% AA	0.790		-0.147		0.543	
	(0.758)		(0.205)		(0.255)	
% AA ^ 2	-0.022		-0.114		-0.018	
	(0.032)		(0.293)		(0.011)	
% Latino	1.777		0.002		0.417	
	(0.759)		(0.293)		(0.364)	
% Latino ^ 2	-0.049		0.002		-0.013	
	(0.023)		(0.009)		(0.011)	
Income Inequality	-6.588		-1.473		-0.491	
	(3.344)		(1.270)		(1.581)	
Income Inequality ^ 2	6.585		1.509		0.552	
	(3.338)		(1.280)		(1.593)	
Vote Bias by Race	4.999		-0.709		1.617	
	(2.655)		(0.936)		(1.164)	
Vote Bias * % AA	-0.503		-0.001		-0.454	
	(0.545)	1.760	(0.168)	0.000	(0.201)	2.590*
Vote Bias * % AA ^2	0.009		0.000		0.016	
	(0.024)		(0.162)		(0.009)	
Vote Bias * % Lat	-1.054		0.025		-0.229	
	(0.449)	5.520*	(0.168)	0.170	(0.209)	0.780
Vote Bias * % Lat ^2	0.031		0.000		0.008	
	(0.014)		(0.005)		(0.007)	
r2	0.224		0.521		0.258	

Notes: N=50 States; Cell entries are coeffients from ordered logit regression (in the case of immigrant benefits) and OLS regression for the other two policy areas, with standard errors in parentheses underneath; F statistics are from tests of joint significance for each social diversity variables and that variables squared

Table 5

Interactions between Racial Composition & Min. Representation in Legislature

|	Immigrant Benefits		TANF Benefits		SCHIP Benefits	
	B	**Joint F**	**B**	**Joint F**	**B**	**Joint F**
Citizen Ideology	0.070		0.018		0.015	
	(0.026)		(0.009)		(0.011)	
Per capita income	0.000		0.083		0.074	
	(0.000)		(0.070)		(0.089)	
% AA	0.014		-0.069		-0.083	
	(0.199)		(0.069)		(0.088)	
% AA ^ 2	0.002		0.001		0.006	
	(0.010)		(0.003)		(0.004)	
% Latino	0.354		-0.209		0.063	
	(0.321)		(0.100)		(0.127)	
% Latino ^ 2	-0.005		0.005		0.000	
	(0.008)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Income Inequality	-4.696		-1.477		0.439	
	(2.977)		(1.216)		(1.540)	
Income Inequality ^ 2	4.500		1.519		-0.446	
	(2.986)		(1.225)		(1.554)	
AA Representation	-0.177		0.010		-0.175	
	(0.443)		(0.176)		(0.224)	
Latino Representation	-0.920		-0.224		-0.139	
	(0.429)		(0.170)		(0.216)	
Rep * % AA	-0.019		0.008		0.009	
	(0.061)	2.030	(0.016)	0.270	(0.020)	1.530
Rep * % AA ^2	0.002		0.000		0.000	
	(0.002)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Rep * % Lat	-0.003		0.000		0.000	
	0.002	5.820*	(0.001)	0.250	(0.001)	0.830
Rep * % Lat ^2	0.139		0.014		0.017	
	(0.062)		(0.019)		(0.024)	
r2	0.244		0.547		0.270	

Notes: N=50 States; Cell entries are coeffients from ordered logit regression (in the case of immigrant benefits) and OLS regression for the other two policy areas, with standard errors in parenthesis underneath; F statistics are from tests of joint significance for each social diversity variables and that variables squared

Table 6

Interactions between Income Inequality and Income-based Bias in Voting

	Immigrant Benefits		TANF Benefits		SCHIP Benefits	
	B	**Joint F**	**B**	**Joint F**	**B**	**Joint F**
Citizen Ideology	0.045		0.012		0.011	
	(0.025)		(0.008)		(0.010)	
Per capita income	0.429		0.031		0.093	
	(0.175)		0.063		(0.079)	
% AA	0.083		-0.078		-0.029	
	(0.150)		(0.048)		(0.060)	
% AA ^ 2	-0.007		0.001		0.001	
	(0.006)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
% Latino	-0.032		-0.087		-0.003	
	(0.137)		(0.050)		(0.063)	
% Latino ^ 2	0.003		0.002		-0.003	
	(0.004)		(0.001)		(0.063)	
Income Inequality	10.186		0.588		61.268	
	(45.119)		(17.217)		(21.633)	
Income Inequality ^ 2	-10.126		0.282		-60.986	
	(45.088)		(17.185)		(21.594)	
Vote Bias by Income	2.050		0.310		9.028	
	(6.662)		(2.540)		(3.191)	
Vote Bias * Inequality	-0.082		-0.008		-0.361	
	(0.267)	0.110	(0.102)	1.880	(12.770)	4.020**
Vote Bias * Inequ. ^ 2	0.081		0.003		0.360	
	(0.267)		(0.102)		(12.759)	
r2	0.190		0.561		0.306	

Notes: N=50 States; Cell entries are coeffients from ordered logit regression (in the case of immigrant benefits) and OLS regression for the other two policy areas, with standard errors in parenthesis underneath; F statistics are from tests of joint significance for each social diversity variables and that variables squared

Table 7

**Interactions between Income Inequality & Interest Group Capture**

	Immigrant Benefits		TANF Benefits		SCHIP Benefits	
	B	**Joint F**	**B**	**Joint F**	**B**	**Joint F**
Citizen Ideology	0.055		0.019		0.009	
	(0.025)		(0.009)		(0.012)	
Per Capita Income	0.452		0.067		0.110	
	(0.172)		(0.062)		0.085	
% AA	0.091		-0.120		-0.017	
	(0.142)		(0.044)		(0.061)	
% AA ^ 2	-0.007		0.002		0.001	
	(0.005)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
% Latino	-0.075		-0.151		-0.007	
	(0.136)		(0.051)		(0.071)	
% Latino ^ 2	0.004		0.004		0.001	
	(0.004)		(0.001)		(0.002)	
Income Inequality	-24.137		-5.701		4.648	
	(10.523)		(4.320)		(5.954)	
Income Inequality ^ 2	23.941		6.062		-4.679	
	(10.511)		(4.315)		(5.947)	
Interest Group Capture	-188.673		-36.241		41.904	
	(96.968)		(38.688)		(53.323)	
IG Capture * Inequality	7.550		1.572		-1.704	
	(3.891)	3.800	(1.548)	3.18*	(2.134)	0.370
IG Capture * Inequ. ^ 2	-7.521		-1.689		1.721	
	(3.889)		(1.544)		(2.129)	
r2	0.208		0.561		0.165	

Notes: N=50 States; Cell entries are coeffients from ordered logit regression (in the case of immigrant benefits) and OLS regression for the other two policy areas, with standard errors in parenthesis underneath; F statistics are from tests of joint significance for each social diversity variables and that variables squared

Figure 1
Hypothesized Association between Social Diversity and Provision of Social Policy Benefits

Figure 2
Immigrant and TANF Generosity by Proportion African-American in the State

Figure 3
**Policy Generosity by Proportion Latino in the State**


X = immigrant, 0 = tanf, triangle = schip

Figure 4
**Policy Generosity by Income Inequality in the State**

Figure 5
**Relationship between Latinos and Immigrant Benefits under Low vs. High Vote Bias**

Figure 6
Relationship between Latinos and Immigrant Benefits under Low vs. High Representation

Figure 7
Relationship between % African Americans and SCHIP by Vote Bias

Figure 8
Relationship between Income Inequality and SCHIP by Income Vote Bias

Figure 9
Relationship between Income Inequality and TANF by Interest Group Capture