Mass Support for Redistricting Reform:
District versus Statewide Representational Winners and Losers

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"Most voters don't know anything about redistricting and don't care. They don't see the lines."
     —Bruce Cain (quoted by Powell 2004)

Institutional change generally does not come easy. In particular, scholars have found that

alterations made to political institutions regulating electoral rules are relatively rare occurrences

(see Lijphart 1984). One reason that institutional change occurs infrequently is that it is

inherently risky for elites (North 1990), especially for those who are (or at least perceive

themselves to be) winners under the status quo. Officials in control of electoral rulemaking are

generally reluctant to alter the status quo unless a change will clearly benefit them (Bowler,

Donovan, and Karp 2006; Grofman 1990; Rokkan 1970). As a result, scholars have found that

institutions, and the rules governing them, tend to evolve in such a way as to maintain

equilibrium, thus preserving the status of winners (Riker 1962; 1982).

But is support for institutional change at the mass level any more likely? Are voters—

when presented with the opportunity—more likely than elites to alter political institutions?

Using unique and previously unexamined survey data, we explore mass support for institutional

reform. Specifically, we are interested in the level of mass support in American states for

changing the way legislative districts are drawn. Does a voter's current status as a

representational (or partisan) 'winner' or 'loser' under a state's redistricting system shape

support for redistricting reform? If so, what conditions are necessary for mass support for

institutional change? We argue that ordinary voters—like their elected officials (Boatright

2004)—may exhibit a similar rational, self-interested calculus when given the opportunity to be

policymakers for a day. Despite not being keenly aware of how legislative district lines are

drawn, we suggest that citizens are able to make strategic choices (Riker 1986) based on whether

they are winners or losers under the current gerrymandered system. As with elected officials, we expect losers under a current institutional arrangement to vote in favor of reforms to create new electoral rules advantaging themselves; winners, conversely, are expected to preserve the status quo.

The major debate over partisan versus nonpartisan gerrymandering in the United States hinges on which method might minimize electoral losers at the district versus the statewide (or Congressional delegation) level. In a provocative essay, Brunell (2006) argues that partisan gerrymandering may minimize district level losers. McDonald (2006a), in contrast, argues that nonpartisan gerrymandering leading to more competitive districts may lead to better representation at the statewide (or Congressional delegation) level. This research helps to empirically assess these opposing arguments.

Pre- and post-election surveys from the off-year 2005 elections in California and Ohio make for an intriguing comparative case study, as we are able to hold constant the mechanism (direct democracy) used to alter an electoral institution (redistricting), while varying the partisan context in each state (bipartisan Democratic gerrymander in California; bipartisan Republican gerrymander in Ohio). Through this natural controlled experiment, we are able to test hypotheses concerning an individual's status as a representational winner or loser at both the district and statewide levels. When viewed through the conceptual prisms of partisanship and legislative representation at both the statewide *and* district levels, we argue that being a winner or loser can help explain why less than a majority of voters supported the redistricting reform ballot measures in the two states.

Political Elites versus the Mass Public/ Electoral Losers versus Representation Losers

Losers are often defined in the literature as out-of-power politicians (Riker 1962), but here we define *voters* who are represented by politicians of a different political party as *representational* losers. As with recent cross-national research examining the relationship between winners and losers and their attitudes toward political institutions at the elite level (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2002, 2006; Anderson et al. 2005; Andrews and Jackman 2005), we are interested in whether winners and losers at the mass level are more or less likely to support institutional reforms. Recent studies drawing on national and cross-national data find that citizens who are *electoral* losers under a current set of institutional rules are more likely to support overhauling those procedures (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Banducci and Karp 1999; Wenzel, Bowler, and Lanoue 2000; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Bowler and Donovan 2006; Anderson, et al. 2005; Donovan and Karp 2006; Karp 2005; Norris 1999).

Our study departs from previous research in a number of important ways. Most scholars have used the results of a single national election to determine whether a person is an electoral loser or winner (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Norris 1999; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Banducci and Karp 1998; Donovan and Karp 2006), or survey questions measuring whether the respondent feels like they generally win or lose in elections (Bowler and Donovan 2006). Rather than "electoral losers," we use the term "representational losers" to designate those individuals who are represented by elected officials from a different political party. Unlike previous research focusing on national politics, we measure losers at the subnational level (statewide and district levels). Extant literature has tended to focus on opinions and attitudes about institutional change. In contrast, we measure actual voting behavior on electoral reform in statewide ballot initiative contests. Finally, we measure the importance of

being a representational loser at multiple levels of government simultaneously (Congress, statewide, district). Most previous research operationalizes winners and losers along only one dimension (see Bowler and Donovan 2006 for an exception).

As with previous studies, however, we are interested in whether some citizens are more likely to support institutional change of election rules than others, depending on their status as winners or losers. Are representational losers under a given system of redistricting predisposed to support changes in the way districts are gerrymandered? Does either partisan control of the state legislature or representation at the district level condition the strategic choices of voters when it comes to supporting redistricting reform? Riker (1962, 1986) argues that political elites act strategically, manipulating institutions to their electoral benefit. We suggest that individual citizens may also act strategically when making decisions to change an electoral institution.

A Voting Paradox: Redistricting Reform in California and Ohio

Thirty-eight states currently give sole authority to drawing state legislative boundaries to the legislature, with 26 states giving sole authority for redistricting congressional seats to the state legislature (McDonald 2006b). In the remaining states, periodic redistricting of state and congressional districts is given to a bipartisan or nonpartisan board or commission, or is done though a combination of legislative and commission bodies (McDonald 2004). McDonald argues only Iowa and Arizona have true non-partisan redistricting. In California and Ohio, the state legislature controls the redistricting process. Following the 2000 census, California and Ohio state legislatures created bipartisan gerrymanders, with Democratic and Republican lawmakers agreeing to carve the state's congressional and state legislative districts into safe seats for their incumbents (Mann and Cain 2005: 2). California's state Assembly, state Senate, and

Congressional districts were gerrymandered by the Democratic-controlled state legislature to advantage Democrats, but in a way that also ensured Republicans received safe seats; in Ohio, all three levels of legislative districts were gerrymandered to benefit an abundance of Republican candidates, but the state legislature preserved some safe seats for Democrats.

On Tuesday, November 8, 2005, citizens had the opportunity in both states to alter the way gerrymandering is conducted by voting on ballot initiatives that would have created non-partisan redistricting commissions. The text, as well as the election results of the two redistricting proposals was quite similar. California's Proposition 77 would have amended the state's constitutional process for redistricting California's Senate, Assembly, and Congressional districts, reducing the power of the state legislature by having a three-member panel of retired judges selected by legislative leaders redraw the districts, with the proposed district boundaries then being referred to the statewide electorate for a popular vote. But Proposition 77, championed by Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, received only 40% of the popular vote.[1] Ohio's Issue 4, which would have established a five member appointed board to oversee the drawing of legislative maps to ensure "competitive" redistricting, was sponsored by a coalition of Progressive non-profit organizations. The initiative won just 30% of the vote.[2]

The defeat of the two initiatives came as a surprise to many observers. According to numerous statewide polls, public support across the county (including in California and Ohio) for altering the way state and congressional legislative districts are partitioned tends to run quite

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[1] After failing to prod the state legislature to modify the way redistricting was conducted in the state, Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger called for a special election and lead the charge—with his ballot measure committee, the California Recovery Team—raising millions of dollars to place Proposition 77 (as well as four other measures) on the November ballot.

[2] In the wake of Ohio's close and highly contested 2004 presidential election, including concerns over the accuracy of the vote count, progressive reformers (Reform Ohio Now) qualified a slate of election reform initiatives for the state's 2005 ballot. In addition to the non-partisan districting initiative (Issue 4), Ohio's ballot included initiatives to 1) create early voting and no excuse absentee voting, campaign finance reform; and 3) a non-partisan board to oversee elections in the state, effectively replacing the secretary of state for overseeing elections.

high. According to a statewide poll of 800 registered voters conducted in April 2006, California voters prefer redistricting to be done by an independent commission by a 3-to-1 margin (California Common Cause 2006). The poll, funded by three nonpartisan groups, found that a majority of Democratic, Republican, and Independent voters all supported an independent commission to gerrymander legislative districts. Over half of the Californian's polled in April, 2006 who said they voted against Prop. 77 just five months earlier, claimed they preferred an independent redistricting commission to the existing process. Similarly, in Ohio, just two months after more than two-thirds of Ohioans rejected Issue 4 at the polls, an independent survey funded by the nonpartisan Reform Institute (2006) found that 70% of Ohio voters supported more "balanced" and "competitive" congressional and legislative races, including over half of all registered Republicans and Democrats. These survey results parallel those of a post-election November 2005 poll funded by the nonpartisan JEHT Foundation (2006).

Despite widespread evidence that the mass public supports redistricting reform (Walters 2006), why did the two redistricting ballot measures fail—and fail by large margins? At first blush, support for such an institutional reform might seem akin to the mass support for term limits in the 1990s (Benjamin and Malbin 1992; Donovan and Snipp 1994) and other governance policies restricting the power of elected officials, such as tax and spending limits and campaign finance reforms (Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert 1998). Rather than having partisan legislators essentially choose their constituents through a politically-charged system of gerrymandering, we might expect voters—regardless of their political persuasion—living in states without redistricting commissions to support institutional reforms intended to create more competitive legislative elections. In contrast to supermajority approval for term limit initiatives in the 1990s, the redistricting propositions received half the support.

If in the abstract, popular support for independent redistricting commissions is generally high, why did large majorities of citizens opt not to change the institutional design when they were given the opportunity at the polls? Why didn't voters jump at the opportunity to minimize the power of their state legislators who control the process of drawing their own legislative districts as well as those of their compatriots in the US House of Representatives? One possible explanation, of course, is that voters were confused by the ballot measures. Not knowing fully what the consequences of the measures could be, they may have decided just to vote 'no' in order to preserve the status quo (Magleby 1984; Bowler and Donovan 1998). Yet this possible explanation is rather thin. Scholars have shown that voters are able to make competent decisions on an array of complicated ballot propositions using limited information, such as simple shortcuts from the media, interest groups, and political elites to make informed choices (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Nicholson 2003). As Lupia (1994: 63) shows, by using shortcuts, most voters are able to "adapt their behavior to the complexity of electoral choice."

Because the Ohio and California state legislatures are charged with drawing districts in both states, we suspect instead that an individual's partisanship played a sizable role in the vote choice of those who participated in the off-year, nonpartisan election. Although they had no explicit partisan cues on their physical ballots (such as party labels) on which to inform their decisions, these highly motivated voters (it was an off-year election, after all) likely used partisan cues to inform their vote choice. Partisan identification is one of the strongest and most consistent determinants of voting behavior on ballot propositions (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Branton 2003; Smith and Tolbert 2004). But partisanship alone is unlikely to explain the voting patterns on the two redistricting ballot measures. We suspect whether a citizen is a

representational winner or a loser at both the statewide and district level provides a fuller account of why citizens voted to support or oppose the initiatives.

Defining Winners and Losers: National versus Subnational Winners and Losers

In answering the question of who supports institutional changes, such as altering the method of gerrymandering, an operationalizable definition of winners and losers is needed. Who should be considered a winner or loser? An overview of previous research indicates that political scientists have classified individuals as losers and winners in a variety of ways. Using survey data, some scholars have used the results of a single national election to determine whether a person is an electoral loser or winner (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Norris 1999; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Banducci and Karp 1998; Donovan and Karp 2006). Under this schema, winners and losers at the mass level are usually categorized according to "an individual's status as a supporter of the government or opposition" (Anderson et al. 2005: 10), with losers supporting a losing candidate or a political party in a previous national election that currently does not have governing power (Anderson and Guillory 1997). In the 2000 presidential elections, for example, Gore voters would be defined as electoral losers. Alternatively, scholars have employed experimental survey designs to measure loser status through a subjective understanding of whether people over time "think of themselves as categorical losers in the electoral arena" (Bowler and Donovan 2006). Using a prospective question of electoral losses, for example, Donovan, Parry, and Bowler (2005: 157) ask respondents to think about candidates that they support in upcoming national, state, and local elections, coding those who reply "most of them might lose" as electoral losers.

Each approach in operationalizing an individual's winner/loser status has its strengths and limitations. When relying on survey data, individuals may misreport (intentionally or unintentionally) their vote in a single election, overestimating their support for a winning candidate or party (Wright 1990). An election for a single national office may not accurately gauge an individual's representation at the subnational level. Much of the previous literature overlooks the importance of subnational representation, which is a focus here. Survey questions measuring "perceptions" of being an electoral loser compensate for the temporal vagaries of using a single election, but considerable noise can be introduced from having respondents characterize (inaccurately or otherwise) their memories or perceptions of past electoral losses.

In contrast, our operationalization of loser status is not based on whether an individual supports a losing candidate (or party) in an election, regardless of whether it is a fixed point in time point or a longitudinal self-assessment. Rather, informed by Bowler, Donovan, and Karp's (2006) investigation of how elites view possible alterations of electoral institutions and Barretto, Segura, and Woods' (2004) analysis of Latino turnout in majority-minority districts, we suggest there are two different lenses through which citizens might perceive being representational winners or losers. Both lenses are informed by an individual's partisanship and by the party of the member who serves as his or her representative in the state legislature and in Congress.

Statewide Legislative Loser

First, we consider an individual to be a statewide legislative loser if his or her party identification is at odds with the legislative party in control of state legislature. In other words, respondents who identify with the party in the legislative minority are representational losers. These individuals may feel as though their partisanship is not adequately taken into account by

their state legislature as a whole. We classify individuals whose party identification is the same as the minority party in the state legislature as "statewide legislative" losers.

District Loser

Second, we define an individual's winner/loser status in terms of representation at the district level. Pairing respondents' zip-codes with their party identification, we determine whether individuals are represented in the state House, state Senate, or U.S. House by legislators belonging to the same political party. Following research showing legislators to be more responsive to their own party's constituency (Shapiro et al. 1990), we suggest that individuals who are representational losers at the district level may consider themselves to be losers. Under this schema, a respondent is a "district loser" if his or her party identification does not coincide with at least two-thirds of his or her representatives (state House, state Senate, and U.S. House).[3]

Offering objective contextual data to measure representational loser status at the mass level, the concepts of statewide legislative and district losers build upon previous research using a single election or self-reported perceptions of being an electoral loser. We acknowledge that operationalizing statewide and district loser status in part through the prism of party identification may have some limitations. For example, Anderson et al. (2005) and Nadeau and Blais (1993) find a limited impact of partisanship on the relationship between winner/loser status and support for political institutions. Craig et al. (2006), however, find that beyond presidential vote choice, partisanship in the American context has a significant effect on an individual's general beliefs regarding electoral procedural fairness. Conceptualizing losers and winners in part through the enduring prism of an individual's party identification (Green, Palmquist, and

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[3] Alternative coding in which district level losers were defined as by being represented by all three representatives of a different political party produced similar, but weaker findings. This result was likely due to limited variation on the district-level loser variable, because a smaller segment of respondents were classified as representational losers.

Schickler 2002) may be as reliable an indicator as using vote choice in the last national election, which is used in much of the previous literature.

For our purposes, national elections may have little to do with an individual's attitudes toward state-level electoral institutions and willingness to alter them. Additionally, there were no candidates—only initiatives and referendums—on the November 2005 ballots in California and Ohio, so using a respondent's candidate vote choice to determine winner/loser status is not possible. For these reasons, we suggest that using party identification at the mass level, paired with information about the party of elected representatives to measure the degree of partisan representation, are reliable and direct empirical indicators of winner or loser status.

Research Hypotheses

Following some basic assumptions about the self-interest of citizens when given an opportunity to alter electoral institutions, we expect both district losers and statewide legislative losers to act strategically and support initiatives calling for alternative redistricting commissions.

Statewide Legislative Loser Hypothesis

We hypothesize, ceteris paribus, that mass support or opposition toward non-partisan redistricting commissions can be partially explained by whether a citizen is a statewide legislative loser or not. We expect statewide legislative losers in Ohio (Democrats) to be more supportive of redistricting reform than Republicans, whereas we expect statewide legislative losers in California (Republicans) to be more supportive of the reform than Democrats.

District Loser Hypothesis

Beyond partisanship, we hypothesize that representational losers at the district level— those represented in the state legislature and in Congress by representatives of a political party

other than their own—will be more likely to support institutional reforms to create more competitive elections, such as non-partisan redistricting. District-level losers are measured by the respondent's partisanship combined with information about the party of the individual's elected representatives to Congress (U.S. House) and the state legislature (Senate and House). If an individual has a different partisanship than the majority (at least two out of three) of his/her representatives at the district level, he or she is considered to be a district loser.

It is possible that an individual is a loser at both the statewide and district levels.[4] The possible combinations of these two levels of representation can be mapped out by a simple 2 x 2 table pairing an individual's representational winner/loser status at the statewide legislative level with his or her representational winner/loser status at the district level. For example, there can be an individual who is a winner statewide (Republican in Ohio), but a loser at the district level (represented by Democrats). Similarly, an individual may be a statewide loser (Democrat in Ohio), but be a district-level winner (represented by a majority of Democrats). Because of the rational self-interest of most citizens, we expect respondents who are dual representational losers—at both the statewide legislative and district levels—to be the most likely to support the California and Ohio ballot measures altering the process of legislative redistricting. In contrast, we expect dual representational winners under the current system, and those with at least partial winner status, to vote to preserve the status quo.

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[4] See Bowler, Donovan and Karp (2006) for a parallel example among elites.

Figure 1
Representational Winners and Losers

OHIO	Statewide Legislative	
District	*Winner*	*Loser*
Winner	Least supportive of election reform/institutional change *(Republicans)*	More supportive of election reform/institutional change *(Democrats)*
Loser	More supportive of election reform/institutional change *(Republicans)*	Most supportive of election reform/institutional change *(Democrats)*

CALIFORNIA	Statewide Legislative	
District	*Winner*	*Loser*
Winner	Least supportive of election reform/institutional change *(Democrats)*	More supportive of election reform/institutional change *(Republicans)*
Loser	More supportive of election reform/institutional change *(Democrats)*	Most supportive of election reform/institutional change *(Republicans)*

Ohio and California Opinion Samples

We test these hypotheses in the context of an off-year election with unique survey data from Ohio commissioned by the authors, as well Field Poll data from California. The 2005 electoral context is ideal, in that the media's focus was on the ballot propositions, as there were no gubernatorial, congressional, or presidential contests to divert their attention. This allows us to isolate possible media effects for the ballot propositions. In Ohio, four high-profile citizen initiatives (including Issue 4) were bundled together by supporters of election reform (a response to perceived voting problems in Ohio's 2004 election); an additional legislative referendum on economic development was also on the ballot. Eight propositions were on California's November 2005 ballot. Four of the measures, including Proposition 77 (redistricting), were backed by Governor Schwarzenegger.

We draw on a large-scale panel survey (pre- and post-election) conducted September-October 2005 of 1,076 Ohio registered voters, with a re-interview survey of 742 respondents

conducted immediately after the November election.[5] The sample is a random telephone survey

of registered Ohio voters, with questions about vote intentions on the statewide ballot measures,

as well as media sources and elite cues used by voters to make decisions on the issues.[6] As a

comparison, we use the October 2005 California Field Poll of California registered voters,

randomly selected for telephone interviews conducted in English and Spanish.[7] Both state

opinion samples included nearly identical question wording about vote intentions for the

redistricting commission initiatives, as well as a follow-up question describing the ballot

language. The surveys then asked the respondents whether they supported the substance of the

proposal in principle. No post-election opinion data are available for California.

The outcome (or dependent) variable for both surveys measures vote choice (or vote

intentions) for the redistricting reform initiatives. Pre-election polls can be problematic,

especially when it comes to direct democracy (Bowler and Donovan 1998). This is evidenced by

the fact that about a third of the respondents in the pre-election polls had not heard of or did not

have an opinion on the measures. The post-election Ohio poll may provide a more accurate

assessment of views on Issue 4. We thus focus on the post-election poll results, but also analyze

the pre-election surveys.

Three dependent variables are used in the Ohio analysis. In the post-election Ohio wave

respondents were asked, "How did you vote on Issue 4 [redistricting commission amendment],"

with "for" coded 1, and "against" coded 0. In the pre-election survey, respondents were asked

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[5] The 2005 Ohio Ballot Initiatives Survey is a random sample of the Ohio registered voters interviewed by telephone
between September 28 and October 20, 2005 by the University of Akron Survey Research Center. The number of
respondents was 1,076 and the margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points The Ohio Ballot Initiatives Post-
Election Survey re-interviewed 746 of the 1076 original telephone respondents immediately after the November
2005 election, generating a 69% re-interview rate.
[6] Questions on media use and partisan cues for issue campaigns have not been included in previous state surveys on
direct democracy.
[7] The survey was conducted October 18-24, 2005. To equalize the probability of telephone household selection from
anywhere in the area sampled, samples are first systematically stratified to all counties in proportion to each
county's share of telephone households statewide. San Francisco, CA, Field Research Corporation.

about their awareness of the redistricting ballot measure,[8] with those aware of the ballot measure asked the follow-up question: "Given what you have heard so far do you favor or oppose the proposed redistricting commission amendment, or have you not made up your mind?" Individuals aware and who supported the redistricting measure were coded 1, with those opposed or unaware coded 0. As a robustness check, we estimate a second model where the dependent variable describes the language of the ballot proposition.[9] Respondents choosing "the redistricting commission is a good idea because legislative elections will become more competitive" were coded 1, and those choosing "the redistricting commission is a bad idea because the commission won't be accountable to the voters" were coded 0. In the sample, 540 Ohioans (or 58%) said the amendment was a bad idea, and 392 (42%) said a good idea.

Similar question wording was included in the pre-election California Field Poll. California respondents were first asked if they were aware of Proposition 77—the redistricting measure—with responses including "yes, have heard" and "no, have not."[10] Those responding yes were asked their vote intentions, with supporters coded 1, and opponents or those with no opinion coded 0. There were 528 valid responses to the redistricting question, with 152 indicating aware and support and 376 indicating opposition or unaware. As in Ohio, a second question asked vote preferences on Proposition 77 after being read the description of the ballot measure.[11]

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[8] Question wording: "Still another proposed amendment would create a new five-member non-partisan commission appointed with the help of judges to redraw the lines for congressional and state legislative districts. The commission would be required to make competitive elections a primary factor in drawing new district lines. Are you aware of this amendment or not?"

[9] Question wording: "With regard to the proposed redistricting commission amendment, which of the following statements comes closet to your view?"

[10] Of the 1450 respondents in waves 1 and 2 of the field poll, 906 were not asked this question. Valid responses to this question included 393 "yes, have heard," 153 "no, have not" and 16 don't know.

[11] After being read the ballot description, 188 people said "would vote yes," while 267 said they "would vote no," and 89 indicated "no opinion." Those indicating yes, were coded 1, and all others coded 0.

The primary explanatory (independent) variables measure whether the respondent is a statewide legislative loser (based on their partisanship) and whether the individual is a representational loser at the district level. District level information measuring the party of the respondent's congressional representative (U.S. House Member) and representatives to the Ohio or California legislature (House and Senate) were merged with the survey data.

There is some controversy over how to code "independent leaners." Although these respondents have been observed to behave as partisans when they vote in two-candidate presidential elections through the 1980s (Keith et al. 1992), NES data from the 1990s and 2000s also show that a large category of independent "leaners" more closely resemble pure independents than partisans on several attitudinal and behavioral markers, including propensity to support third party candidates and attitudes about the party/electoral system (Donovan, Parry, and Bowler 2005). The literature suggests that in non-presidential races, such as off year or special issue elections, like 2005, independents are a meaningful category (Weisberg 1993).

The Ohio survey included a seven point scale of partisanship making coding of independent leaners possible, where as the California survey included only a three point scale of partisanship (Democratic, Republican, Independent). We take a middle ground in this debate, coding Ohio independent leaners as partisans when measuring whether the respondent is a district level loser (i.e. direct candidate representation), and coding independent leaners as independents when measuring whether statewide legislative losers (Democrats) were more likely to vote for election reform/redistricting ballot proposition.

Given our focus on voting on election reform ballot initiatives (not candidates), analysis of an off-year election, and our desire to create symmetry with the California survey data, in the following Ohio models the measure of statewide legislative loser excludes independent leaners

from the measure of partisans, and instead allows them to be part of the reference group. Strong and somewhat strong Democrats are coded 1, while Democratic leaners, independents, third party adherents, and Republicans are coded 0. Thus Democrats (strong and somewhat) in Ohio are coded as statewide legislative losers. Similar results are found when Democratic partisans are defined using three categories: strong, moderate, and leaners.[12]

A second step is coding respondents as district level losers. In Ohio, our merged sample included 1,061 respondents. Of these, 413 individuals resided in districts in which all three representatives (U.S. House, Ohio state Senate and House) were Republicans, while 134 individuals in the sample resided in districts in which all three representatives were Democrats. The remaining resided in districts with a mix of Republican and Democratic representatives.

Following the literature that shows independent leaners to vote as partisans in major candidate races (Keith, et al. 1992), we created our district representation loser variable using the standard seven-point measure of individual partisanship. Those who self-identified as being strong, somewhat strong, or who lean Democrat are coded 1, with all others coded 0. Republicans are those who self-identify as a strong, somewhat strong, or who lean Republican (coded 1), with all others coded 0. Pure independents and those identifying with an "other party" are coded as independents. This measure of partisanship was matched to the partisanship of the respondent's district representatives. The result was a variable measuring whether the respondent was a district loser. Democrats who are represented by a majority of Republican lawmakers were coded 1 (losers), while Democrats residing in districts in which a majority of their representatives are Democrats are coded 0. Republicans were coded in the same manner. Pure independents represented by either a majority of Democratic or Republican legislators are coded

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[12] The correlation between the two variables representing Democratic partisans is .85 (p<.000). The correlation between the two variables measuring Republican partisans is .89 (p<.000).

1 (losers). Many respondents in our state samples were district level losers, but also statewide winners, and vice versus.

This coding resulted in the following distribution: 546 respondents, or 51% of Ohio survey respondents, were district level losers in 2005, meaning that a majority of their elected representatives were from a different political party than their own. Cross-tabulating this variable by partisanship provides a measure of the extent of gerrymandering in Ohio at the district level. In Ohio, 53% of Democrats are district losers, while only 18% of Republicans are losers at the district level, a 35 point bias favoring Republicans.[13] This means that 47% of Ohio Democrats were district level winners, even if they were statewide losers. While Republicans in Ohio were more likely to be representational winners at both levels, the correlation is not high, while the correlation between being a statewide and district level loser is minimal.[14]

We employ a similar coding scheme for the California survey data, but we adapt it slightly because of question wording. Individual partisanship in the California survey is measured with the only available question; a four-point party registration question was asked, with choices for "Republican," "Democrat," "Non-partisan/Independent" or "Green/Libertarian/American Independent/Reform/Other Party." Respondents indicating independent or support for third or other party were coded as independent. Those indicating Republican were coded 1 for the binary variable measuring Republican, and all others 0. Republican identifiers in California are statewide legislative losers. Those responding Democrat were coded 1 for the binary variable measuring Democrat, and all other 0. Similar findings in

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[13] While 12 of Ohio's 18 U.S. House seats were held by Republicans (66%) in 2005, even though 51% of Ohioans voted Republican in the 2004 presidential election, this district-level variable provides an additional measure of the extent to which gerrymandering in Ohio has made Democrats representational losers.

[14] In the Ohio sample, the correlation between Democratic partisan (strong, moderate) or statewide legislative loser and district loser is .043. However, the correlation between district loser and statewide winner or Republican partisan (strong/moderate) is -.434 (p=.05). In Ohio, Republicans are less likely to be district losers, but the correlation is not high.

terms of partisan support for non-partisan redistricting in both states suggest that the models are not sensitive to measurement variation in term question wording.

We again merge our individual level measure of partisanship with a contextual variable measuring the party affiliation of the respondent's elected representatives to create a district loser variable for the California opinion data. In waves 1 and 2 of the California Field Poll, 657 out of 1,382 respondents were coded as district-level losers; for these individuals, a majority of their elected representatives (U.S. House and both chambers of the California legislature) belonged to a different political party. Similar to the Ohio sample, overall 48% of Californians are district level losers. Cross-tabulating our district-level loser variable with partisanship reveals that 49% of California Republicans are dual losers, versus only 31% of California Democrats. Thus California's gerrymandering results in only an 18% representational bias in favor of the Democrats, which is roughly half the representational bias in favor of Republicans in Ohio. By this measure, gerrymandering in California may be less severe than in Ohio, but clearly both the Republican and Democratic legislative majorities engage in bipartisan gerrymandering.

Control Variables

A critical component of the statewide legislative loser hypothesis is the presence of elite cues either in support or opposition to the ballot measures, which allow voters to make rational decisions (Lupia 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998) and alter public opinion over time (Zaller 1992). Elite cues may also condition voting in issue elections along partisan lines (Branton 2003). As was the case with other ballot measures in 2004, California Governor Schwarzenegger was a primary sponsor and vocal proponent of Proposition 77. The Field Poll included a unique question that measured the personal effect of "Governor Schwarzenegger's support of a ballot measure." Those responding "more inclined to vote yes" were coded 1, and

those responding "more included to vote no" or "no effect" were coded 0. This variable allows us to directly measure the effect of partisan elite cues in voting for a ballot initiative.

In Ohio, redistricting did not have such a high profile supporter.[15] Instead, the post-election sample included a series of media exposure/use questions that allow us to measure a similar phenomenon. The question asked "how important in the voting decision" was "endorsements by political parties." Responses to this three-point scaled question ranged from "very important" (coded 3) to "not at all important" (coded 1). Since the issues were the primary focus of the election (without major candidate races), this question measures elite cues for the four initiatives and one referendum on the ballot. Additional media use and mobilization variables were also included in the Ohio models, measuring the importance of TV and radio news, newspaper stories, newspaper endorsements, TV ads, phone mobilization, mailings, and endorsements for the ballot propositions by interest groups.[16]

Control variables are selected to avoid bias in estimating the effects of strategic voting for the redistricting ballot measures. Variables are coded to be as similar as possible in both state samples, but vary slightly because of data availability. With the Ohio and California opinion samples we control for standard demographic factors, including age (measured in years), a binary variable for gender (males coded 1, females 0), education,[17] income,[18] and race[19] (binary variable for white coded 1, all others 0). Evaluations of the economy have been found to be

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[15] Schwarzenegger did lend his support to the initiative near the end of the campaign, even traveling to Ohio.

[16] In each case, a four-point scale measured responses, with higher values indicating the media source or mobilization was "very important" (coded 4) in the respondent's voting decision

[17] In Ohio, self-reported education is measured on a six-point ordinal scale from 1 (grades 1-6) to 6 (post graduate work). In California, education is measured on a ten-point scale from 1 (under 8th grade) to 10 ("graduate work past master's degree"). Higher values indicate increased education in both surveys.

[18] In Ohio, total yearly family income is measured on a five-point scale from 1 (under $18,000) to 5 (over $72,000), with higher values indicating increased wealth. In California, yearly total household income is also measured on a five-point scale from 1 (under $20,000) to 5 (over $80,000).

[19] Because African Americans are the dominant minority group in Ohio, and are largely 'packed' into majority-minority legislative districts, the binary variable for white race measures a white versus black voter. In California, Latinos are the dominant minority population.

important in voting on ballot propositions (Bowler and Donovan 1994). Respondents in both surveys expressing poor evaluations of the state economy were coded 1, and 0 for others.[20] Religion, especially evangelical/ fundamentalist Christian, has become increasingly important in American elections (Campbell 2006). To account for this phenomenon, we include a binary variable measuring whether the respondent is a born again Christian (coded 1) with all others coded 0. Our models of strategic voting based on a respondent's status as a representational winner or loser might be seen as biased, unless we control for general interest in the election. In both Ohio (post-election sample only) and California we include an ordinal variable measuring general interest in the election, with higher scores indicating increased attention to the election.[21]

Beyond loser/winner status at the statewide and district levels, we also test whether those who were most concerned about political corruption would support redistricting reform. Attitudes about specific institutional elements of the election system may be independent of general sentiments about politics, such as satisfaction with how democracy is currently working (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2006). While the California survey did not include a question on corruption, the Ohio surveys did.[22] Variables measuring this concept are included in the appropriate models to test whether those most concerned with political corruption were more likely to vote for redistricting commissions.[23] Exclusion of this variable does not change the substantive effects we report.

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[20] Ohio respondents were asked, "Is the state economy on the right or the wrong track?" Those indicating wrong track (poor economic evaluations) were coded 1, and those indicating right track coded 0. California respondents were asked about the overall direction of California's economy, with those indicating poor (coded 1) and other responses coded 0.
[21] In the Ohio sample, a three-point scaled question measures how closely the respondent is following the 2005, from "very closely" (coded 3) to "not very closely" (coded 1). In California, an ordinal four-point scale measures "how closely have you been following news about the special election" with "very closely" (coded 4), and "not at all" (coded 1).
[22] The pre- and post-election questions measuring attitudes about political corruption in the state have slight variations in question wording.
[23] The post election question asked respondents "if corruption is a serious problem in Ohio" with responses ranging from "a serious problem" (coded 3), "somewhat of a problem" (coded 2) to "not a problem" (coded 1). The pre-

Findings—Ohio

Our analysis begins by focusing on the swing-state of Ohio, given the larger sample size and panel survey data with pre- and post-elections waves. For consistency with the California data, we also include a binary variable for pure independents, or those aligning with a third party.[24] Logistic regression analysis based on the pre-election survey data finds that statewide representational losers (Democrats) were more likely to support the non-partisan redistricting measure (see Table 1, Column 1), controlling for all other factors. Democrats were significantly more likely to indicate an intention to vote for the redistricting commission, or to support the idea of more competitive elections in the abstract when read a description of what the ballot proposition would do (Column 2). This suggests that voting for changing political institutions through redistricting may be strategic, conditioned by being a representational loser at the statewide level. This finding is also consistent with research showing that voters use simple short cuts (Lupia 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998) when casting votes in issue elections. We find evidence that voters think about ballot issues on election reform (redistricting) through partisan lenses (Branton 2003; Smith and Tolbert 2004). Theoretically, the analysis provides support for our statewide legislative loser hypothesis in Ohio. On the practical side, it may provide empirical support for those advocating non-partisan redistricting commissions in the states to increase electoral competition and improve statewide representation of electoral losers.

Column 3 of Table 1 replicates the above models of vote intentions for Issue 4 in Ohio, again using the pre-election survey data, but includes our critical variable measuring whether the

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election variable measured corruption with varying question wording, and asked the respondent their level of disgust with Ohio politics. Those responding "disgusted" were coded 3, and those satisfied coded 1, with those neither disgusted or satisfied coed 2.

[24] Pure independents are coded 1, all others (partisans, including leaning Republican and leaning Democrat) coded 0. The findings are unchanged whether this variable is included or not.

respondent is a district-level loser. Overall, we find district-level losers in Ohio are more likely to favor redistricting reform. Stated another ways, district level winners oppose redistricting reform. Noteworthy is that our measure of statewide legislative loser (Democrat) loses its statistical significance. The analysis is consistent with research suggesting that partisan gerrymandering provides better district level representation than highly competitive districts (Brunell 2006). We show that district level winners are more likely to oppose election reform to create more competitive districts. As scholars have focused primarily on losers in national elections, this is an important finding that loser status at the district level (Congress and state legislatures) matters.

In Table 1 (Columns 1 and 3) we see the coefficients for gender are statistically significant, with males more likely to support Issue 4 than females.[25] Those with higher levels of education are also more supportive of competitive elections, as are those with higher incomes and the older. There is some support for the importance of the economy in issue voting, as those most concerned with Ohio's poor economy are more likely to support for election reform.

Table 2 draws on the post-election Ohio panel wave, replicating the fully specified model (Column 3, Table 1) but including the control for interest in the election, which was only asked in the post-election sample. Because of the sample of voters, these finding may be more robust than those based on the pre-election data. The dependent variable is now the reported vote either for or against Issue 4, rather than vote intentions. Consistent with the pre-election data analysis, we find evidence (Column 1) that being a statewide legislative loser (using party identification as a proxy) matters. Democrats (statewide losers) are significantly more likely than Republicans or

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[25] Little in the published research has linked gender with preferences for election reform, but this may be an avenue for future research.

independents to support Issue 4 to limit the practice of partisan gerrymandering. This provides additional evidence for our statewide legislative loser hypothesis.

Even when improving our model specification with the control for general political interest in the post-election sample, we see that district-level losers are more likely to support changing political institutions by voting for electoral reform. The coefficient for the district level loser variable is positive and statistically significant, regardless of the set of control variables included. This is compelling evidence that district-level losers vote strategically for electoral reform, and are more in favor of changing the election rules.

The model in Column 2 adds additional variables measuring elite cues and the importance of media exposure in voting decisions. Even with this extensive battery of control variables, Democratic partisans (statewide losers) are still more likely to vote for Issue 4, as are district losers of either party. Probability simulations holding the explanatory variables in our fully specified model (Table 2, Column 2) at their mean or modal values indicates a large substantive effect of being a statewide and district level loser on the probability of supporting non-partisan redistricting (See table below). An individual who is a dual winner (statewide and district level) has only a .10 probability of voting yes on Ohio's Issue 4. The same individual who is a statewide winner (Republican), but district level loser (of either party) has a .18 probability of voting yes; a .08 probability increase based on losing at the district level alone. But losing at the statewide level has an even bigger impact on vote choice than at the district level. An individual who is district winner but statewide loser has a .24 probability increase of voting for more competitive districts than a dual winner. Finally, a dual loser (district and statewide) has a whopping .40 increased probability of voting for non-partisan redistricting than a similarly

situated dual winner. As hypothesized, we find evidence that dual representation losers are the strongest supporters of changing election rules.

Probability of Voting for Issue 4 (Non-partisan Redistricting) in Ohio varying whether the Respondent is a Statewide or District Winner or Loser

Winner/Loser Status	Yes Vote	Difference from Baseline (Dual Winner)
Baseline: Statewide and District Winner	.10 (.026)	
Statewide Winner and District Loser	.18 (.047)	+.08
Statewide Loser and District Winner	.34 (.069)	+.24
Statewide Loser and District Loser	.50 (.069)	+.40

Probability simulations estimated with Clarify software setting explanatory variables at their mean or modal values from Table 2, Column 2. Respondent is assumed to be a white female who believes the Ohio economy is poor with average age, income, education, exposure to media and party cues re the ballot propositions.

These findings reveal it is a combination of strategic voting and partisan cues, operating at both the district and statewide levels that contributed to the defeat of Ohio's redistricting ballot measure. A voter must be a loser at both the district *and* statewide levels to be likely to support the election reform measure, and winners or partial winners out numbered dual losers. It also suggests that the mass public, like partisan elites, may act rationally when voting for institutional change of election rules.

In contrast to the pre-election survey, we also find evidence that opinions about political corruption matters, as those who are more concerned about corruption in Ohio politics are more likely to support changing the political system by voting for Issue 4. Distrust of politics may increase support for election reform. We also see that those who are more interested in the election (and likely more informed) are more likely to vote for Issue 4. Some of the media exposure variables are also important, but not endorsements by political parties. Respondents indicating that newspaper endorsement/editorials were the most important in their voting decision are statistically less likely to support the ballot proposition, all else equal. Most major

newspapers in Ohio were opposed to Issue 4, and it is notable that individuals who found the editorial pages most important are opposed to the ballot proposition. This is consistent with published literature showing that voters learn more from print media than TV or radio (Smith 1989), and that information from the media is important when citizens vote on ballot propositions (Nicholson 2003). Those relying on Internet/email news about the ballot propositions are significantly more likely to support the reforms. This is consistent with a growing literature on the importance of online news in voting and elections (Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Bimber 2003).

Findings—California

Table 3 replicates the models for the California opinion sample. Lacking a post-election sample and given the small number of cases (redistricting question asked to only half the sample), we have less confidence in the findings from California. Nevertheless, the model in Column 1 shows statewide legislative losers (Republican partisans) are significantly more likely to support Proposition 77 (non-partisan redistricting) than Democrats, the reference category. This is expected, as Republicans are statewide legislative losers in California. This finding is consistent with the Ohio data analysis, but is inverted, as Democrats are the most likely to support non-partisan redistricting in Ohio. Independents and those registered with a third party in California are also more likely to support non-partisan redistricting, even after being read a description of the ballot proposition, unlike in Ohio. The model in Column 2 indicates the coefficient for Republican partisanship remains comparable whether the dependent variable is intention to vote in favor of the redistricting reforms, or support for the redistricting proposal after being read the ballot description. Again, this finding parallels the Ohio data. The fact that

statewide representational losers are a powerful predictor of support for non-partisan redistricting in two different states—irrespective of partisanship—is strong evidence that voters (and not just political elites) think strategically about election reform.

The control for elite cues indicates that those who were more inclined to vote "yes" on the ballot proposition because of Governor Schwarzenegger's endorsement were significantly more likely to vote for the redistricting ballot measure, even after controlling for partisanship. This is direct evidence that elite partisan cues matter and can shape voting in issue elections (Karp 1998; Nicholson 2003). Even with a control for general interest in the election, we find that males are more supportive of election reform. Mirroring the Ohio case study, then, we find strong evidence to support the statewide legislative loser hypothesis in California.

Column 3 adds the coefficients for district level loser. We find representational losers at the district level in California are *not* more likely to support non-partisan redistricting, unlike Ohio. Because of collinearity concerns, the variable for endorsement by Governor Schwarzenegger's is dropped from this model; when it is included, the null findings are unchanged. Either because of our limited California survey data, or because of the lack of a true relationship, we fail to find support for the district level loser. This may also be a reflection of less partisan, and more bipartisan gerrymandering in California than in Ohio.

Conclusion

Riker (1962, 1986) argues that political elites act strategically, manipulating institutions for their electoral benefit. Building on the literature, we find compelling evidence that the mass public may also act strategically when making decisions about institutional change, as representational losers are significantly more likely to support or vote for modifying electoral

institutions. We find support for redistricting reform is contingent on loser status at the statewide legislative level and district level. While the findings are mixed regarding district level representation (evident in Ohio, but not in California), in general, we present evidence that "losers" statewide and at the district level are more likely (by as much as 40% over dual winners) to support efforts to create more competitive elections through nonpartisan redistricting reform. While it may be in the self-interest of statewide legislative losers (Democrats in Ohio and Republicans in California) to support changing the way redistricting is determined, some of these individuals (district level winners) may benefit at the district level from the current method of gerrymandering, which dampens their support for broader institutional change (Brunell 2006).

Our analysis offers empirical evidence to support both sides of the redistricting debate. We show district level winners are more likely to favor the status quo (partisan gerrymandering) in these two states. At the same time, statewide legislative losers appear almost 25% more likely to favor non-partisan redistricting and more competitive elections than statewide winners. What voters want in terms of representation at the statewide level may not be the same as what they want at the district level. Because voters can win and lose at two different levels (statewide and district) this creates multiple blockage points for adoption of redistricting reform. This analysis may help us understand why recent redistricting ballot propositions have been defeated.

Yet in 2000, voters in Arizona adopted Proposition 106, which created a non-partisan redistricting commission for the state by a 56% vote margin. If voters act strategically and winners at the district and statewide prefer the status quo (partisan gerrymandering), why have state redistricting reforms been successful previously. Arizona's Proposition 106 was largely backed by Jim Pederson, a 2006 Democratic U.S. Senate candidate and chair of Arizona's Democratic Party. While Arizona's circumstances may have been similar to Ohio (Republican

gerrymander), Ohio's ballot proposition lacked a high profile political elite as a sponsor. If Ohio's non-partisan redistricting proposition was backed by a popular Democratic candidate, it may have faired better, as studies show Democrats and liberal are generally more supportive of election reform worldwide (Karp 2005).

In contrast to other studies that rely on candidate preferences in the last election or perceptions of being an electoral loser, we find evidence that objective representation at the subnational level (context) matters: individuals who are statewide and district level representational losers are significantly more supportive of institutional change. The analysis adds weight to a growing body of literature suggesting that strategic voting matters when it comes to electoral reform. As such, the research may have implications for future attempts to reform American electoral institutions in other states (Donovan and Bowler 2004).

The findings from the surveys are also particularly timely. In 2006, a United States Supreme Court ruling reinforced the gerrymandering powers of state legislatures. In its decision *League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry*, the Court ruled that states may redraw legislative districts at any time, even mid-decade, and that redistricting done for partisan gain is not inherently unconstitutional. Despite the prospect of increased gerrymandering at the state level, good government reformers hoping to use the initiative process to alter the rules of the redistricting game face an uphill battle. As such, legislative redistricting done by state legislatures is likely to continue to be either partisan or bipartisan, with extremely safe districts created for candidates of both parties, and relatively few competitive districts (Cain and Gerber 2002).

Though voters may not "see the lines" of the districts drawn by state legislatures, they may be politically savvy enough to know whether they are representational winners or losers at

the state and district levels. By isolating the vote choice on redistricting reform ballot measures, we are able to demonstrate how citizens voted strategically for and against the measures in California and Ohio, not only because of statewide partisan and representation considerations, but also because of district-level considerations.

Table 1

Statewide and District Representational Loser Hypothesis, Ohio Pre-election Survey Data

	Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission		Support Redistricting when read ballot description		Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission	
	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z
Statewide Legislative Loser (Democrat)	**1.06 (.31)**	**.000**	**.49 (.15)**	**.000**	.09 (.30)	.775
District Loser					**.53 (.28)**	**.062**
Independent	.15 (.50)	.762	-.10 (.24)	.671	-.73 (.50)	.145
Age	$.03 (.90^{-2})$	.000	$.28^{-3} (.00)$	.947	$.03 (.94^{-2})$	.000
Male	.81 (.29)	.005	.09 (.14)	.528	.68 (.28)	.016
Education	.32 (.13)	.016	.07 (.07)	.340	.31 (.13)	.016
Income	.25 (.12)	.041	$.24^{-2} (.06)$	.967	.22 (.12)	.058
White	.66 (.50)	.183	.43 (.21)	.045	.56 (.50)	.265
Ohio Economy Poor	.52 (.34)	.125	.14(.15)	.368	.66 (.34)	.052
Ohio Politics Corrupt	.20 (.22)	.364	.20 (.12)	.102	.33 (.22)	.131
Born again Christian	-.43 (.34)	.204	-.05 (.15)	.746	-.57 (.34)	.095
Constant	-8.89 (1.11)	.000	-.34 (.49)	.497	-8.72 (1.19)	.000
N	945		945		943	
Wald Chi^2	62.64	.000	19.61	.022	57.84	.000
Pseudo R^2	.14		.02		.12	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Probabilities based on two-tailed test.
Source: The Ohio Ballot Initiatives Survey is a random sample of the Ohio registered voters interviewed by telephone between September 28 and October 20, 2005 at the University of Akron Survey Research Center. The number of respondents is 1,076.

Table 2

Statewide and District Representational Loser Hypothesis, Ohio Post-election Survey Data

| | Voted for Non-Partisan Redistricting—Issue 4 | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z
Statewide Legislative Loser (Democrat)	**1.52 (.26)**	**.000**	**1.56 (.28)**	**.000**
District Loser	**.61 (.26)**	**.016**	**.70 (.27)**	**.008**
Independent	.45 (.42)	.281	.40 (.45)	.375
Age	.02 ($.88^{-2}$)	.064	.02 (.01)	.019
Male	.33 (.25)	.187	.25 (.26)	.343
Education	.20 (.12)	.087	.09 (.12)	.447
Income	.35 (.11)	.002	.35 (.12)	.003
White	-.50 (.36)	.164	-.44 (.37)	.231
Ohio Economy Poor	-.16 (.27)	.561	-.11 (.29)	.716
Ohio Politics Corrupt	.81 (.20)	.000	.77 (.21)	.000
Born again Christian	-.25 (.28)	.371	-.31 (.28)	.270
Interest in 2005 Election	.44 (.20)	.031	.23 (.21)	.270
Importance to Voting Decision				
Exposure TV news about ballot propositions			-.12 (.20)	.540
Newspaper stories			.29 (.19)	.121
Newspaper endorsements			-.46 (.23)	.043
Internet news			.48 (.21)	.021
TV ads			-.12 (.24)	.623
Phone Mobilization			-.04 (.25)	.890
Mailings			.21 (.19)	.253
Endorsements by political parties			.06 (.21)	.779
Endorsements by interest groups			.23 (.21)	.270
Constant	-7.31 (1.08)	.000	-8.17 (1.41)	.000
N	479		469	
Wald Chi^2	88.16	.000	103.04	.000
PseudoR^2	.20		.23	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Probabilities based on two-tailed test.

Source: The Ohio Ballot Initiatives Post-Election Survey re-interviewed 746 of the 1076 original telephone respondents immediately after the November 2005 election and was conducted by the University of Akron Survey Research Center.

Table 3

Statewide and District Representational Loser Hypothesis, California Pre-election Survey Data

	Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission		Support Redistricting when read ballot description		Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission	
	b (s.e)	p>z	b (s.e)	p>z	b (s.e)	p>z
Statewide Legislative Loser (Republican)	**1.48 (.33)**	**.000**	**1.24 (.29)**	**.000**	**2.11 (.30)**	**.000**
District Loser					-.20 (.29)	.499
Independent	.61 (.38)	.106	.53 (.32)	.104	.80 (.44)	.068
More inclined to vote "yes" because of Governor Schwarzenegger's endorsement	1.92 (.31)	.000	1.66 (.28)	.000		
Interest in special election	.39 (.25)	.118	.15 (.20)	.438	.38 (.21)	.077
Age	.02 (.01)	.023	$.71^{-2}$ $(.81^{-2})$	.381	.02 (.01)	.004
White	.43 (.33)	.193	.22 (.28)	.420	.51 (.31)	.104
Male	.83 (.27)	.002	.61 (.24)	.010	.78 (.25)	.002
Income	.21 (.12)	.070	.03 (.09)	.722	.27 (.10)	.011
Education	.04 (.07)	.541	.04 (.06)	.419	-.01 (.06)	.809
Born again Christian	.07 (.31)	.819	.19 (.29)	.505	-.05 (.28)	.846
CA Economy Poor	.47 (.32)	.139	.26 (.26)	.315	.40 (.28)	.151
Constant	-6.61 (1.26)	.000	-3.66 (.98)	.000	-6.26 (1.09)	.000
N	429		442		446	
Wald Chi^2	95.50	.000	92.05	.000	91.77	.000
Pseudo R^2	.29		.20		.21	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Probabilities based on two-tailed test.

Source: 2005 California Field Poll (#05-04). Split sample design with redistricting questions asked in wave 1 only: 676 California residents interviewed by telephone conducted in English and Spanish October 18-24 using random digit dialing. Of these, 528 responded to the redistricting question. San Francisco, CA, Field Research Corporation.

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